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iAbstract
This thesis seeks to determine the most effective jurisdiction for criminal accountability for UN
peacekeeping personnel who engage in sexual exploitation and abuse of women, and other conduct
amounting to violence against women. As criminalisation is sought as the appropriate method of
prevention and punishment of such conduct, it is first examined why criminalisation is necessary. The
impact of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) on women in the territories in which peace operations
are located is detailed as harms in the form of violations of the rights of these women. Alternatives
to criminal sanctions are then considered, in particular the actions of the UN towards prevention and
prohibition of SEA. While such regulations are necessary, they are ultimately inadequate in
preventing and punishing SEA. Included is an assessment of the Draft Convention on Criminal
Accountability of UN Officials and Experts on Mission, the adoption of which would support
criminalisation.
However, the UN itself is unable to exercise criminal jurisdiction, and thus it is essential to examine
which jurisdictions would be most effective in undertaking criminal prosecution of peacekeeping
personnel. The choice between national jurisdictions and international criminal justice is debated.
Which jurisdiction offers a more effectual forum for ensuring accountability? What potential
impediments exist and how can such hindrances can be overcome?
This thesis argues that gender-based crimes by UN peacekeepers should be criminalised, and that,
while the International Criminal Court should not be discounted as a potential forum for prosecuting
perpetrators, domestic prosecutions are far more likely and far more effective.
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1As far as Im concerned, there is no such thing as consensual sex between soldiers and the
local civilian population in a war or conflict zone.
Romeo Dallaire
1
1. Introduction
Over the past years, allegations have arisen of peacekeeping personnel committing sexual
exploitation and abuse (SEA) against women in the territories where peace support operations
(PSOs) are located.2 Allegations have included conduct such as sexual conduct with minors, rape,
sexual slavery, involvement in trafficking, and sexual conduct with prostitutes.3
Violence against women such as sexual exploitation and abuse, rape, sexual slavery, and prostitution-
related activities is harmful to the women involved, and amounts to criminal conduct. Sexual
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers must be prevented and, when it occurs, punished.
Punishment is necessary to deter, and as a method of restoring the balance of justice after the
commission of a crime, and the criminal justice system is the preferred option.4 However, UN PSOs
are usually located in failed states- states in a situation of armed conflict or post-conflict. There is
little infrastructure to enable prosecution for criminal offences. In addition, there are organisational
dilemmas: personnel are repatriated for misconduct without any further repercussions for their
behaviour, resulting in impunity for perpetrators of SEA.
Such conduct not only damages the reputation of the UN; it further impedes the ability of peace
support operations to function effectively by damaging the credibility of the mission amongst the
local and international communities, as well as by causing friction within the mission itself.5 Finally,
this conduct contributes to a reduction in numbers of mission personnel due to repatriation. Most
importantly, such conduct has victims. Such crimes can be committed against both male and female
1 R. Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil, (Arrow Books, London 2003), p. 184.
2 Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary General,
A/59/782 (2005), A/60/861 (2006), A/61/957 (2007), A/62/890 (2008), A/63/720 (2009).
3 Ibid.
4 K.M. Carlsmith, et al., 'Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment' (2002) 83
(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 284-299.
5 Dallaire, supra note 1.
2victims, but the majority of victims of such conduct are women. It is for this reason that this thesis
analyses crimes against women.
1.1. Context of Research
Previous research and reporting into the problem of discipline of peacekeeping personnel has mostly
stemmed from the incidences of sexual exploitation, trafficking of women, and use of prostitutes.
Reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think-tanks have recounted incidences of
SEA by personnel and criticised organisations for lack of response.6 The ‘boys will be boys’ attitude of
organisations, and the military in particular, has been highlighted.7 This perspective is one which
relegates sexual exploitation and abuse to ‘normal’ conduct of men. The reports often offer
recommendations to organisations and states to assist with the prevention and punishment of this
conduct.
Other studies have analysed specific examples of gender issues in PSOs, with an emphasis on sexual
exploitation and abuse, including prostitution.8 The impact of military operations, particularly
peacekeeping missions, on the prostitution trade in host states has been highlighted.9 Such research
6 E. Schade, 'Experiences with regard to The United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in Mozambique'
(International Save the Children Alliance, Barrio, 20 November 1995) , M. Vandenberg, 'Hopes Betrayed:
Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution' (Human
Rights Watch, New York, November 2002) Vol. 14, No. 9 (D); 'Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) "So does it
mean that we have the rights?" Protecting the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution
in Kosovo' (Amnesty International, 6 May 2004) EUR 70/010/2004; S.E. Mendelson, 'Barracks and Brothels:
Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans' (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Washington, D.C., February 2005) ; S. Martin, 'Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN
Peacekeeping Missions' (Refugees International, October 2005) 'From Camp to Community: Liberia study on
exploitation of children' (Save the Children UK, Monrovia, 8 May 2006) .
7 E.g. Mendelson, ibid., p. 19; Martin, ibid.
8 P. Higate, 'Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone' (Institute for Security Studies,
March 2004) ISS Monograph No. 91; P. Higate, 'Peacekeepers and Gender: DRC and Sierra Leone', Pambazuka
News, (8 July 2004), http://www.pambazuka.org/#2; P. Higate and M. Henry, 'Engendering (In)security in Peace
Support Operations' (2004) 35 (4) Security Dialogue 481-498; S. Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN
Peacekeeping, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2004); P. Higate, 'Peacekeepers, Masculinities and Sexual
Exploitation' (2007) 10 (1) Men and Masculinities 99-119; P. Higate, 'Revealing the soldier: Peacekeeping and
prostitution', in Herdt and Howe (eds.), 21st Century Sexualities, (Routledge, 2007), 198-202.
9 K.H.S. Moon, Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations, (Columbia University Press,
New York 1997); R. Schaffer, 'Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations' (1999) 10 (2)
Journal of World History 499-502; I. Talleyrand, 'Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and
Abet International Trafficking in Women' (2000) 27 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 151-
176; E.N. Chang, 'Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry' (2001) 15
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 621-653; J.S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender
Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001); K. Ziegler, 'Challenges
3is written with the aim of criticising the governments and organisations involved, by revealing the
misconduct of personnel whilst engaged in serving abroad.
Within the UN itself, the Secretariat has issued a number of reports and regulations, and the General
Assembly has adopted resolutions that address the issue of SEA in PSOs, as well as misconduct and
discipline in general. There have been some publications since the UN has begun to take action to
prevent and prohibit SEA. Such papers critique different aspects of the UN actions.10 Other research
in the field considers specific problem areas such as the application of international humanitarian law
(IHL) to PSOs;11 or military command or discipline in missions.12 The application of human rights in
of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century, Report on the VIII Seminar Human Rights and Gender Issues in
Peacekeeping' (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis, Novia Scotia, Canada, 28 May-1 June 2001) ; K.J.
Allred, 'Human Trafficking: Breaking the Military Link' (2005) IV (4) The Quarterly Journal 64-72; Martin,
supra note 6; V. Kent, 'Protecting civilians from UN peackeeepers and humanitarian workers: Sexual
exploitation and abuse', in Aoi, et al. (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping, (United Nations
University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris 2007), 44-66.
10 R. Murphy, 'An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel' (2006)
13 (4) International Peacekeeping 531-546; D. Otto, 'Making sense of zero tolerance policies in peacekeeping
sexual economies', in Munro and Stychin (eds.), Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, (Glasshouse
Press, London 2007), 259-282; N. Quénivet, 'The Dissonance between the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy
and the Criminalisation of Sexual Offences on the International Level' (2007) 7 International Criminal Law
Review 657-676; M. Ndulo, 'The United Nations Responses To The Sexual Abuse And Exploitation Of Women
And Girls By Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions' (2009) 27 (1) Berkeley Journal of International Law
127-161; O. Simic, 'Rethinking 'sexual exploitation' in UN peacekeeping operations' (2009) 32 Women's Studies
International Forum 288-295.
11 U. Palwankar, 'Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-keeping forces' (1993)
(294) International Review of the Red Cross 227-240; B.D. Tittemore, 'Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations' (1997) 33 Stanford Journal of
International Law 61-117; C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military
Operations' (1998) 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3-34; M. Zwanenburg, 'Double Standards in
Peacekeeping? Subcontracting Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of
International Law 753-757; R. Murphy, 'International humanitarian law training for multinational peace support
operations- lessons from experience' (2000) (840) International Review of the Red Cross 953-968; D. Shraga,
'UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for
Operations-Related Damage' (2000) 94 (2) American Journal of International Law 406-412; R. Murphy, 'United
Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian Law' (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 153-194; A.
Faite and J.L. Grenier (eds.), Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, (International Committee of
the Red Cross, Geneva 2004); 'Application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law
to UN-mandated forces: Report on the Expert meeting on multinational peace operations' (2004) 86 (853)
International Review of the Red Cross 207-212; G. Porretto and S. Vité, 'The application of international
humanitarian law and human rights law to international organisations' (University Centre for International
Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 2006) 1.
12 J.W. Houck, 'The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in the Era of "Peace Enforcement"' (1993-
1994) 4 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 1-69; H. McCoubrey and N.D. White, The Blue
Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations, (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited,
Aldershot 1996); R. Murphy, 'Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian
and Irish Forces' (1999) 4 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 41-73; P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in United
Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents' (2000) 5 (1) Journal of
Conflict and Security Law 45-62.
4peace operations13 is an issue that is conflated with the extraterritorial application of human rights in
general,14 particularly since case law developments in the European Court of Human Rights.15
There is little to no literature dealing with domestic criminal law capabilities to prosecute
peacekeeping personnel. Some discussion exists on the ability of the United States to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military abroad,16 and there is case law
with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction in both Australian and United States law.17 There is a lot of
literature on US military law in general, including criticism of the US war crimes legislation.18 A
13 Murphy, ‘IHL Training’, supra note 11; M. Katayanagi, Human Rights Functions of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2002); K. Månsson, 'Integration of Human
Rights in Peace Operations: Is There An Ideal Model?' (2006) 13 (4) International Peacekeeping 547-563; R.
Murphy and K. Månsson, 'Perspectives on Peace Operations and Human Rights' (2006) 13 (4) International
Peacekeeping 457-461; Poretto and Vité, supra note 11; T. Howland, 'Peacekeeping and Conformity with
Human Rights Law: How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti' (2006) 13 (4) International Peacekeeping 462-476;
J. Cerone, 'Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations' (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1447-
1510; P. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2006); P. Rowe, 'Do Soldiers Really Have to Apply Human Rights Law in Military Operations?' (United Nations
Association, Westminster Branch, 16 May 2006) ; K. Starmer, 'Responsibility for troops abroad: UN mandated
forces and issues of human rights accountability' (2008) (3) European Human Rights Law Review ; F. Messineo,
'The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: Attribution of Conduct to UN-Authorized Forces
and the Power of the Security Council to Displace Human Rights' (2009) 56 (1) Netherlands International Law
Review 35-62.
14 K.M. Meessen (ed.), Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice, (Kluwer Law International, London
1996); K. Altiparmak, 'Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights
in Iraq?' (2004) 9 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 213-251; F. Coomans and M.T. Kamminga (eds.),
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, (Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford 2004); R. Wilde, 'Legal
"Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights' (2004-
2005) 26Michigan Journal of International Law 739-806; K. Altiparmak, 'European Convention on Human
Rights: Extra-territorial Application' (2005) 69 Journal of Criminal Law 295-301; J. Cerone, 'The Application of
Regional Human Rights Law Beyond Regional Frontiers: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and US Activities in Iraq' (2005) ASIL Insight ; S. Miller, ' Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial
Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention' (2010) 20 (4) European Journal of
International Law 1223-1246.
15 Discussed infra in Chapter 2.
16 See e.g.M.S.S. Gibson, 'Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem'
(1995) 148 Military Law Review 114-185; C.G.R. Schmitt, 'The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: The
Continuing Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad- Problem
Solved?' (2000) The Army Lawyer 1-10; F.A. Stein, 'Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current
Loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act' (2005) 27 Houston Journal of International Law 579-
607; M.G.R. Schmitt, 'Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an
Unforeseen Loophole' (2005) The Army Lawyer 41-47.
17 See Chapter 4.
18 F.A. Gilligan and F.I. Lederer, Court-Martial Procedure, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, (Lexis Law Publishing,
Charlottesville, Virginia 1999); D. Cassel, 'The ICC's New Legal Landscape: The Need to Expand U.S.
Domestic Jurisdiction to Prosecute Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity' (1999-2000) 23
Fordham International Law Journal 378-397; C.M.E. Eichelman, 'International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for
the United States Military' (2000) The Army Lawyer 23-32; D. Cassel, 'Empowering United States Courts to
Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (2001) 35 New England Law Review
421-445; M.S. Zaid, 'Will or Should the United States ever Prosecute War Criminals?: A Need for Greater
5significant amount of commentary exists in this area due to the uneasy relationship between the US
and the ICC, as the US is not a party to the Rome Statute and has sought to distance its personnel
from any potential association with the ICC, with particular impact on peace operations.19
In the field of international criminal law, there is a wealth of sources in all formats available, due to
the fact that this is a relatively new area of international law, and is constantly developing.20 Analyses
exist of all areas of international criminal law- including the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, substantive law,
procedural law, case law, history, and policy concerns.21
1.2. Research Question
This thesis seeks to determine the best jurisdiction for criminal accountability for peacekeeping
personnel who engage in sexual exploitation and abuse, and other conduct amounting to violence
Expansion in the Areas of Both Criminal and Civil Liability' (2001) 35 New England Law Review 447-469; E.
Talbot Jensen and J.J. Teixeira, 'Prosecuting Members of the U.S. Military for Wartime Environmental Crimes'
(2005) XVII (4) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 651-671; M.M.N. White, 'Charging War
Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner' (2006) The Army Lawyer 1-11; T.W. Pittman and M. Heaphy, 'Does the
United States Really Prosecute Its Service Members for War Crimes? Implications for Complementarity before
the International Criminal Court' (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 165-183.
19 M. Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', in Shelton (ed.), International
Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court, (Transnational Publishers,
Inc., Ardsley, New York 2000), 219-279; J. Paust, 'The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory
Nationals' (2000) 33 (1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1-11; S.D. Murphy, 'Efforts to Gain Immunity
from ICC for U.S. Peacekeepers' (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 725-729; C.M.V.d. Kieft,
'Uncertain Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal Court' (2002) 23 Cardozo Law
Review 2325-2368; 'Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for U.S. Peacekeepers' (2002) 96 (3) American
Journal of International Law 725-729; 'American Servicemembers' Protection Act' (2002) 96 (4) American
Journal of International Law 975-977; M.T. Johnson, 'The American Servicemembers' Protection Act:
Protecting Whom?' (2003) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 405-484; L.J. Faulhaber, 'American
Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002' (2003) 40 (2) Harvard Journal on Legislation 537-557; S. Zappala,
'Are Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) and the ICC' (2003)
1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 671-678; M.E. Lantto, 'The United States and the International
Criminal Court: A Permanent Divide?' (2008) 31 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 649-646; S.W. Risch,
'Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the International Criminal Court' (2009) May
Army Lawyer 61-89.
20 See e.g.W.A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006); R. Cryer, et al., An Introduction to International
Criminal Law and Procedure, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007); W.A. Schabas, An Introduction
to the International Criminal Court, 3rd ed., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007).
21 For general texts, see e.g. ibid.; M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law Volume I Crimes,
(Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New York 1999); M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law
Volume II Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms, 2nd ed., (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New
York 1999); A. Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary
Volume II, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002); K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2002); M.C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley,
New York 2003); A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008); G.
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2009).
6against women. As criminalisation is sought as the appropriate method, it is first examined why
criminalisation is necessary. The impact of sexual exploitation and abuse on women in the territories
in which PSOs are located is detailed as harms in the form of violations of the rights of these women.
Alternatives to criminal sanctions are then considered, in particular the actions of the UN in
prevention and prohibition of SEA. While such regulations are considered to be necessary, they are
ultimately inadequate in preventing and punishing SEA. Included is an assessment of the Draft
Convention on Criminal Accountability of UN Officials and Experts on Mission, the adoption of which
would support criminalisation.
However, the UN itself is unable to exercise criminal jurisdiction, and thus it is essential to examine
what jurisdictions would be most effective in undertaking criminal prosecution of peacekeeping
personnel. The choice between national jurisdictions and international criminal justice is debated.
Which jurisdiction offers a more effective forum for ensuring accountability? What potential
impediments exist and how can such hindrances can be overcome?
This thesis will argue that gender-based crimes by peacekeepers should be criminalised, and that,
while the International Criminal Court should not discounted as a potential forum for prosecuting
perpetrators, domestic prosecutions are more likely and more effective.
1.3. Methodology
This thesis is doctrinal and theoretical in its orientation and is designed to be able to be applied so
that it will be useful in the field of ensuring accountability for peace operation personnel for
misconduct. Several different areas of law contribute to the research, namely public international
law, and the subsets of public international law of international criminal law, international
humanitarian law, and international human rights law; and domestic criminal law and military law
(particularly military disciplinary law).
The main methodology used in Chapter 2 is international feminist legal theory. The direction of the
remainder of the thesis is influenced by such thinking, with particular motivation from the writings of
7authors such as Charlesworth, Chinkin, and MacKinnon.22 The theoretical approach does not aim to
fall into a fixed feminist category such as radical, liberal, socialist, or postmodern.23 Instead the
international legal feminist approach is followed. This view seeks to recognise not only the need for
violations of the rights of women to be avoided and punished, but to demonstrate the impact of
intersectionality on women- that is, the impact of characteristics such as race, religion and ethnicity
as well as gender, for women.24 The aim is to find a solution for the violations of women’s rights that
result from the commission of violence against women such as sexual exploitation and abuse, by
peacekeeping personnel, through challenging the gendered system of international law,25 and by
shifting the emphasis from the survivors of violence to the male perpetrators.26 This is particularly
relevant in the context of military operations, given the dominance of the masculine in the military.27
In addition, socio-legal theory is used, particularly in Chapter 2, where the social ramifications of the
conduct of peacekeeping personnel are presented as the reasoning behind the need for
22 H. Charlesworth, et al., 'Feminist Approaches to International Law' (1991) 85 American Journal of
International Law 613-645; H. Charlesworth, 'Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International Law' (1993)
25 Stud. Transnational Legal Policy 1-18; H. Charlesworth, 'Cries and Whispers: Responses to Feminist
Scholarship in International Law' (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 557-568; H. Charlesworth,
'Feminist Methods in International Law' (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 379-394; H.
Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, (Manchester
University Press, Manchester 2000). C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass., London 1987); C.A. MacKinnon, 'Prostitution and Civil Rights' (1993) 1 Michigan Journal
of Gender and Law 13-31; C.A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues, (Belknap
Press, Cambridge, Mass., London 2006); C.A. MacKinnon, 'Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on
Akayesu' (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 940-958; C.A. MacKinnon, 'The ICTR's Legacy on
Sexual Violence' (2008) 14 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 101-110.
23 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods’, ibid, p. 381; F.R. Teson, 'Feminism and International Law: A Reply'
(1992-1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 647-684; M. Zalewski, Feminism after Postmodernism:
Theorising Through Practice, (Routledge, Florence, KY, USA 2000), pp. 12-28.; R.C. Preston and R.Z. Ahrens,
'United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theory' (2001-2002) 8 Michigan Journal of Gender
and Law 1-43, pp. 7-10.
24 Ibid. See also M. Minow, 'Beyond Universality' (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 115-138; K.
Engle, 'International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet' (1991-1992) 13 Michigan Journal of
International Law 517- 610 See Chapter 2, Violence against women.
25 Charlesworth et al., supra note 22, p. 615.
26 G. Allwood, French Feminisms: Gender and violence in contemporary theory, (UCL Press Limited, London
1998), pp. 119-133.
27 C. Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives, First ed., (South End Press, London
1983); C. Marshall, et al., Militarism versus Feminism: Writings on Women and War, (Virago Press Limited,
London 1987); C.L. Williams, Gender Differences at Work: Women and Men in Nontraditional Occupations,
(University of California Press, Berkeley 1989); Whitworth, supra note 8; P. Higate, 'Peacekeeping and
Gendered Relations', Peace & Conflict Monitor, (2003); P. Higate (ed.), Military Masculinities: Identity and the
State, (Praeger, Westport CT 2003); Higate, ‘Peacekeepers, Masculinities’, supra note 8; M. Alison, 'Wartime
sexual violence: women's human rights and questions of masculinity' (2007) 33 Review of International Studies
75-90; C. Duncanson, 'Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peackeeping Operations' (2009)
11 (1) International Feminist Journal of Politics 63-80.
8criminalisation. The social impact of violent behaviour is an important consideration in
criminalisation, as according to such theory the purpose of criminal law is to prevent and punish
social harms.28
Chapter 4 takes both a doctrinal and comparative approach. Legislative and case law of Australia and
the United States are examined. These two jurisdictions were selected due to the participation of
those states in PSOs, and also because the two states have Anglo common law legal systems (or
Anglo-American legal culture, as it has come to be known).29 Both states’ legal systems were
originally based on the Anglo system of law; and both are federations with a separation of state and
federal laws.30 It is interesting to note the diverse developments in each system over the hundreds of
years since their establishment, including domestic legislation and statutory interpretation, the
ideological concepts of law, and the observance and application of international law within the
domestic systems.31
An empirical study was not undertaken for this thesis due to the fact that there is sufficient empirical
data available on the basis of which a classical doctrinal analysis could be undertaken. There was a
need for analysis of the relevant documents (instruments, regulations, etc), to explore different
aspects of regulation of peacekeepers at national and international levels.
1.3.1. Definitions
It is important to clarify definitions of words and phrases that will be commonly used throughout this
thesis. The term ‘peacekeeping personnel’ or word ‘peacekeepers’ will be used to refer to the
28 J. Herring, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 2; L. May, Crimes Against
Humanity: A Normative Account, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), pp. 80-90.
29 D. Nelken, 'Doing Research Into Comparative Criminal Justice', in Banakar and Travers (eds.), Theory and
Method in Socio-Legal Research, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland Oregon 2005), 245-258, pp. 245-6.
30 E.A. Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry
NY 1996); G. Carney, The constitutional systems of the Australian states and territories, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2006).
31 See e.g. B. Van Schaack, 'International Law in the United States Legal System: Observance, Application, and
Enforcement' (2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review 807-815; F. Valdes, 'Whats the Fuss? Constitutionalism,
Internationalism, and Original Method' (2007) 3 (1) Florida International University Law Review 1-26. See also
Australian Year Book of International Law; American Journal of International Law.
9military personnel and those civilians who fall under military jurisdiction when deployed as part of a
mission.
With respect to UN missions, there are several different terms that are used, such as peacekeeping
operation and peace support operation. Peacekeeping was never defined or addressed by the UN
Charter, and the concept itself has evolved over the years to include missions that keep peace,
support peace, enforce peace, build peace, and many other roles such as disarmament, de-mining,
and transitional administration.32 In this thesis, the term ‘peace support operation’ (PSO) or ‘mission’
will be used, and will encompass all varieties of missions.33
In addition, it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘gender-based crimes’ as it is applied in this
thesis. In general, ‘gender-based crimes’ are crimes committed against a person because of that
person’s actual or perceived gender. Similarly, ‘gender-based violence’ is violence committed against
a person because of that person’s gender. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life”.34 ‘Sex’
and ‘gender’ must be differentiated. ‘Sex’ refers to the biological and physiological characteristics
that define men and women. ‘Gender’ refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities,
32 H. McCoubrey and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations,
(Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot 1996), pp. 1-10; M.P. Karns and K.A. Mingst,
'Peacekeeping and the changing role of the United Nations: Four dilemmas', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds.),
United Nations peacekeeping operations: Ad hoc missions, permanent engagement, (United Nations University
Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris 2001), 215-237; A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, 'From An Agenda for Peace to the
Brahimi Report: Towards a new era of UN peace operations?', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds.), United Nations
peacekeeping operations: Ad hoc mission, permanent engagement, (United Nations University Press, Tokyo,
New York, Paris 2001), 238-255; Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations, (United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York 2004), A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, 'From An Agenda for
Peace to the Brahimi Report: Towards a new era of UN peace operations?', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds.),
United Nations peacekeeping operations: Ad hoc mission, permanent engagement, (United Nations University
Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris 2001), 238-255p. Ix; Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations,
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York 2004); B.F. Klappe, 'International Peace
Operations', in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2008), 635-673p. 635.
33 ‘Peace support operation’ is used by other scholars as a generic term, e.g. Rowe, ‘Maintaining Discipline’,
supra note 12; Murphy, ‘UN Military Operations and IHL’, supra note 11; as is ‘mission’, e.g. Murphy, ‘Legal
Framework’, supra note 12. Others use ‘peace operations’ or ‘peacekeeping operations’; e.g. Tittemore, supra
note 11; Shraga, supra note 11.
34 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, A/RES/48/104, 23 February 1994.
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and attributes; the social differences and social relations between men and women.35 In this thesis,
‘gender-based’ will not be used in the general sense.36 It will refer specifically to violence or crime
committed against women, and the particular categories of violence/crimes examined will be sexual
exploitation, rape, sexual slavery, and prostitution-related activities. Related offences such as
trafficking and HIV-related offences will be considered in the context of these other crimes.
Analysis of crimes against women will be undertaken as the majority of victims of sexual exploitation
and abuse, rape, sexual slavery, and prostitution-related activities are women. Women have distinct
experiences during and after armed conflict.37 While not all violence against women has a sexual
element, sexual violence figures largely in women’s experiences of armed conflict.38 Those particular
crimes have been selected as they have been committed by peacekeepers, and they are crimes that
are targeted at women.39 Rape and sexual slavery are commonly criminalised. Hence, particular
prominence will be given to sexual exploitation and prostitution-related activities, as they are
presently not commonly criminalised, as will be demonstrated throughout the thesis. Specific
definitions of crimes will be detailed in later chapters.
1.3.2. Emphasis on UN Peace Support Operations and Military
Personnel
In undertaking the analysis of potential solutions for the commission of gender-based crimes by
peacekeepers, this thesis will only analyse criminal jurisdiction over military personnel involved in UN
PSOs. It is understood that there are many multi-national missions deployed throughout the globe by
organisations other than the UN, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
35 Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations, (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, New York 2004), p. 1. See also Concepts and Definitions, Office of the Special Adviser on Gender
Issues and Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm.
36 “[T]he term 'gender-based' provides a new context for understanding violence against women because it
reflects the unequal power relationship between women and men in society. This does not mean that all acts
against a woman are gender-based violence, or that all victims of gender-based violence are female.” 'Africa-
Asia: Gender-based violence: A silent, vicious epidemic', IRIN NEWS, (1 September 2004)
37 J. Gardam and M. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law, (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2001), pp. 19-51.
38 Ibid., pp. 25-30; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1820 (2008),
S/2009/362, 20 August 2009.
39 Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary General,
A/59/782 (2005), A/60/861 (2006), A/61/957 (2007), A/62/890 (2008), A/63/720 (2009).
11
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) using the Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and the African Union (AU).40 However, only UN
missions will be considered. This choice is due in part to the large number of UN missions
worldwide,41 the size of UN missions, and to the fact that the UN has been taking action with regard
to sexual exploitation and abuse by mission personnel, hence resulting in an availability of resources
to analyse.42 The involvement of other organisations in military peace support operations is far more
limited, for example NATO in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF); ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leone
and Guinea-Bisseau; and the AU, currently in Sudan as part of UNAMID.43 These missions can be
subsumed by a larger UN mission, or are established as a small mission to take over once the
mandate of a larger UN mission has been completed.44
While this thesis recognises that within UN missions, UN civilian staff forms part of a PSO, only law
applicable to military personnel will be examined. The first of two reasons for this selection is the fact
that UN reports show that the overwhelming majority of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse
are against peacekeeping personnel, and the majority of those against military personnel. In 2004,
there were 121 total allegations; 105 of those were Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
personnel, 80 of whom were military personnel.45 In 2005, allegations totalled 373, with 340 being
against DPKO personnel, 193 of which were against military personnel.46 After 2005, statistical
reporting methods changed in the Reports of the Secretary-General, giving numbers of allegations in
completed investigations only. Military personnel still represent the largest group against whom
40 E.g. NATO- KFOR (Kosovo); ECOMOG- Liberia; AU- AMIS (Sudan).
41 For current operations on five continents, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.shtml.
42 See Chapter 3.
43 African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.
44 E.g. ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia was succeeded by UN mission UNAMSIL and UNMIL; C. Ero,
'ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia' (1995) Journal of Humanitarian Assistance ; T. Ajayi,
'The UN, the AU and ECOWAS – A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa?' (Freidrich Ebert Stiftung,
New York, November 2008)
45 Special Measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/59/782, 15 April 2005, Annex 1 Nature of allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1
January- 31 December 2004.
46 Special Measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/60/861, 24 May 2006, Annex I Nature of allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1
January- 31 December 2005.
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investigations were conducted. In 2006, 66 out of 82 DPKO investigations involved military
personnel;47 in 2007 it was 118 out of 136;48 and in 2008, 61 out of 80.49
1.3.2.1. Military is a ‘special community’
The second reason for choosing to address only military personnel is the distinctive culture of the
military. The ‘special community’ that exists to distinguish military life from civilian life means that
different rules apply to military personnel. This is relevant to the choice of military in this thesis
because they are subject to a different, stricter standard of behaviour than civilians. Militaries have
unique disciplinary systems, designed to be applicable in situations distinct from ordinary daily life,
such as serving abroad in a PSO. Given that the majority of personnel in a mission are military, it is
appropriate to gain an understanding of the military system of justice. This presentation of the
military as a ‘special community’ will be undertaken in the context of Australian and US military law,
the two states whose laws will be examined in Chapter 4.
As will be discussed throughout this thesis, military personnel in a PSO are under the jurisdiction of
their sending state. If a state tries its own military nationals, it is generally likely to be in a military
court.50 This is principally because the military has a separate goal other than simply punishment
when it takes disciplinary action. The military prefers to regulate and discipline its own in order to
maintain the required sense of discipline and obedience, and thus functionality, of the armed forces.
Militaries have adopted the court-martial as a method of trying their own personnel.51 The Manual
for Courts-Martial United States defines the purpose of military law:
47 Special Measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/61/957, 15 June 2007, Annex V Status of investigations reported in 2006, for personnel of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 1 January- 31 December 2006. Note number of investigations does not correlate to
number of allegations received, which totalled 357.
48 Special Measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/62/890, 25 June 2008, Annex V Status of investigations conducted in 2007 involving personnel of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1 January- 31 December 2007.
49 Special Measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/63/720, 17 February 2009, Annex VI Status of investigations into allegations involving peacekeeping
personnel reported in 2008 and their follow-up. Statistics for 2009 were not available as of February 2010.
50 D.A. Schlueter, 'The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey' (1980) 87Military Law Review 129-166.
51 Ibid.
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“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and
discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”
52
Likewise, the United Kingdom states that “[t]he principal object of military law is to maintain order
and discipline amongst members of the Army and, in certain circumstances, those who accompany
them”.53 Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States have a long history of military
justice systems, designed to investigate and discipline offences relating to the armed forces.54 This is
also based on jurisdictional reasoning: civilian criminal jurisdiction is generally only territorial,
whereas military jurisdiction functions extraterritorially in order to maintain discipline when
personnel are serving overseas. This includes the court-martials themselves, which are able to be
convened in any location.55 This ability to hold courts-martial closer to the territory of the crime is
more convenient, efficient and economical, due to ease of access to witnesses and evidence.
Some of the criminal provisions examined in this chapter are restrictions on behaviour imposed
through military law that would be seen as a violation of rights, such as freedom of association, in
civilian law. However, in both Australian and United States case law they have been held to be
constitutional in a military context, against challenges that have proclaimed these restrictions to be
violations of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech.56
While these military-specific laws may seem restrictive,57 such laws certainly work in favour of the
ability to restrict military personnel from engaging in behaviour such as sexual exploitation and
abuse, engaging the services of a prostitute, visiting brothels or strip clubs, and trafficking, whilst
engaged in a PSO. Some areas which in non-military life fall under more societal regulation (i.e. what
52 Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2008 Edition), Part I Preamble, 3. Nature and purpose of military
law, at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf.
53 United Kingdom Army, Serving Soldier, Discipline and Military Law- Introduction at
http://www.army.mod.uk/servingsoldier/termsofserv/discmillaw/intro/ss_hrpers_disc_intro_w.html.
54 C.H.B. Garraway, 'Editorial Comment: Abu Ghraib- Another Black Hole? Military Excesses? Is There a
'Right Way' of Dealing?' (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 981-987, pp. 982-3.
55 Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2008 Edition), Part II Rules for Courts-Martial, Chapter II
Jurisdiction, R.C.M. 201(a)(3).
56 US: Parker v Levy 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Able v United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2nd Cir. 1998). Aust: Re Tracey;
Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1989) 166 CLR 518 (10 February 1989); McWaters v Day [1989] HCA 59;
(1989) 168 CLR 289 (5 December 1989).
57 The author is not aiming to comment on this, but rather simply seeking to use the law as it exists.
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is seen as morally reprehensible or generally unacceptable behaviour), in the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the law.58
President Wilson described the nature of the special community and the reason for discipline as
follows:
“The purpose of the Articles of War [now the UCMJ] in times of peace is to bring about a
uniformity in the application of military discipline which will make the entire organization
coherent and effective, and to engender a spirit of cooperation and proper subordination to
authority which will in time of war instantly make the entire Army a unit in its purpose of self-
sacrifice and devotion to duty in the national defense.”
59
The Second Circuit Court in Able v United States referred to the specialised community, and held:
“Moreover, in the military context, the Court has recognized that “the essence of military service
‘the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service.’”
Justice is afforded on different terms than is found in civilian life because the military is a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline.””
60
The Court in Able offered a detailed discussion of the distinctive aspects of military life, and thus the
requirement of a unique disciplinary system.
“Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that... the extraordinary
responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique conditions of military service, and the critical role
of unit cohesion, require that the military community, while subject to civilian control, exist as a
specialized society; and... the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and
traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would not be acceptable in
civilian society...
“The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is necessary because members of the
armed forces must be ready at all times for worldwide deployment to a combat environment.
“The worldwide deployment of United States military forces, the international responsibilities of
the United States, and the potential for involvement of the armed forces in actual combat
routinely make it necessary for members of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living
58 See Mill’s concept of law jurisdiction and society jurisdiction, discussed in J. Schonsheck, On
Criminalization: An Essay in the Philosophy of the Criminal Law, Vol. 19, (Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1994), p. 58.
59 United States v Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637 (1958) at 644, citing President Wilson, 53 Congressional Record
12844. Hooper was charged with conduct unbecoming for sodomy and “publicly associate[ing] with persons
known to be sexual deviates, to the disgrace of the armed forces”. Ibid., at 646-7.
60 Able v United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2nd Cir. 1998) at 632 and 633. Emphasis added.
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conditions and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced
intimacy with little or no privacy.
“The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the
armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.”
61
There has also been discussion in Australian law concerning the application of both military and civil
criminal legislation to Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel. In contrast to the US military, the
majority of criminal offences that ADF personnel are subject to are found in civil criminal legislation.
Yet there is still an emphasis on the special circumstances of the military. The Defence Force
Discipline Act (DFDA)62 contains only a limited number of offences that are specific to the military
context, and referred to as service offences. The application of the two laws is based on the
reconciliation of “two sets of constitutional objectives”.63 One of these sets of objectives is
“the defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States and the control of the armed
forces. To achieve these objectives, it is appropriate to repose in service authorities a broad
authority, to be exercised according to the exigencies of time, place and circumstance, to impose
discipline on defence members and defence civilians. The second set of objectives… consist of
recognition of the pre-ordinate jurisdiction of the civil courts and the protection of civil rights
which those courts assure alike to civilians and to defence members and defence civilians who
are charged with criminal offences. To achieve these objectives, civil jurisdiction should be
exercised when it can conveniently and appropriately be invoked and the jurisdiction of service
tribunals should not be invoked, except for the purpose of maintaining or enforcing service
discipline… proceedings may be brought against a defence member or a defence civilian for a
service offence if, but only if, those proceedings can reasonably be regarded as substantially
serving the purpose of maintaining or enforcing service discipline.”
64
This highlights the position of the military as a special community and demonstrates the reasoning
behind the limited number of offences that are found within the DFDA. In McWaters v Day, the High
Court of Australia held that “it is clear that the Discipline Act contemplates parallel systems of
military and ordinary criminal law and does not evince any intention that defence force members
61 Able, at 635-636. The Court went on to find that the prohibition on acts constitutional, and therefore also the
prohibition on statements.
62 Defence Force Discipline Act (Cth) 1982.
63 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1989) 166 CLR 518 (10 February 1989), at 569.
64 Re Tracey at 569-570, per Brennan and Toohey JJ.
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enjoy an absolute immunity from liability under the ordinary criminal law”.65 The issue has been
addressed several times in the High Court, which has consistently determined the Constitutional66
validity of applying both civil and military disciplinary law to defence personnel, as part of the
“maintenance of good order and discipline in the defence forces”.
“It is open to Parliament to provide that any conduct which constitutes a civil offence shall
constitute a service offence, if committed by a defence member. As already explained, the
proscription of that conduct is relevant to the maintenance of good order and discipline in the
defence forces. The power to proscribe such conduct on the part of defence members is but an
instance of Parliament's power to regulate the defence forces and the conduct of the members
of those forces. In exercising that power it is for Parliament to decide what it considers necessary
and appropriate for the maintenance of good order and discipline in those forces. And
Parliament's decision will prevail so long at any rate as the rule which it prescribes is sufficiently
connected with the regulation of the forces and the good order and discipline of defence
members.”
67
It is evident how important good order, conduct and discipline, and unit cohesion are the military in
order to ensure it functions to the best of its capacity. Hence we see that whether a state prefers to
use specific military disciplinary law as the principal method of proscribing offensive conduct, as with
the US UCMJ, or to use civil criminal law as the principal method, as in the case of the ADF, the
emphasis is still on a specific form of conduct and discipline to be adhered to by military personnel
due to the factors mentioned that render the military a ‘special community’. It is this unique ‘special
community’ that creates an interesting focus group for the analysis in this thesis. The application of
different laws can mean a different expected standard of behaviour, and certain conduct may be
inappropriate that would otherwise be acceptable in an ordinary civilian context. Applying such laws
ensure the efficacy of a PSO. Good order, conduct and discipline, and unit cohesion are essential for
missions to operate efficiently and with full cooperation between national contingents.
65 McWaters v Day [1989] HCA 59; (1989) 168 CLR 289 (5 December 1989) at 298.
66 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (the Constitution); s. 51(vi) confers upon Parliament the power
to make laws in relation to “the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and
the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth”; and s. 51(xxix) confers the
power to make laws in relation to external affairs.
67 Re Tracey at 545 per Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ. Affirmed in Re Colonel Aird; Ex-parte Alpert [2004]
HCA 44; 220 CLR 308; 209 ALR 311 at 545 per Gummow J.
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This is not to ignore the existence of allegations against non-military personnel. One of the
arguments in this thesis is that UN regulations and international instruments and agreements should
be applicable to all categories of personnel. However, in the context of the UN, there are distinctive
circumstances for different categories of personnel with regards to jurisdiction and immunity, and
such differences are taken into account in the analysis.
Nor does this thesis seek to disregard the broader context of issues. For example, not all groups of
women in different PSO regions are the same, but necessary limitations require a certain element of
generalisation. Additionally, general discussion on prostitution will not be engaged in, as the thesis
seeks to address prostitution-related activities only in the context of PSOs. Criminalisation is the
solution advocated in this thesis, but cannot be ultimately successful without engagement in other
aspects such as development, peace, and sustainability.68
1.4. Importance of Research
The context of the research of this thesis has been outlined above. This thesis seeks to differentiate
from other research by combining issues to address criminal accountability of peacekeepers for
gender-based crimes against women. Rather than concentrating on one distinguishing legal concern,
this thesis will demonstrate that the overall problem is distinctly complex. A comprehensive attempt
to determine a solution cannot ignore the fact that there are numerous fields of concern: the impact
of the conduct on the victims; immunities; jurisdictional multiplicities; domestic legal barriers; and
restrictions of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This thesis makes a contribution by bringing together the
fields of international criminal law, human rights, and international humanitarian law.
This thesis is divided into four main chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the criminalisation of violence
against women by peacekeepers. After introducing general principles of criminalisation, specific
reasons for criminalisation are considered, namely the fact that such violence constitutes a violation
of the rights of the victims, and this violation amounts to harm committed against the victims. A
68 D. Otto, 'Making sense of zero tolerance policies in peacekeeping sexual economies', in Munro and Stychin
(eds.), Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, (Glasshouse Press, London 2007), 259-282.
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spectrum of rights violated is addressed. In addition, the obligation of states under international law
to criminalise violence against women is assessed, through case law and international instruments
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.69 Yet the
question of whether such obligations are applicable outside the territory of a state arises. Hence the
extraterritoriality of human rights is analysed with specific reference to the application of case law in
this area to peace support operations. Finally, Chapter 2 will examine the alternative forms of
regulation, the code of conduct. This is the final principle of criminalisation, to seek an alternative
form of regulation to criminalising the conduct in question.
A fresh approach is offered to examining the impact of sexual exploitation and prostitution on
women, presenting the impact from a criminological perspective, as harms against women. These
harms are characterised as rights violations, referenced to specific rights such as the right to health
and the right to development. This analysis in itself is unique, in that it expressly examines why
conduct such as sexual exploitation and abuse should be criminalised, rather than simply assuming it
should be. In doing so it is also questioned whether non-criminal approaches are effective.
The thesis seeks to make a contribution to scholarship on the issue of the applicability of human
rights in peace operations and the extraterritorial application of human rights. After engaging in a
general analysis of international and regional case law on extraterritorial application of human rights,
the case law is placed in the context of the conduct at issue in the thesis, and its direct applicability
to violence against women by peacekeepers is examined.
Given that it is the behaviour of UN peacekeepers being addressed throughout this thesis, it is
necessary to consider the actions of the UN towards preventing and punishing gender-based crimes
committed by peacekeepers. Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the prohibition and prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse in UN missions, as well as issues of jurisdiction, immunity,
accountability, and cooperation or mutual legal assistance. All these issues have direct bearing on the
69 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1249 UNTS 13, entered into
force 3 September 1981.
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potential for peacekeepers to be prosecuted for gender-based crimes. For example, is immunity an
obstacle to prosecution? Which state has jurisdiction over personnel? How are peacekeepers to be
held accountable, and how can states and the UN cooperate during investigations and prosecutions?
These questions and others are addressed in Chapter 3.
This thesis is the first scholarly work to analyse the Draft Convention on Criminal Accountability for
UN Officials and Experts on Mission.70 The Draft Convention has been discussed in UN committees,
but no research has been published critiquing the proposed provisions. While this thesis does not
offer an analysis of every provision in the Draft Convention, the principal provisions are examined in
Chapter 3, with recommendations made of potential improvements. The provisions examined deal
with criminal accountability (both substantive law and mutual criminal legal assistance), immunity,
and jurisdiction- themes that are also appraised elsewhere in this thesis in the context of national
jurisdiction and the ICC.
Chapter 4 examines national jurisdiction over peacekeepers. As examples, the jurisdictions of
Australia and the USA are used. These two jurisdictions were selected for a variety of reasons:
linguistic accessibility; the fact that Australia and the US are both contributors to peace operations-
Australia particularly with personnel and the United States being the largest financial contributor to
missions. In addition, the two states have a similar legal heritage, but their laws have taken markedly
differing directions, and an analysis of both states’ laws with regard to the relevant gender-based
crimes demonstrates this. There are two main areas of the states’ laws that area examined. Firstly,
jurisdiction; whether the states have enacted legislation to enable provisions to be enforced for
crimes committed extraterritorially. Secondly, substantive law; whether each state has the necessary
legislation in place, proscribing the particular crimes at issue in this thesis. Extraterritorial jurisdiction
and substantive law are both essential for a state to have the ability to prosecute its own personnel
70 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring accountability of United Nations staff and experts on
mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations, A/60/980, 16 August 2006
(hereinafter ‘Report on ensuring accountability’).
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for crimes committed whilst serving in a peace operation. Chapter 4 aims to demonstrate the ability,
alongside the inability and potential, of states to prosecute their personnel.
The comparative analysis of domestic laws is innovative as no other study has specifically examined
whether any states actually have the legal ability to discipline their personnel in a criminal context for
misconduct such as sexual exploitation. In demonstrating that states do not necessarily have the laws
required to enable prosecution, this thesis shows support for the adoption of a convention (from the
Draft Convention, as discussed in Chapter 3) in order to obligate states to enact relevant laws.
The final chapter, Chapter 5, explores the potential of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a
forum for the prosecution of peacekeepers. Substantive law aspects will first be examined- whether
or not gender-based crimes committed by peacekeepers would fall within the definitions of the
chapeau elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following that, the relevant individual
crimes of the Rome Statute of the ICC71 are assessed, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution and sexual violence. Given the specific and hierarchal structure of a PSO, command and
superior responsibility as a category of individual criminal responsibility is addressed to examine the
potential and difficulties of application. Once again immunities are raised, within the context of the
Rome Statute: whether immunity would be an impediment to prosecution and how it may be
circumvented. The final issues are considered in the context of prosecutorial discretion: the status of
peacekeepers as ‘big fish’ or ‘small fish’, and how prosecutorial policy may impact on the likelihood
of peacekeepers being prosecuted due to such status. Secondly, how the gravity threshold is applied
by the Prosecutor and whether crimes committed by peacekeepers would cross that threshold. All of
these factors are brought together to form a view on whether the ICC could be used to prosecute
peacekeepers.
Perhaps the most original aspect of this thesis is this analysis of the potential of the International
Criminal Court as a forum before which to prosecute peacekeeping personnel. A significant amount
71 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002.
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of literature exists on international criminal law and the ICC in particular, as mentioned above.
However, there is no other study that has addressed the specific concept of peacekeepers before the
ICC. In particular, the concept of command and superior responsibility is an interesting issue to
address, as there is existing analysis of the problems of command within peace operations,72 but not
the problems that this may cause when considering individual criminal responsibility of commanders
and superiors.
Analysis of the gender-based crimes of the ICC is also from a different perspective- namely, with the
specific victims and perpetrators in mind. There is much literature on the gender-based crimes in
international criminal law,73 but none to consider the application of the crimes specific to the ICC in
the peacekeeping context, either in relation to the individual crimes or the chapeau elements.
Moreover, much of the existing literature concentrates on rape.74 While this thesis undertakes a
discussion of rape, it also considers the crimes of sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and sexual
violence. An entirely new provision is also suggested; a recommendation for an amendment to the
72 E.g. M.M.J. Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Military Legal and Policy Challenges, (Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1997); Murphy, ‘Legal Framework’, supra note 12.
73 A selection: T. Meron, 'Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law' (1993) 87 (3) American
Journal of International Law 424-428; A. Stiglmayer (ed.),Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, (University of Nebraska Press, LIncoln and London 1994); K.D. Askin, War Crimes Against
Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1997);
K.D. Askin, 'The International War Crimes Trial of Anto Furundzija: Major Progress Toward Ending the Cycle
of Impunity for Rape Crimes' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 935-955; C. Steains, 'Gender
Issues', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague 1999), 357-390; K.D. Askin, 'Women's Issues in International Criminal Law: Recent
Developments and the Potential Contribution of the ICC', in Shelton (ed.), International Crimes, Peace, and
Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New
York 2000), 47-63; R. Dixon, 'Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here?' (2002)
13 (3) European Journal of International Law 697-719; D. Buss, 'Prosecuting Mass Rape: Prosecutor v
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic' (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 91-99; K.D. Askin,
'Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances,
Enduring Obstacles' (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288-316; N.N.R. Quénivet, Sexual
Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New York 2005); A.
Obote-Odora, 'Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution' (2005) 12 New England
Journal of International and Comparative Law 135-159; MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape’, supra note 22; S.
SaCouto, 'Advances and Missed Opportunities in the International Prosecutions of Gender-Based Crimes' (2006-
2007) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 49-56; B. Stern and I. Fouchard, 'Sexual Violence as Genocide',
in Sadat and Scharf (eds.), The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law, (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Leiden 2008), 285-308; MacKinnon, ‘The ICTR’s Legacy’, supra note 22; N. Henry, 'Witness to
Rape: The Limits and Potential of International War Crimes Trials for Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence'
(2010) 2 (1) International Journal of Transitional Justice 114-134.
74 Ibid.
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Rome Statute to include a provision proscribing sexual exploitation as a war crime and crime against
humanity.
This thesis concludes with the hope of stimulating academic discussion, general scholarship in the
area, as well as encouraging practical action by the UN and the ICC. The UN is encouraged to
continue to cultivate the Draft Convention, and the ICC to develop a broad definition of gravity and
war crimes, as well as for state parties to consider amending the Rome Statute with a new provision
to proscribe sexual exploitation.
Overall the thesis seeks to demonstrate the requirement for criminalisation as a form of punishment
for peacekeepers who commit gender-based crimes, and to determine the best forum for such
prosecution. It pursues an alternative to impunity for such violence against women.
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2. Criminalisation of Violence against Women by
Peacekeepers
2.1. Introduction
The first step to take when addressing criminalisation of gender-based violence against women by
peacekeepers is to ask whether and why such conduct should be criminalised. This includes
addressing the concept of criminalisation itself, and questioning the adequacy and efficacy of
alternative forms of prohibition and punishment.
As discussed in the introduction, within this thesis, ‘gender-based crimes’ refers to a variety of
conduct that constitutes violence against women and girls based on the fact that they are female.
Behaviour categorised as violence against women relevant to this thesis includes rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, trafficking, sexual abuse, activities
relating to prostitution, and sexual exploitation.75 Currently, not all activities referred to are
criminalised- or at least, not criminalised in international law or all national jurisdictions. The
behaviours most commonly criminalised are rape, sexual slavery, sexual abuse and trafficking.
Prostitution is sometimes criminalised, however most frequently in relation to the actions of the
woman in offering sex for money, and less often in relation to the actions of the man in buying sex or
procuring women. This chapter will examine the need for criminalisation of prostitution-related
activities (particularly the clientele) and sexual exploitation committed by peacekeeping personnel.
The chapter will start with a general discussion of the problem and the international law as it exists.
After an introduction to the principles of criminalisation, there will be an in-depth analysis of why
prostitution and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers should be criminalised. This will include
detailing the effects on women of the behaviour on women; demonstrating how this behaviour
75 It is of course the case that men can be victims of rape, sexual slavery, trafficking, sexual exploitation, sexual
abuse, and enforced prostitution. However, the majority of victims of these crimes are girls and women.
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causes harm to the women involved,76 as a violation of their human rights. Finally, the effectiveness
of codes of conduct as a non-criminalised method of prevention and punishment will be considered.
Later in this thesis, jurisdictional issues of Australian and United States law will be compared. Hence,
the current chapter will make reference to various national laws or regulations, but in particular
those of Australia and the United States.
2.2. Definitions and the Problem
2.2.1. Sexual Exploitation
There has been publicity in recent years surrounding instances of sexual exploitation committed by
mission personnel.77 Accusations and reports have emerged about the commission of sexual
exploitation by peacekeepers in missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Haiti, East Timor, and Cambodia.78
76 This argument follows the concept of harm to others as the principle reason for criminalisation. See J.
Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 1, (Oxford University Press, New York,
Oxford 1984), discussion infra.
77 E.g. J. Wald, 'U.N. accuses force of sex abuse', CNN, (8 January 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/01/08/congo.peacekeepers.sex/ 'Burundi: Growing discontent with
South African troops', The Norwegian Council for Africa, (16 March 2005),
http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/8616.html M. Dodd, 'Hushed rape of Timor', The Weekend Australian, (26 March
2005), http://www.etan.org/et2005/march/20/26hushed.htm 'Cote d'Ivoire: French peacekeeping force opens
inquiry into sex abuse claims', IRIN, (20 May 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54555
'DRC-Nigeria: 11 policemen suspended over sex abuse allegations in DR Congo', IRIN, (27 September 2005),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=56514 K. Holt and S. Hughes, 'UN staff accused of raping
children in Sudan', Daily Telegraph, (2 January 2007),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1538396/UN-staff-accused-of-raping-children-in-Sudan.html 'UN
troops face child abuse claims', BBC News, (30 November 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6195830.stm C.J. Williams, 'Sex scandal in Haiti hits U.N. mission',
Baltimore Sun, (16 December 2007), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/world/bal-
te.haiti16dec16,0,3111217.story R. Lindsay, 'U.N. peacekeepers accused of rape', The Washington Times, (17
December 2006), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/17/20061217-122119-4767r/ L.
Charbonneau, 'Peacekeepers may have committed sex abuse in Congo-UN ', Reuters AlertNet, (12 August 2008),
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N12498196.htm D. Montgomery, 'India peacekeeping forces accused
of committing sex crimes in Congo', Jurist, (13 August 2008),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/08/india-peacekeeping-troops-accused-of.php B.S. Klapper, 'UN: 50
peacekeepers punished for sex abuses', Associated Press, (9 November 2009),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jMJ30OyX6btcjGlkS1HAobqkw-JwD9BPE1682
78 P. Higate, 'Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone' (Institute for Security Studies,
March 2004) ISS Monograph No. 91; Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations
of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, A/59/661, 5 January 2005 (hereinafter OIOS MONUC Investigation); Special measures for protection
from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary General, A/59/782 (2005), A/60/861 (2006),
A/61/957 (2007), A/62/890 (2008), A/63/720 (2009).
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Sexual exploitation is defined by the UN as: “Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to, profiting
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another”.79 This is the definition of
sexual exploitation that will be used in this thesis,80 as the definition is broad.81 “Sexual purposes”
encompasses any form of sexual activity, such as touching, oral sex or intercourse. The definition
allows distinct differentiation of sexual exploitation from rape, a crime in which the emphasis is on
lack of consent.82 While there is an implication of lack of consent in the definition of sexual
exploitation, as it is considered “abuse”, the circumstances of sexual exploitation may make it
difficult to prove a lack of consent. Hence it is more effective for non-consent to not exist as an
element of sexual exploitation.
The definition also emphasises that there is an exchange involved for the sexual activity; that there is
a purpose to the commission of the sexual activity. Generally, the situations of sexual exploitation
that occur involving peacekeepers entail the peacekeepers offering food or money in exchange for
sex- habitually with girls, occasionally boys.83 There are sometimes boys who serve as intermediaries,
finding girls (and boys) for the peacekeepers to have sex with- in other words, procuring sexual
contact for them.84 Exploitation has much in common with prostitution, in that it involves the
exchange of goods, money or services for sexual favours. However, as is clear in the definition of
sexual exploitation, there is an additional element at play here: abuse of power.
79 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,
ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003.
80 National criminal laws may have differing definitions of sexual exploitation, e.g. the Canadian Criminal Code,
(R.S., 1985, c. C-46), section 153, which provides for sexual exploitation to apply only to a young person (aged
14-17 years), and refers to such concepts as trust, authority and dependency.
81 For a view disagreeing with the UN definition of sexual exploitation, see O. Simic, 'Rethinking 'sexual
exploitation' in UN peacekeeping operations' (2009) 32 Women's Studies International Forum 288-295.
However, it must be noted that Simic does not discuss the definition as used in this thesis.
82 See discussion on consent, supra Chapter 4.
83 OIOS MONUC Investigation, supra note 78; the Secretary-General’s Reports’ statistics confirm that the most
common forms of sexual exploitation and abuse committed are sex with minors, sexually exploitative
relationships and sex with prostitutes; see Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual
abuse, Report of the Secretary General, A/59/782 (2005), A/60/861 (2006), A/61/957 (2007), A/62/890 (2008),
A/63/720 (2009); P. Higate, 'Peacekeepers, Masculinities and Sexual Exploitation' (2007) 10 (1) Men and
Masculinities 99-119, p. 107;
84 Ibid.
26
While peacekeepers may not be living with the luxuries that they may have at home, they are
generally living in better conditions than some of the local population- or certainly, at least, have
more disposable income, and are thus able to afford the sustenance that eludes poorer local girls
and women. “The truth… is that it is difficult to find two more unequally situated people involved in
the same transaction and occurrence anywhere in our social order.”85
A principal reason women are driven to a situation of sexual exploitation is their socio-economic
vulnerability in post-conflict situations.86 For example, one Haitian woman stated that UN CivPol
(civilian police) on patrol are only interested in talking to the local women: “These women are not
prostitutes who talk to them but they are hungry. They will sell their bodies for money.”87
2.2.2. Prostitution
Prostitution is the engagement in sexual activity in exchange for payment, usually money.
Procurement, or pandering, means obtaining a person as a prostitute for another person (a procurer
is commonly known as a pimp). A client solicits a prostitute for sexual activity, or patronises a
prostitute.
There is debate in feminist theory over whether prostitution is violence against women or not, and
whether prostitution should be legalised/decriminalised.88 This thesis does not delve into the
broader argument of whether prostitution in general is violence against women, or whether it should
be legalised/decriminalised everywhere and at all times, but rather looks at prostitution in the
85 D. Leidholdt, 'Prostitution: A Violation of Women's Human Rights' (1993-1994) 1 Cardozo Women's Law
Journal 133-147, p. 135.
86 V. Kent, 'Protecting civilians from UN peackeeepers and humanitarian workers: Sexual exploitation and
abuse', in Aoi, et al. (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping, (United Nations University Press,
Tokyo, New York, Paris 2007), 44-66, p. 52.
87 S. Martin, 'Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions'
(Refugees International, October 2005) , p. 5.
88 See e.g. J. Freeman, ‘The Feminist Debate Over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups, Radical
Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent’, 5 Berkeley Women’s L.J. (1989-1990), pp. 74-109; M.A.
Baldwin, 'A Date with Justice: Prostitution and the Decriminalization Debate' (1993-1994) 1 Cardozo Women's
Law Journal 125-131; C. Meyer, ‘Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberation or Dehumanization?’, 1 Cardozo
Women’s L.J. (1993-1994), pp. 105-120; E. Bernstein, 'What's Wrong with Prostitution? What's Right with Sex
Work? Comparing Market in Female Sexual Labor' (1999) 10 Hastings Women's Law Journal 91-117; J.E.
Larson, ‘Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights’, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2003-2004), pp. 673-700; I. de
Pommereau, 'Rethinking the legal sex trade', The Christian Science Monitor, (11 May 2005),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0511/p15s02-woeu.html; M.M. Dempsey, 'Rethinking Wolfenden: Prostitute-
Use, Criminal Law, and Remote Harm' (2005) June Criminal Law Review 444-455.
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relevant limited settings. These settings are those in which peacekeeping missions are situated,
which exist in special conflict or post-conflict circumstances, in turn creating particular societal
structures.
2.2.3. The Military, Peacekeepers, and Sex Trade
The increase in peacekeeping personnel, in particular military personnel, acts as a magnet for an
increase in the sex industry in mission areas. This increase in demand for commercial sex services
also results in an augmentation in trafficking and forced prostitution.89 This is evident in the example
of Cambodia, where the sex trade increased significantly due to the influx of peacekeeping personnel
from 1992.90 Between 1992 and 1993, the number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from 6,000 to
25,000 (including child prostitutes).91
A dramatic increase is also notable in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in the regions of Kosovo and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.92 “According to local NGOs, prior to the war in 1999 and the consequent
international presence in Kosovo, not only trafficking but also prostitution was very uncommon.”93
UNMIK peacekeeping forces arrived in Kosovo in July 1999.94 By the end of 1999, brothels had
89 For discussion addressing demand as the principle factors in increasing trafficking and prostitution of women,
see N. Hotaling and L. Levitas-Martin, ‘Increased Demand Resulting in the Flourishing Recruitment and
Trafficking of Women and Girls: Related Child Sexual Abuse and Violence Against Women’, 13 Hastings
Women’s L.J. (2002), pp. 117-126; K.J. Allred, 'Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the
Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It' (2006) 33 (1) Armed Forces & Society 5-23.
90 UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Martin, supra note 87, p. 4; S. Koyama and H. Myrttinen,
'Unintended consequences of peace operations on Timor Leste from a gender perspective', in Aoi, et al. (eds.),
Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York,
Paris 2007), 23-43, p. 32.
91 Martin, supra note 87, p. 4.
92 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). 'Kosovo (Serbia and
Montenegro) "So does it mean that we have the rights?" Protecting the human rights of women and girls
trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo' (Amnesty International, 6 May 2004) EUR 70/010/2004, pp. 7-8,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR700102004ENGLISH/$File/EUR7001004.pdf. See also
'Trafficking, Slavery and Peacekeeping: The Need for a Comprehensive Training Program. A Conference
Report.' (Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre & UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute,
Turin, 9-10 May 2002) , pp. 12-13; and J. Gronow, 'Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe'
(UNICEF, 15 August 2000) , p. 47, available at
http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/CEE_CIS_2000_Trafficking.pdf.
93 'Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe: Current Situation and Responses to Trafficking in
Human Beings' (UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE ODIHR, 2002) , p. 96, available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2002/06/1847_en.pdf.
94 UNMIK, authorised by S/RES/1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999. Missions were present in the former Yugoslavia
during the 1990s prior to the conflict, such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the UN Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
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appeared in the immediate vicinity of the mission centres. There was “significant organized
prostitution in four locations close to major concentrations of KFOR troops. Most of the clients were
reported to be members of the international military presence, while some KFOR soldiers were
allegedly also involved in the trafficking process itself.”95 Eighteen establishments were identified
as places where trafficked women were believed to be working in forced prostitution. Clients of
these establishments were identified as Americans, Italians, Germans and French:
“KFOR and UNMIK were publicly identified in early 2000 as a factor in the increase in trafficking
for prostitution by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In May 2000, Pasquale
Lupoli, IOM’s Chief of Mission in Kosovo, alleged that KFOR troops and UN staff in Kosovo had fed
a “mushrooming of night clubs” in which young girls were being forced into prostitution by
criminal gangs. “The large international presence in Kosovo itself makes this trafficking
possible.””
96
It took 1.5 years until the first ‘off-limits’ list was circulated. An ‘off-limits’ list designates specific
areas or specific locations that peacekeeping personnel are not permitted to enter. In January 2001
the first ‘off-limits’ list had 75 listed establishments. By July 2003, there were over 200 bars,
restaurants, clubs and cafés in Kosovo on the ‘off-limits’ list.97 In 2002 it was estimated that 40% of
the clientele of prostitutes was international, mostly members of the KFOR contingent.98 Elsewhere
in the former Yugoslavia, a former UN official found that the closure of prostitution night clubs in
Bosnia matched the withdrawal of troops and International Police Task Force (IPTF) from the area.99
While a certain percentage of the increased numbers of prostitutes will be local girls and women, a
large number may be trafficked women. This was particularly the case in the former Yugoslavia,
where Kosovo became a major destination for trafficked women and girls after previously having low
levels of both prostitution and trafficking.100 In these situations, the demand for prostitutes is catered
95 ‘So Does It Mean That We Have the Rights?’, supra note 92, p. 7; 'U.N. Peacekeeping: United Nations Faces
Challenges in Responding to the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Peacekeeping Operations' (United States General
Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 12 December 2001) GAO-02-194.
96 Ibid., p. 8.
97 Ibid.
98 UNICEF, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe’, 2002, supra note 93, p. 96.
99 S.E. Mendelson, 'Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human Trafficking in the Balkans' (Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., February 2005) , p. 12.
100 ‘So Does It Mean That We Have the Rights?’, supra note 92, p. 7.
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to through the growth of organised criminal groups that develop specific rings for trafficking women
who end up working as forced prostitutes.101
In East Timor, there was a marked increase in prostitution, mainly in the capital Dili,102 and also in
locations where peacekeepers undertook ‘rest and recreation’, such as Bali, Indonesia.103 There was a
subsequent reduction in prostitution corresponding to the withdrawal of troops.104 Unlike other
missions, there was no mission-wide ‘off-limits’ list for UNMISET.105 Curfews on personnel were
imposed by national contingents, rather than by mission regulations, resulting in contrasting
behaviour of different nationals. For example, Australian peacekeepers were restricted by a curfew
and the number of alcoholic drinks per day permitted.106 In contrast, Portuguese troops had no or
little restrictions. Consequently they visited massage parlours; were involved in bar brawls; and cases
of children fathered by Portuguese soldiers were reported.107
The United States military is known for its participation in the encouragement and expansion of the
commercial sex industry around overseas bases and missions, based on several factors.108 Firstly,
there are numerous studies on the issue. 109 Secondly, the US has the biggest military presence
outside its own territory of any state. It has permanent military bases in the Philippines, Korea, Japan
and Germany. It was involved in the two World Wars, but has also been heavily involved in armed
conflicts outside its territory or region in the 20th and 21st Centuries- the Korean War, the Vietnam
101 Mendelson, supra note 99, pp. 14-17.
102 Koyama and Myrttinen, supra note 90, p. 35.
103 Ibid., p. 34.
104 Ibid.
105 UN Mission of Support in East Timor.
106 Koyama and Myrttinen, supra note 90, pp. 35-36.
107 Ibid.
108 E.N. Chang, 'Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry' (2001) 15 Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 621-653.
109 L.C.T.B. Turner, 'The Suppression of Prostitution in Relation to Venereal Disease Control in the Army'
(1943) 7 Federal Probation 8-11; S.P. Sturdevant and B. Stoltzfus, Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and
the U.S. Military in Asia, (The New Press, New York 1992); K.H.S. Moon, Sex among Allies: Military
Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations, (Columbia University Press, New York 1997); R. Schaffer, 'Sex among
Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations' (1999) 10 (2) Journal of World History 499-502; E.N.
Chang, 'Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry' (2001) 15 Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 621-653; S. Sun, 'Where the Girls Are: The Management of Venereal
Disease by United States Military Forces in Vietnam' (2004) 23 (1) Literature and Medicine 66-87; K.J. Allred,
'Human Trafficking: Breaking the Military Link' (2005) IV (4) The Quarterly Journal 64-72.
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War (where at its height the US had over 550,000 troops in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos),110 and
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Studies on the US military in Asia111 have ascertained that the military, far from discouraging the
behaviour, saw the development of these industries as part and parcel of international relations,
keeping the military involved with local business and politicians- even believing that the increase of
the sex industry was a worthy contribution to the development of the local economy.112 It is even
part of the US military’s recruiting strategy to push the fact that joining the military will mean
travelling and exotic experiences- and imply that this includes sexual adventures.113
In relation to UN peacekeeping involvement, the United States is the largest financial donor,114 but
contributes only a relatively small number of personnel, most of whom are civilian police (contracted
through companies). For example, in December 2000, the US contributed 885 personnel to peace
support operations (PSOs), of whom 849 of which were civilian police.115
2.2.4. Violence against Women
“[V]iolence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of
women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms... “violence against
women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”
116
110 David Bonavia, ‘US looks back on worst year in Vietnam’, The Times, Thursday, Jan 02, 1969; pg. 4; Issue
57448; col A.
111 Japan, the Philippines, and Korea are the three main areas in Asia where the U.S. has bases. There was
alsoVietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the Second Indochinese War (the Vietnam War).
112 See e.g.Moon, supra note 109; and Sturdevant and Stoltzfus, supra note 109.
113 A. Bickford, 'See the World, Meet Interesting People, Have Sex With Them: Tourism, Sex, and Recruitment
in the U.S. Military', American Sexuality magazine, (2003).
114 See the DPSO website ‘Financing’ at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/financing.html.
115 In March 2007, the US contributed 321 personnel, of whom only 9 were military soldiers and 295 were
police. Monthly troop contributor figures available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. The
last month’s numbers, for November 2009, show the US contributing 76 personnel, 57 of whom were civilian
police.
116 Preamble and Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, A/RES/48/104, 23
February 1994.
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Such is stated in the Preamble and Article 1 of the Declaration of the Elimination of Violence against
Women. Article 2 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women defines violence
against women as being
“understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual
abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence
related to exploitation;
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including
rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and
elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it
occurs.”
117
There is a broader social context of violence against women.118 In the case of violence against women
committed by peacekeepers, the social context can include the domination of developed countries
over developing (or North over South), personified by male dominance over local women.119 The
local women are treated as inferior to women in home countries, where peacekeeping personnel
would not frequent prostitutes, exploit poorer women for sex, or keep a sexual slave.120
Within this broad social context, each individual victim of violence against women suffers. In general,
women are vulnerable to violence due to economic inequality and discrimination.121 This situation is
exacerbated in the context of post-conflict societies. The report of the Secretary-General on all forms
of violence against women of 2006 defines such intersectionality:
117 This is the definition that will be used in this thesis. ‘Violence’ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as
“The exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property; action or
conduct characterized by this; treatment or usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with
personal freedom. “ or “An instance or case of violent, injurious, or severe treatment”. Oxford English
Dictionary, 2nd Edition, 1989.
118 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘In-depth study on all forms of violence against women’, A/61/122/Add.1, 6
July 2006, para. 73.
119 Although it must be noted that not all peacekeeping personnel come from developed countries. Countries
such as Nigeria and Bangladesh contribute some of the largest numbers of personnel to missions.
120 P. Higate, 'Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone' (Institute for Security
Studies, March 2004) ISS Monograph No. 91, p. 13, available at Institute for Security Studies,
http://www.iss.co.za/.
121 Secretary-General’s Report on all forms of violence against women, supra note 118, para. 86.
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“The intersection of male dominance with race, ethnicity, age, caste, religion, culture, language,
sexual orientation, migrant and refugee status and disability- frequently termed
‘intersectionality’- operates at many levels in relation to violence against women. Multiple
discrimination shapes the forms of violence that a woman experiences. It makes some women
more likely to be targeted for certain forms of violence because they have less social status than
other women and because perpetrators know such women have fewer options for seeking
assistance or reporting.”
122
Intersectionality is a concept which is particularly relevant to women in post-conflict situations that
are targeted by peacekeeping personnel for the purposes of activities such as prostitution and sexual
exploitation.123 Peacekeeping personnel are often a different race and/or ethnicity to the local
community they are charged with protecting.124 They speak different languages, come from a
different culture and possibly have different religions.125 One example of the issue of differences in
religion occurred in Sierra Leone, where new arrivals to UNAMSIL126 who were of the Muslim faith
demanded that local women cover their bare breasts.127 For the local community, it was acceptable
for women to wear nothing on their torso. However, the peacekeeping personnel imposed their own
value system upon the women. This was in spite of Rule 2 of the Code of Personal Conduct for Blue
Helmets, which obliges peacekeeping personnel to “Respect the law of the land of the host country,
their local culture, traditions, customs and practices”.128
Of course, the biggest intersection is that of male dominance with economic factors. Peacekeeping
personnel have disposable income that local women simply do not. These stark contrasts can create
a relationship of instability between peacekeeping personnel and local women if not approached in a
122 Ibid., para. 361.
123 For examples of feminist discussions on intersectionality, see C.A. MacKinnon, 'From Practice to Theory, or
What is a White Woman Anyway?' (1991) 4 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 13-22; H. Charlesworth and C.
Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, (Manchester University Press, Manchester
2000), especially Chapter 7 Human Rights, pp. 201-249.
124 J. Petrovic, 'Cultural Context of Peace Operations', in Howard and Oswald (eds.), The Rule of Law on Peace
Operations, (Asia-Pacfic Centre for Military Law, Melbourne 2002), 213-221.
125 Ibid.
126 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.
127 Higate, ‘Case Studies: DRC & Sierra Leone’, supra note 120, pp. 46-47; P. Higate, 'Peacekeepers and
Gender: DRC and Sierra Leone', Pambazuka News, (8 July 2004), http://www.pambazuka.org/#2, pp. 2-3.
128 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, available at
http://cdu.unlb.org/UNStandardsofConduct/TenRulesCodeofPersonalConductForBlueHelmets.aspx. For further
discussion on the Code of Conduct, see infra United Nations Codes of Conduct.
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sensitive and appropriate manner. For example, in the DRC, the relative wealth of the peacekeepers
is seen as an issue by local people, particularly with regard to the attitudes of peacekeepers towards
local women, and the peacekeepers being seen as ‘powerful’ in these regards.129
The women targeted for sexual exploitation are also frequently refugees or internally displaced
persons, which means they are subject to a lack of resources and stability in their everyday life, and
thus, more vulnerable to violence.130 Women working in brothels are often trafficked, and thus kept
in a lifestyle of slavery involving coercion and violence.131 On top of these factors is the basic fact that
a lot of peacekeeping personnel carry weapons, which puts them in a position of power over any
unarmed person.
Prostitution and sexual exploitation reinforce women’s sexuality as a commodity, rather than
recognising a woman’s sexual autonomy. Sexual autonomy is a person’s right to freely choose when
and with whom they engage in sexual activities. In treating women like sexual objects, in their acts of
violence against women, there are many possible reasons for the actions of the male peacekeeping
personnel. It may be a use of violence against women “as a way of disciplining women for
transgressions of traditional female roles or when they perceive challenges to their masculinity”.132
This is particularly the case in situations where there are cultural and religious differences, where
attitudes of discrimination and intolerance may prevail against women behaving in a different
manner to that of women in their home society. Alternatively, it may be that these women are in fact
not transgressing traditional female roles, but are in fact fitting right into the ‘other’ female role that
these men do not access in their ‘normal’ daily life back in their home country. The ‘other’ female
129 Higate, ‘Case Studies: DRC & Sierra Leone’, supra note 120, p. 17.
130 UNHCR and Save the Children UK, ‘Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children
in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone’, (2002), http://www.womenwarpeace.org/docs/savereport.doc; Report of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers
in West Africa, 11 October 2002, A/57/465; J. Gardam and M. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International
Law, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001), pp. 30-33.
131 See, e.g. Mendelson, supra note 99, pp. 9-10.
132 Report of the Secretary-General (2006), supra note 118, para. 75.
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role is that of ‘whore’, in opposition to ‘Madonna’- the bipolar images of a woman as either ‘dirty’
(i.e. a sexual object) or ‘good’ (i.e. marriageable).133
2.2.5. Effects on the Mission of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by
Peacekeepers
A principle of peacekeeping is to ‘do no harm’: “It is the duty of each peacekeeper to protect the
vulnerable and to refrain from doing harm”.134 Peacekeepers have a duty of care to the people they
are sent to protect.135 In a letter to the General-Assembly in 2005, then Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, referring to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, found that “such abhorrent acts
are a violation of the fundamental duty of care that all United Nations peacekeeping personnel owe
to the local population”.136 Sexually exploitative behaviour conducted by peacekeepers also creates
problems with the potential success of a mission. Cooperation with and support of the local
population are vital elements of a peace support mission, and “the sexual exploitation scandals…
have created additional distrust among the local population towards male peacekeepers”.137
Acceptable conduct must be exercised by mission personnel at all times to ensure the best possible
relations with local communities, which in turn contributes towards the effectiveness of the
mission.138
Misconduct by members of a mission may also affect morale and effectiveness of the mission units. A
vital aspect of a military force is its cohesiveness, obtained through values such as trust and
heightened through camaraderie and high morale.139 Negative behaviour by troops, as well as
133 B. Cooper, 'Prostitution: A Feminist Analysis' (1989) 11 Women's Rights Law Reporter 99-119, p. 102. See
infra.
134 The Peacekeepers’ Duty of Care; see
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2005/duty_of_care.htm; MINURSO’s Conduct &
Discipline/Welfare newsletter, Vol. I, Issue I, March 2007 at http://www.minurso.unlb.org/conduct/march07.pdf.
135 Ibid.
136 Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, 24 March
2005, A/59/710.
137 Martin, supra note 87, p. 7 (specific reference to distrust in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
138 H. McCoubrey and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations,
(Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot 1996), p. 177; see also The Peacekeeper’s Duty of Care,
supra note 134.
139 “Military organizational effectiveness should encompass social structure... non-material factors (esprit,
staying power, and will to fight), and... morale and political attitudes...”; J.K. Sagala, 'HIV/AIDS and the
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negative assertions and attitudes towards the mission from both within and without the operation
reduce the ability of troops to function effectively together.140
This first section has outlined the problem of violence against women by peacekeepers, particularly
sexual exploitation and prostitution-related activities. It is the argument of this thesis that such
conduct should be criminalised. The next section of this chapter will outline the principles of
criminalisation before applying the principles to violence against women by peacekeepers.
2.3. Principles of Criminalisation
Violence against women by peacekeepers should be criminalised, but there must be valid reasons as
to why. This section will summarise the general principles of criminalisation in order to demonstrate
what criteria need to be fulfilled for conduct to be criminalised.
The function of criminal law
“is to preserve public order and decency, to protect citizens from what is offensive or injurious
and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and aggravation of others, particularly
those who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced,
or in a state of special physical, official or economic dependence. It is not... the function of the
law to intervene in the private lives of citizens.”
141
The central aim of criminal law, then, is, or ought to be to prevent harm.142 The law imposes rules of
behaviour that ensure all people enjoy life in society.143 It prevents harm by imposing punishment,
such as imprisonment, “in situations where tortious remedies are an insufficient deterrent” for anti-
social behaviour.144 Punishment acts not only as a deterrent for anti-social behaviour, but as an
imposition of hardship upon a defendant for a wrongdoing, as a method of retribution deserved by
the wrongdoer, with the severity of the sentence imposed equating to the severity of the
Military in Sub-Saharan Africa: Impact on Military Organizational Effectiveness' (2006) 53 (1) Africa Today 53-
77, p. 59.
140 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
141 Wolfenden Committee, cited in W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory, (Hart Publishing, Oxford-
Portland Oregon 2002), p. 32.
142 A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law : Theory and Doctrine, 3rd ed., (Hart, Oxford 2007), p. 2;
Wilson, supra note 141, p. 19; Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76.
143 H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice, (Oxford University Press, New York 1979), p. 10; M. Findlay,
Criminal Law: Problems in Context, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, South Melbourne 2006), p. 3.
144 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 4.
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wrongdoing committed.145 Criminalisation of certain behaviour communicates to society that “the
prohibited activity is a serious wrong that must not be done”.146
Criminal law is a public rather than private law, because it is in the interest of the public to control,
prevent and prosecute criminal offences.147 Behaviour is criminalised “because it consists in
wrongdoing which directly and in serious degree threatens the security or well-being of society, and
because it is not safe to leave it redressable only by compensation of the party injured”.148 A criminal
conviction “is a pronouncement made on behalf of society and is a form of community
condemnation”.149 Some behaviour is criminalised because it is inherently wrong (mala in se), and
other behaviour is wrong because it is illegal (mala prohibita).150
Simester and Sullivan state that the “imposition of a criminal sanction represents the most severe
infringement of a person’s liberty, and, as such, should be available only where there is a clear social
justification”.151 The question is then, what factors are used for measuring if there is social
justification for criminalisation?
2.3.1. Justification for Criminalisation152
2.3.1.1. Harm to Others
Lord Mostyn stated:
“[N]ew offences should be created only when absolutely necessary. In considering whether new
offences should be created, factors taken into account include whether:
145 Ibid., pp. 4, 33. J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 3rd ed., (Lexis Publishing, New York 2001), pp.
14-22; J.B. White, 'Making Sense of the Criminal Law' (1978) 50 University of Colorado Law Review 1-27, pp.
3-4.
146 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 22. Criminalisation of behaviour is social criticism of the conduct in
question; Gross, supra note 143, pp. 6-7.
147 It is, however, more complicated than this in certain jurisdictions, including international criminal law, where
the rise of victims’ rights has in some ways moved criminal law to a more private law mentality. See e.g. M.C.
Bassiouni, 'International Recognition of Victims' Rights' (2006) 6 (2) Human Rights Law Review 203-279.
148 Allen, Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence (1931), pp. 233-4, cited in Simester and Sullivan,
supra note 142, p. 2.
149 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 5.
150 Ibid., p. 3; Gross, supra note 143, pp. 122-124.
151 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 8.
152 The Anglo-American principles of criminalisation will be applied; for European continental counterparts to
the harm principle, see N. Persak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and
Continental Counterparts, (Springer, New York 2007), Chapter V, pp. 95 ff.
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the behaviour in question is sufficiently serious to warrant intervention by the criminal law;
the mischief could be dealt with under existing legislation or using other remedies;
the proposed offence is enforceable in practice;
the proposed offence is tightly drawn and legally sound; and
the proposed penalty is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.”
153
The first element of this list examines the seriousness of the behaviour in question. This requires
examining the harm committed. There are two areas of harm identified by Feinberg: harm to others,
and harm to self (paternalistic justification).154 Other suggested bases for criminalisation,
counterposed to harm, are offence to others and immorality.155 Generally, criminalisation based
solely on reasoning related to morality and paternalism is rejected by liberal theorists, although soft
paternalism is consistent with liberal argumentation. This thesis argues paternalistic reasons for the
criminalisation of prostitution-related behaviour and sexual exploitation, but only in conjunction with
the main argument that this behaviour results in harm to others.
The harm principle has been advocated as the principal reason for criminalisation by many criminal
theorists such as Joel Feinberg156 and John Stuart Mill.157 Feinberg explains the principle:
“It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in
preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from
acting) and there is probably not other means that is equally effective at no great cost to other
values.”
158
In following the harm principle, the specific effects of the conduct in question must be identified-
how does the conduct harm others? Harm is generally defined as a setback to interests;159 “the
153 Lord Williams of Mostyn, H.L. Deb., vol. 602, col. WA58; June 18, 1999, ‘New Criminal Offences’
(emphasis added). Penalties will not be discussed in this thesis.
154 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76; and J. Feinberg, Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the Criminal
Law, Vol. 3, (Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 1986).
155 J. Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 2, (Oxford University Press, New
York, Oxford 1985); J. Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 4, (Oxford
University Press, New York, Oxford 1988); and A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch, 'Rethinking the Offense
Principle' (2002) 8 (3) Legal Theory 269-295.
156 Ibid.
157 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (ElecBook, London 2001 (orig. 1859)), p.18.
158 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76, p. 26.
159 Ibid., Chapter 1, ‘Harms as Setbacks to Interest’, pp. 31-64. Gross, supra note 143, p. 115.
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impairment of a person’s opportunities to engage in worthwhile activities and relationships, and to
pursue valuable, self-chosen, goals”;160 and a ‘wrong’ as “a violation of somebody’s rights”.161 That is,
harm results in the reduction of quality of life for the victim. The interests affected may include
proprietary interests, as well as a person’s physical integrity and well-being.162
For behaviour to be criminalised, the seriousness of the harm must be considered. Harm committed
must also be a wrongful act or omission. Conduct that results in harm and merits criminalisation is
generally seen as prima facie wrong.163 A legislative authority should consider the gravity or
seriousness of the harm, as well as the likelihood or probability of the harm. The case for
criminalisation strengthens the greater the gravity or seriousness, and likelihood or probability of the
harm.164
If remote harms can be imputed back to the defendant, it is appropriate to criminalise remote harms.
Remote harms include those resulting from “conduct the riskiness of which depends on the existence
of a contingency”,165 such as a prohibition of high blood-alcohol level when driving; “conduct which
has no ill consequences in itself, but which is thought to induce or lead to further acts… that create
or risk harm”,166 such as gun possession; and conduct which only results in harm when “combined
with similar acts of others”,167 such as pollution caused by dumping garbage into water systems. The
defendant may be in a situation where they sought to assist or encourage the conduct of others
which directly caused the harm. In such situations, it must be clear that the conduct in question is
linked to the subsequent harm.168
160 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 10.
161 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76, p. 34.
162 Ibid., p. 10-11; Wilson, supra note 141, p. 24; Gross, supra note 143 pp. 116-122.
163 Simester and Sullivan, ibid., p. 12, see fn. 33. See also D.N. Husak, 'Limitations on Criminalization and the
General Part of Criminal Law', in Shute and Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General
Part, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), p. 27 "only conduct worthy of condemnation may be punished".
164 Wilson, supra note 141, p. 22.
165 A. von Hirsch, 'Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and Fair Imputation', in Simester and Smith
(eds.), Harm and Culpability, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996), 259-276, p. 263.
166 Ibid., p. 264.
167 Ibid., p. 265.
168 Wilson, supra note 141, p. 28-29.
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2.3.1.2. Paternalism
The theory of paternalism aims to prevent harm to oneself.
“It is always a good reason in support of a prohibition that it is probably necessary to prevent
harm (physical, psychological, or economic) to the actor himself.”
169
This involves preventing the offender from committing certain acts for their own sake; acts which will
result in harm to the offender. Feinberg refers to paternalism as a category of harm, ‘harm to self’,
but others categorise paternalism as a stand-alone principle separate from harm.170 Paternalistic laws
cover the prohibition of such behaviour as suicide, euthanasia, and possession and use of drugs, and
the positive obligation to wear a seatbelt.171
There is generally considered to be two categories of paternalism- hard and soft paternalism. Hard
paternalism justifies criminalisation on the basis that “it is necessary to protect competent adults,
against their will, from the harmful consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and
undertakings”.172 Soft paternalism reasons that criminalisation is justified “to prevent self-regarding
harmful conduct… when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when
temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not”.173
Some theorists such as Mill argue that paternalism is not an appropriate reason for criminalisation.
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear... because in the
opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right.”
174
While Feinberg argues that “hard paternalistic justification of any restriction of personal liberty is
especially offensive morally, because it invades the realm of personal autonomy”,175 a certain degree
of paternalistic notions is acceptable as reasoning in criminalisation. An argument for criminalisation
169 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76, pp. 26-7.
170 Feinberg, Harm to Self, supra note 154; Persak, supra note 152, p. 17.
171 Persak, supra note 152., p. 13.
172 Feinberg, Harm to Self, supra note 154, p. 12.
173 Ibid.
174 Mill, supra note 157.
175 Feinberg, Harm to Self, p. 25. Feinberg does not support paternalism, and presents the theory that soft
paternalism is in fact ‘anti-paternalism’. Feinberg, Harm to Self, supra note 154, p. 15.
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based on paternalistic reasons must “show why it is justified to coerce D and promote her welfare at
the expense of her autonomy”.176 Thus, paternalistic arguments should not be applied liberally and
wantonly, but cautiously and infrequently.177
2.3.1.3. Offence to Others
Another identified basis for criminalisation is that of the offence principle, and is defined by Feinberg
as follows:
“It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is probably
necessary to prevent serious offense to persons other than the actor and would probably be an
effective means to that end if enacted.”
178
The offence principle cannot be satisfied by mere evil or unpleasant conduct. The conduct in
question must cause serious offence to a large enough portion of society. Hence the pervasiveness
and the intensity of the offence should be measured. If behaviour is easily avoidable by those who
would be affronted by it, there is less argument for criminalisation. Following the principle of
freedom of expression, “the broader social impact of the conduct is also considered”.179 Thus, if
conduct has a general social usefulness, there is less support for criminalisation. Simester and
Sullivan argue beyond Feinberg’s definition, that the offensive behaviour must also be wrongful.180
“What makes offensive conduct wrong... is that it treats other persons with a gross lack of
consideration or respect”.181 Thus, offensive conduct conveys a lack of consideration or respect for
and to the victim.
2.3.2. Other Factors in Criminalisation: Individual Liberties,
Alternative Measures and Practical Issues
Aside from these factors, it must always be considered whether criminalisation of the behaviour in
question intrudes too much upon individual liberties and autonomy. “[I]f the law is to respect the
right of citizens to control their own lives, it should not deprive them of that control without good
176 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 19.
177 Husak, supra note 163, p. 34.
178 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76, p. 26.
179 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 15.
180 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
181 Ibid., p. 16.
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reason.”182 Criminal prohibitions are necessary to protect society from harm, but must not reach so
far as to restrict the individual’s right to liberty. Individual welfare and liberty must be balanced
against the seriousness of the harm itself and the probability of the harm, as well as the collective
welfare of society, and the final decision must support individual autonomy.183
Before any conduct is criminalised, alternative measures to criminal sanctions should be examined.
Only if another form of regulation not amounting to criminalisation has proven to be or would be
ineffective in preventing or regulating the conduct in question should criminalisation be an option.
The law must exist only “to achieve a compelling government purpose... and the law must be
necessary to accomplish that purpose. A law is not necessary unless it is the least restrictive means to
attain its objective.”184 Thus, offences should be created only where absolutely necessary-
criminalisation should be the ultima ratio, the last resort for preventing anti-social behaviour.
Practical issues should also be addressed. Is the offence structured narrowly enough to clearly state
what conduct is prohibited? Is the offence capable of being policed, enforced and prosecuted by the
various actors in the law enforcement and legal systems? Factors such as to what extent a crime is
able to be detected, the cost of enforcement, and the comparative balance of effectiveness of
policing the offence and the prevention of the offence should all be considered.
This section has discussed the general principles of criminalisation. In the following section of this
chapter, these principles will be applied to the topic in question, whether prostitution-related
activities and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers should be criminalised.
2.4. Reasons for Criminalisation of Prostitution-related
Activities and Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers
The previous section has demonstrated the principles of criminalisation. How then are these applied
to prostitution-related activities and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers? Why should such conduct
be criminalised? This section of the chapter will firstly look at the obligations of states under
182 Ibid., p. 7. See also Wilson, supra note 141, pp. 18-19; and Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note 76, p. 9.
183 Wilson, supra note 141, pp. 38- 42.
184 Husak, supra note 163, pp. 22, 36.
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international law to criminalise violence against women. However whether states are required to
uphold human rights obligations outside the territory of the state then becomes an issue. Hence
secondly the section will examine the extraterritorial application of human rights; analysing case law
of international and regional bodies. The third and fourth sub-sections will consider the principles of
harm to others and paternalism resulting from sexual exploitation and prostitution-related activities
by peacekeepers. Finally, codes of conduct as alternative forms of regulation will be appraised.
2.4.1. States’ Obligations to Criminalise Violence against Women
“Impunity for violence against women compounds the effects of such violence as a mechanism of
control. When the State fails to hold the perpetrators accountable, impunity not only intensifies
the subordination and powerlessness of the targets of violence, but also sends a message to
society that male violence against women is both acceptable and inevitable. As a result, patterns
of violent behaviour are normalised... State inaction with regard to the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system has particularly corrosive effects as impunity for acts of violence against
women encourages further violence and reinforces women’s subordination.”
185
States have a responsibility under international law to criminalise violence against women. Failure to
do so is a violation of obligations to prevent, punish, and investigate acts of violence, and to provide
remedy for violence perpetrated against women. This failure may result in state accountability to one
of the human rights bodies.
At the level of customary law, states have an obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent harm
committed by both state and private actors.186 This principle was stated in the case of Alabama
Claims (U.S. v Gr. Brit.) in 1872,187 and is now supported by a wealth of international instruments that
impose the duty on states to prevent harm through legislative and other means, as well as case law
that supports the capacity of human rights bodies to enforce accountability for this duty.188
185 Report of the Secretary-General on violence against women, supra note 118, paras. 76 & 96.
186 R.J. Cook, ‘Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors’, 25
Stud. Transnat’l Legal Pol’y (1993), pp. 97-98.
187 Alabama Claims (U.S. v Gr. Brit.), 3 Geneva Arb. 8 (1872).
188 See following discussion.
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There are several international and regional instruments which obligate states to criminalise violence
against women, whether directly or more generally:189 the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);190 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR);191 the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol);192 American Convention on Human Rights (the
American Convention);193 the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará);194 the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Protocol);195 and
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).196
CEDAW is the most prominent and wide-ranging source of the obligation to criminalise trafficking,
and exploitation of prostitution of women, as it is an international rather than regional instrument.197
The Convention has 185 state parties, including Australia.198 Notably and surprisingly, given the
strong feminist movement in the United States, the US is not a state party. Article 6 obliges all
“States Parties [to] take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic
in women and exploitation of prostitution of women”.
189 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) and its Optional Protocol contain many provisions
relating to criminalisation of activities such as sexual exploitation, sale of children, prostitution and pornography
in relation to children, which covers the girl child. However, this Convention will not be discussed in this thesis.
CROC, 1577 UNTS 3, entered into force 2 September 1990.
190 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res. 34/180, A/34/46,
entered into force 3 September 1981.
191 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976.
192 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, GA RES. 25, annex II,
A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered into force 25 December 2003.
193 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 18
July 1978.
194 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 33
ILM 1534 (1994), entered into force 5 March 1995.
195 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
CAB/LEG/66.6, 13 September 2000.
196 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (ETS 5), 213 UNTS
222, entered into force 3 September 1953.
197 See Cook, ‘Accountability in International Law’, supra note 186, pp. 94-116.
198 Australia became a state party in 1982. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm.
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The ICCPR prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, slavery, servitude and
compulsory or forced labour.199 Australia and the US are parties to the ICCPR. Under Article 2(2) of
the ICCPR, state parties must “where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures... adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognised in the present Covenant”. Furthermore, each state party to the Covenant must “ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity,” and “ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”.200
There is also a mechanism to ensure state accountability for violations of this obligation. State parties
are required to report to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) on “measures taken to eliminate
trafficking of women and children, within the country or across borders, and forced prostitution.
They must also provide information on measures taken to protect women and children, including
foreign women and children, from slavery...”201 There is also a requirement to provide the HRC with
“the provisions of their criminal law which penalize torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment, specifying the penalties applicable to such acts, whether committed by
public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons. Those who
violate article 7, whether by encouraging, ordering, tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts,
must be held responsible.”
202
Thus there is an international obligation on state parties to criminalise and punish torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment, slavery, servitude and forced labour, the definitions of which can
be structured to include trafficking, sexual slavery, sexual exploitation and forced prostitution.
Article 5 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (known as the Palermo Protocol) imposes a specific obligation to criminalise trafficking
in persons:
199 ICCPR, Articles 7 & 8.
200 ICCPR, Article 2(3)(a) and (c).
201 ICCPR General Comment 28 (68th session, 2000): Article 3: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women,
A/55/40 vol. I (2000) 133 at para. 12.
202 ICCPR General Comment 20 (Forty-fourth session, 1992): Article 7: Concerning Prohibition of Torture and
Cruel Treatment or Punishment, A/47/40 (1992) 193, para. 13.
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Criminalization
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this Protocol, when committed
intentionally.
Article 5(2) also requires the criminalisation of attempt, acting as an accomplice, and organising or
directing other persons to commit an offence.
While this is a relatively new Protocol, and has only been in force since late 2003, Australia and the
US ratified the Protocol in late 2005.203 This has given both countries time to enact criminal
legislation prohibiting trafficking-related offences, as per their obligation under the Palermo
Protocol.204 In particular, Article 5(2)(b), requiring criminalisation of accomplice participation, is
particularly relevant. The requirement can be interpreted widely by states to encompass behaviour
that includes patronising brothels where trafficked women work as prostitutes.205
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in General Comment 4 confirmed the “obligation of States
parties to enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of sexual exploitation and related
trafficking”.206 While the General Comment dealt specifically with adolescents, the statement of the
Committee is notable in that it obliges state parties to criminalise all forms of sexual exploitation and
related trafficking, and not just exploitation relating to adolescents or children. However, the
mandate of the Committee on the Rights of the Child is restricted to only issues falling under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and thus imposing obligations relating to adults is outside the
ambit of the Committee. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has 193 state parties, more than
any other international human rights convention.207
203 Entry into force 25 December 2003. The Protocol has 135 state parties as of 4 January 2010.
204 See infra for discussion of national criminal laws.
205 See discussion supra about the link between patronising brothels and trafficking.
206 CRC General Comment 4 (33rd session, 2003): Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, A/59/41 (2004) 102 at para. 37; CROC Article 34.
207 As of 4 January 2010. Somalia and the United States are the only states to have signed but not ratified the
CROC.
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At regional level, the American Convention on Human Rights imposes upon state parties an
obligation to respect the rights within the convention.208 Such rights include freedom from slavery
and forced labour, prohibition of trafficking in women, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, and the rights to life and liberty.209 It also requires state parties,
“[w]here the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already
ensured by legislative or other provisions... to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional
processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”
210
In the Velasquez Rodriguez case,211 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the Court
could compel a state to ensure the fulfilment of rights under the American Convention, and
discussed in detail the obligations of state parties in relation to ensuring full enjoyment of
Convention Rights. The Court held that state parties had a
“fundamental duty to respect and guarantee the rights recognized in the Convention. Any
impairment of those rights which can be attributed under the rules of international law to the
action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which
assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention.”
212
This ruling indicates that a state party to the American Convention could be held accountable before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for not enacting and enforcing legislation criminalising
trafficking in women, sexual exploitation, and prostitution-related activities by peacekeeping
personnel. This accountability could be two-fold: firstly, under the state’s obligation to respect and
guarantee Convention rights.
“As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore
the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the
violation.... An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable
208 American Convention, Article 1 Obligation to Respect Rights. The United States is not a party to the
American Convention on Human Rights.
209 American Convention, Article 4 Right to Life; Article 5 Right to Humane Treatment; Article 6 Freedom from
Slavery (specifically covers trafficking in women); Article 7 Right to Personal Liberty.
210 American Convention, Article 2 Domestic Legal Effects.
211 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
212 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, para. 164.
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to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person
responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to
respond to it as required by the Convention... This duty to prevent includes all those means of a
legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights
and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead
to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for
damages.”
213
As well as prevention, state parties are obligated to investigate all violations of convention rights.
The failure of state party to punish the violation and restore the victim’s enjoyment of rights
amounts to a failure “to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to
the persons within its jurisdiction”.214
The Inter-American Court specified that the duty to investigate “is not breached merely because the
investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.”215 The investigation must be
undertaken by the state rather than the victim or the victim’s family. The Inter-American Court held
that “[w]here the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated,
those parties are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the
international plane.”216
The second category of accountability arises from the fact that peacekeeping personnel could be
considered actors of ‘public authority’ or “persons who use their position of authority”217 and thus
their actions would be imputable to the state.218
The Convention of Belém do Pará219 deals in detail with the duties of states in relation to state law
preventing and punishing violence against women, and covers criminalisation of any crimes of
violence against women by peacekeeping personnel:
213 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, paras. 166, 172 & 175.
214 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, para. 176.
215 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, para. 177.
216 Ibid.
217 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, para. 172.
218 See infra Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights for further discussion.
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The States Parties condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, by all
appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence
and undertake to:
1. refrain from engaging in any act or practice of violence against women and to ensure that
their authorities, officials, personnel, agents, and institutions act in conformity with this
obligation;
2. apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against women;
3. include in their domestic legislation penal, civil, administrative and any other type of
provisions that may be needed to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women and to
adopt appropriate administrative measures where necessary;
4. adopt legal measures to require the perpetrator to refrain from harassing, intimidating or
threatening the woman or using any method that harms or endangers her life or integrity, or
damages her property;
5. take all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to amend or repeal existing
laws and regulations or to modify legal or customary practices which sustain the persistence and
tolerance of violence against women;
6. establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence
which include, among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and effective access to such
procedures;
7. establish the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women
subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, reparations or other just and effective
remedies; and
8. adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to this
Convention.
220
Fulfilment of obligations under this convention would mean state parties such as Haiti enacting
legislation to enable prosecution of peacekeeping personnel for such crimes committed within the
territory of Haiti.221
219 The United States is not a state party to the Convention of Belém do Pará.
220 Convention of Belem do Para, Article 7 (Duties of States).
221 There have been allegations surrounding peacekeeping personnel within MINUSTAH, (United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti) concerning sexual exploitation and patronising of prostitutes, particularly
adolescent girls; BBC Newsnight special report, ‘UN troops in abuse row’, 30 November 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/6196710.stm.
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The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
declares that
1. Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her
person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be
prohibited.
222
The African Protocol also obliges state parties to “take appropriate and effective measures to...
enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced
sex whether the violence takes place in private or public…”223 African countries with a PSO in their
territory should be encouraged to ratify the African Protocol and subsequently fulfil the obligations,
enacting legislation that specifically allows for jurisdiction over visiting mission personnel for violence
against women.
The European Convention on Human Rights guarantees such rights as the right to family and private
life, the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, the prohibition of slavery and
forced labour, and the right to liberty and security. All state parties are under the obligation “to
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention”.224 Implementation of this obligation has been clarified by the European Court of Human
Rights. In the case of X and Y v the Netherlands, the Court found that civil remedies are insufficient
for the prevention of sexual abuse, and that criminal law is required to fulfil a state’s obligation to
secure these rights under the ECHR.225
2.4.2. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights
The discussion above relating to states’ obligations to criminalise gender-based violence by
peacekeepers, and that below covering violations of rights as harms against women, show the
relevance of the protection of human rights by sending states. However, this raises the question of
222 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 4(1): The Rights to Life, Integrity and Security of the
Person.
223 Ibid., Article 4(2).
224 ECHR Article 1: Obligation to respect human rights.
225 X and Y v The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, discussing the obligation to prevent sexual abuse in relation
to Article 8.
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the extraterritorial application of human rights to invoke state responsibility and ensure the
protection of such rights during peacekeeping missions. The issue of the extraterritorial application
of human rights is one of controversy, particularly as human rights engage state responsibility. The
existence of extraterritorial application of human rights has been discussed in regional and
international case law, the findings of which can be applied to peacekeeping personnel.
Jurisdiction of a state is the power of that state to govern persons and property; prescriptive
jurisdiction is the right to prescribe laws, and enforcement jurisdiction is the power to enforce such
laws.226 Jurisdiction has traditionally been viewed as linked to state sovereignty, and is territorial.227
However, it is also accepted that, provided there is no specific rule to the contrary, jurisdiction may
be enacted extra-territorially.228
2.4.2.1. International case law
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that, with the exception of the permitted
derogation of certain provisions under Article 4, “the protection of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war”.229 The Court affirmed this in 2004 in
the Israel Wall Advisory Opinion: “More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict”.230 The Court went on to
specifically address extraterritorial application of the ICCPR:
“The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may
sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the
[ICCPR], it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, State parties to the Covenant
should be bound to comply with its provisions… the drafter of the Covenant did not intend to
226 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 299;
M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, Cases And Materials On International Law, 4th ed., (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2003), p. 268; D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, London
2004), p. 265.
227 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, France v Turkey, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (Lotus Case), pp. 18, 20; Dixon
and McCorquodale, ibid., p. 268.
228 Lotus Case, pp. 19, 20.
229 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para.
25.
230 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Reports 2004, p. 178, para. 106.
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allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their
national territory.”
231
It was the Court’s final conclusion that the ICCPR “is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in
the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”.232 A state is not to “raise any obstacle to the
exercise of such rights”.233
A year later in the contentious decision of DRC v Uganda,234 the Court held that Uganda had failed to
“comply with its obligations as an occupying Power… in respect of violations of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law in the occupied territory”.235 However, the ruling
indicates that the responsibility extended to violations committed not only in occupied territory,
determining Uganda to be responsible for violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law committed by Ugandan soldiers in the territory of the DRC.236 This
was based on the fact that the “conduct of individual soldiers and officers… is to be considered as the
conduct of a State organ… a party to an armed conflict shall be responsible for all acts by persons
forming part of its armed forces”.237 The Court held that the conduct of the Ugandan soldiers was
attributable to Uganda “by virtue of [their] military status and function”.238 According to the Court’s
reasoning, a state would be accountable and responsible for human rights violations committed by
its military and police whilst involved in a peacekeeping mission, as even though the mission is multi-
national under the auspices of the UN, soldiers and police officers remain under the flag of their
sending state. That is, the state retains a certain degree of control over their military personnel239 -
including jurisdiction.
231 Ibid., p. 179, para. 109.
232 Ibid., p. 180, para. 111.
233 Ibid., p. 181, para. 112.
234 Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Uganda), 19 December 2005, General List No. 116.
235 Ibid., para. 220.
236 That is, not just the occupied territory; ibid.
237 Ibid., paras. 213-214.
238 Ibid., para. 213.
239 J. Cerone, 'Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations' (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1447-
1510, p. 1457.
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The finding most relevant to the extraterritorial application of human rights during peacekeeping
missions is found in General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee (HRC). In relation to
the ICCPR, the HRC found that
“a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the
power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party… This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a
State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.”
240
The HRC also found in the case of Lopez Burgos v Uruguay that state parties could be held
responsible for violations of ICCPR rights committed by state agents outside the territory of the state
party, “whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it”.241 The
HRC determined “it would be unconscionable to interpret the responsibility under article 2… as to
permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory”.242 The Third Periodic Report of Belgium
before the HRC in 1998 demonstrated that state practice is to apply human rights and to maintain
jurisdiction, as Belgium had done in the prosecution of individual peacekeepers who committed
human rights violations during their service in Somalia.243
2.4.2.2. Regional case law
The extraterritorial application of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the
American Declaration) has been addressed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) in two 1999 cases, Coard v United States244and Alejandre v Cuba.245 In Alejandre, the IACHR
240 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80] The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, (emphasis added).
241 Delia Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984), para. 12.
242 Ibid.
243 Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 1707th Meeting, CCPR/C/SR.1707, 27 October 1998,
para. 22. A similar finding was made with regards to Italy and crimes committed by its peacekeepers in Somalia;
Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the 1680th Meeting, CCPR/C/SR.1680, 24 September 1998,
para. 22.
244 Coard et al. v United States, Case No. 10.951, Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999.
245 Alejandre et al. v Cuba, Report No. 86/99, 29 September 1999.
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held that Cuba was responsible for the actions of Cuban military pilots for the shooting down of two
civilian aircraft over international waters. The IACHR stated:
“[U]nder certain circumstances the Commission is competent to consider reports alleging that
agents of an OAS member state have violated human rights protected in the inter-American
system, even when the events take place outside the territory of that state. In fact, the
Commission would point out that, in certain cases, the exercise of its jurisdiction over
extraterritorial events is not only consistent with but required by the applicable rules… Because
individual rights are inherent to the human being, all the American states are obligated to respect
the protected rights of any person subject to their jurisdiction. Although this usually refers to
persons who are within the territory of a state, in certain instances it can refer to extraterritorial
actions, when the person is present in the territory of a state but subject to the control of
another state, generally through the actions of that state’s agents abroad.”
246
The IACHR held that it had jurisdiction over the case even though the events took place outside the
territory of Cuba, because “when agents of a state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and
authority over persons outside national territory, the state’s obligation to respect human rights
continues- in this case the rights enshrined in the American Declaration”.247
This line of reasoning was also applied in Coard, where the IACHR held that the jurisdiction of the
Commission over extraterritorial acts is not only “consistent with but required by the norms which
pertain”, including during times of armed conflict.248
The best known case from European human rights law is that of Bankovic et ors v Belgium et ors,249 a
2001 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)- best known because it seen as
controversial, and even departing from other ECtHR case law.250 In Bankovic, the Grand Chamber
held that the case was not admissible, as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) did not
246 Ibid., para. 23 (emphasis added).
247 Ibid., para. 25.
248 Coard, paras. 37, 39.
249 Bankovic et ors v Belgium and 16 other contracting states (Admissibility), Application no. 52207/99,
Decision of the Grand Chamber 12 December 2001.
250 K. Altiparmak, 'Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in
Iraq?' (2004) 9 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 213-251; R. Lawson, 'Life after Bankovic: On the
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights', in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.),
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, (Intersentia, Antwerp & Oxford 2004), 83-124, pp. 109-
116; Cerone, ‘Human Dignity’, supra note 239, pp. 1481-1494; S. Miller, ' Revisiting Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention' (2010) 20
(4) European Journal of International Law 1223-1246, pp. 1226-1230.
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apply extraterritorially in the case at hand. The case was brought by victims and relatives of victims
of a NATO bombing of a radio and television building in Belgrade, Serbia, who claimed that, in
conducting the air strike, the NATO states had violated their human rights obligations. The Grand
Chamber held that state jurisdiction is primarily territorial, and that the wording of Article 1 of the
ECHR indicated that the Convention was to “reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of
jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the
particular circumstances of each case”.251 It was considered that exceptional circumstances including
those such as occupation were necessary to invoke extraterritorial application of the ECHR, and
required a state to exercise effective control over the territory in question,252 and those exceptional
circumstances did not exist according to the facts of Bankovic.253
Other cases of the ECtHR have found a broader application of the ECHR. In Drozd v France, the ECtHR
held that jurisdiction is not limited to the territory of a state party; and the responsibility of a state
party “can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own
territory”.254 The ECtHR applied this same finding in Loizidou v Turkey, and gave an example of the
responsibility of a state party being triggered by military action resulting in the exercise of “effective
control of an area outside its national territory”.255 The 2004 case of Issa v Turkey continued this
flexible approach to the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, holding that “a State may also be
held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the
251 Bankovic, para. 61.
252 Ibid. paras. 67-73.
253 Ibid., paras. 74-82.
254 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, Application no. 12747/87, Judgment 26 June 1992, para. 91. The
Court referenced multiple other ECtHR cases to support this finding: “(see the Commission’s decisions on the
admissibility of applications no. 1611/62, X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 25 September 1965, Yearbook,
vol. 8, p. 158; no. 6231/73, Hess v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1975, Decisions and Reports (DR) no. 2, p. 72;
nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Cyprus v. Turkey, 26 May 1975, DR 2, p. 125; nos. 7289/75 and 7349/76, X and Y v.
Switzerland, 14 July 1977, DR 9, p. 57; no. 9348/81, W. v. the United Kingdom, 28 February 1983, DR 32, p.
190).” See Miller, supra note 250, pp. 1240-1242.
255 Loizidou v Turkey, Application no. 15318/89, Judgment 18 December 1996, para. 52.
55
territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control
through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully - in the latter State”.256
In 2007, the ECtHR considered simultaneously the admissibility of two cases, Behrami and Seramati,
which included discussion on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR during multi-national peace
missions, both NATO and UN.257 KFOR and UNMIK were the relevant missions. The ECtHR considered
it
“essential to recall at this point that [although NATO command of operational matters was
‘effective’],
258
the necessary… donation of troops by willing TCNs [troop contributing nations]
means that, in practice, those TCNs retain some authority over those troops (for reasons, inter
alia, of safety, discipline and accountability) and certain obligations in their regard (material
provision including uniforms and equipment). NATO’s command of operational matters was not
therefore intended to be exclusive.”
259
However, the ECtHR ultimately found both KFOR (with powers delegated by the Security Council) and
UNMIK (as a subsidiary organ of the UN created by the Security Council) to be under the ultimate
command of the Security Council for operational matters, and consequently the actions and
omissions in question to be attributable to the UN according to the wording of the ILC Draft Articles
on the Responsibility of International Organisations.260 It was held that the relevant acts and
omissions could thus not be attributable to the respondent state parties, and “moreover, did not
take place on the territory of those States or by virtue of a decision of their authorities”, as a
consequence of which the case was declared inadmissible.261
2.4.2.3. Application to Peace Support Operations
It is the case in the majority of peacekeeping operations that the operation is required “to administer
interim justice either independently of, or in conjunction with, the host state because local
256 Issa et ors v Turkey, Application no. 31821/96, Judgment 16 November 2004, para. 71.
257 Behrami and Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, Application Nos. 7412/01 and
78166/01, Decision of the Grand Chamber 2 May 2007.
258 Ibid., para. 139 and 140.
259 Ibid., para. 138.
260 Ibid., paras. 140-143, 151. The facts of the cases concerned the death and injury of young boys due to
undetonated cluster bomb units (Behrami, paras. 5, 61); and alleged unlawful detention and lack of access to
court (Saramati, paras. 8-17, 62).
261 Ibid., para. 151.
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authorities are unwilling or unable to exercise law and order functions”.262 Such duties in maintaining
law and order may include re-establishing rule of law, ensuring the criminal justice system is
functional, training local police and military personnel, and assisting the government with functional
duties.263 Such power or effective control has been exercised in many operations, including but not
limited to East Timor, Egypt, West Irian, Congo, Cambodia, Somalia, Kosovo, and Iraq.264
Peacekeepers are at times involved in operations that exercise effective control, and public powers
that are normally exercised by the government. Some operations operate as transitional
administrative authorities, replacing the government temporarily.265 In such situations, human rights
obligations apply extraterritorially.
It is, however, significant that the emphasis of the human rights bodies, with the exception of the
Bankovic decision, has been that effective control over persons (and property) is sufficient for human
rights obligations to be engaged, and that the effective control does not need to be over territory.266
In Lopez Burgos, the HRC specified that the relevant relationship is not “to the place where the
violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred”.267 In Öcalan v
Turkey, the ECtHR held that Öcalan was under effective Turkish authority and control as soon as the
Kenyan authorities handed him over to the Turkish officials.268
262 B.M. Oswald, 'Model Codes for Criminal Justice and Peace Operations: Some Legal Issues' (2004) 9 (2)
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 253-275, p. 253.
263 Ibid., pp. 253-254.
264 Ibid.
265 Such as the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), or the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC).
266 This also distinguishes the application of human rights law from the application of the law of occupation. E.-
C. Gillard, 'International Humanitarian Law and Extraterritorial State Conduct', in Coomans and Kamminga
(eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, (Intersentia, Antwerp & Oxford 2004), 25-40, p.
33; M. Scheinin, 'Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', in Coomans
and Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, (Intersentia, Antwerp & Oxford
2004), 73-82, p. 76; Lawson, supra note 250, pp. 95 & 98; D. Cassel, 'Extraterritorial Application of Inter-
American Human Rights Instruments', in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Treaties, (Intersentia, Antwerp & Oxford 2004), 175-182, p. 177.
267 Lopez Burgos, para. 12.2.
268 Öcalan v Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, Judgment 12 March 2003, para. 93. This confirmed an earlier
decision by the European Commission on Human Rights that authorised agents remain under the jurisdiction of a
state when outside that state’s territory, and bring other persons under the jurisdiction of that state when they
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Even without the exercise of effective control, it would be contrary to the purpose of the ICCPR to
permit a state party (through its peacekeepers as state agents) to perpetrate rights violations, even
without the acquiescence of the state, simply because those violations were committed outside that
state’s territory. Again, the authority of the sending state in relation to discipline and accountability
is pertinent. The sending state has the responsibility to discipline and hold accountable perpetrators
of violations as part of its human rights obligations, because “the responsibility of the state is
engaged ‘insofar as’ state agents affect person or property”.269 Following the rulings of the various
human rights bodies, which would deem a victim of sexual exploitation to be in the control or
authority of a peacekeeper, who is a state agent, commission of a human rights violation by a
peacekeeper produces a “direct and immediate link between the extraterritorial conduct of a state
and the alleged violation of an individual’s rights”.270
Given the fact that international humanitarian law (and/or the law of occupation) does not always
apply during a peace support operation,271 human rights must apply to an operation in order to avoid
a vacuum of rights protections for the local population. It is not expected that states secure all rights
and freedoms, but they must take measures within the scope of their powers to avoid violations.272
However, such expectations of preventing violations are higher in relation to fundamental rights such
as the right to life, and the right to freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, due
to the fact that these are non-derogable rights.
The circumstances of the European cases of Behrami and Saramati can be distinguished from a case
of gender-based crime committed by a peacekeeper. The violations alleged in the case were
exercise authority over such persons; Stocké v the Federal Republic of Germany, Application no. 11755/85,
Report of the Commission adopted 12 October 1989, para. 166.
269 Lawson, supra note 250, p. 105.
270 Ibid., p. 104.
271 G. Porretto and S. Vité, 'The application of international humanitarian law and human rights law to
international organisations' (University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 2006) 1, p. 53.
Administrative and policing work is not armed conflict, even as regards duties such as crowd and riot control,
and therefore IHL is not applicable in a situation where the mission only entails such work, even if carried out
my military forces; ibid, p. 55. See e.g. the work of the first all-female peacekeeping unit working in Liberia
UNMIL; T. McConnell, 'All-female unit keeps peace in Liberia', The Christian Science Monitor, (2007) See also
discussion infra, Chapter 5, War Crimes.
272 Lawson, supra note 250, pp. 106-7, 120.
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attributable to official operational acts or omissions- that is, the failure of mission personnel to
adequately fulfil their task of cluster bomb clearance, and the actions taken through the arrest,
detention and trial of Saramati under the mission’s authority. In contrast, an act of rape, sexual
exploitation or sexual slavery is not an act or omission committed as part of the operation, and
therefore cannot be said to be only attributable to the UN in its operational command capacity. As
the ECtHR stated, ‘safety, disciplinary and accountability’ authority for military and police personnel
rests with the sending state. The ECtHR found the UN to hold ultimate authority- and thus,
responsibility- only over operational decisions, but not over those relating to safety, discipline and
accountability. This delineates the areas of responsibility, demonstrating that state parties would be
likely to be considered responsible for rights violations by military personnel amounting to crimes,
especially when committed outside the realm of operational authority.
Applying the reasoning of decisions made by regional and international human rights bodies, a
sending state remains obligated to ensure rights enshrined in the relevant instrument stay protected,
as military personnel are agents of the sending state whose actions produce effects in the territory of
the host state.
2.4.3. Harm to Others- Violations of Rights as Harms against
Women
It has been demonstrated above that states have obligations to criminalise violence against women.
It has also been shown that human rights have extraterritorial application over peacekeeping
personnel under the jurisdiction of the sending state. What must now be examined are the harms
against women that result from prostitution and sexual exploitation. These harms amount to
violations of human rights, and such violations are, to apply the criminalisation terminology used
supra,273 set-backs to internationally protected interests. Such violations impair the opportunities of
these women “to engage in worthwhile activities and relationships, and to pursue valuable, self-
273 See supra text accompanying notes 159-162.
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chosen, goals”.274 Quality of life for these women is significantly reduced, and the physical integrity
and well-being of the women are affected.275 This section will explore some of the different harms
experienced by women as victims of prostitution and sexual exploitation, presenting them as
violation of human rights.
One significant argument for the criminalisation of prostitution-related activities and sexual
exploitation is the link to trafficking that such behaviour perpetrates. Increased demand in
prostitution services and increased sexual exploitation of local women results in an augmentation of
trafficking, enforced prostitution and sexual slavery,276 categories of violence against women that are
recognised as criminal conduct.277 Trafficking engages organised crime syndicates, as networks of
people work together to move women from one place to another, whether within one country or
across state borders.278 It also encourages corruption in law enforcement officials working in a failed
state.279 At a 2002 US House of Representatives hearing on the issue of sexual slavery in Bosnia, a
former UN human rights investigator gave a statement that “the trafficking and forced prostitution
trade is not separate from a ‘legitimate’ prostitution trade… anyone who is patronizing prostitution
in Bosnia is supporting the sex slave trade”.280
274 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 10.
275 J. O'Connell Davidson, 'The Rights and Wrongs of Prostitution' (2002) 17 (2) Hypatia 84-98, p. 94.
276 ‘So does it mean we have the rights?’, supra note 92; sex work is linked to organised crime in general, see
Unclassified cable, subject: Trafficking in women: turning a blind eye?, Doc_Nbr: 2000SARAJE09710, Oct
2000, Date/Case ID: 11 Aug 2003 200102920 available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/bosnia/1000cable.pdf.
277 See e.g. Articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002.
278 Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations,
Second Session, 'The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade in Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger Problem in the U.N.
System?' (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 24 April 2002) Document No. 107-85; M.
Vandenberg, 'Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for
Forced Prostitution' (Human Rights Watch, New York, November 2002) Vol. 14, No. 9 (D), IV. Women’s and
Girls’ Experiences of Trafficking into the Bosnian Sex Industry, pp. 15-21; 'Trafficking, Slavery and
Peacekeeping: The Need for a Comprehensive Training Program. A Conference Report.' (Transnational Crime
and Corruption Centre & UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Turin, 9-10 May 2002) , pp. 9-
10; Mendelson, supra note 99, pp. 14-17.
279 ‘Hopes Betrayed’, ibid., VI. Local Police Involvement in Trafficking, pp. 26-35.
280 ‘The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade in Bosnia’, supra note 278, Prepared Statement of David Lamb, former
UN human rights investigator in Bosnia, p. 32.
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Prostitution is a supply-demand enterprise.281 Thus, it is incongruous to criminalise all aspects of
trafficking (trafficking itself, selling of girls and women, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery and
sometimes procurement), if the clientele remain free to participate without fear of consequences.282
This situation produces a situation of inequity, where the women and girls are victimised many times
over, (sometimes resulting in their facing criminal charges for prostitution, and if applicable,
deportation),283 while the male clients act with impunity.284 Aside from the aim of reducing
prostitution activities in general, criminalising prostitution-related activities by peacekeepers can
thus effectively be a form of prevention of trafficking.285
However, it is not only the link to other crimes such as trafficking that demonstrates the need to
criminalise prostitution activities by peacekeepers. Whether trafficked or not, the effect of
prostitution and sexual exploitation on its victims is most vital to the argument in favour of
criminalisation. Working in prostitution and being subject to sexual exploitation in PSO areas is a
situation of violence against these women, which will be explored below. The growth of the sex
industry in mission areas is one reason why prostitution activities such as procurement and
patronisation should be criminalised for peacekeeping personnel, in order to stop the commercial
sex trade.286
281 O’Connell Davison, supra note 275, p. 91; M.M. Dempsey, 'Rethinking Wolfenden: Prostitute-Use, Criminal
Law, and Remote Harm' (2005) June Criminal Law Review 444-455, p. 453; Allred, ‘Peacekeepers and
Prostitutes’, supra note 89.
282 Allred, ‘Human Trafficking’, supra note 109.
283 ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’, supra note 92, pp. 20-21.
284 D. Pallen, 'Sexual Slavery in Bosnia: The Negative Externality of the Market for Peace' (2003) XIII (1)
Swords & Ploughshares 27-43; J. Murray, 'Who Will Police the Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish
Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina' (2003) 34 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 475-527; Secretary-General,
'In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: Report of the Secretary-General' (United Nations
General Assembly, 6 July 2006) A/61/122/Add.1; J. Halley, et al., 'From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism' (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 335-423.
285 M. Noone, 'The U.S. Approach to Combating Trafficking in Women: Prosecuting Military Customers. Could
it Be Exported?' (2005) IV (4) The Quarterly Journal 81-89; Halley et al, ibid; B. Oswald and S. Finnin,
'Combating the Trafficking of Persons on Peace Operations' (2006) 10 International Peacekeeping: The
Yearbook of International Peace Operations 1-32.
286 Allred, supra note 281; Noone, ibid.; Halley et al., ibid.
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Feminist debate has questioned whether prostitution itself- the act of providing sexual favours for
money- constitutes violence against women per se.287 Whilst this thesis makes no comments on
prostitution as violence per se, it is submitted that, in the circumstances existing in PSO areas,
prostitution is violence against women. Prostitution in these situations amounts to an extensive
amount of harms committed against women.
Prostitution and sexual exploitation violate a large number of the rights of the women and girls
concerned, significantly in these particular circumstances. Rights violated include rights related to
employment (such as the right to just and favourable conditions of work),288 freedom from
discrimination,289 and the rights to education,290 liberty,291 equality,292 health,293 development,294
family and marriage.295 It may include a violation of the rights to freedom from torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment,296 freedom from slavery,297 and access to justice.298 In extreme cases it
could lead to a violation of the fundamental right to life.299 Reference in this section will mainly be,
where applicable, to the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but also to other relevant instruments.
287 C. Overall, 'What's Wrong With Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work' (1992) 17 (4) Signs 705-724; C.A.
MacKinnon, 'Prostitution and Civil Rights' (1993) 1 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 13-31; S.K. Hunter,
'Prostitution is Cruelty and Abuse to Women and Children' (1993) 1 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 91-
104; and Leidholdt, supra note 85.
288 Articles 23 & 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 22 of the ICCPR; Articles
6-8 of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR); Article 11 of CEDAW.
289 CEDAW; Article 2 of the UDHR; Articles 2 & 26 of the ICCPR.
290 Article 26 of the UDHR; Article 18 of the ICCPR; Article 13 of the ICESCR; Articles 28 & 29 of the CROC;
Article 10 of CEDAW; UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education; Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the
ECHR.
291 Article 3 of the UHDR; Article 9 of the ICCPR.
292 Supra note 289.
293 Article 25 of the UHDR; Articles 11 & 12 of the ICESCR; Article 12 of CEDAW.
294 Article 11 of the ICESCR; Articles 13 & 14 of CEDAW.
295 Article 16 of the UDHR; Article 23 of the ICCPR; Article 10 of the ICESCR; Article 16 of CEDAW.
296 The CAT; Article 5 of the UDHR; Article 7 of the ICCPR.
297 Article 4 of the UHDR; Article 8 of the ICCPR; the Slavery Convention of 1953; the Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Other of 1949; the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and other relevant conventions and treaties
of 2000.
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2.4.3.1. Employment-related Rights and Freedom from Slavery
Employment related rights are violated due to the fact that women who work as prostitutes and
those who are subject to sexual exploitation are not undertaking freely chosen employment or
working under just, favourable and safe conditions of work.300 Such women often work on the street,
leaving them vulnerable to violence, as well as to the elements. Women who work in a brothel may
have a room with a bed in which to service clientele, but those on the street do not, and are risking
their safety by going to strange places with clients. There is no minimum wage structure for
prostitution, which means that the pay may be so minimal it barely enables the woman to provide
herself with a roof over her head. Should a client refuse to pay, a prostitute has no means of
recovering the lost payments. Hence, the possibility of just and favourable remuneration is remote.
Exploitation of labour is prominent in such situations.
The employment situation may be even worse if a woman is subject to the demands of a procurer.
She has even less freedom to choose when and with whom she conducts her work. She is usually
obliged to give up part of her earnings to the procurer, meaning she makes even less money. All of
these factors create an unstable, unsafe and unfair working environment.
The situation is certainly no better for women working in a brothel, especially if they are victims of
forced prostitution. These women are usually the victims of trafficking, and find themselves forced to
work as a prostitute, having sex with a very high number of clients to pay off the debt of the cost of
their purchase, with little or no pay- essentially in conditions of slavery.301 In these situations women
are coerced to stay through violence, drugs and confiscation of their passport.302 If the women are
trafficked from another country, fear of an unknown law and order system and lack of language skills
also prevent these women from seeking help. Under these circumstances, rights to freely choose
300 Articles 23 & 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 22 of the ICCPR; Articles
6-8 of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR); Article 11 of CEDA; W J.E.
Larson, 'Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights' (2004) 37 (3) U.C. Davis Law Review 673-700.
301 K.E. Nelson, 'Sex Trafficking and Forced Prostitution: Comprehensive New Legal Approaches' (2001-2) 24
Houston Journal of International Law 551-578, pp. 555-6.
302 Ibid., p. 555.
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employment (i.e. freedom from forced labour),303 to work under favourable and safe conditions, and
to just and favourable remuneration are all violated;304 as is the right to freedom from slavery.305
Women working in a brothel or for a procurer may be denied other employment-related rights as
enshrined in the UDHR, namely the rights to rest periods, leisure, reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.306 This is particularly the case in countries where prostitution is
not legalised or decriminalised, as there is no system to keep a check on employment conditions.
Brothel owners/managers and procurers are under no obligation to grant rest periods, holidays or to
ensure working hours are reasonable, and may force women to work long hours and without rest
breaks or holidays (certainly without paid holidays).
One contention that emerges in feminist debate over the legalisation of prostitution is that it
represents the freedom of a woman to choose her own occupation, including sex work.307 However,
this is not the case when it comes to prostitution in states experiencing armed conflict, law and order
instability, lack of infrastructure, and poverty. Such factors are generally present in states where
peacekeeping missions are present. Prostitution is not simply a ‘career option’ for girls and women in
these circumstances, a freely chosen form of employment, but rather a desperate way for poor girls
and women to pull themselves a level above abject poverty.308 It is not a valid choice made by these
girls and women. It is ‘survival prostitution’.309
One young prostitute in Haiti stated:
303 See Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labour, adopted on 25 June 1957 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation at its
fortieth session, entry into force, 17 January 1959.
304 Nelson, supra note 301, p. 556.
305 Article 4 of the UHDR; Article 8 of the ICCPR; the Slavery Convention of 1953; the Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Other of 1949; the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and other relevant conventions and treaties
of 2000.
306 Ibid., pp. 555-6.
307 Cooper, supra note 133, p. 109.
308 I. Talleyrand, 'Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and Abet International Trafficking
in Women' (2000) 27 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 151-176, p. 158.
309 Higate, ‘Case Studies DRC & Sierra Leone’, supra note 120, p. 15; Leidholdt, supra note 85, p. 136; Kent,
supra note 86, p. 53.
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“The poverty and the misery are so bad; you can get to the point of almost starving. You can’t
find money for clothes or somewhere to sleep. You are forced to have sex with men to get
money to eat or somewhere to sleep. At times I’ve felt so bad I’ve wanted to kill myself.”
310
2.4.3.2. Right to Education
Those who work as prostitutes or are subject to sexual exploitation or trafficking are often girls,
some quite young. As a result, a woman’s right to education is habitually violated. They are denied
the opportunity to undertake education, and thus to find themselves alternative employment.311 The
temptation or pressure to make money to assist with family expenses may seem a more realistic
option to a girl or young woman, despite the compulsory nature of elementary education and the
right to free education at the elementary and fundamental stages.312 In a 2002 report, the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) found that a majority (57%) of 168 women and girls
who had been trafficked from Moldova to Kosovo had only a basic primary education.313 Education
helps to make children and young adults less vulnerable, enabling them to be more aware of options
and opportunities in life.
Education can also have an impact on bolstering the rights to health, liberty and security, equality,
and family, and freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment.314 It can also impact on the ability
of girls and women to control and make decisions in relation to their own sexual activity, particularly
in the absence of sexual health education. The Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against
Women has found that:
“Adolescent girls and women in many countries lack adequate access to information and services
necessary to ensure sexual health. As a consequence of unequal power relations based on
310 BBC report on exploitation in Haiti by UN peacekeepers, supra note 221.
311 N. Ray, 'Looking at Trafficking Through a New Lens' (2006) 12 Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 909-927,
pp. 919-920.
312 Article 26(1) UDHR; K. Halvorsen, 'Notes on the Realization of the Human Right to Education' (1990) 12
Human Rights Quarterly 341-364, pp. 351-2.
313 IOM Kosovo, Return and Reintegration Project, Situation Report – February 2000 to September 2002, 2002,
p. 13. Cited in "So Does It Mean That We Have the Rights?", supra note 92, p. 11.
314 Article 26(2) UDHR.
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gender, women and adolescent girls are often unable to refuse sex or insist on safe sex and
responsible sex practices.”
315
The Committee goes on to require state parties to
“ensure, without prejudice and discrimination, the right to sexual health information, education
and services for all women and girls, including those who have been trafficked, even if they are
not legally resident in the country.”
316
2.4.3.3. Right to Development
Violations of employment-related rights and the right to education contribute to the violation of the
right to development. Developmental rights can be found in Article 11 of the ICESCR and Articles 13
and 14 of CEDAW. These articles express the right to development in terms of rights to freedom from
hunger achieved by development of agrarian systems and food distribution, involvement in
cooperatives and community activities, rights to financial services and recreational activities. The
1986 Declaration on the Right to Development states that “all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”.317
Women who find themselves in conditions of poverty in a post-conflict society, with their rights to
education and employment violated, are frequently unable to contribute to the potential
development and economic growth of their society and community.318 This is particularly the case if
they end up victims of sexual exploitation or working in prostitution. Nor can these women
experience their own development, with poor wages, lack of education, and unfavourable working
conditions. Such situations of poverty and lack of education drive women to desperate measures to
support themselves and their families. The IOM report of 2002 found that over 70% of forced
prostitutes from Moldova who had been trafficked considered themselves poor to very poor (earning
315 CEDAW General Recommendation 24 (20th Session, 1999): Article 2: Women and Health, A/54/38/Rev.1
part I (1999) at para. 18.
316 Ibid.
317 Declaration on the Right to Development, A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986.
318 Halvorsen, supra note 312, p. 343.
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less than USD 30 per month), and that 88% had sought to leave Moldova for the purposes of finding
work, induced by promises of (non-sex) work in other countries.319
2.4.3.4. Right to Marriage and Family
Working as a prostitute or being a victim of sexual exploitation may render it difficult for a woman to
enjoy her rights to family life and marriage (freely entered into).320 It is certainly impossible if the
woman is a victim of forced prostitution, where she is shut out from the world, meets other
prostitutes and clients, and customarily lives in a shared room.321 A poor income means little or no
ability to care adequately for children.
An unwanted pregnancy may result in a fatherless child, denying both mother and child the right to
family.322 Alternatively, it may result in an unsafe termination of the pregnancy, which may in turn
bring about a future inability to have children, which also causes a violation of the right to family.
In certain cultures, women who engage in prostitution or are victims of sexual exploitation may be
ostracised from their society. Such rejection will often include rejection as a potential wife or
partner, meaning that these women are unable to marry or found a family.323
2.4.3.5. Right to Health
“I felt sick, and was coughing a lot. I had a terrible headache and fever… I was lying in bed and
almost fading, when the owner’s son came into my room and I was beaten badly by him. As a
result, I suffered grave bodily injuries. I stayed in bed for three months. Except for other injuries,
he broke my hand too. All the time I spend in bed, he repeatedly exploited me.”
324
One of the most serious harms a woman experiences as a victim of sexual exploitation or when
working as a prostitute is the violation of her right to health.325 This violation occurs on many
319 60% of surveyed women were promised work in Italy. Supra note 313.
320 Article 16 of the UDHR; Article 23 of the ICCPR; Article 10 of the ICESCR; Article 16 of CEDAW.
321 See e.g. “So does it mean we have the rights?”, supra note 92, p. 15.
322 Koyama and Myrttinen, supra note 90, pp. 37-38.
323 Ibid., p. 38.
324 “So does it mean we have the rights?”, supra note 92 p. 15.
325 Article 25 of the UHDR; Articles 11 & 12 of the ICESCR; Article 12 of CEDAW.
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levels.326 Prostitutes anywhere, but particularly in poor regions are more at risk of contracting and
passing on sexually transmitted infections (STIs), in particular HIV/AIDS.327 This is because poorer
prostitutes (including those in poor regions) are more willing to engage in sexual intercourse without
a condom, for more money. They are also at risk of being forced, through physical violence, to
engage in unprotected sex. Or it may even be the case that there is simply no access to an adequate
supply of prophylactics. Such harms and risks also exist in the circumstances of sexual exploitation.
In particular, a woman’s right to reproductive health- and reproductive freedom- is violated.328
Despite the
“right of all persons, free of coercion, discrimination and violence, to the highest attainable
standard of sexual health, including access to sexual and reproductive health care services; seek,
receive and impart information related to sexuality; sexuality education; respect for bodily
integrity; choose their partner; decide to be sexually active or not; consensual sexual relations;
consensual marriage; decide whether or not, and when, to have children; and pursue a satisfying,
safe and pleasurable sexual life”,
329
such rights of sexually exploited women are violated.
326 S.K. Hunter, 'Prostitution is Cruelty and Abuse to Women and Children' (1993) 1 Michigan Journal of
Gender and Law 91-104.
327 See discussion infra on the harm of HIV/AIDS to both the women and the peacekeeping personnel.
328 “Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes.
Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they
have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last
condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and
acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of
fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable
women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a
healthy infant. In line with the above definition of reproductive health, reproductive health care is defined as the
constellation of methods, techniques and services that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
preventing and solving reproductive health problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations, and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and
sexually transmitted diseases.” Programme Of Action Of The International Conference On Population And
Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994, Chapter VII Reproductive Health, available at
http://www.unfpa.org/publications/detail.cfm?ID=275.
329 “These working definitions were elaborated as a result of a WHO-convened international technical
consultation on sexual health in January 2002, and subsequently revised by a group of experts from different
parts of the world. They are presented here as a contribution to on-going discussions about sexual health, but do
not represent an official WHO position, and should not be used or quoted as WHO definitions.” WHO Sexual
Health, definition of sexual rights, available at
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/gender_rights/sexual_health/en/.
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The Committee on the Rights of the Child recognised that people “who are sexually exploited,
including in prostitution... are exposed to significant health risks, including [STIs], HIV/AIDS,
unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, violence and psychological distress”.330 In developing
countries, unsafe sex is the second most important risk factor leading to disability, disease or
death.331 Inequalities in access to health services and sexual coercion and exploitation are two
significant obstacles to women engaging in safe sexual relationships and ensuring reproductive
health.332
Violent, unwanted sexual encounters and STIs put a woman at risk of being unable to reproduce. A
prostitute is often not free to choose with whom she engages in sex, and certainly a forced prostitute
has no sexual autonomy. Victims of sexual exploitation likewise act out of necessity rather than
choice. Thus such women have no freedom over their reproductive choices, especially as they are at
risk of unwanted pregnancy due to lack of access to contraception. A 2002 UNICEF report on
‘Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe’ reported that the majority of women and girls
trafficked into the sex industry in Kosovo were forced to have unprotected sex, with 40% only using
condoms ‘occasionally’.333 Unwanted pregnancy can in turn lead to abortions, which if not conducted
with adequate healthcare facilities and properly trained staff, can lead to infections, potential
inability to reproduce, risks in future pregnancies, and in extreme cases, death.334 Women in areas
such as South America and West and East Africa are more likely to engage in unsafe abortions which
produce such risks.335 Those who continue with the pregnancy risk complications during the
pregnancy and childbirth, which may also lead to serious disability or even death.336
330 CRC General Comment 4 (Thirty-third session, 2003): Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, A/59/41 (2004) 102 at para. 37.
331 A. Glasier, et al., 'Sexual and reproductive health: a matter of life and death' (2006) 368 (9547) The Lancet
1595-1607, p. 1597.
332 Ibid., p. 1596.
333 'Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe: Current Situation and Responses to Trafficking in
Human Beings' (UNICEF, UNOHCHR, OSCE ODIHR, 2002) , p. 96.
334 D.A. Grimes, et al., 'Unsafe abortion: the preventable pandemic' (2006) 368 (9550) The Lancet 1908-1919,
pp. 1910-1911.
335 Ibid.
336 Glasier, supra note 331, p. 1597.
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Physical violence, STIs, HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies are often exacerbated by lack of access
to health care.337 This is particularly the case for forced prostitutes, who have no ability themselves
to find health care and are subject to the whims of their captors.338 For example, UNICEF’s 2002
report found that 36% of trafficked women in Kosovo were denied healthcare, and only 10% had
access to regular health care.339
2.4.3.6. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment
“We worked from 9am to 11pm. After that he said, ‘You do what you like’, but we were locked.
When we asked to go out he said, no, that we had to be here. We slept in a room together, me
and another girl. All the windows had bars. He didn’t ever beat me; it was just psychological
threats. We were coerced in that way; I couldn’t go out.”
340
The right to freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment341 is a non-derogable,
fundamental right.342 States have the obligation to “protect both the dignity and the physical and
mental integrity of the individual”.343 It is submitted that the acts of prostitution and sexual
exploitation committed by peacekeepers amount to inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Being
paid to carry out sexual favours by men; being regarded as less than human (like property);344 being
at the mercy of these men, having to do as the men wish, sometimes involving violent situations,
amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.345 Sexual exploitation is degrading- that is, being so
poor that you are reduced to trading sex for money, food or other goods. “There is no dignity in
poverty, which denies the person full powers of agency. Yet the right to sell one’s labor (sexual or
337 Ibid., pp. 1597, 1601.
338 Mendelson, supra note 99, p. 9.
339 UNICEF, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe’, 2002, supra note 333, p. 96.
340 Romanian woman trafficked into Kosovo and held as a forced prostitute in a brothel; "So does that mean we
have the rights?", supra note 92, p. 15.
341 The CAT; Article 5 of the UDHR; Article 7 of the ICCPR
342 A.-M. Bolin Pennegård, 'Article 5', in Alfredsson and Eide (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1999), 121-146, p. 127; ICCPR General Comment 20 (1992),
supra note 202, para. 3.
343 ICCPR General Comment 20 (1992), supra note 202, para. 2.
344 “The [trafficked women] weren’t held in any regard at all. Sex isn’t even the word for it… I’ve never
experienced anything as base as this.” Statement by former US peacekeeper referring to the treatment of
Ukrainian and Moldovan women by Russian peacekeepers in Bosnia; Mendelson, supra note 99, p. 52.
345 See Leidholdt, supra note 85, and O’Connell Davidson, supra note 275, pp. 87 & 91.
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otherwise) does not guarantee the restitution of dignity or moral agency.”346 “Buying a woman’s
body is as much a violation of her human dignity as selling it.”347 Women who are victims of
trafficking and forced prostitution experience inhuman and/or degrading treatment, which may
include beatings, being forced to have sex at gunpoint, starvation, death threats against their
children, and being locked in a dark room.348 Violence experienced by sexually exploited women can
also be considered torture, depending on the circumstances surrounding the violence.
2.4.3.7. Right to Life
Such physical violence also puts a sexually exploited woman at risk of having her most fundamental
right: her right to life.349 This is also at risk when a woman engages in unprotected intercourse,
placing her at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.350 STIs, including HIV/AIDS, and pregnancy and childbirth
complications are highly contributing factors to death in women in developing countries.351
2.4.3.8. Access to Justice
Access to effective remedies,352 including criminal accountability of perpetrators and victims’
compensation, is difficult for victims of peacekeeper misconduct. Difficulties faced by victims include
a culture of impunity, language barriers, lack of information and education on where to go for help,
lack of income to enact and continue a legal process, and discrimination.353 This is something which
has been recognised by the UN and is being addressed, but the success of proposed regulations and
systems remains to be seen.354 In addition, even if prostitution is legal or decriminalised in a
346 O’Connell Davidson, ibid., p. 94.
347 Leidholdt, supra note 85, p. 145.
348 "So does that mean we have the rights?", supra note 92, pp. 15-17.
349 Article 3 of the UHDR; Article 6(1) of the ICCPR. Hunter, supra note 326, pp. 94-95.
350 See further discussion infra on HIV/AIDS.
351 Glasier, supra note 331.
352 Articles 6-10 of the UDHR; Articles 14 & 16 of the ICCPR.
353 C.R. Miller and N. Haltiwanger, 'Prostitution and the Legalization/Decriminalization Debate' (2004) V
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 207-242, pp. 227-229.
354 See infra Chapter 3.
71
particular state, legalisation is no guarantee that a prostitute will be given full access to justice within
the legal system, and may even lead to over-regulation of the industry.355
2.4.3.9. Freedom from Discrimination
All of these harms are exacerbated by the violation of freedom from discrimination.356 These women
are working as prostitutes and being sexually exploited because they are women- because men
demand that women be available by payment for the provision of sexual services for men. The
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women recognises
“that violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between
men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men
and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is
one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position
compared with men”.
357
It is this domination which provides for the vast increase in prostitutes working in the PSO regions.
These women are denied safe and just jobs because they are women, and the demand for their
services is perpetrated by men.
The expansion of prostitution has repercussions beyond the victims. It creates an atmosphere of
disrespect for and discrimination against women generally within the society, where men (and
perhaps even those women who are not sexually exploited and do not work as prostitutes) view the
majority of women as indecent, as whores.358 These attitudes make it difficult for women to grab a
foothold in the rebuilding of society, and to hold important, influential roles within the community. It
also prevents women from being involved in the economic development of society.
The examples of rights violations show the harm that sexually exploitative conduct by peacekeepers
visits upon its female victims. Such harms violate rights across the spectrum, from fundamental rights
355 See e.g.M. von Galen, 'Prostitution and the Law in Germany' (1996) 3 Cardozo Women's Law Journal 349-
376; J. Halley, et al., 'From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism' (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of
Law & Gender 335-423, pp. 395-405.
356 CEDAW; Article 2 of the UDHR; Articles 2 & 26 of the ICCPR.
357 Preamble.
358 Leidholdt, supra note 85, p. 135.
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such as the rights to life and freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, to
economic and social rights such as the right to development. The resulting harm is sufficient to justify
criminalisation, that is, “the behaviour in question is sufficiently serious to warrant intervention by
the criminal law”.359
2.4.4. Harm to Others and Paternalism- Sexually Transmitted
Infections and HIV/AIDS
There is also a legal paternalism argument for criminalisation of prostitution-related activities and
sexual exploitation.360 This relates to the potential health harms that arise from the indiscriminate
sexual relations peacekeeping personnel engage in with prostitutes and with other women in cases
of sexual exploitation. There is a long history of problems with sexually transmitted infections (STIs)
within the military when stationed overseas.361 This risk is especially prominent in PSOs located in
regions with high levels of HIV/AIDS, such as sub-Saharan Africa.362 These high levels of AIDS and HIV
infection mean that engaging in sexual relations with a member of the local population carries a
formidable risk of contracting the virus. Engaging in sexual relations with multiple partners means
personnel also risk disseminating the virus further amongst the local population, putting more
women at risk of contracting HIV. At the end of a tour of duty, an infected member will then return
home, where the possibility exists of spreading the virus globally.
359 Lord Mostyn, supra note 153.
360 As with the moralist arguments (see infra), paternalist reasons are not enough in themselves enough to justify
criminalisation, but do support the overall reasoning for criminalisation.
361 See, e.g. E.N. Chang, 'Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry' (2001)
15 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 621-653, pp. 632-634; S. Sun, 'Where the Girls Are: The
Management of Venereal Disease by United States Military Forces in Vietnam' (2004) 23 (1) Literature and
Medicine 66-87; L.C.T.B. Turner, 'The Suppression of Prostitution in Relation to Venereal Disease Control in
the Army' (1943) 7 Federal Probation 8-11; Moon, supra note 109K.H.S. Moon, Sex among Allies: Military
Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations, (Columbia University Press, New York 1997); and J.S. Goldstein, War and
Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001),
pp. 339-342.
362 For example, “Sub-Saharan Africa has just over 10% of the world’s population, but is home to more than
60% of all people living with HIV... In 2005, an estimated 3.2 million people in the region became newly
infected, while 2.4 million adults and children died of AIDS.” www.unaids.org “Some 1.7 million [1.4 million-
2.4 million] people were newly infected with HIV in 2007, bringing to 22.5 million [20.9 million-24.3 million]
the total number of people living with the virus. Unlike other regions, the majority of people (61%) living with
HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are women.” Key facts by region – 2007 AIDS Epidemic Update,
http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/2007EpiUpdate/default.asp. By the end of 2008, there were 22.4 million
people infected with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa; “Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most affected and is home to
67% of all people living with HIV worldwide and 91% of all new infections among children”; 2009 AIDS
Epidemic Update, http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2009/2009_epidemic_update_en.pdf.
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The issue of STIs, and in particular, HIV/AIDS is one that is linked to both prostitution and sexual
exploitation. The problem is also linked, of course, to acceptable and appropriate sexual behaviour,
but becomes even more far-reaching and significant when considered in relation to peacekeeping
personnel. HIV/AIDS is in fact, a contributing reason to why sexual exploitation and commercial sex
related activities should be criminalised. This is because peacekeepers, particularly the military
personnel involved in a PSO, are a high risk group for contracting (and spreading) HIV/AIDS.363
There are several reasons for this. A large number of military personnel are young men, single, who
partake in casual sex.364 This propensity to engage in casual sex is greater when posted abroad, an
experience seen as ‘adventurous’ and ‘exotic’. Personnel are in a situation of ‘instability’. By this it is
meant not just the climate of political instability, but rather finding themselves in a situation contrary
to a stable home life where ‘normal’ relationships are possible. Thus, there is a high tendency for
those posted abroad to spend time in bars, meeting women with whom they engage in casual sex.
This behaviour is made all the easier by the significant amount of disposable income that
peacekeeping personnel find themselves with.365
This situation can be exacerbated if there is a lack of other recreational activities for personnel to
engage in. If there are no or few provisions for leisure time within the mission, personnel are forced
to seek recreational activities elsewhere, which inevitably is in places such as bars and nightclubs.
Units or battalions that find themselves with an early curfew, and living in barracks equipped with
excellent provisions for recreational activities find themselves with a greater sense of camaraderie,
but also are far less subject to the boredom that could drive them to bars and nightclubs. 366 Creating
such positive living conditions is even more important given that personnel are often only permitted
363 V. Kent, 'Protecting civilians from UN peackeeepers and humanitarian workers: Sexual exploitation and
abuse', in Aoi, et al. (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping, (United Nations University Press,
Tokyo, New York, Paris 2007), 44-66, p. 53.
364 See UNAIDS, ‘On The Front Line: A review of policies and programmes to address HIV/AIDS among
peacekeepers and uniformed services’, 2003, Copenhagen, Doc. UNAIDS/03.44E; and M. Foreman, 'Combat
AIDS: HIV and the World's Armed Forces' (Healthlink Worldwide, London, 2002) , pp. 7-8.
365 Not having to budget for such costs as rent or bills, personnel often find themselves with more disposable
income than they may have at home. It is also significantly more in terms of cost of living in mission countries,
given that personnel are not paid in local currency, but usually in US dollars or their own national currency.
366 Higate, ‘Case Studies: DRC & Sierra Leone’, supra note 120, p. 45.
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leave after months of service in the mission (the exact amount of time varies, depending on a range
of factors).
There are other factors which render peacekeepers as a high risk group to contract HIV. These factors
centre on the high risk partners that peacekeepers engage in sex with. The locations of peacekeeping
missions are in countries facing instability, poverty and a lack of adequate education and healthcare.
Subsequently a high rate of HIV often exists within the local population. A prime example of this is
Sub-Saharan Africa, where there are currently seven PSOs currently located.367 Sub-Saharan Africa
has one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the world, and the majority (61%) of Sub-Saharan Africans
infected with HIV are women.368 This risk is exacerbated by the fact that peacekeepers are most
often engaging in sex with commercial sex workers and women who carry out survival sex, who are
in themselves a high risk group due to the frequency and multiplicity of sexual partners they have. It
is naïve to deny that use of prostitutes elevates the risk of STIs, in particular, HIV/AIDS. The
Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women found that “women in prostitution are
particularly vulnerable to” HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.369 According to UNAIDS,
“[t]he risk of infection is highest where sex workers are most powerless and therefore unable to
negotiate or insist on the use of condoms by their clients, or to resist violent and coercive sex.”370 For
example, in the Ethiopian region of UNMEE,371 around the area where the PSO is located, more than
70% of commercial sex workers were found to be HIV positive.372
367 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), African Union-United
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), United
Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and United Nations Integrated
Office in Burundi (BINUB) (BINUB is a political mission administered by the DPKO);
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml#africa.
368 Supra note 362.
369 CEDAW General Recommendation 24 (20th Session, 1999): Article 2: Women and Health, A/54/38/Rev.1
part I (1999) at para. 18.
370 UNAIDS, Sex workers and clients,
http://www.unaids.org/en/Issues/Affected_communities/sex_workers_and_clients.asp.
371 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
372 'U.N. Peacekeeping: United Nations Faces Challenges in Responding to the Impact of HIV/AIDS on
Peacekeeping Operations' (United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 12 December 2001)
GAO-02-194, p. 9.
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While it may be argued that criminalisation of prostitute-related sex and sexual exploitation with
regards to HIV prevention would only be necessary in missions located in high-level HIV regions, this
is not the case. Firstly, the spreading nature of the virus means that it is not possible to predict where
the virus will increase in vast numbers. Factors such as current infection rate, commonness and
effectiveness of preventative actions, availability of health care and general attitudes towards
prevention all contribute to this uncertainty. One example of this is India, which in 2006 became the
country with the second highest HIV rate after South Africa.373 Regions such as Eastern Europe and
Central Asia are also showing a dramatic rise in the number of people infected.374
In addition, it has been demonstrated that peacekeepers have actually contributed to the spread of
HIV through their high levels of casual sex with commercial sex workers and local women. Cambodia
is a prime example of this. UNAMIC375 arrived in Cambodia in 1991, and was subsumed by the larger
UNTAC376 in 1992. At that point, HIV had only just been detected in donated blood in 1991. However,
from that point, HIV levels rose dramatically. UNTAC’s mandate ended in 1993. UNAIDS reports as
follows:
“HIV prevalence among national adult population in Cambodia has declined to 1.9% in 2003.
There were an estimated 123,100 people living with HIV/AIDS in 2003 with prevalence rate
among women showing a steady rise.
Cambodia’s 2003 HIV Sentinel Surveillance (HSS) found that there was a larger decline among
young female sex workers compared with those older than 20 years. The reasons for this are
twofold: increasing mortality and a decline in HIV incidence which, according to recent
estimations, fell steeply between 1994 and 1998, before stabilizing (NCHADS, HSS 2003).”
377
373 The figure of over 5 million people infected with the virus is only an estimate, and the number of infected
people in the population may even be greater. UNAIDS Country Report 2006- India, ‘Overview of the AIDS
Epidemic’, p. 4, available at
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/2006_country_progress_report_india_en.pdf.
374 UNAIDS, Regions, ‘Eastern Europe and Central Asia’, at
http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Regions/EasternEuropeAndCentralAsia.asp; 2007 AIDS
Epidemic Update- Key facts by region, http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/2007EpiUpdate/default.asp; 2009
AIDS Epidemic Update, Eastern Europe and Central Asia- Latest epidemiological trends,
http://data.unaids.org/pub/FactSheet/2009/20091124_FS_eeca_en.pdf.
375 A small mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia.
376 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.
377 UNAIDS Cambodia, HIV/AIDS Situation, at http://www.un.org.kh/unaids/default.asp?pageID=2.
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It is interesting to note that HIV incidence among female sex workers only began to decline in 1994,
after the departure of UNTAC in late 1993. As stated previously, between 1992 and 1993, the
number of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from 6,000 to 25,000.378 All of these figures demonstrate the
link between peacekeepers’ involvement with prostitutes, and HIV/AIDS. It has been acknowledged
by the US government that “the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia coincided with the U.N.
peacekeeping mission”.379 In fact, in one survey by UNAIDS, it was found that 45% of Dutch
peacekeepers had engaged in sexual activity with commercial sex workers or local women over the
course of their five month deployment to UNTAC in 1993.380 The same US governmental report also
attested to the fact that “increased rates of HIV infection in East Timor coincided with the presence
of U.N. peacekeepers”.381
Women may increase their risk of HIV by engaging in intercourse with peacekeepers from countries
with a high prevalence of HIV. They may become infected from these sexual encounters, and in turn
infect other peacekeepers. A study in 2001 found that approximately 14% of peacekeepers came
from countries with HIV prevalence within the general population of over 5%.382 From available
statistics, it is generally the case that HIV prevalence within the military is twice that of prevalence in
the general population, which means that HIV prevalence amongst these peacekeepers may be over
10%.383
An example of contrasts is Nigeria, which consistently ranks in the top 10 of contributing troop
states.384 Nigeria is located in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that up to 5.6% of the general adult
378 Supra note 91.
379 ‘U.N. Peacekeeping: United Nations Faces Challenges’, supra note 372, p. 24.
380 Ibid., p. 10.
381 Ibid.
382 UNAIDS, ‘On the front line’, supra note 364, pp. 6-7.
383 Ibid. Examples of figures comparing general population prevalence and military prevalence include Angola
(general population 5.5%; military 50%); DRC (general population 4.9%; military 50%); Malawi (general
population 15%; military 50%). General population figures from 2002; military figures from 1999. Figures are
difficult to obtain as armed forces do not necessarily conduct regular testing, and if they do, are not always
willing to release results publicly. See ibid., p. 5.
384 In 2001, Nigeria ranked 3rd, with 3,446 peacekeepers. Ibid., p. 22. In January 2007, they were ranked 9th, with
2,468 peacekeepers. See Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, Monthly Report 31
January 2007, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/jan07_2.pdf.
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population aged between 15 and 49 is infected with HIV.385 These figures are even higher for the
Nigerian military; however Nigeria has a pre-deployment testing policy, thus reducing the chance of
infected personnel being deployed on a mission.386 However, a study of 653 peacekeepers showed
48% had engaged in sex whilst on mission,387 and despite years of education, Nigerian soldiers
continue to engage in unsafe sex.388 Despite the fact that pre-deployment education and testing is
conducted, this study demonstrates the high level of peacekeepers engaging in this behaviour, and
consequently that they are putting themselves into a high risk group for contracting HIV, particularly
if practicing unsafe sex.
Currently, the UN policy in relation to HIV-infected personnel on peacekeeping missions is that of
non-discrimination. That is, the UN does not require mandatory HIV testing of personnel prior to
deployment. Consistent with a general policy of non-discrimination applicable to UN staff, the UN
does not prohibit HIV-positive personnel from engaging in PSOs.389 It does recommend that HIV-
positive personnel not be deployed on missions. However, this is based principally on health-related
reasons. Firstly, prior to deployment, personnel may be subject to multiple vaccinations, some of
which can cause health problems for a person infected with HIV. More importantly, the UN stresses
the issue of lack of access to adequate health care. PSOs are generally located in countries with sub-
standard health care systems, and the missions themselves are not set up to cater for the provision
of any severe or long-term health care which a person infected with HIV may require. Finally, the UN
discourages deployment of HIV positive personnel in accordance with its policy of HIV prevention.
This recommendation aims to minimise the risk of HIV transmission to the local population.
Henceforth, it is the choice of the sending state as to whether they allow HIV positive personnel to
be deployed on PSOs. Policies within national militaries vary significantly. Some countries employ
mandatory testing, others do not. Some may carry out mandatory testing only of recruits, such as the
385 UNAIDS, Nigeria- HIV and AIDS Estimates, available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/nigeria.asp.
386 UNAIDS, ‘On the Front Line’, supra note 364, p. 7.
387 Ibid., p. 5.
388 Forman, supra note 364, p. 46.
389 Ibid., pp. 5-6. See also UNAIDS, ‘On the Front Line’, supra note 364, p. 14.
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United States, and others may conduct mandatory testing of personnel on a regular basis. Thus, it is
not possible to determine which contingents in a mission may have HIV positive personnel.
It cannot be doubted that education covering prevention and awareness is vital, and should not only
be continued, but increased.390 However, behavioural change is hard to implement to a 100%
standard. For example, even within the US Armed Forces, despite years of guidance and instruction,
condom use is under 45%.391 The Department of Defense aims to increase this to 50%, which
although an improvement on 45%, is obviously nowhere near 100%.
Given the enormity of the problem of HIV in relation to peacekeepers, criminalisation of
procurement of prostitutes, patronising commercial sex workers, and sexual exploitation would
contribute to the effort to reduce the spread of HIV infection. Education alone appears not to work.
Personnel would be less likely to engage in conduct that is illegal, and this would decrease the
occurrences of peacekeepers having sex with prostitutes or engaging in sexual exploitation. This in
turn will reduce opportunities for HIV transmission, which results in harm to the victim- in this case,
identifiable as the woman (harm to others) or the peacekeeper (harm to self).392
It may be argued that criminalising such sexual relations is criminalising behaviour that is merely the
risk of harm of HIV/AIDS, rather than the harm itself.393 However, if one of the sexual partners is HIV
positive or has AIDS, whether this fact is known or not, the act of sexual intercourse is in fact the act
that causes the harm- the infection of the other person with HIV (or applicable STI). Even if classified
as ‘merely’ endangerment, endangerment is sufficient for criminalisation in exceptional
circumstances,394 which HIV/AIDS is. For paternalistic reasons to be applied as the justification for
criminalisation, very serious harm must result from the conduct. The harm must justify restrictions
390 For discussions on prevention and awareness training, see UNAIDS, ‘On the Front Line’, supra note 364, pp.
11-23; and Foreman, supra note 364, pp. 37-48.
391 Figures from 2002. Foreman, supra note 364, p. 46. However it must be noted that this statistic is not
accompanied by detailed information about the status of survey participants, i.e. whether participants were
engaging in casual sex, or in a monogamous relationship.
392 Thus there are direct, identifiable victims; Persak, supra note 152, p. 65.
393 Husak, supra note 163, p. 37.
394 Persak, supra note 152, p. 45.
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placed on personal autonomy.395 HIV/AIDS is a very serious harm, as it ultimately results in death,396
and, as peacekeepers are in a high risk group, there is a substantial risk in such harm arising from
peacekeepers engaging in sexual exploitation and sexual relations with prostitutes. Such high risk
factors and the seriousness of the harm justify the criminalisation of this behaviour, on both grounds
of harm to others and paternalism.
2.4.4.1. Prima Facie Argument in Favour of Criminalisation
The sections above demonstrate the prima facie argument in favour of criminalisation of prostitute-
related activities and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers. Not only do states have an obligation
under international human rights law to ensure such behaviour is criminalised, but it is clear that
such conduct is harmful, particularly to the female victims, but, as seen in the paternalism argument,
can also result in harm to the perpetrators themselves. The harm resulting from the conduct
explored has negative effects on women’s abilities and opportunities to “engage in worthwhile
activities and relationships, and to pursue valuable, self-chosen goals”.397 Such conduct is
undoubtedly worthy of condemnation, and thus should be punished.398
However, criminalisation should only be the ultima ratio- the last resort in legislative action. Thus, it
must also be considered whether alternative forms of regulation are or would be a viable option to
prevent and/or punish violence against women by peacekeepers. The remainder of this chapter will
examine whether alternative forms of regulation have been, are, or would be effective in dealing
with the conduct. Chapter 3 will examine this further, and will also address problems that have arisen
in relation to the enforcement of such offences in practice. The value of alternative forms of
regulation needs to be considered, and whether such regulations have limitations that result in a low
level of deterrence, which can be increased through criminal proscription of the relevant conduct.
395 Ibid., p. 18.
396 The same paternalistic reason is used for the justification of criminalisation of suicide, as it results in death.
397 Simester and Sullivan, supra note 142, p. 10.
398 Husak, supra note 163, p. 27.
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2.4.5. Alternative Forms of Regulation- Codes of Conduct
In the above sections, it has been shown that peacekeepers engaging in such conduct as sexual
exploitation and sexual relations with prostitutes results in harm, particularly to the women. It must
now be considered whether “the mischief could be dealt with under existing legislation or using
other remedies”.399 Alternative forms of regulation will thus be addressed. The present chapter will
examine codes of conduct, at both the national and the UN level. The subsequent chapter will be
dedicated to analysing the alternative forms of regulation in place and proposed by the UN,
demonstrating the need and support for criminal accountability for peacekeepers.
2.4.5.1. National Codes of Conduct
Many armed forces around the world function according to a code of conduct. A code of conduct is
set of rules or regulations intended to be followed as a behavioural guide. Those who follow it
consider the code when making decisions and taking actions in every aspect of their life. It is
intended to apply both to working situations and those outside of the work environment, as all
behaviour reflects on the person and on the institution. It is essentially a “moral” guide for
behaviour, but violation of the code can often result in military discipline.
The first code of conduct that military personnel will follow is their national armed forces code of
conduct, if one exists. Not all defence forces have a code of conduct. Some paradigms of codes of
conduct that will be examined here are the United States, South Africa, and Canada. Some codes are
very general in content, while others are more specific and refer to the law of armed conflict. Codes
of conduct can be social codes governing personal relationships,400 or codes directed specifically at
behaviour of forces serving in another country.401
399 Lord Mostyn, supra note 153.
400 The United Kingdom has a Code of Social Conduct, which aims to enforce policy on “social misbehaviour”,
including but not limited to “unwelcome sexual attention in the form of physical or verbal conduct; over-
familiarity with the spouses or partners of other Service personnel; displays of affection which might cause
offence to others; behaviour which damages or hazards the marriage or personal relationships of Service
personnel or civilian colleagues within the wider defence community; and taking sexual advantage of
subordinates”. See Armed Forces Code of Social Conduct: Policy Statement, available at
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/Personnel/EqualityAndDiversity/ArmedForces
CodeOfSocialConductPolicyStatement.htm.
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The Code of Conduct for Members of the United States Armed Forces (USAF) has only six regulations,
and mentions nothing about adherence to either international law or US law, apart from the concept
of treason. Mention is only made of soldiers’ obligations when they are taken as a prisoner of war.
There is no reciprocal reference as to how prisoners of war captured by the USAF should be treated.
The Code is centred on surrender and capture of USAF personnel, as well as patriotic statements
about “fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life… I will trust in my god and in
the United States of America”.402 There is no reference at all to the law of armed conflict, or to any
prohibition of unacceptable social behaviour such as abuse of power, sexual offences, or corruption.
Both the Canadian and the South African Codes of Conduct are more detailed. The Canadian Code of
Conduct deals only with the law of armed conflict rather than general behaviour, while the South
African version covers both areas. The purpose of the Code of Conduct for CF (Canadian Forces)
Personnel is “to provide simple and understandable instructions to ensure that CF members apply as
a minimum, the spirit and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict in all CF operations other than
Canadian domestic operations”.403 CF personnel are required to “know and faithfully comply with
these eleven rules”,404 because they are based on the law of armed conflict and following the rules
will enable personnel to “the armed forces to achieve legitimate military objectives while ensuring
operations are carried out in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict”.405 The Code of Conduct is
applicable in full during PSOs, at which time the CF applies, “as a minimum, the spirit and principles
The Australian Defence Force has a similar social code, and national anti-discrimination legislation is applied
with the ADF. See Defence Fairness and Resolution available at http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/default.htm in
general and http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/RR/unacceptablebehaviour.htm for Defence Instructions (General) 35-
3 covering “Unacceptable behaviour”, including harassment, discrimination, abuse of power, inappropriate
relationships and associated behaviour, sexual offences and indecency.
401 Such as the Norwegian Forces Code of Conduct, which is “based on military codex, national and international
law, as well as agreements and declarations ratified and adopted by Norwegian authorities”. See O.W. Erichsen,
'CHOD's Code of Conduct for Norwegian personnel serving abroad', Forsvarets Skolesenter, (2006)
402 Code of Conduct for Members of the United States Armed Forces, Executive Order 10631 of 17 August
1955, available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/code_of_conduct2.htm
403 National Defence, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, document
number B-GG-005-027/AF-023, available at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=3483.
404 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
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of the Law of Armed Conflict in all Canadian military operations other than Canadian domestic
operations”.406
The significant operational advantage of having one Code applicable to all operations is that
there is only one standard to train to. Furthermore, should a CF operation shift from peace
support to armed conflict, the Code would continue to apply. It does require CF members
however, to understand and be able to apply the eleven rules of the Code to their specific
operation.
407
The Code of Conduct for CF Personnel covers such rules as: humane treatment of detainees,
prohibition of abuse and torture, and to abide by the laws of armed conflict, taking all steps to stop
breaches and report breaches.408
The Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the South African National Defence Force409
(SANDF) is even more detailed than the CF Code of Conduct. There are 25 rules in the SANDF Code of
Conduct, and it covers both general behaviour and the law of armed conflict. The Code refers to
serving with such qualities as dignity, honour, loyalty, integrity and courage. It even refers to
concepts of democracy and political neutrality. The Code requires personnel to take personal
responsibility for their action. Personnel are prohibited from abusing their “authority, position or
public funds for personal gain, political motive or any other reason”. They must “treat all people
fairly and respect their rights and dignity at all times, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, culture,
language or sexual orientation”, as well as respect subordinates. They are also obliged to “report
criminal activity, corruption and misconduct to the appropriate authority”.
In relation to the laws of armed conflict, among other rules, it is prohibited to obey “an obviously
illegal order”, attack civilians and civilian objects, kill, torture or abuse prisoners of war, and tolerate
or engage in rape or looting.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Available at http://www.dcc.mil.za/Code_of_Conduct/Files/English.htm.
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In both the CF and the SANDF Codes of Conduct, respect for civilians is emphasised, a concept which
should govern all peacekeeping personnel and stop them from behaviour such as sexual exploitation.
This requirement is found in the regulations covering humane treatment for civilians, prohibition of
attacking civilians, and prohibition of abuse, torture and rape.
Comparing these three very different codes of conduct reveals that the SANDF Code of Conduct is by
far the most detailed and comprehensive, in that it covers behaviour related to the law of armed
conflict, but also social and criminal behaviour. Particularly relevant to preventing violence against
women are the rules prohibiting abuse of authority or position, requiring people to be treated fairly,
and for rights and dignity of all people to be respected. There is a direct prohibition of rape, and
personnel are obliged to report criminal activity and misconduct. All these regulations in the Code of
Conduct assist in directing behaviour away from patronising of prostitutes, sexual abuse and
exploitation, trafficking and sexual slavery, as well as discouraging impunity for such behaviour.
2.4.5.2. United Nations Codes of Conduct
As well as following their own national code of conduct, if one exists, peacekeeping personnel are
required to follow the codes of conduct issued by the UN. There are multiple codes of conduct,
applying to different personnel on the mission. A PSO, such as MONUC,410 may even provide its own
separate code of conduct.
The best-known of the UN codes of conduct is the Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue
Helmets.411 This code applies to military and CivPol personnel in a PSO. It is given to peacekeeping
personnel on a card, along with the further details in the document ‘We Are United Nations
Peacekeepers’, which promotes professional and disciplined behaviour that respects local
410 Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo), code available at http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=858.
411 Supra note 128. See also Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNCIVPOL Code of Conduct, available
at http://web.schq.mi.th/~matpmunny/UN%20document/CIVPOL/selstand_civpol/annexe.pdf.
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inhabitants and customs, and never brings discredit to the UN through improper personal conduct or
abuse of position.412
The Ten Rules require behaviour that includes:413
1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring,
considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and
impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your
authority.
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are
there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration. Neither solicit
nor accept any material reward, honor or gift.
Both of these rules have relevance to behaviour that constitutes violence against women. However,
the most direct rule actually explicitly states:
“4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the
local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.”
The combination of these three rules, with particular emphasis on Rule Four, which explicitly
prohibits sexual abuse and exploitation, should make it clear to military and CivPol personnel
engaged in PSOs that this behaviour is not permitted by ‘Blue Helmets’ during peacekeeping
missions.
The MONUC Code of Conduct is specifically related to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse. It is
actually titled Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.414 This has stemmed from
that fact that the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in fact one of the missions
where the most allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation have arisen, and continue to arise.415
412 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “We Are United Nations Peacekeepers”, A/61/645, Annex III. See
Appendix 1.
413 Emphasis added. For the full Ten Rules Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets and “We Are United Nations
Peacekeepers”, see Appendix 1.
414 Available at
http://monuc.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=G58IEd8POw4%3d&tabid=2587&mid=3051.
415 Secretary-General Press Release, ‘Secretary-General ‘Absolutely Outraged” by Gross Misconduct by
Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of Congo’, 19 November 2004, SG/SM/9605, AFR/1069,
PSO/115; see Statistics on the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) website http://cdu.unlb.org/.
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The MONUC website explains the issues, details the Code of Conduct, and details where and how to
report misconduct.416 The Code of Conduct strictly prohibits MONUC personnel engaging in:
¾ Any act of sexual abuse and exploitation, or any other form of sexually humiliating,
degrading or exploitative behavior.
¾ Any type of sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18 years).
¾ Use of children or adults to procure sexual services for others.
¾ Exchange of money, employment, goods, services for sex with prostitutes or others.
¾ Any sexual favour in exchange of assistance provided to the beneficiaries of such
assistance.
¾ Visits to brothels or places which are declared off-limits.
This is a code of conduct that should be adopted in all PSOs, regardless of whether or not there is a
history of allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation. It is clear and concise about what behaviour is
prohibited. It covers sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, as well as procuring and patronising of
prostitutes, and has an emphasis on prohibiting sexual activity with children. What it is missing is
specific reference to trafficking and sexual slavery. While these are effectively covered by the first
regulation prohibiting “[a]ny act of sexual abuse and exploitation, or any other form of sexually
humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour”, it would also be useful to explicitly prohibit
trafficking and sexual slavery, as well as any behaviour that facilitates trafficking and sexual slavery.
‘We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel’417 is similar to a code of conduct for personnel,
with an extensive list of behavioural mores to follow, a number of which specifically reference sexual
exploitation. Personnel declare that they will, among other behaviour, always conduct themselves in
a professional and disciplined manner; comply with the provisions of the mission mandate; respect
local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions and gender
issues; support and aid the infirm, sick and weak; obey UN supervisors/superiors; report all acts
involving sexual exploitation and abuse. In addition, personnel promise to never commit improper
416 See the MONUC website, Conduct and Discipline http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2582.
417 Supra note 412.
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personal conduct; fail to perform duties or abuse positions; commit any act that could result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially
women and children; commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with
children under 18, or exchange or money, employment, goods or services for sex; or become
involved in sexual liaisons which could affect the mission’s impartiality.
2.4.5.3. Are Codes of Conduct Effective as a Preventative Measure?
2.4.5.3.1. National Codes of Conduct
From the codes of conduct examined here, it is evident that national codes of conduct cannot be
relied upon as regulations to effectively prevent violence against women. The first reason is that not
all defence forces have codes of conduct. The second is that not all codes of conduct cover the same
conduct. As is demonstrated by the codes of conduct examined above, not all codes of conduct
prohibit the type of behaviour that constitutes violence against women. Some do not even regulate
behaviour according to the law of armed conflict, and so are lacking in any real substance. Thus, even
though military personnel may prioritise following their national code of conduct over the UN Code
of Conduct, that national code of conduct may not be comprehensive, and may have no prohibition
of behaviour constituting violence against women such as sexual abuse and exploitation.
Even if national codes of conduct do contain regulations that prohibit violence against women, a
code of conduct is not enforceable without criminal law provisions. A code of conduct is not a piece
of law, and thus in itself cannot be enforced and punishment cannot be applied from the code itself.
Enforcement of code regulations and punishment of violations can only be undertaken through
legislative provisions that specifically address either all violations of the code of conduct in general,
or specific crimes that are also mentioned in regulations of the code of conduct. Thus a code of
conduct may be something that military personnel apply as a matter of principle, but without
legislative disciplinary mechanisms relating to the code’s regulations, a code of conduct is ultimately
not a truly effective method of preventing and punishing violence against women.
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2.4.5.3.2. United Nations Codes of Conduct
The UN Codes of Conduct specifically prohibit sexual abuse and exploitation; however, sexual abuse
and exploitation have been and continue to be committed by peacekeepers.418 This demonstrates
that a code of conduct is not enough as a measure to prevent this behaviour being committed.
While military and CivPol peacekeeping personnel are obliged to carry the card of the Ten Rules with
them, not all personnel prioritise the Rules. Some see their priority as being to follow their national
code of conduct, if one exists.419 Another problem is adequate training on the Code of Conduct and
the ‘zero tolerance policy’. The DPKO does have special training modules on sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse. However, one of the biggest problems with training within PSOs is that there is so
much to be conducted and not all mission personnel end up being trained in all necessary areas.
There are constant troop rotations (sometimes as frequently as every 3 or 6 months), which creates a
constant need for training of new arrivals, as well as ensuring existing personnel are up to date.
Many personnel find the sheer amount of training involved upon arrival at a mission to be
overwhelming.420 New recruits tend to prioritise remembering only what they see as the most
important elements- usually aspects related to military activity, and not gender or sex issues, and the
Ten Rules become just another card in their pocket.421
It is also problematic that the Ten Rules do not apply to all personnel. Standards of conduct should
be applicable to all personnel in a mission, regardless of category of personnel, in order to create a
uniform standard of conduct practised throughout the whole mission. The importance of such a
problem has been recognised by the UN, which mandated a Group of Legal Experts to address the
issue of “standardising the norms of conduct so that they are applicable to all categories of
418 See Statistics on the CDU website http://cdu.unlb.org/.
419 Higate, ‘Case Studies: DRC & Sierra Leone’, supra note 120, p. 50.
420 Ibid., p. 19.
421 Ibid.
88
peacekeeping personnel”. The subsequent report of the Group of Legal Experts is discussed infra in
Chapter 3.422
Thus it is apparent that codes of conduct are not adequate preventative measures. As stated above,
violations of national codes of conduct are only enforceable through criminal law, and violations of
UN codes are only enforceable by repatriation and subsequently prosecution through national
military or civil criminal law. Thus, violations of the UN codes of conduct are not subject to
disciplinary action without the reinforcement of national criminal law anyway.
2.4.6. Alternative Forms of Regulation- UN Regulations
Since the UN became aware of the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, the
organisation has made developments towards finding a solution for the problems. Unfortunately, the
commission of sexual exploitation and abuse, and use of prostitutes by peacekeeping personnel is
still on-going.423 The two biggest problems lie with the inability of the UN firstly to investigate and
prove cases, and secondly, to discipline peacekeeping personnel. These are the two principle issues
identified in UN reports on the issue of accountability of peacekeepers for sexual exploitation and
abuse by peacekeeping personnel. Since late 2003, the UN has begun to take action towards
overhauling its regulations and agreements in order to ensure accountability for peacekeeping
personnel for criminal actions, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse. Such actions will be
analysed in detail in Chapter 3.
422 Report of the group of legal experts on making the standards contained in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin
binding on contingent members and standardising the norms of conduct so that they are applicable to all
categories of peacekeeping personnel, A/61/645, 18 December 2006. See Chapter 3.
423 See e.g., BBC report on exploitation in Haiti by UN peacekeepers, supra note 310; Statistics on the CDU
website http://cdu.unlb.org/; Secretary-General’s Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data,
A/58/777 for 2003; A/59/782 for 2004; A/60/861 for 2005; A/61/957 for 2006; A/62/890 for 2007; A/63/720 for
2008.
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2.5. Conclusion
Criminalising violence against women encourages a social policy that allows women to regain their
autonomy that is lost when they are the victims of violent conduct. With regards to preventing
prostitution and sexual exploitation, criminalisation allows women to regain autonomy in relation to
their health, sexuality, family and marriage life, economic circumstances, development, and
education. Criminalisation of this anti-social behaviour enables women “to have an adequate range
of choices”, and puts in place “laws which protect [these women] from the consequences of their
own vulnerability and of communal living”.424 “The criminal law inevitably reflects the way in which
politically organised society protects and reconciles the interests valued in a given society.”425 The
state has basic responsibilities to the community, “such as ensuring that people co-operate with each
other so as to promote non-exploitative social and economic relations”.426
In the first step to determining whether particular conduct should be criminalised, it must be
established that the conduct results in harm to an identifiable victim. This chapter has demonstrated
that the commission of gender-based violence against women such as sexual exploitation and
patronising of prostitutes by peacekeepers is harmful. It violates many rights of the women involved.
In circumstances involving the transmission of STIs and HIV/AIDS, it also results in harm to the
peacekeepers themselves, which adjoins a paternalist justification for criminalisation. The harm
caused justifies the restriction on individual liberties that criminalisation results in.
However, it not only the harm resulting from the conduct that justifies criminalisation- it must also
be ascertained if any other form of non-criminal law regulation may prevent the harmful conduct.
This chapter has examined the potential of codes of conduct in this regard. As a form of regulation
other than criminal law, codes of conduct, whether issued by national militaries or the UN, are
insufficient to prevent peacekeepers from committing gender-based crimes, and unable to ensure
accountability for such misconduct.
424 Wilson, supra note 141.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid., p. 41.
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The following chapter will continue the examination of alternative forms of international regulation.
It will demonstrate why and how the UN reports, regulations and agreements alone are insufficient
to prevent criminal misconduct by peacekeepers, but instead support national criminalisation
specifically targeted at jurisdiction over peacekeepers as well as coordinating regulations to ensure
such criminal accountability can be effectively enforced. The UN actions assist in the practical
application of criminal law to gender-based violence against women.
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3. United Nations Steps towards Accountability of
Peacekeeping Personnel
3.1. Introduction
Chapter 2 has demonstrated the extent of the problems of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by
peacekeeping personnel. As a consequence of increased awareness of the issue of sexual
exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel, the United Nations (UN) has made developments
towards finding a solution for the problem. For the purposes of this thesis, an examination of the
actions taken by the UN must be undertaken to determine whether or not the UN actions are
effective in both preventing and punishing SEA by peacekeeping personnel. Actions taken by
different UN entities are examined- the Secretariat, the member states (in the guise of bodies such as
the General Assembly), and various departments and agencies such as the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). There is a need for the UN to be involved in the prevention and
punishment of SEA by UN peacekeepers, as the peacekeepers are acting under the auspices of the
UN. Consequently, it is the UN, in the form of the Security Council, which issues the mandate of the
peace support operations (PSOs); and the Secretariat and associated departments such as the DPKO,
which coordinate and administer PSOs. Thus, even though it is ultimately the responsibility of the
sending states to discipline their troops, the application of standard regulations to all personnel is
necessary for the effective functioning of a mission. A uniform standard of conduct is indispensable
to a productive PSO.
The main actions taken by the UN have occurred since late 2003, with a significant number taking
place from 2005 onwards. These include issuances of regulations, reports with recommendations,
draft documents including a Draft Convention, and General Assembly resolutions. The emphasis of
these is specifically on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, but some relate to misconduct and
discipline in general. The real catalyst for organisational change within the UN in relation to the issue
of SEA in peace support operations (PSOs) was the report entitled A comprehensive strategy to
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eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations, known as
the Zeid Report.427 The report was released in March 2005, and is highly critical of the system,
analysing the problems and recommending solutions. The Report examined the rules on standards of
conduct; the UN investigatory process; organisational, managerial and command accountability; and
individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability. There are several principal areas in which
the Zeid Report and subsequent reports have found problems, and the organisational changes have
sought to address these. These areas are: the prohibition of SEA in UN missions; the creation of
agreements with states and conventions to obligate states to ensure criminal accountability by
exercising jurisdiction over criminal offences committed by peacekeeping personnel; lack of
cooperation between the UN and states in misconduct investigations; inadequate recording and
reporting of misconduct cases and data; ensuring managerial and command responsibility; the need
for attention to victims’ rights including financial compensation, care and assistance; the need for
more comprehensive training both pre- and post-deployment; and the need for adequate welfare
and recreation facilities for personnel in the field.428 These issues will be discussed in this chapter as
they relate to the following themes: prohibition and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse;
jurisdiction; immunity; accountability (individual and superior/command); cooperation or mutual
legal assistance; and victims’ rights.
The UN has also established a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) within the Department of Field
Support (DFS), a department that functions in conjunction with the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO). The CDU consists of a main office located at UN Headquarters in the USA, and in-
mission units.429 The main role of the CDU is to develop and implement policies and strategies to
427 The Zeid Report is a report by His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, who was
commissioned by the Secretary-General in 2004 to advise and assist in addressing the problem of sexual
exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel. A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual
exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations, (report accompanying Letter dated 24 March
2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly), A/59/710, March 2005.
428 Ibid.
429 The author thanks the CDU for assistance on the work of the CDU. Except where otherwise cited, all
references to the work of the CDU are courtesy of an interview with a senior member of the CDU held at UN
Headquarters in New York in March 2008.
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prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. This is carried out through the enforcement of standards of
conduct; increasing awareness of conduct and discipline issues; training mission personnel and host
populations; acting as a focal point for allegations of misconduct (including SEA); advising heads of
mission on all conduct and discipline issues and implementation of measures to prevent misconduct;
monitoring allegations of misconduct; providing feedback to victims and host populations on
investigation outcomes; and collection of data on investigations.430 Due to the establishment of the
CDU, the DPKO/DFS is the most advanced UN agency in terms of actions taken with regard to
conduct and discipline issues. The DPKO devotes a large amount of resources to conduct and
discipline, something which other agencies are currently unable to do.431
In addition to the CDU, an inter-agency task force has been established to deal with some of the
issues listed above.432 This UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) task force on protection
from SEA (the SEA Task Force) includes UN agencies such as the DPKO the DFS, the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Development Programme (UNDP), the CDU, UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UNICEF. Participating NGOs include Save the Children
UK, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam and Refugees International.433 The SEA Task Force works to prevent
and ensure accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse in four main areas of engagement with
and support of local populations; prevention; response systems including victim assistance; and
management and coordination.434
This chapter summarises and analyses the actions that have been taken by the UN in relation to the
thematic areas listed above, with emphasis on the prohibition and prevention of sexual exploitation
430 See the Conduct and Discipline Unit website http://cdu.unlb.org/. See also Special measures for protection
from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/957, 15 June 2007, paras. 22-
26.
431 Interview with Ariana Pearlroth, gender and SEA focal point of the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), March 2008.
432 Hereinafter ‘SEA Task Force’ (SEA meaning sexual exploitation and abuse). See A/61/957, paras. 19 and 20.
433 The author thanks Marianne Mollman of Human Rights Watch and Ariana Pearlroth of OCHA for the
information about this task force. See also Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation, Report of
the Secretary-General, 25 June 2008, A/62/890, paras. 18-19.
434 Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary-General,
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and abuse in UN missions, jurisdiction, and criminal accountability of peacekeeping personnel.
Mention will be made of the work of the CDU and the SEA Task Force, and various UN documents
including resolutions; with an emphasis on the Draft Convention.
3.2. The prohibition and prevention of sexual exploitation
and abuse in UN missions
While prosecution of perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse is vital, the first step, and even
more importantly, is to ensure SEA does not happen in the first place. To achieve this, the UN has
been working on a strengthened system of prohibition and prevention of SEA (and misconduct in
general) by its personnel. This has consisted of the implementation of a Secretary-General’s Bulletin
on the prohibition of SEA, the establishment of the CDU, the revision of the Draft Model
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), addressing inadequate recording and reporting of
misconduct case and data, enacting more comprehensive training both pre- and post-deployment,
and looking towards ensuring adequate welfare and recreation facilities in the field. These are all
actions the UN itself has taken as an international organisation at Secretariat and agency level,
although the implementation of some of the changes (e.g. the adoption of new articles in
subsequently adopted Memoranda of Understanding) does require the cooperation of states. This
section will examine each of these instruments and areas of action.
3.2.1. Secretary-General’s Bulletin
The first institution-wide step taken by the UN to prohibit SEA by peacekeeping personnel was the
Secretary-General’s bulletin of 2003 entitled ‘Special measures for protection from sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse’.435 This is still the principal source of authority for the UN when it
comes to addressing the prohibition and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse; almost all
other documents issued refer to this bulletin. It is an internal UN document, and therefore
constitutes administrative prohibition of SEA. The bulletin is brief, and succinctly clarifies the
prohibition of the commission of acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse by UN forces
435 ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003.
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conducting operations under UN command and control.436 The bulletin applies to all staff of the UN,
including staff of separately administered organs and programmes of the UN.437 The meanings of
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are defined in the bulletin, the definitions of which are used in
this thesis. These have become the accepted definitions for use by the UN, and there is no other
agreed definition within international criminal law for sexual exploitation.438
“[T]he term ‘sexual exploitation’ means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to,
profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the
term ‘sexual abuse’ means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature,
whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”
439
Section 3 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin details the prohibition of sexual exploitation and sexual
abuse. While it is recognised that such behaviour has always been unacceptable and prohibited
conduct for UN staff, the bulletin gives more detailed clarification of existing general obligations
under the UN Staff Rules and Regulations.440 The Bulletin prohibits sexual exploitation, sexual
conduct with a minor, prostitution-related activities, and relationships based on unequal power
dynamics:
“3.2 ...
(a) Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore
grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal;
(b) Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age
of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence;
(c) Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other
forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any
exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance;
436 Section 2.2.
437 Section 2.1.
438 For a discussion of the definition of ‘sexual violence’ as found in international criminal law, particularly the
Rome Statute, see Chapter 5.
439 Section 1.
440 Staff Rules and Regulations, ST/SGB/2007/4.
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(d) Sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they
are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the
work of the United Nations and are strongly discouraged...”
Section 3 obliges any staff member to report any concerns or suspicions regarding sexual exploitation
or abuse, and to create and maintain an environment that prevents SEA, with particular emphasis on
the responsibility of managers.441 It is also explicitly stated that:
“3.3 The standards set out above are not intended to be an exhaustive list. Other types of
sexually exploitive or sexually abusive behaviour may be grounds for administrative action or
disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal, pursuant to the United Nations Staff
Regulations and Rules.”
Section 4 of the bulletin specifies the duties of heads of departments, offices and missions, obliging
them to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse, ensure
circulation of the bulletin, take appropriate disciplinary action in cases of misconduct, appoint a focal
point for sexual exploitation and abuse reports, and to inform the UN of any investigations and
actions taken.
Finally, the bulletin makes reference to criminal prosecution: “If, after proper investigation, there is
evidence to support allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, these cases may, upon
consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred to national authorities for criminal
prosecution.”442 This indicates that the UN envisages criminal prosecution as a valid and necessary
result of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. Yet it is also recognition of the limited reach of the
UN in this regard. While the UN can be significantly involved in the prohibition and prevention of
SEA, as an international organisation and not a state entity, the UN has little authority with regards
to accountability. The UN can take disciplinary action in an administrative form, such as repatriation,
but does not have the legal capacity to engage in criminal prosecution. These issues of jurisdiction
and accountability will be addressed infra.
441 Sub-sections 3.2 (e) & (f).
442 Section 5.
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3.2.2. Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an instrument concluded between states or states and
organisations. MoUs are not treaties, and are generally seen as not legally binding.443 MoUs are
chosen as a form of agreement as they do not require the formalities of a treaty, are amended
without difficulty, and can be more easily terminated.444 The most common use of MoUs is to form
an agreement concerning the status of armed forces in the territory of another state.445
With regards to UN PSOs, an MoU is an agreement between the UN and troop contributing countries
(TCCs) detailing the obligations and rights in the form of administrative, logistics and financial terms
and conditions of both parties to the agreement in relation to the personnel, equipment and services
contributed to an operation.446 The Model Memorandum of Understanding (Model MoU) has the
basic provisions which are applied and also individualised where relevant for each mission. In 2007,
revised provisions to the Model MoU were adopted in order to incorporate obligations relating to
the prevention and punishment of sexual exploitation and abuse.447 Five new provisions have been
adopted, along with a new Annex H, and additional definitions in Annex F. New definitions added to
the MoU include the definitions of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse that are found in the
Secretary-General’s Bulletin.448 Others include:
Misconduct means any act or omission that is a violation of United Nations standards of conduct,
mission-specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and
443 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007), Chapter
3 MOUs, pp. 32-57. See also A. Aust, 'The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments' (1986) 35
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787-812; K. Raustiala, 'Form and Substance in International
Agreements' (2005) 99 (3) The American Journal of International Law 581-614; J.H. McNeill, 'International
Agreements: Recent U.S.-UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of Understanding' (1994) 88 American
Journal of International Law 821-826.
444 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, ibid., pp. 45-46.
445 Ibid., p. 48; McNeill, supra note 443.
446 Such an instrument is not exclusive to the UN, see e.g. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces, 19 June 1951, 199 UNTS 67.
447 The Model MoU can be found in A/C.5/60/26, Chapter 9, p. 148. The initial revised draft model MoU was
part of the Report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring accountability of United Nations staff and experts
on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations, A/60/980, 16 August 2006
(hereinafter ‘Report on ensuring accountability’); and the final revised draft model MoU is in the Report of the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the 2007 resumed session, A/61/19
(Part III), Annex, 12 June 2007. The later draft was adopted by A/RES/61/291, 24 August 2007.
448 Supra Secretary-General’s Bulletin.
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regulations in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement where the impact is outside the
national contingent.
Mission-specific rules and regulations means, mindful of national caveats, standard operating
procedures, directives and other regulations, orders and instructions issued by the Head of
Mission, Force Commander or Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations peacekeeping
mission in accordance with the United Nations standards of conduct; they shall contain
information on applicable national and local laws and regulations.
Serious misconduct is misconduct, including criminal acts, that results in, or is likely to result in,
serious loss, damage or injury to an individual or to a mission. Sexual exploitation and abuse
constitute serious misconduct.
These definitions will help create understanding as to the standards of conduct to be engaged in by
mission personnel, and assist states, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) and the CDU with the
adoption of policies and regulations relating to conduct and discipline of all personnel.
Article 3 of the Model MoU has been amended to include as one of the purposes of the MoU the
specification of UN standards of conduct for personnel provided by the state party to the agreement.
Two of the five new provisions will be discussed in this section. Article 7 quater Investigations will be
dealt with infra in the section on Lack of cooperation between the UN and states in misconduct
investigations, Article 7 quinquiens Exercise of jurisdiction by the Government will be discussed in
the section on Jurisdiction, and Article 7 sexiens Accountability is discussed in several different
sections as it deals with a variety of issues such as command responsibility, and paternity claims.
Changes to the UN code of conduct, We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel, under Annex H,
have been discussed in Chapter 2. The emphasis in the new MoU provisions is on the responsibilities
of the sending state as regards ensuring the discipline and good order of national contingent
members, the responsibilities of the national contingent commander in maintaining discipline and
good order, cooperation of investigations, sending state jurisdiction, and accountability. However,
there are some elements that deal with prohibition and prevention within the UN.
Article 7 bis requires a sending state to ensure that all contingent members are obligated to comply
with the UN standards of conduct (the new Annex H). It is the obligation of the government to assure
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that all contingent members are familiar with and fully understand these standards of conduct, and
hence to conduct adequate and effective pre-deployment training of personnel. The UN also agrees
to provide mission-specific training on standards of conducts, mission-specific rules and regulations,
and relevant local laws and regulations, conducted during mission assignment. Under Article 7 ter,
which deals with discipline, the sending state is obliged to train the national commander pre-
deployment to enable the national commander to fully discharge his or her responsibilities in
maintaining discipline and good order. The UN is also required to organise training on UN standards
of conduct, mission rules and regulations, and the local laws and regulations for commanders upon
their arrival in-mission.
In these provisions, we see an interdependent agreement, with each party to the MoU agreeing to
undertake certain obligations to guarantee a comprehensive implementation of the standards of
conduct. This recognises that full implementation of these standards is not possible without action
and cooperation of both the UN and member states. While, as it will be shown infra, criminal
accountability is the responsibility and domain of states, the UN must be the principal actor with
regards to ensuring all personnel are aware of the prohibition of misconduct such as SEA. Training
must be conducted by both the sending state and the UN to make certain that personnel are aware
not just of the prohibition of SEA itself, but the importance of not engaging in such behaviour, in that
they learn the impact of SEA on the victims, the community, the mission, and the UN. Personnel must
also be aware of the consequences of misconduct such as SEA. The aim of this is to prevent SEA
occurring in the first place, avoiding the need for punitive measures to be enacted.
3.2.3. Conduct and Discipline Units
Following up on this need for prevention of SEA within the UN, the establishment of the CDU and the
SEA Task Force constitute substantial advancements by the UN towards “institutionalizing
comprehensive, United Nations-wide implementation of prevention of abuse and the enforcement of
the standards of conduct and strategic collaboration with non-governmental organization
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partners”.449 The CDU was established to develop, interpret and implement strategies and measures
to prevent and address misconduct and discipline issues, and to strengthen the capacity of the UN to
address misconduct in a more consistent manner. For example, the CDU has developed internal
guidelines on how to handle allegations, training guidelines on SEA, and reporting mechanisms for
the field and headquarters.450
Mission CDUs are the units of a mission which adopt policy directives, standard operating
procedures, and manuals and guidelines, as well as regulate and streamline important issues and
activities concerning conduct and discipline within the mission.451 The CDU also adopts other
operational material on the basis of actual practice in the field or at Headquarters, such as
maintenance of misconduct data, assessment missions, and guidance.452 The UN has found that new
guidelines and standard operating procedures are still needed to address policies that have been
recently adopted, as well as changes in the facets of implementation of some existing processes.453
For example, it is the aim of the CDU to issue guidelines on the interpretation of the Secretary-
General’s bulletin. This is due to the complexity of issues covered in the bulletin, and guidelines will
be issued in order to review, elaborate and clarify the obligations of mission personnel under the
bulletin.454
The CDU also engages on the issue of criminal accountability with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA),
which is coordinating with the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the General Assembly on issues of criminal
accountability (such as the progress of the Draft Convention). Any decision to refer a case to national
authorities for a criminal investigation is taken in consultation with the OLA.455
449 Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/61/957, 15 June 2007, para. 32.
450 A/62/890, paras. 21-2.
451 Report of the Secretary-General, Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline including full justification
of all posts, A/62/758, 20 March 2008, para. 48. (Hereinafter ‘Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline’.)
There were 18 field CDUs in 2008; A/63/720, para. 21.
452 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, ibid., para. 48.
453 Ibid., para. 49.
454 Ibid., paras. 5 and 6.
455 Ibid., para. 14.
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The CDU further assists with the reporting requirements of the Secretariat in relation to conduct and
discipline issues, maintaining oversight of the problems and reporting on any issues.456
More detail is provided on the role of the CDU under each of the categories discussed below in this
chapter.
3.2.4. In-mission Preventative Measures
Within missions, with the assistance of the mission CDUs, heads of mission have put in place
preventative measures in order to protect local communities and avoid further instances of SEA.
Mission specific measures and instructions are issued by the head of mission, force commander or
police commissioner, as appropriate, to ensure adherence to standards of conduct. Some of the most
common measures are “restriction of movement of personnel in out-of-bounds areas and after
certain hours, the wearing of uniforms on and off duty, and regulated and supervised recreation
activities for uniformed personnel”.457 On top of the UN Code of Conduct, mission-specific codes of
conduct have been adopted and posted in all mission locations, requiring the signature of all civilian
staff, MilObs, CivPol, and any consultants and contractor personnel.458 The need for distinct mission-
specific codes of conduct stems from the fact that every mission exists in its own unique
environment. This means not only a different mission mandate, but a different local community and
government, different law and order conditions, and different nationalities of mission personnel.
Hence it is necessary, on top of the UN-wide standards of conduct, to enact mission-specific codes of
conduct specific to the mission circumstances and location, in order to take into account these
individualities.
This difference also applies to the CDU structure. A network of in-mission SEA focal points has been
developed by CDUs in some missions, and in others CDU officers have been posted in various areas
of the mission. This disparity takes into account the set-up of the mission: some missions may have
456 Ibid., para. 50.
457 Ibid., para. 41.
458 Ibid. For detail on training, see infra The need for more comprehensive training both pre- and post-
deployment.
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one central location or be located in a small region, such as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP),459 and others, such as the Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du
Congo (MONUC), are spread out amongst a large number of posts throughout a large territorial area,
with considerable distance between stations.460 It is necessary to ensure personnel at all mission
stations are engaged with CDU personnel and CDU policies and regulations, and this may require
CDU structural differences between missions.
3.2.5. The need for more comprehensive training both pre- and
post-deployment
As is evident from the new MoU provisions and the functions of the CDU, training is a particularly
important part of the prevention of SEA, as without explicit knowledge of what behaviour is not
permitted peacekeeping personnel may be unaware of their obligations. Training is especially vital
given the frequent rotation of peacekeeping personnel.461 It is the responsibility of the mission CDUs
to raise awareness of standards of conduct in peacekeeping missions, and it is the Chiefs of the CDUs
who must ensure full implementation of comprehensive training strategies.462 This includes training
peacekeeping personnel and raising awareness amongst the local population. Training personnel
distinguishes between managers and commanders and the various categories of subordinate
personnel deployed in the mission, based on the different tasks of the personnel within the
mission.463 With respect to outreach activities with the local population, the CDU targets community
leaders, local governmental and non-governmental organisations, and media.464
The CDU has developed training and awareness-raising material for orientation sessions on SEA,
including the CDU website465 and generic training modules. A website can be an extremely valuable
459 See http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unficyp.pdf.
460 See http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/monuc.pdf.
461 Report of the Secretary-General, Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission,
11 August 2008, A/63/260, para. 74 (Hereinafter ‘SG’s 2008 Report on Criminal accountability’).
462 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 67.
463 SG’s 2008 Report on Criminal accountability, supra note 461, para. 75. For further discussion on
managerial/superior and command responsibilities, see infra Ensuring managerial/superior and command
responsibility.
464 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, paras. 35 and 40.
465 http://cdu.unlb.org/.
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tool for training and awareness-raising if consistently updated. The website was not regularly
updated, between early 2007 and late 2009. Without this maintenance a website becomes an
outdated source that may be of little use. It would be of benefit to the CDU to maintain the website
as a source for all relevant documents, as well as information about the CDU itself (e.g. new
campaigns, reports, etc).
Training is conducted by CDU staff, Integrated Training Teams and focal points, as well as by
commanders in military or formed police units.466 In order to enable training to be conducted by
military and police commanders, the CDU engages in ‘train-the-trainer’ workshops.467 Headquarters
CDU has developed standard modules on prevention of SEA, designed for all levels and categories of
peacekeeping personnel. UNDP, the DPKO, UNICEF and OCHA have created a training video entitled
‘To Serve with Pride: Zero Tolerance for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’.468 In addition, it is the
responsibility of each field CDU to develop and implement mission-specific training strategies as well
as evaluations to measure the impact of such training.469 Mission-specific training takes into account
local issues in the host country in order to ensure personnel are sensitised to cultural and other
aspects specific to the local community.470
One of the priority areas for training is mission managerial and senior leadership. Training of existing
and prospective managers includes a session on conduct and discipline and the role of managers “as
role models, to achieve an environment free from all types of misconduct”.471 The CDU is also
involved with Senior Mission Leaders’ programmes in Peacekeeping Centres globally and the DPKO
Senior Leadership Induction Programmes. The UN is recognising that the hierarchical structure of a
PSO, particularly given the fact that the majority of personnel in a PSO are military, means that the
466 Ibid., para. 36. It is the role of P-3 and P-4 Conduct and Discipline Officers to provide training on the
prevention of SEA and conduct and discipline in general; ibid., para. 70.
467 Ibid., para. 38.
468 Ibid., para.. 36. See also Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget
performance for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 and budget for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30
June 2009, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/727, 30 April 2008, para. 78. (Hereinafter ‘Overview of
financing’); A/62/890, para. 21; SG’s 2008 Report on Criminal accountability, supra note 461, para. 76.
469 SG’s 2008 Report on Criminal accountability, supra note 461, para. 87-8.
470 Ibid.
471 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 39.
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role of managers and commanders in preventing and punishing SEA is extremely important. A
significant part of the problem in the past has been the lack of willingness of leadership to take
action over allegations of SEA, resulting in an increase in the occurrences of SEA due to an
atmosphere of impunity. This accentuation on training of management and senior leadership has
implications with regards to superior and command responsibilities, which will be further discussed
in Chapter 5.
Another specific training drive that the CDU is tackling is the issue of use of prostitutes. The CDU has
received funding for a pilot for an anti-prostitution campaign.472 Missions in East Timor (UMIT), Haiti
(MINUSTAH), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL)
and Sudan (UNMIS) are the missions currently running the pilot of the campaign.473 Each mission is
approaching the campaign differently, with mission-specific strategies. MONUC is focussing on
transactional sex/prostitution with minors, and is working with UN partners and NGOs. MINUSTAH
and UNMIL are dealing with communication and outreach with more focus on prevention with the
personnel and with the local population. In Sudan, workshops are being held and materials produced
to target both personnel and the local community. As the campaign is newly established, its success
is yet to be verified. Monitoring is budgeted into the campaign, and there will be evaluation of the
campaign in the Northern Hemisphere Spring of 2009. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation,
the campaign may be extended to all missions, although this will be dependent on external funding.
The extent of use of prostitutes by mission personnel has been shown in Chapter 2, and this
provokes an understanding of just how vital such a campaign is within PSOs. The campaign should
focus on the impact of prostitution (including its dramatic increase) on women and the local
community, the illegality of sexual activity with minors, and the potential health implications of
engaging in sexual relations under such circumstances.474 The campaign should also create
472 Overview of financing, supra note 468, para. 78.
473 Information on the anti-prostitution campaign courtesy of Ms Yasna Uberoi, Headquarters CDU, email dated
8 August 2008, on file with the author; A/62-890, para. 22.
474 See supra Chapter 2.
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awareness amongst personnel of the negative repercussions of engaging in prostitution-related
activities within the local community. This includes impact on the relationship of the mission with the
local community and the overall reputation of the PSO within the host state and the international
community, and the fact that such repercussions can jeopardise mission effectiveness.475 Personnel
need to be made aware of their role in re-building a post-conflict society,476 and that by proliferating
prostitution amongst local women their actions are inimical to this role. Potential accountability for
such behaviour should also be made clear, so that personnel are aware that there are consequences
for violating mission standards, particularly if the misconduct amounts to a criminal offence. Finally,
the positive and supportive actions that personnel can take instead should also be discussed, in order
to assure that the campaign training does not concentrate on entirely negative aspects. The
campaign could be combined with community reconstruction and development actions, looking to
promote other ways for women to support themselves. There could also be a link with programs
designed to combat trafficking, corruption and organised crimes.
3.2.6. The need for adequate welfare and recreation facilities for
personnel in the field
In January 2008, a comprehensive review of the welfare and recreation needs of all categories of
peacekeeping personnel was issued by the Secretary-General.477 The report reviews conditions of
service of peacekeeping personnel, details the current status of reforms under consideration or in
the process of implementation, surveys current welfare and recreation practices in missions, and
identifies concerns and makes recommendations for addressing issues.
An emphasis is made on the need for increased attention to the well-being of peacekeeping
personnel, to assist personnel with acceptance of the ‘special constraints’ in their private and public
lives and to strengthen the resources of personnel to cope with the “distinct challenges of
475 See supra Chapter 2.
476 See e.g.M. Katayanagi, Human Rights Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2002).
477 Report of the Secretary-General, Comprehensive review of the welfare and recreation needs of all categories
of peacekeeping personnel, A/62/663, 24 January 2008. (Hereinafter ‘Comprehensive welfare review’.)
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peacekeeping”.478 It is pointed out that “the provision to peacekeeping personnel of adequate
opportunities for welfare and recreation forms an important part of the strategy to prevent serious
misconduct on their part, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse”.479 In fact, the review
“is premised on the recognition that instances of failure of peacekeeping personnel to measure
up to the prescribed standards of conduct not infrequently have to do with social and
psychological challenges that face them in the broken societies amidst which they live and work.
The proportionally higher incidence [sic] of misconduct among categories of personnel who are
deployed individually and, therefore, are unable to draw on social reinforcements, and moral
checks and balances that with deployment as formed bodies, is an example.”
480
A previous independent study confirms the provision of adequate welfare and recreation facilities as
an effective method for preventing SEA.481 A case study details two units of UNAMSIL482 with a
curfew of 18.00, which had created a sense of ‘home’ in the barracks and messes “with well-
organised recreational facilities, a mosque, sturdy accommodation constructions and an overall
sense of pride in their ability to be largely self-sustaining”.483 The units had a range of activities
organised on a daily basis, such as movie nights, cricket, football and weight-training, all of which
contributed to the creation of a greater sense of camaraderie and provided an outlet for the
boredom that can arise on mission deployments. Members of the unit expressed no desire to leave
the unit when off-duty.
Other soldiers based in Freetown would maintain accommodation for local women with whom they
engaged in sex with.484 A pattern of ‘gift exchange’ would emerge, where peacekeeping personnel
formed ‘relationships’ with local women, providing them with accommodation, money and goods in
exchange for sex, i.e. sexual exploitation. In other areas of Sierra Leone, UN personnel visited clubs,
478 Ibid., para. 42.
479 Ibid., para., 41.
480 Ibid., para. 45.
481 P. Higate, 'Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone' (Institute for Security
Studies, March 2004) ISS Monograph No. 91, p. 45.
482 UN Mission in Sierra Leone.
483 Higate, supra note 481.
484 Ibid., p. 43.
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bars and brothels to have sex with prostitutes. In comparison with the two units referred to above,
there was no curfew and no provision for recreational activities for these personnel.485
In the case studies, the units that were provided with recreational facilities did not engage in any
form of SEA, a stark comparison to other soldiers who were not provided with recreational facilities
by the mission. Such case studies demonstrate the effectiveness in avoiding SEA through ensuring
the welfare of peacekeeping personnel, and in particular the provision of recreational facilities. The
implementation of a curfew and the provision of adequate welfare and recreational facilities will
assure that personnel have activities to keep them occupied when off-duty, significantly decreasing
the temptation to visit clubs, bars and brothels.486
In order to secure adequate leave for mission personnel, the Comprehensive welfare review
recommends a review by DPKO of the current compensatory time off policy as well as the application
of recreational leave allowance to be made admissible to contingent personnel for the 15 days of
leave allowed in six months of deployment.487 The report found that some lower-paid categories of
UN personnel (such as UN Volunteers) were not able to participate in welfare flights for recreational
leave due to issues of affordability.488 It is recommended that the Department of Field Support re-
examine the current policies limiting the number of people permitted to take such flights.489 Some
missions provide group travel to places of interest outside the mission area for mission personnel on
leave, which is an excellent practice enabling personnel to leave the confines of the mission area to
refresh and rejuvenate.490 The report also recommends the establishment of designated leave
485 Ibid.
486 The effectiveness of this is demonstrated by a comparison of different national troops in East Timor. Those
without a curfew or any restrictions visited bars and massage parlours; whereas those with restrictions did not. S.
Koyama and H. Myrttinen, 'Unintended consequences of peace operations on Timor Leste from a gender
perspective', in Aoi, et al. (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, (United Nations
University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris 2007), 23-43, pp. 35-36.
487 Comprehensive welfare review, supra note 477, paras. 20 and 24.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid., para. 37.
490 Ibid., para. 38.
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centres, where personnel can access facilities for rest and recuperation such as books, games and
television. Accommodation and transport should also be provided at these centres.491
Welfare needs cover a wide variety of issues, from provision of food and water to affordable
transport for recreational leave breaks. The report recognises that welfare needs will vary from
mission to mission, and that it is vital that welfare needs are assessed at the start-up phase of each
mission.492 Particular attention should be paid to security of personnel (particularly those located in
remote mission posts), supply of food and potable water, and the maintaining of funds for the
provision of welfare and recreational needs.493 Another key area is communication; peacekeeping
personnel should have adequate to access to communications such as internet and telephone, in
order to be able to maintain contact with their families.494 This can help to avoid the sense of
isolation that may be felt when deployed, especially if deployment is to a remote post. Working in a
PSO, personnel may be engaging in long hours,495 highly stressful and distressing tasks in a tense
environment, and they are doing so without the immediate support of family and friends. Dallaire
writes of the horrific incidents he was forced to deal with in his time as commander of UNAMIR,496 of
missing his family,497 and of how important communication and contact with his family was,498 but
also how difficult this communication and contact was to undertake.499 Personnel cannot be left to
mission duties in a void of support, be it logistical and practical or emotional, either within the
mission or from external sources such as family.
On top of this, provision of recreational activities and facilities should be an essential element of any
welfare practices. Minimum standards of facilities for welfare and recreation should “entail the
491 Ibid., para. 39.
492 Ibid., para. 25.
493 Ibid., paras. 26-30.
494 Ibid., paras. 31-32.
495 R. Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil, (Arrow Books, London 2003), p. 107. Dallaire mentions the
pressure he and his staff were under, and the fact they were working day and night.
496 Ibid., e.g., pp. 115-118, describing the rape and murder of a group of children; pp. 255 ff. describing the
murder of members of the Belgian contingent; p. 325 having to move dead bodies out of the way of their vehicle.
497 Ibid., pp. 127-128; 217.
498 Ibid., p. 353; 470-471.
499 Ibid., pp. 417-419; 470-471.
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provision of installations, equipment and amenities enabling a range of outdoor and indoor sporting,
social and cultural events”, such as televisions, stereos, fitness and sport equipment, games and
reading library.500 A ‘welfare kit’ is also suggested for non-military personnel, comprising generic
equipment such as an indoor gym, a multi-purpose recreation centre for use as an indoor lounge
(including internet, indoor games, television and DVD/VCR player, board games and refreshments), a
library, and a prayer/meditation room.501 The detail provided in the Comprehensive welfare review is
extremely valuable and should prove to be very beneficial to the DPKO and DFS as well as TCCs
during the establishment of missions, as well as throughout the mission’s duration. Such facilities will
assist personnel in coping with stress and boredom that may be experienced, existing as an outlet to
relieve stress, as well as a method of ensuring personnel are able to be occupied with recreational
activities when off-duty.
The importance of the provision of such facilities is confirmed in the new Model MoU provisions.
Sending states are provided with funds for contingent members’ welfare.502 Article 7(5) ter of the
Model MoU requires a sending state government to use its welfare payments to provide adequate
welfare and recreation facilities to its contingent members in the mission. Under the MoU, this is not
an interdependent responsibility shared by the UN and states. This provision places the responsibility
for provision of welfare and recreation facilities for military personnel on the sending states. While
the Comprehensive welfare review suggests a ‘welfare kit’ for non-military equipment, it is the detail
of implementation of this that is important. What must be addressed is how such welfare and
recreational facilities are to be funded and which department or unit will undertake their installation
and maintenance in-mission. There is a distinction created between facilities for military and non-
military personnel, rather than mission-wide facilities. The provision of mission-wide facilities would
ensure that facilities are maintained and retained, as sending states would be likely to remove
facilities upon the departure of their own personnel. Mission-wide facilities would also ensure all
500 Comprehensive welfare review, supra note 477, paras. 47 and 50.
501 Ibid., para. 57.
502 Ibid., para. 52.
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personnel have access to facilities, rather than the possibility of some personnel having access to
only very basic facilities whilst other personnel have extensive facilities provided for them. This does
not mean that sending states should not be obliged to provide welfare and recreation facilities, but
that such facilities should be available to all mission personnel without distinction of role or position
within the mission. One benefit of sending states providing facilities would be that it would establish
culture-specific facilities, as different cultures engage in different recreational activities (e.g. different
sports such as soccer or tennis). However, the UN needs to assure and monitor the provision of
welfare and recreation facilities at each mission, rather than relying wholly on sending states.
Particularly given the fact that sending states will only be providing facilities for their own contingent,
the provision of welfare and recreation facilities should be a joint responsibility of states and the UN,
to assure comprehensive provision of such facilities.
3.2.7. Recording and reporting of misconduct cases and data
The Zeid Report found that there was little data available on cases of SEA by peacekeeping
personnel.503 This had already been flagged as an issue. Prior to the 2003 Zeid Report, the General
Assembly directed the Secretary-General to maintain data on investigations into sexual exploitation
and related offences. Since then, the Secretary-General has submitted annual reports to the General
Assembly to comply with the request.504
The reports give a brief overview of new cases of SEA, and also outline progress in implementing
special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse undertaken in the previous
calendar year. The latter reports are somewhat more detailed than the first one for 2003, adding
tables of offences committed, demonstrated by categories of personnel (peacekeeping personnel
and other UN agencies, as well as separating peacekeeping personnel into military and civilian
personnel). Both the 2004 and 2005 reports declare: “in substantiated cases, the military personnel
were repatriated on disciplinary grounds. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is following
503 Zeid Report, supra note 427, paras. 41 and 62.
504 Secretary-General’s Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data, A/58/777 for 2003; A/59/782
for 2004; A/60/861 for 2005; A/61/957 for 2006; A/62/890 for 2007; A/63/720 for 2008.
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up with Member States to obtain information on disciplinary and/or criminal action taken.”505
However, although encompassing a whole year following the 2004 report, the 2005 report makes no
mention of any follow-ups actually undertaken or reports received relating thereto. Thus, there is no
way of knowing whether or not the personnel that were repatriated received any kind of disciplinary
action, or were subject to criminal prosecution. Nor do the reports mention the nationality of
repatriated personnel. Such lack of transparency creates difficulty for anyone without access to
internal UN files to conduct investigations into any potential disciplinary or criminal proceedings
taken once the personnel were repatriated.
In the 2006 report, 13 investigations against military personnel were substantiated and all individuals
were repatriated.506 This report does mention feedback received from two member states against
seven military personnel, which included three demotions in rank, four custodial sentences and five
dismissals from the armed services.507 Similar details are to be found in the 2007 report, which
mentions ongoing criminal proceedings in one member state, and three other member states having
taken action against 21 military personnel, resulting in three dismissals from service, six reprimands,
seven imprisonments, one reduction in rank and imprisonment, and four dismissals from service and
imprisonment.508 In addition, all such personnel are banned from participation in any UN missions.
The 2008 report does mention that two states sentenced military personnel to 30 and 40 days
imprisonment.509
States are slow to follow-up on prosecution. The 2007 report notes that one member state reported
criminal proceedings were ongoing following the repatriation of 111 military personnel.510 In the
2008 report, the same member state stated that these criminal proceedings were still ‘under review
by its Ministry of Defence’.511 The CDU website contains statistics on UN follow-up with member
505 A/59/782 for 2004, para. 7; A/60/861 for 2005, para. 8.
506 A/61/957 for 2006, para. 9(a).
507 Ibid.
508 A/62/890 for 2007, para. 9(a).
509 A/63/720 for 2008, para. 11(a).
510 A/62/890 for 2007, para. 9(a).
511 A/63/720 for 2008, para. 11(a).
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states.512 These statistics show that member states are not providing responses to follow-up
requests. The UN needs to continue to pressure states in situations such as this, to ensure the state
does take action. Again, the statistics do not detail which member states are concerned. It may be
useful to maintain complete transparency, as states would be more likely to respond to requests if
their performance was made public, and therefore open to criticism or commendation.
One of the purposes of the CDU has been to develop a database of misconduct allegations, and
investigations. Creating a database of misconduct allegations will enable the UN to effectively
monitor misconduct cases and trends, as well as meet the Secretariat’s reporting obligations to
legislative bodies.513 A database of offenders when allegations are substantiated will be part of a
wider vetting policy. The database has been operational for approximately four years. It is a web-
based file-storage system called CyberArk, and facilitates the secure storage, transmission, receipt of
and access to documents on cases of misconduct.514 In 2008 the UN created a more comprehensive
Misconduct Tracking System, which will enable sharing of data and information by CDU Headquarters
and mission CDUs, including permitting the input of new information by mission CDUs.515
Coordination with OIOS to ensure compatibility and completeness of data is ongoing.516
There is no central database yet; and currently the database contains only DPKO cases.517 Details of
individuals repatriated for misconduct are entered into the database, including reasons for
repatriation and that s/he will not be considered for further service in any PSO.518 There is a formal
policy for senior officers, however the CDU believes that it will not be possible to vet all troops, and
that in the end this will have to be up to the TCCs to undertake.
512 UN follow-up with member states (sexual exploitation and abuse),
http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/UNFollowupWithMemberStatesSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx; UN follow-up
with member states (excluding sexual exploitation and abuse)
http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/UNFollowupWithMemberStatesExcludingSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx.
513 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 21.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid.; A/63/720 for 2008, para. 15.
516 Ibid.
517 As of early 2008.
518 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 30.
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The UN currently finds that once immunity ratione materiae has been waived, the Secretariat is
“generally not provided information regarding difficulties, including evidentiary issues, that might
arise in criminal proceedings instituted before national jurisdictions”.519 This will hopefully be an
issue that will be addressed by the new investigation coordination and information sharing
provisions of the MoU, and the database constructed by the CDU, which in turn will enable UN
actions regarding cooperation to be amended to ensure the least possible procedural problems for
state criminal proceedings.
This section has established that the UN is taking action towards the prohibition and prevention of
SEA. The UN, particularly through the CDU, is actively seeking to create a more effective system of
prevention and reporting. However, should SEA be committed, there is a need for punishment
through criminal prosecution. As demonstrated in this section, the UN can only take administrative
action, not criminal. Thus, there are further procedures required to ensure that when SEA is
committed, it is not done so with impunity. The following section will address the first issue related
to prosecution of peacekeeping personnel, namely the question of which state has jurisdiction over
the personnel.
3.3. Jurisdiction
Thus far in this chapter, the actions of the UN regarding prohibition and prevention of SEA have been
discussed. Prevention is certainly the ideal situation, but there also need to be punitive measures in
force to ensure accountability for when such misconduct does occur. While the UN can impose
administrative punishments for personnel committing SEA, the UN does not have the ability to
undertake criminal prosecution.520 Jurisdiction is a complicated issue in relation to peacekeeping
personnel. As mentioned in Chapter 2, jurisdiction of a state is the power of that state to govern
persons and property; prescriptive jurisdiction is the right to prescribe laws, and enforcement
519 Second session report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 621, para. 31.
520 The juridical capacity of the UN consists of the capacity: “(a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of in
movable and movable property; (c) to institute legal proceedings.” Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 15, 13 February 1946; Article I, Section 1.
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jurisdiction is the power to enforce such laws.521 Jurisdiction has traditionally been viewed as linked
to state sovereignty, and is territorial.522 However, it is also accepted that, provided there is no
specific rule to the contrary, jurisdiction may be enacted extra-territorially.523 “The only prohibitive
rule... is that criminal jurisdiction should not be exercised, without permission, within the territory of
another state”.524 “This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules
which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other States.”525
Such rules include those applicable during PSOs. In addition, jurisdiction is not limited to national
territory when acts of state authorities produce effects outside their own territory.526 Actions of
peacekeeping personnel inevitably produce effects outside the territory of their sending state or
state of nationality. Of the various instruments relative to the establishment of a PSO, two govern
jurisdiction over personnel.
The first of these is a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is an agreement between the UN and
a host state. The agreement covers issues like transport and communications, as well as privileges
and immunities of the PSO.527 Under paragraph 47(b), military personnel are deemed to be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state for any criminal offences committed within the host
state or territory. The SOFA requires the Secretary-General to obtain guarantees from troop
contributing countries (TCCs) that they “will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with respect to
crimes or offences which may be committed by members of their national contingents serving with
the peace-keeping operation”.528 Such text offers no obligation on the part of sending states, as the
521 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 299;
M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, Cases And Materials On International Law, 4th ed., (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2003), p. 268; D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, London
2004), p. 265.
522 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, France v Turkey, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (Lotus Case), pp. 18, 20; Dixon
and McCorquodale, ibid., p. 268.
523 Lotus Case, pp. 19, 20.
524 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), (Arrest
Warrant Case), ICJ, General List No. 121, (2002), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal, para. 54.
525 Ibid, p. 19.
526 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, Application no. 12747/87, Judgment 26 June 1992, para. 91.
527 A/45/594, Annex, paras. 15, 24-31. Jurisdiction is covered in paragraphs 46-49.
528 Ibid., para. 48.
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sending state is not a party to a SOFA. Additionally, should the Secretary-General obtain the required
guarantee, it is only a guarantee to be prepared to exercise jurisdiction, and not one to definitively
exercise that jurisdiction.
The second instrument to address jurisdiction is the mission MoU. As has been mentioned supra, the
Model MoU which is used as a template for MoUs concluded for all PSOs has been amended to
include provisions on sending states’ criminal jurisdiction over their troops.529 There are two new
provisions particular to jurisdiction with regards to discipline and criminal offences.
Under Article 7 ter Discipline, discipline and good order of national contingent members are the
responsibility of the national commander. The sending state must secure the authority of the
commander to take reasonable measures to maintain discipline and good order of the national
contingent members in compliance with standards of conduct, and rules and regulations. A national
commander must inform the Force Commander of any serious matters relating to discipline and
good order including disciplinary action taken for violations of the standards of conduct or mission
rules and regulations, or for failure to respect the local laws and regulations.
The sending state is obliged to train the national commander pre-deployment to enable the national
commander to fully discharge their responsibilities in maintaining discipline and good order.
Another new provision confirms that military personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the sending state in respect of any crimes or offences committed by them whilst assigned to a
PSO.530 “The Government assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such jurisdiction with
respect to such crimes or offences.”
Under the MoU the government is also obligated to “exercise such disciplinary jurisdiction as might
be necessary with respect to all other acts of misconduct committed by any members of the
529 The amendments are set out in the Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/61/19
(Part III), and were adopted by the General Assembly in a resolution on Comprehensive review of the whole
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, A/RES/61/291, 24 August 2007.
530 Article 7 quinquiens Exercise of jurisdiction by the Government.
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Government’s national contingent while they are assigned to the military component of [United
Nations peacekeeping mission] that do not amount to crimes or offences.”
Article 7 quinquiens of the revised draft MoU thus clearly requires a troop-contributing state to
ensure they have adequate criminal jurisdiction over its national contingent. It enforces this in
conjunction with paragraphs 47(b) and 48 of the SOFA.531 This requirement enacts the nationality
principle532 and is two-fold: a state must ensure not only that the subject-matter jurisdiction is
comprehensive, but that such jurisdiction is able to be exercised extra-territorially. This two-fold
requirement may result in a void in the potential of sending states to exercise jurisdiction. For
example, while a state may ensure all of its criminal law is applicable extraterritorially, the
substantive criminal law may not be wide-ranging; for example, there may be no provisions
proscribing sexual exploitation.533
It is evident from both the SOFA and the MoU that there are two main categories of personnel:
military and civilian. Military personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state.
The status of civilian personnel is somewhat unclear. As the SOFA suggests, civilian personnel are
subject to host state jurisdiction. However, as has already been raised, the issue of whether or not
the host state is able to undertake prosecution creates a problematic praxis. This lacuna has been
addressed by the General Assembly in its Resolution of Criminal accountability of UN officials and
experts on mission,534 and in the Draft Convention on criminal accountability of UN officials and
experts on mission.535 The Draft Convention also attempts to address the potential jurisdictional gaps
that may arise with regards to the enactment of jurisdiction by sending states over military
personnel. Unfortunately, as discussed below, neither instrument is a wholly adequate solution to
531 Although it must be recalled, as mentioned supra, that the SOFA is only binding on the host state and not the
sending state.
532 A state may enact jurisdiction over its own nationals regardless of where a crime was committed; Brownlie,
supra note 521, pp. 303-4.
533 See Chapter 4 for further discussion.
534 A/RES/62/63, 8 January 2008; A/RES/63/119, 11 December 2008.
535 Report on ensuring accountability, supra note 447.
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these jurisdictional gaps. The Draft Convention could potentially be a comprehensive resolution of all
gaps, but to do so it must be reworked and eventually adopted as a convention.
The GA has adopted two resolutions calling for states to take all appropriate measures to ensure
accountability for crimes committed by UN officials and experts on mission.536 The resolutions
“strongly urge[ ] all States to consider establishing to the extent that they have not yet done so
jurisdiction, particularly over crimes of a serious nature, as known in their existing domestic
criminal laws, committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on
mission, at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction
also constitutes a crime under the laws of the host State”.
537
States are encouraged to cooperate with each other and the UN in relation to information sharing
and coordination of investigations, as well as the prosecution of UN officials and experts on mission
alleged to have committed serious crimes.538
The resolutions also request the Secretariat to create awareness in sending states of expectations of
standards of conduct of personnel, to strengthen existing training on standards of conduct, and to
bring any credible allegations of criminal misconduct to the attention of the state against whose
nationals such allegations are made.539
While it is encouraging that the GA has adopted resolutions addressing the issue of SEA, the
resolutions are not strongly worded. The resolutions are positive steps taken by the GA, but it must
be recalled that a GA resolution is only soft law,540 and offers no binding obligations over member
536 A/RES/62/63, 8 January 2008; A/RES/63/119, 11 December 2008. Experts on mission include military
observers, military liaison officers, military advisers, arms monitors, members of formed police units, seconded
individual UN police and seconded corrections officers; SG’s 2008 Report on Criminal accountability, supra
note 461, para. 65.
537 A/RES/62/63; A/RES/63/119, para. 3.
538 Ibid., para. 4.
539 Ibid., paras. 5, 6 and 9.
540 In fact, it has been stated that “the GA is also a political organ, which does not make it an ideal forum for
establishing the law”; M.D. Öberg, 'The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General
Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ' (2005) 16 (5) European Journal of International Law 879-906, p. 902,
with reference to Skubiszewski, ‘Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and Evidence of Custom’, in Le
droit international a l’heure de sa codification- etudes en l’honneur de Roberto Ago (Vol. I) (1987) 503, pp. 506-
7. See also Harris, supra note 521, p. 62, n. 75, referring to GA Resolutions as “a major source of ‘soft law’”; M.
Koskenniemi, 'The Police in the Temple; Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View' (1995) 6 European
Journal of International Law 325-348, p. 336, referring to the dichotomy between hard UN law of the Security
Council and soft UN law of the General Assembly.
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states.541 This is particularly so given the terminology used in the resolutions, “strongly urges”,
“requests” and “encourages”; as opposed to more demanding or requiring language.542 States are
not urged to establish jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals, they are urged only to
consider establishing such jurisdiction. Thus the resolutions can be deemed recommendations rather
than decisions, rendering them non-binding.543 Further, the resolutions only cover UN officials and
experts on mission, and not national military personnel. The most effective aspects of the resolutions
are that they require constant action by the UN, with the continued support for the Ad Hoc
Committee on criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission,544 and the requirement
that the Secretary-General report to the GA on the implementation of the resolution.545 Such support
indicates that the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel will continue to
be addressed not just by the Secretariat, the CDU and the OLA, but also by the member states of the
UN within the GA.
3.3.1. Draft Convention on the criminal accountability of UN
officials and experts on mission
A Group of Legal Experts was appointed to examine the problem of accountability of UN staff and
experts on mission following the recommendation of the Zeid Report, including examining
recommendations made in the Zeid Report. The limited mandate of the Group of Legal Experts as
concerns the categories of personnel is due to the fact that jurisdiction over military personnel is
granted exclusively to the sending state, under paragraph 47(b) of the model SOFA.546 As a result, the
Group of Legal Experts issued a report on ensuring accountability of UN staff and experts on mission
with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations.547 The report addresses
jurisdictional issues, as well as definitional problems, and ultimately recommends the adoption of a
541 Brownlie, supra note 521, p. 15.
542 Öberg, supra note 540, p. 880.
543 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20
July 1962 ICJ Reports 1962, p.151, at 163.
544 Para. 9.
545 Para. 10.
546 A/45/594, Annex; jurisdiction is covered in paragraphs 46-49.
547 Report on ensuring accountability, supra note 447.
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new convention to address specific jurisdictional and related issues. This chapter will analyse some
provisions of the Draft Convention on the criminal accountability of UN official and experts on
mission.548
An international convention is recommended by the Group of Legal Experts in order to ensure a
binding obligation on states to extradite or prosecute, address other issues that facilitate the
effective exercise of jurisdiction by states (e.g. extradition and evidence), create greater consistency
for matters such as the scope of the crimes covered, and express the importance the international
community places on the problem of serious crimes, especially sexual exploitation and abuse, being
committed by peacekeeping personnel.549
The Group points out two disadvantages of an international convention, namely the lengthy period
of time it can take for a convention to be negotiated, adopted and to come into force; and that the
convention will only bind state parties.550 However, several suggestions are made of possible
measures that may mitigate these disadvantages:551 that the General Assembly can adopt a
resolution calling on member states to establish jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals
in PSOs;552 and the addition of provisions on criminal accountability to MoUs for not only troop-
contributing agreements, but also for those that cover contributions of personnel other than military
contingents, such as formed police units.553 A third possible measure is suggested. The Group pointed
out the number of persons who are available for posts in PSOs often exceeds the number of available
posts. Therefore, the DPKO, when deciding who to appoint to a post, could apply the criterion of
whether the state of nationality of a potential personnel member has established jurisdiction over
crimes committed by their nationals on a PSO. This last suggestion may work in relation to the
548 Report on ensuring accountability, ibid., Annex III.
549 Report on ensuring accountability, ibid., para. 63.
550 Ibid., para. 64.
551 Ibid., para. 65.
552 As discussed supra, this has since been done with the General Assembly Resolutions on Criminal
accountability of United Nations official and experts on mission, A/RES/62/63, 8 January 2008; A/RES63/119,
11 December 2008.
553 Also discussed supra, the model MoU has been amended to include provisions on sending states’ criminal
jurisdiction over their troops.
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recruitment of officials and experts on mission but would be difficult to apply in reality in relation to
troops, as the UN already has difficulty obtaining the necessary number of troops for missions (e.g.
for the new African Union-UN hybrid mission in Sudan).554
An analysis of the Draft Convention put together by the Group of Legal Experts must take into
account, as the Group points out, that “this is no more than a preliminary draft for the purposes of
illustrating how a convention might look and what issues it could address”.555 The Group states the
aim of the convention to be the creation of “conditions which make it easier for any applicable
immunity to be waived, without prejudice to the rights of the alleged offender”.556 The Draft
Convention “sets out obligations on the part of States parties to take measures to investigate, arrest,
prosecute and extradite offenders and to render mutual legal assistance [and] to protect the rights of
victims”.557 The Draft Convention has potential, but much work would be needed before such a
convention could or would be finalised and accepted by states.558 A significant number of provisions
of the Draft Convention deal with jurisdiction, and these are discussed in this section.
3.3.1.1. Definitions
Article 1 of the Draft Convention sets out definitions of peacekeeping operations and UN officials and
experts on mission. The Group recognises that the definition of ‘United Nations peacekeeping
operations’ provided is limited, as a consequence of the terms of reference of the Group. The
definition given covers only operations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international
peace and security.559 The Group states that there “is no reason why the provision of the present
Draft Convention cannot extend to crimes committed during peacebuilding or other humanitarian
554 Department of Public Information, ‘Sudan Must Live Up To Commitment To Remove Obstacles Hindering
Full Deployment Of African Union-United Nations Darfur Mission, Security Council Told’, Security Council
5915th Meeting (AM), 18 June 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9363.doc.htm.
555 Report on ensuring accountability, supra note 447, para. 67.
556 Ibid., para. 68.
557 Ibid.
558 This is confirmed by subsequent meetings of the Sixth Committee discussing Criminal accountability of UN
officials and experts on mission. While some states, such as those in the European Union (EU), CANZ
(Australia, Canada and New Zealand), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are in favour of an
international convention, others are more reluctant (such as Russia, Egypt and the Non-aligned Movement
[NAM] states). United Nations Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 5th meeting (2008), A/C.6/63/SR.5.
559 Article 1(b). The definition is taken from the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, 2051 UNTS 363, entered into force 15 January 1999, see fn 9 to Article 1(b) of Draft Convention.
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operations”.560 This should in fact be the case. A more comprehensive scope of the situations in
which such a convention would apply would be more appropriate. There is little point in drafting a
convention aimed at ensuring criminal accountability that only covers certain mission situations and
leaves personnel participating in other categories of missions not subject to criminal accountability
mechanisms.561 There is a need for uniform application of rules to all types of missions. This will
create less confusion and less difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the Convention is applicable at
any given time. Both states and personnel will benefit from greater ease of organising, applying and
following the appropriate applicable law.
‘United Nations officials and experts on mission’ is taken to mean “members of a [UN] peacekeeping
operation to whom article V or article VI of the [Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations] applies, in whole or in part”.562 In the Report on Ensuring Accountability, the Group
states that it understands UN officials to include UN staff and UN Volunteers, and experts on mission
to include UN police, military observers, military advisers, military liaison officers and consultants.
Another report on criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission also lists arms
monitors, members of formed police units, seconded individual UN police and seconded corrections
officers.563 There is no indication of whether the Group’s list is a comprehensive list, and it is not
included in the text of the Draft Convention. This is not necessarily a negative exclusion, as a broader
definition of who the convention applies to will help ensure no personnel are excluded from the
scope of the convention by a restrictive and exhaustive definition.
The Draft Convention has an optional definitional clause to provide application of the Draft
Convention to ‘other’ officials and experts on mission, including those from specialised agencies and
those to whom Article 105 of the UN Charter is applicable, which will cover personnel from states
560 Fn 9 to Article 1(b).
561 M. O'Brien, 'Issues of the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and
Experts on Mission', in Quénivet and Shah-Davis (eds.), International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in
the 21st Century, (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2010), 57-75, p. 62.
562 Article 1(d)(i).
563 SG’s 2008 Report on criminal accountability, supra note 461, para. 65.
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who are not parties to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities.564 Again, this is a broad
definition to cover a less specific group of personnel.
3.3.1.2. Scope of application
The limited scope of application ratione personae of the Draft Convention is the biggest lacuna in the
Draft Convention.565 The Draft Convention applies exclusively to UN officials and experts on mission.
Article 2(2) expressly excludes from the scope of the Draft Convention, military personnel of national
contingents and other personnel who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of a state other than
the host state under provision of a SOFA and MoU. While the scope of the Draft Convention was so
applied in keeping with the terms of reference of the Group of Legal Experts to cover only officials
and experts on mission, an international convention on criminal accountability for peacekeeping
personnel should not exclude any members of the mission. Perhaps it is assumed that national laws
adequately cover criminal accountability of military personnel for crimes committed during PSOs
given that sending states are granted exclusive jurisdiction over their military personnel, but this is
not necessarily the case. States not only require laws that cover the subject-matter jurisdiction of
SEA (and indeed, any other crimes), but these must be applicable extra-territorially. Not all states
have such laws enacted, and a convention obligating states to do so should cover all personnel
participating in PSOs.566 For example, as will be shown in Chapter 4, of the two example states
analysed, Australia and the United States, neither country has legislation covering the crime of sexual
exploitation when committed by military forces or CivPol.567 The closest provision in US military law is
564 Article 1(d)(ii).
565 Article 2 Scope of application.
566 While many states report that their criminal laws are applicable extra-territorially, the extra-territorial
application of criminal law is irrelevant if there is no substantive provision outlawing, e.g., sexual exploitation;
SG’s 2008 Report on criminal accountability, supra note 461.
567 Nor do they have such a legislative provision applicable to national civilians. Australia does have provisions
prohibiting child sex tourism (sexual offences with children overseas), which are specifically applicable extra-
territorially. These provisions could be used to prosecute an Australian national for sexual exploitation of a child;
however they are not specific to sexual exploitation and apply only to crimes against children. Part IIIA Child
Sex Tourism Crimes Act (Cth) 1914.
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a 2005 amendment to Article 134 of the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which outlaws
patronising a prostitute.568
The scope of the Draft Convention is also limited to exclude applicability to UN operations authorised
as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “in which a [UN] official or expert on
mission is engaged as a combatant against organised armed forces and to which the law of
international armed conflict applies”.569 In this situation, criminal liability may be, according to the
Group, provided for under international humanitarian law (IHL), such as the Geneva Conventions,570
but it is still necessary that a state undertakes legal proceedings, and that that state has the relevant
laws to be able to carry out such proceedings in the first place. According to the Secretary-General’s
Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, IHL rules are
applicable in an enforcement action, but also when personnel are engaged in a PSO in which the use
of force for self-defence is mandated.571 Hence, it may be asked why the Draft Convention is limited
to exclude enforcement actions where IHL is applicable, but not missions in which IHL is applicable
due to the permissibility of use of force for self-defence.
To a certain extent, this exclusion of the Draft Convention’s applicability during times when IHL is
applicable is logical. Certain actions which would constitute a crime outside the arena of armed
conflict are not necessarily deemed a crime when carried out during armed conflict. An example of
this is murder or assault, which have specific definitions under IHL that enables combatants to
lawfully kill or assault someone within the confines of armed conflict.572 IHL is a lex specialis, and
568 Amendment to Sec. 3 Part IV, ¶ 97, Article 134- (Pandering and prostitution). Amended by Executive Order
13387-2005, Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, October 18, 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 60701; amendment
came into effect on 1 October 2007.
569 Article 2(3).
570 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 75 UNTS 287; all Geneva Conventions entered into force 21 October 1950.
571 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law,
ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999.
572 The war crimes of wilful killing and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health are
the IHL equivalents, and require a specific mens rea and actus reus distinct from murder or assault under
ordinary criminal law; see the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court,
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serves to ensure a balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations, aiming to
diminish suffering and protect civilians while maintaining the effectiveness of military operations.573
Thus the requirement of applicability of the crimes covered in the Draft Convention may result in
unjust criminal prosecution for actions performed in armed conflict.
However, the counter-argument is that IHL may not necessarily cover all criminal behaviour which
may fall under SEA, which can still be committed by peacekeeping personnel during armed
conflict.574 This will depend on a state’s national laws, including whether their interpretation of IHL is
expansive enough to cover crimes that may not necessarily be specifically stated in legislation or
codes.575 National domestic laws being enacted to implement the crimes under the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court are a step towards ensuring that violations of IHL are more
comprehensively criminalised, but not all states have comprehensive war crimes legislation. An
effective example of this is the comparison between Australian, UK and US war crimes law. Australia
has enacted extensive and detailed legislation to cover the crimes of the Rome Statute, whereas the
US has extremely limited war crimes legislation. The Australian and UK legislation essentially adopts
the terminology from the Rome Statute, including the gender-based crimes, outrages upon personal
dignity and sexual violence.576 The US War Crimes Act covers only Grave Breaches and Common
Article 3 violations.577 The US is not a party to either of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Articles 8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(a)(iii) (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949); and Article
8(2)(c)(i) (serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
573 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2nd ed., (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2010), pp. 4-5; M. Sassoli and A.A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?
Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law,
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1999), pp. 67-68.
574 Alternatively, for military personnel, the crime may be charged as a military-specific offence such as conduct
unbecoming or failure to obey order or regulation, which fails to recognise the seriousness of the crime of sexual
exploitation. See, e.g., US UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892. Art. 92; § 933. Art. 133.
575 This may also depend on prosecutorial discretion with regard to interpretation of potential offences with
which to charge perpetrators.
576 Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995, Chapter 8- Offences against humanity and related offences, Division 268-
Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against the administration of the justice of the
International Criminal Court, Subdivision E- Other serious war crimes that are committed in the course of an
international armed conflict, ss. 268.58 and 268.64; International Criminal Court Act 2001, Part 5 Offences
under Domestic Law.
577 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c). There are also other war crimes from the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
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Conventions, and thus the crimes of “rape, forced prostitution and other indecent assault” of women
and children are not found within the War Crimes Act.578 Thus, to ensure criminal responsibility for
sexual exploitation if IHL were applicable, the US would be obligated to deem sexual exploitation to
fall under the Grave Breaches,579 such as inhuman treatment, or wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health; or one of the defined Common Article 3 violations such as cruel or
inhuman treatment, rape, or sexual assault or abuse.580 Without a broad interpretation of war crimes
offences, the non-applicability of the Draft Convention during times when IHL is applicable will result
in a void enabling peacekeeping personnel to commit certain crimes without binding criminal
accountability.
3.3.1.3. Establishment of jurisdiction
State parties are required to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over
the crimes set out in article 3,” and to establish territorial and nationality jurisdiction.581 The Draft
Convention also obliges state parties to establish aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute)
jurisdiction.582 State parties “may” also establish passive personality jurisdiction and jurisdiction over
a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of the state.583 Each state
party must notify the Secretary-General of any measures taken to establish such jurisdiction, and any
subsequent changes.584 This requirement should ensure both the effectiveness and compliance of
the convention.585 Notification by a state to the Secretary-General will demonstrate observable
and Other Devices. The US is not a party to the Rome Statute, but this does not prevent the US from enacting
comprehensive war crimes legislation.
578 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, Article 76.
579 E.g. Art 147, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
580 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d). Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen, as the United States retains a policy that only
non-US nationals will be charged with war crimes; see discussion infra Chapter 4.
581 Article 4(1) Establishment of jurisdiction.
582 Article 4(4).
583 Article 4(2), emphasis added.
584 Article 4(3). There are similarities between the Draft Convention Art. 4 and Art. 10 of the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel; M.-C. Bourloyannis-Vrailas, 'The Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel' (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 560-590,
pp. 578-580.
585 K. Raustiala, 'Form and Substance in International Agreements' (2005) 99 (3) The American Journal of
International Law 581-614, p. 610.
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changes in behaviour of states, attesting to not only compliance by states, but also effectiveness of
the convention, as states will be aware that their measures taken will be under scrutiny.586
Article 4(6) allows for the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction “established by a State party in
accordance with its national law”, which the Group points out “does not preclude a State party from
asserting jurisdiction beyond that provided for under the Draft Convention if permissible by general
international law”.587
3.3.1.4. Investigations and the taking into custody of an alleged
offender
The Draft Convention includes a provision on investigations and the taking into custody of an alleged
offender.588 It applies to the enactment of territorial, and aut dedere aut judicare territorial
jurisdiction. A state party is required to investigate and, if circumstances warrant it, take the alleged
perpetrator into custody for either prosecution or extradition- if the alleged perpetrator is within the
territory of the state, or has committed a crime within the territory of the state. This provision thus
ensures there is no safe haven for a non-national within the territory of a state party, as they can be
arrested for any crimes falling under the Draft Convention they may have committed.
However, there is no obligation to investigate and/or arrest an alleged perpetrator who is a national
of the state party and has committed a crime in the host state while engaged on a PSO, and is still
located in the host state.589 Thus, there is once again a gap in obligations for states in the Draft
Convention. This enables a perpetrator to avoid criminal accountability by not returning to his/her
country, as that state is not obligated under the convention to investigate unless the alleged
perpetrator is within that state’s territory. While the Group placed an emphasis on the fact that the
host state should be the primary source of criminal jurisdiction, this may not always be possible, and
in fact, if the Draft Convention is amended to apply to military personnel, the host state may not
586 O’Brien, supra note 561, p. 68.
587 Article 4(6) and accompanying fn 33.
588 Article 6 Investigations and the taking into custody of an alleged offender.
589 Of course, if the host state is a party to the convention, it will be obligated to investigate and/or arrest a
perpetrator.
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have jurisdiction at all over that category of personnel due to SOFA and MoU provisions.590 The Draft
Convention should not simply provide for the ideal situation, but incorporate provisions to deal with
any potential jurisdictional situation that may arise.591 Such a provision could provide for the primacy
of host state jurisdiction, but failing that, a state party should be obligated to investigate and take
into custody any of its nationals even when they are still located in the host state. While it is
generally true that a state’s jurisdiction is territorial, this concept is flexible in international law,
which leaves states “a wide measure of discretion” with regards to the “application of their laws and
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory”.592 Such a
discretionary situation is found in the context of PSOs, when it is the sending state which retains
criminal jurisdiction over its personnel. This criminal jurisdiction must be able to be physically
enacted, and considering the move towards cooperation between sending states, the host state, and
the UN, it would be beneficial and practical to allow sending states to undertake investigate and take
an offender into custody within the host state.
3.3.1.5. Prosecution and extradition of offenders
The Draft Convention applies aut dedere aut judicare jurisdiction, requiring a state party “in the
territory of which the alleged offender is present... if it does not extradite... to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”.593 This jurisdiction has been referred to as
“the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events,”594 and
requires the offender to be present in the territory of the arresting state.595 Aut dedere aut judicare
jurisdiction has developed from treaty law, but is expanding to be acceptable in customary law for
international crimes, the prohibition of which is considered a norm jus cogens such as torture.596
590 This is certainly an issue that would have to be further examined before a convention could be enacted, with
regards to the primacy of the convention over these other forms of international agreements.
591 O’Brien, supra note 561, p. 69.
592 Lotus Case, supra note 522, pp. 18-19.
593 Article 7 Prosecution of offenders.
594 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 524, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal,
para. 42.
595 Ibid., para. 57.
596 M.N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008), p. 673. See also the
current application before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Questions relating to the Obligation to
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“The duty to prosecute under those treaties which contain the aut dedere aut prosequi provisions
opens the door to a jurisdiction based on the heinous nature of the crime rather than on links of
territoriality or nationality (whether as perpetrator or victim). The 1949 Geneva Conventions lend
support to this possibility, and are widely regarded as today reflecting customary international
law.”597 Thus it is important to include such a provision requiring state parties to prosecute or
extradite in the Draft Convention.
However, the situation of PSOs can be differentiated from the ordinary, in which a state’s
representatives (and the offender) would be wholly within the state’s own territory. This is not the
case when personnel are serving in a UN mission. Consequently, such a provision leaves another
loophole for states, requiring a state to initiate prosecutorial proceedings only if the alleged
perpetrator is within that state’s territory. Despite the Group recognising criminal proceedings held
within the territory in which the conduct occurred to be significantly advantageous, due to the ease
of access to evidence and witnesses, there is no equal requirement that states prosecute their own
nationals even if they are not located in that state’s territory- which personnel are not unless they
are repatriated.
Despite the recommendation of on-site courts-martial in the Zeid Report,598 the Group has failed to
build this into the Draft Convention, even though it is likely that some of those personnel considered
within the scope of this Draft Convention may be subject to their national military jurisdiction.
Should the convention be expanded to cover military personnel, those personnel would definitely be
included. Courts-martial are convenient as they are able to be convened anywhere in the world.599 A
requirement to prosecute could even be tempered by the condition that states only be obligated to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), application submitted 16 February 2009, in which Belgium alleges
a breach by Senegal of that state’s obligations to prosecute or extradite, under the Convention against Torture
and customary international law.
597 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 524, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal,
supra note 524, para. 46; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law
Volume I: Rules, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), pp. 607-611; G. Werle, Principles of
International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2009), pp. 68-70.
598 Zeid Report, supra note 427, para. 36.
599 J. Blackett, Rant on the Court Martial and Service Law, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009),
Chapter 5 The Court Martial, pp. 77- 132.
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prosecute in the host state using a temporary on-site court-martial or other legal body if the host
state is unable or unwilling to prosecute.
Article 8 renders all crimes covered by the Draft Convention as extraditable offences between state
parties, and obliges state parties to “include such offences as extraditable offences in every
extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded by them”.600 This is in keeping with the imposition of
aut dedere aut judicare jurisdiction in the Draft Convention. It is stated that, “if necessary, the crimes
shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between States parties, as if they had been
committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States parties
which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with article 4”.601 Again, this enacts aut
dedere aut judicare jurisdiction over the crimes, and is a straight-forward provision similar to
provisions in other treaties.602
3.3.1.6. Conduct which is not a crime under the law of the host State
or the State party
Article 9 of the Draft Convention states that there is no obligation on state parties imposed by
Articles 6, 7 and 8
“to take measures where the conduct constituting the alleged crime:
(a) Does not constitute a crime under the law of the State where the conduct occurred; or
(b) Would not, if it had taken place in that State party’s territory, constitute a crime under its
national law.”
603
Article 9(a) applies dual criminality, so a state is not obliged to take action when the conduct does
not constitute a crime in the territory where the conduct occurred (the host state).604 This is contrary
600 Article 8(1) Extradition of alleged offenders.
601 Article 8(4).
602 E.g. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, GA RES 59/290, 13 April
2005, entered into force 7 July 2007, and the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel (supra note 559), both of which contain provisions on which Article 8 of this Draft Convention was
based.
603 Article 9 Conduct which is not a crime under the law of the host State or the State party.
604 Article 5 also states that there is no ‘obligation on a State party to establish jurisdiction over conduct which
does not constitute a crime under the law of the State where the conduct occurred.’ This is seemingly
contradictory to the obligation under Article 4 to enact nationality jurisdiction, the principle of which gives a
state jurisdiction over its own nationals based on that state’s allocated jurisdictional laws, and not the jurisdiction
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to the purpose of requiring states to enact extra-territorial nationality jurisdiction over their
peacekeeping personnel. States are required under the Draft Convention to establish nationality
jurisdiction, enabling them to take legal action to ensure criminal accountability for conduct
committed by their nationals in the host state. Yet the Draft Convention then contradicts itself by
providing a loophole for states to not enforce this jurisdiction when the conduct was not a crime in
the host state, which it may not be, given the lack of legal infrastructure that tends to exist in post-
conflict societies.
Article 9(b) is consistent with the principle of dual criminality, and in this regard compliments Article
9(a). Nonetheless, the aim of the Draft Convention it to require state parties to criminalise and
prosecute the crimes covered by the Draft Convention. Consequently there should be no need for
such a provision as Article 9(b).605 Dual criminality has long been used in extradition agreements, but
the current trend is moving away from the requirement, with the view that it is an impediment to
efficient and effective mutual legal assistance and extradition.606 This rejection of the need for dual
criminality can particularly be seen in the European Union (EU), in relation to the crimes of the Rome
Statute of the ICC (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide). The EU has enacted the
European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which came into force in 2004.607 The aim of the EAW is to enable a
more expeditious and streamlined process in respect of extradition procedures between member
of the state where the conduct occurred. In fact, whether the conduct in question under this Draft Convention is
legal in the territory where it occurred should be irrelevant. The aim of the Draft Convention is for states to
criminalise such behaviour.
605 O’Brien, supra note 561, p. 71.
606 W.V. Dunlap, 'Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties' (1988-1989) 29 Virginia Journal of International
Law 813-858; J.O. Hafen, 'International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement'
(1992) Brigham Young University Law Review 191-230; T.F. Muther Jr, 'The Extradition of International
Criminals: A Changing Perspective' (1995-1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 221-228,
pp. 224-6; G. Griffith and C. Harris, 'Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition' (2005) 6 Melbourne
Journal of International Law 33-54, pp. 37-42; R. Cryer, et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law
and Procedure, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007), pp. 74-75. Others argue that dual criminality is
an essential element of extradition in order to ensure protection of human rights; R.J. Currie, 'Human Rights and
International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension' (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 143-181, p. 160.
This argument can be countered, e.g., with regards to European states as they must comply with the European
Convention on Human Rights; see C. Van den Wyngaert, 'Applying the European Convention on Human Rights
to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?' (1990) 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 757-779.
607 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures
between Member States (2002/584/JHA), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 190/1 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002F0584:EN:NOT> (accessed on 28 January 2009)
(hereinafter, EAW).
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states.608 The EAW still contains reference to dual criminality, but only as an optional ground for non-
execution of the EAW.609 However the aim is to discourage the use of dual criminality as a ground for
non-execution of an extradition request, with member states recognising the equality and validity of
other member states’ law, as part of general EU harmonisation. Of course it is important to recognise
the special circumstances of the EU, as a regional organisation with shared values610- a situation
which could not apply with regard to all states on a global scale.
The move away from the dual criminality requirement is surfacing in more recent extradition
agreements. Instead of a general agreement to extradite, the agreements specifically list crimes that
will be extraditable between the states party to the agreement. The EAW is an example of this,
detailing the scope of the EAW to cover “acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months”, and an
extensive list of crimes that give rise to surrender pursuant to an EAW. Such crimes include
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children, rape, and crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.611 In fact, the EU has found that dual criminality has not been a major restraint on mutual
legal assistance carried out under the EAW, as member states either already have fairly similar
legislation or have enacted legislation to include the serious crimes covered by the EAW.612
Dual criminality should not impede exercise of nationality jurisdiction with regards to crimes
committed by peacekeeping personnel. Were the Draft Convention to list specific crimes to be
agreed as extradition crimes (while not discounting a general provision for unlisted crimes), there
would be no need for the application of dual criminality as a ground for non-execution of jurisdiction
under the convention. The list would enable state parties to undertake legislative changes in the
608 EAW, Preamble, para. 1.
609 EAW, Article 4(1); G.J. Mann, 'The European Arrest Warrant: A Short-Lived Mechanism for Extradition?'
(2006-2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 715-740, p. 719.
610 P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford
2002).
611 L. Vierucci, 'The European Arrest Warrant An Additional Tool for Prosecuting ICC Crimes' (2004) 2 (1)
Journal of International Criminal Justice 275-284.
612 Final Report on the first evaluation exercise- mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, (2001/C 216/02),
Official Journal of the European Communities, C 216, 01/08/2001, P. 0014-0026, 32001X0801(02) (hereinafter
‘Final Report on mutual legal assistance’).
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same vein as those taken by state parties to the Rome Statute. State parties have adopted, or are in
the process of adopting, legislation that contains identical or very similar provisions to the Rome
Statute itself, which avoids the issue of dual criminality ever arising, and demonstrates a willingness
of states to follow their international treaty obligations and criminalise specific behaviour.613
3.3.1.7. Exercise of jurisdiction in the territory of another State party
No state party of the Draft Convention is entitled to exercise jurisdiction and the “performance of
functions [in the territory of another state party] which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of
that other State party by its national law”.614 Again, this text is phrased from the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Group determines that it
“presumably refers to activities such as the exercise of police powers”.615 This provision emphasises
the concept of mutual legal assistance rather than the outright exercise of jurisdiction and other
functions in the territory of another state party without cooperation, assistance or agreement
between the states. However, the special circumstances of a PSO must be taken into account, in that
it involves personnel stationed outside the territory of their sending state, which differentiates the
situation from that of nuclear terrorism. States are permitted to exercise jurisdiction with respect to
disciplining their own military personnel. Personnel designated by the Force Commander or Special
Representative of the Secretary General will police the mission premises and the areas where
personnel are deployed, and military police have the power of arrest of military members of a
mission.616 Therefore, Article 21 should be rephrased to take into account the fact that a SOFA
expressly grants a state party entitlement to exercise jurisdiction and perform functions in the
territory of the host state which are normally reserved for the authorities of the host state.
613 See e.g. the United Kingdom International Criminal Court Act 2001; or the Australian International Criminal
Court Act (Cth) 2002.
614 Article 21 Exercise of jurisdiction in the territory of another State party.
615 Article 21, fn 68.
616 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), A/45/594, Annex, paras. 40 and 41.
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3.4. Immunity
There are many different categories of peacekeeping personnel, and they are subject to different
disciplinary authorities, immunities and jurisdictions. The different classifications of jurisdiction and
immunity applicable to peacekeeping personnel must be kept in mind throughout the consideration
of actions to ensure criminal accountability of peacekeeping personnel.617 There are two different
types of immunities: functional immunity (or immunity ratione materiae) and absolute immunity (or
immunity ratione personae).618 Functional immunity is granted by the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations (General Convention), and can be waived by or on behalf of
the Secretary-General.619 Functional immunity provides immunity from criminal proceedings in the
host state in respect of words spoken or written, and all acts performed in an official capacity or in
the course of the performance of work. Thus any act which is ultra vires official capacity or purposes
of work will not be subject to immunity.620 Such immunity is applied to UN staff, experts on mission
and officials. Functional immunity continues to subsist even after the termination of employment
with the organisation, and may still be invoked.621 Under the SOFA, functional immunity only applies
in the area of operations/territory of the host state, unless specifically provided otherwise.622 Hence
617 These are set out in Appendix 2.
618 R. Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International
Human Rights Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), Chapter 3 Functional Immunity pp. 103 ff; Chapter
4 Personal Immunity pp. 158 ff.
619 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 15, entered into force 17
September 1946, Art. V s. 18, Art. VI and Art. VII s. 27. See also Model SOFA, A/45/594, para. 46. Immunity
for international organizations stems from such agreements and treaties; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd
ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 725. The International Court of Justice has held that any finding
of the Secretary-General as to the immunity of a UN agent “can only be set aside by the most compelling reasons
and is thus to be given the greatest weight by national courts”; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, ICJ
Reports 1999, p. 87, para. 61.
620 Fox, ibid., p. 667.
621 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on
mission, Second session (7-9 and 11 April 2008), A/63/54, para. 32. (Hereinafter ‘Second session report of the
Ad Hoc Committee’.)
622 Model SOFA, para. 2.
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some categories of personnel such as UN Volunteers and consultants do not enjoy functional
immunity in their home state.623
The other category of immunity is absolute immunity. Absolute immunity from host state jurisdiction
is granted under the General Convention to only very senior UN officials (in the form of full
diplomatic immunity),624 and through the SOFA to members of national contingents.625 If immunity is
waived, criminal jurisdiction may be exercised by the host state, sending state, or potentially by a
third state. However, the sending state can only exercise jurisdiction if its laws allow for extra-
territorial jurisdiction over its nationals. Such extra-territorial jurisdiction could be applicable to all
nationals, or specific to certain categories of personnel such as military personnel or police
officers.626 Third state jurisdiction only arises in the case of international crimes over which a third
state exercises universal jurisdiction, or applies the principle of extradite or prosecute.627
Waiver of immunity is not invoked at the outset of an allegation investigation, with the UN electing
to cooperate voluntarily in relation to the investigation. Documents are “provided on a voluntary
basis without prejudice to the possible invocation of immunity”.628 When considering a waiver of
immunity, the UN takes into account the interests of the UN and the impact of a waiver or lack
thereof on the administration of justice.629
The Draft Convention also takes immunities into consideration. Under Article 18, state parties are not
obliged to “take any measure which is inconsistent with any immunity of a [UN] official or expert on
mission unless the competent organ of the [UN] has waived such immunity, either generally or in
relation to specific measures to be taken by that State party”. However, in the instance where
623 Working paper on the accountability of international personnel taking part in peace support operations
submitted by Françoise Hampson, (7 July 2005), E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42, para. 42. (Hereinafter ‘Working
paper’.)
624 General Convention, Art. V, s. 19. On diplomatic immunity, see Fox, supra note 619, pp. 700-716.
625 Model SOFA, A/45/594, para. 27. Fox, supra note 619, pp. 717-718.
626 E.g. the Swedish Penal Code grants jurisdiction to Swedish courts “if the crime was committed in the course
of duty outside the Realm by a person employed in a foreign contingent of the Swedish armed forces”; Ds
1999:36, section 3(3). For further discussion on extra-territorial jurisdiction in national laws, see Chapter 4 for
analysis of Australian and US law.
627 Working paper, supra note 623, para. 46.
628 Second session report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 621, para. 30.
629 Ibid., para. 31.
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immunity exists in relation to specific measures to be taken by the state party, it is the state party
that must seek a waiver of such immunity.630
As regards UN officials and experts on mission, it is up to the UN to waive their immunity. Given the
fact that the UN would not be a party to this convention, there is no reason to obligate the UN to
waive immunity within this convention. However, a stronger provision would declare that immunity
shall not exist for any peacekeeping personnel for crimes committed that are dealt with under the
Draft Convention.631 Officials (with the exception of very senior officials) and experts on mission are
all subject to functional immunity.632 Very senior officials such as the Head of Mission (Special
Representative of the Secretary-General) are protected by absolute immunity. Given that functional
immunity only covers acts committed in an official capacity,633 it can be argued that behaviour such
as sexual exploitation does not fall within the official duties of an official or expert on mission.634 As
noted above, along with very senior officials, military personnel are granted absolute immunity.635
Thus, this provision should state that absolute immunity does not include immunity for criminal acts
to ensure states cannot argue the application of immunity as a reason for non-prosecution of
national military personnel or very senior officials.636
This section has evinced that immunity is a bar to accountability; an obstacle that must be overcome
en route to prosecution of offenders. The question of immunity is not one that is not raised in
ordinary domestic criminal law, and is specific to circumstances involving international law. In this
630 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Article V, Section 20; Article VI,
Section 23.
631 O’Brien, supra note 561, p. 72.
632 Ibid., Article V, Sections 18, and 22.
633 UN Charter, Article 105; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, Article V, Sections 18 and
20, and Article VI, Sections 22 and 23.
634 If this were the case, it would give rise to ‘bizarre results’ (that is, the allowance of officials to commit
international crimes); Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet; Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division) [1999] UKHL 17 (Pinochet III),
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
635 Absolute immunity for senior officials is granted by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
UN, Sections 18 and 19; and for military personnel by the SOFA and MoU.
636 This would be along the lines of the argument of Lord Hope in Pinochet III, supra note 634, who found that,
for a category of personnel to be excluded from general immunity for a crime, a convention must have a
provision either expressly or impliedly rejecting immunity for the particular crimes within that instrument.
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case, it is relevant to all categories of mission personnel, but the applicability and removability is
complex. However, this section has demonstrated how such immunity can be surmounted. Once this
has been achieved, accountability is the next step, which will be examined in the following section.
Immunity will also be examined in Chapter 5 with regard to the International Criminal Court.637 That
examination will support the view taken here, that immunity is a surmountable obstacle to
accountability.
3.5. Accountability
The aim of this thesis is to examine how to ensure criminal accountability for peacekeeping
personnel for the commission of gender-based crimes such as sexual exploitation. The previous
sections in this chapter have examined several issues that are a pre-cursor to accountability-
jurisdiction and immunity. UN instruments relevant specifically to accountability must be examined:
those which deal with the enforcement of standards of conduct and discipline (the MoU), and
require states to have the ability to ensure accountability and to take action on this (the MoU and
the Draft Convention).
The MoU authorises that discipline and good order of national contingent members is the
responsibility of the national commander.638 The sending state must secure the authority of the
commander to take reasonable measures to maintain discipline and good order of the national
contingent members in compliance with standards of conduct, and rules and regulations. A national
commander must inform the Force Commander of any serious matters relating to discipline and
good order including disciplinary action taken for violations of the standards of conduct or mission
rules and regulations, or for failure to respect the local laws and regulations.
The sending state is obliged to train the national commander pre-deployment to enable the national
commander to fully discharge their responsibilities in maintaining discipline and good order. The UN
637 See infra Chapter 5.5 Immunities.
638 Model MoU Article 7 ter Discipline.
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is also required to organise training on UN standards of conduct, mission rules and regulations, and
the local laws and regulations for commanders upon their arrival in-mission.
3.5.1. Accountability under the Draft Convention
Steps to ensuring accountability are addressed in several provisions of the Draft Convention. Article 3
deems an official or expert on mission to have committed a crime “if that person intentionally
engages in conduct which constitutes one of the serious crimes set out in paragraph 2 of the present
article while serving on a [UN] peacekeeping operation in a host State”.639
The Draft Convention contains a principle Article 3(2), and an alternative Article 3(2), which cover the
crimes dealt with under the Draft Convention. The principle Article 3(2) covers only murder, wilfully
causing serious injury to body or health, rape and other acts of sexual violence, and sexual offences
involving children. The phrase “other acts of sexual violence” is broad, and thus enables an expansive
interpretation that includes SEA. However, there is a need to make the list of crimes covered by the
convention non-exhaustive, or at least to include more than on this short list. For example, torture is
not included, nor are crimes such as trafficking, theft, fraud, money laundering, weapons smuggling,
illegal weapons purchasing, drug production and trafficking, or involvement in organised crime.640 It
has been recognised by the UN that “significant forms of misconduct by uniformed peacekeeping
personnel are harassment, assault, excessive use of force, unlawful discharge of weapon and traffic
violations”, and by staff in missions “fraud… theft, harassment (including sexual), abuse of authority,
mismanagement, misuse of the Organization’s assets, and traffic-related violations”.641 Such crimes
should also be covered by the convention. The report offers no explanation as to the reasoning
behind the omission of such crimes or the choice of crimes listed.
639 Article 3 Crimes committed during United Nations peacekeeping operations.
640 There have been instances of serious misconduct other than gender-based crimes, e.g., it was alleged that
Pakistani peacekeeping personnel traded gold mined illegally by militia for, and re-armed the disarmed militia
with, weapons. M. Plaut, ‘UN troops ‘traded gold for guns’, BBC News, 23 May 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6681457.stm.
641 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 11.
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Grounds of criminal responsibility for these crimes comprise intentional individual commission and
attempt. Further, Article (3)(2)(f) covers “participation in any capacity, such as an accomplice,
assistant or instigator”. This is so drafted so as to “apply, for example, to the conduct of senior
persons in authority, for example, managers, who destroy evidence”.642 The provision is broad, and
unusual in its use of the term ‘instigator’. It is not clear what it meant by this term; perhaps it is
designed to encompass grounds of criminal responsibility such as ordering or soliciting or, most
likely, incitement. The provision does not specifically mention the concept of superior or command
responsibility. Superior or command responsibility would be an important form of criminal
responsibility to include, given the hierarchical structure of a PSO,643 covering situations where
superiors or commanders knew or should have known such crimes were being committed but failed
to stop such actions or take steps to punish the perpetrators.644 Nor are the grounds of responsibility
of conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, ordering, soliciting, or inducing mentioned. While it is true
that such grounds can be encompassed in the broad phrase “participation in any capacity”, a more
extensive list would be of assistance to state parties when ensuring their jurisdiction over
peacekeeping personnel is comprehensive. For the same reason, some definitions may be useful for
the terms used, as there are different grounds of criminal responsibility found in states’ national
laws. For example, some states include negligence as a ground of criminal responsibility while others
do not.645
642 Article 3(2)(f), fn 23.
643 There are strategic, operational and tactical layers of the PSO hierarchy. For example, at the top of the
military command structure is the Force Commander, who is in turn under the authority of the political head of
the mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
Principles and Guidelines (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and
Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, January 2008), pp. 66-69, available at
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (hereinafter ‘DPKO Principles and
Guidelines’). See further, Chapter 5.
644 See Article 28 of the Rome Statute. B.I. Bonafé, 'Finding a proper role for command responsibility' (2007) 5
(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 599-618; C. Meloni, 'Command responsibility: mode of liability for
the crimes of subordinates or separate offence of the superior?' (2007) 5 (3) Journal of International Criminal
Justice 619-637. See further, Chapter 5.
645 For example, the Australian Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995 includes negligence as a grounds of criminal
responsibility (Chapter 2- General principles of criminal responsibility, s. 5.5), but the Rome Statute does not
(Articles 25, 30, 31, and 32).
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The crimes covered by the alternate Article 3(2) are “crimes of intentional violence against the
person and sexual offences punishable under the national law of that State party by imprisonment or
other deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least [one/two] year(s), or by a more severe
penalty”.646 More crimes are certainly encompassed by the alternate article. The phrasing of ‘sexual
offences’ is far broader than in the principle Article 3(2). ‘Sexual offences’ will quite easily encompass
crimes such as sexual exploitation. Nonetheless, the catch is that the crimes must be punishable by
at least one year’s imprisonment. For example, states that have not criminalised sexual exploitation
but have criminalised patronising a prostitute may not see one year’s imprisonment as an
appropriate penalty, instead regarding either fines or a lesser period of maximum imprisonment as
adequate punishment.647 Thus, prostitution-related activities may not be subsumed by the
obligations of the Draft Convention. In addition, again, the limitations will exclude many serious
crimes such as theft, fraud, money laundering, involvement in organised crime, weapons smuggling,
illegal weapons purchasing, and drug production and trafficking. The alternate Article 3(2) also covers
attempt, and “participation in any capacity, such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator”.
A more effective crimes provision would list specific crimes that need to be covered by states’
jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel, followed by a catch-all statement to allow the inclusion of
other crimes not mentioned in the list. As it stands, the Draft Convention does not oblige states to
criminalise a large range of specific crimes. Obliging a state to establish jurisdiction over “crimes of
intentional violence against the person and sexual offences punishable... by imprisonment... for a
maximum period of at least one year” does not clarify the crimes a state should criminalise. In fact, a
state could criminalise rape and sexual assault, claiming that it had satisfied its obligations under the
treaty by establishing jurisdiction over ‘rape and acts of sexual violence’ or ‘sexual offences’. With no
definition of ‘sexual violence’ or ‘sexual offences’ provided, the Draft Convention is lacking in strong
646 Article 3(2)(a).
647 That being said, under the US UCMJ, it is clear that the US government has taken the crime of patronising a
prostitute seriously, as it is subject to a maximum penalty of “dishonourable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and confinement for one year”; Manual for Courts-Martial United States 2005 Edition, ¶ 97, Article
134- (Pandering and prostitution), subparagraph (e)(1).
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enforceability and provides a loophole for states to argue they have complied with their convention
responsibilities without having comprehensive legislative provisions.648 Listed crimes need to be
more precise, yet not exhaustive, in the vein of the Rome Statute. For example, ‘sexual offences’
could be defined so as to include, non-exhaustively, crimes such as sexual exploitation, prostitution-
related activities, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, rape, forced pregnancy, and enforced
sterilisation. The definition could then follow the example of the Rome Statute and state “or any
other form of sexual offences of comparable gravity”.649 Following wording of the Rome Statute
would be more likely to appeal to states, given the issues raised during the negotiation of text of the
‘gender-based crimes’, particularly regarding the need to exclude any reference to abortion.650 Such
a definition would require states to criminalise certain specified behaviour, but also allow for a state
to criminalise other behaviour that may be equally categorised as a sexual offence. The
comprehensiveness of the Rome Statute’s gender-based crimes is discussed in Chapter 5, although it
is recognised that the Rome Statute would benefit from an expression provision proscribing sexual
exploitation.
In addition to substantive law definitions, under Article 5 the Draft Convention specifically states that
there is no “obligation on a State party to establish jurisdiction over conduct which does not
constitute a crime under the law of the State where the conduct occurred”.651 This article refers to
the possibility of incongruous criminal jurisdiction, and applies the principle of dual criminality which
648 Yet if a state remains unable to prosecute for a specific offence, this may leave open the door for the ICC to
step in on the grounds of the state’s inability (or unwillingness) to prosecute; Art. 17 Rome Statute; S.A.
Williams and W.A. Schabas, 'Article 17 Issues of Admissibility', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-
Baden 2008), 605-625.
649 See Rome Statute, Articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xiv), and 8(2)(e)(vi).
650 C. Steains, 'Gender Issues', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute,
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999), 357-390, pp. 365-69; K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2002), p. 330; M. Cottier, 'Article 8 War crimes para. 2(b)(xxii)', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford,
Baden-Baden 2008), , pp. 449-50.
651 Article 5 Conduct which is not a crime under the law of the host State.
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is often found in extradition treaties.652 However, it is also somewhat at odds with the jurisdictional
obligations under the Draft Convention, in that it allows for a state not to enact nationality
jurisdiction if the conduct is not a crime in the state in whose territory the conduct occurred. This is
contradictory to the obligation to enact nationality jurisdiction, the principle of which gives a state
jurisdiction over its own nationals based on that state’s allocated jurisdictional laws, and not the
jurisdiction of the state where the conduct occurred. In fact, whether the conduct in question under
this Draft Convention is legal in the territory where it occurred should be irrelevant. The aim of the
Draft Convention is for states to criminalise such behaviour. This provision would create particular
difficulties for enforcing criminal accountability over peacekeeping personnel serving in a mission
located in a country with little or no criminal system infrastructure including a lack of existing laws
over criminal behaviour. It would essentially be a means for states to evade enforcement of criminal
accountability in these specific circumstances.
3.5.2. Ensuring managerial/superior and command responsibility
One problem raised by the Zeid Report was that there is a perception that “neither the [UN] nor its
civilian managers and military commanders are held to account to make good-faith efforts to address
the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations”.653 It was recommended
that managers and commanders set an example and raise awareness of the prohibition of SEA; that a
database be developed so managerial personnel are able to track SEA allegations; improvement of
mission living conditions and mission-specific measures such as curfews and off-limits areas; the
tasking of managers and commanders with the implementation of programmes and policies of the
UN for the prevention of SEA; and the assessment of managers and commanders on how they
perform these duties.654
652 See e.g. the UN Model Treaty on Extradition, GA RES 45/116, amended by GA RES 52/88, Article 4(e);
EAW, supra note 607. For further discussion on dual criminality as it applies to this Draft Convention, see
discussion supra Conduct which is not a crime under the law of the host State or the State party.
653 Zeid Report, supra note 427, para. 37.
654 Ibid., paras. 62-65.
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The CDU has begun working with the SEA Task Force on managerial compliance, including a
compliance-based approach and a risk assessment approach. The unit is also examining changing
performance evaluations for civilians, through human resources. Such changes will probably take
time to develop and implement within the DPKO and especially the UN as a whole, but it will be
anticipated that such approaches will ensure managerial responsibility for SEA-related issues. It
should also be anticipated that such approaches will be applicable to the highest echelons of
management and command, ensuring that those as far up as the Force Commander and the Head of
Mission are aware of the prohibitions, and of their own roles in preventing and punishing
misconduct.
In relation to command responsibility, under the new Article 7 sexiens of the Model MoU, sending
state governments are obligated to take action if national contingent commanders fail to cooperate
with a UN investigation, fail to exercise effective command and control, or neglect to immediately
report to appropriate authorities or take action in respect of allegations of misconduct reported to
the commander.655 It is the contingent commanders’ “obligation to maintain the discipline and good
order of the contingent”.656 The commander’s fulfilment of such requirements shall be evaluated in
the commander’s performance appraisal.657 There appears to have been some success with this
policy already, with the CDU reporting that contingent commanders have been repatriated for
failures to ensure prevention of SEA.
This section has shown how the UN can assist with ensuring accountability for perpetrators of SEA.
These procedures will function in conjunction with states, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Yet one
important aspect of combining the processes of investigation and prosecution of the UN as an
international organisation, and states is how such mutual legal assistance will be coordinated. The
subsequent section will review problems and solutions of cooperation and mutual legal assistance
between the UN and states in misconduct investigations.
655 Model MoU, Article 7(2) sexiens.
656 Article 7(4) sexiens.
657 Article 7(2) sexiens.
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3.6. Cooperation/ Mutual Legal Assistance
3.6.1. Lack of cooperation between the UN and states in
misconduct investigations
The lack of cooperation between the UN investigative bodies, and the UN and states in misconduct
investigations was one of the most significant criticisms from the Zeid Report, with recommendations
made for the establishment of a more professional investigative mechanism, and that sending states
participate in investigations.658 Currently the mandate for UN investigations into misconduct lies with
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),659 as SEA are termed a Category I offence.660
Offences are divided into two categories: Category I Serious offences, and Category II Routine
offences. Category I offences include SEA, and serious criminal activity.661 Investigations into
allegations against civilian personnel are conducted by the OIOS special investigation unit; against
military personnel, by the military police; and against CivPol, by CivPol investigators. Since changes
were made to procedural policies in 2005, the OIOS and the CDU have developed a relationship of
cooperation.662 Many procedural aspects are still evolving, such as information sharing
arrangements, and the application of the new MoU provisions. Standard operating procedures for
both Headquarters and mission follow-up procedures are being developed. Changes already made
have resulted in increased understanding and collaboration between the OIOS and the CDU, both at
mission and Headquarters levels. “Reports from the missions indicate that the improved dialogue has
resulted in substantial improvement in procedures, which has translated into a marked increase in
investigation reports and a substantial decrease in the response time of the Investigations Division in
addressing allegations transmitted to them.”663 Increased sharing of information has enabled mission
658 Zeid Report, supra note 427, paras. 28-36.
659 OIOS http://www.un.org/depts/oios/.
660 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the investigation functions in the United
Nations, A/RES/59/287, 21 April 2005, para. 6.
661 OIOS Investigations Manual, March 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/id_manual_mar2009.pdf, p.
9.
662 Overview of financing, supra note 468, para. 72.
663 Ibid., para. 73.
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CDUs to “better assess the level and gravity of allegations, and to better advise the heads of mission
accordingly”.664
Where appropriate, the CDU, in conjunction with the Office of Legal Affairs, informs the Permanent
Mission of the sending state concerned, with the aim of coordinating the investigation of the
allegation. To date, the UN has found that this process has increased cooperation and advisory
activities between all parties involved in investigations.665 This cooperation continues even at the
conclusion of an investigation. Even if an investigation is conducted by the military police or police
investigators, Headquarters CDU will inform the Permanent Mission of the sending state of the
outcome of the investigation. CDU, on behalf of the DPKO/DFS, where appropriate, will advise the
PSO to repatriate the individual on disciplinary grounds.666 All investigation outcomes are recorded in
a database.667
Cooperation between the UN and states is dealt with in the new MoU provisions. Investigations
relating to misconduct by military personnel are dealt with in Article 7 quater, Investigations. The
government of a troop contributing country “has the primary responsibility for investigating any acts
of misconduct or serious misconduct committed by a member of its national contingent”.668 A
government is required to inform the UN when it has grounds to believe that a member of its
national contingent has committed serious misconduct, and to forward the case to its appropriate
national authorities for the purposes of investigation.669 Should it be the UN who has the grounds,
the UN must inform the sending state’s government (it may be assumed through the Permanent
Mission, although this is not stated). The UN may initiate a preliminary investigation until the
government begins its own investigation, for the purposes of preserving evidence and conducting
fact-finding proceedings. Such an investigation will be conducted in accordance with UN procedure,
by the appropriate UN investigative office, including the OIOS. The investigative team must include a
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid., para. 26.
666 Ibid., para. 30.
667 See supra Recording and reporting of misconduct cases and data.
668 Article 7 quater.
669 Article 7(1) quater.
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representative of the government. At the conclusion of the investigation, the UN is to provide the
sending state with a full report.670
Article 7(3)(a) and (b) and quater require cooperation between the UN and the sending state
government. The UN must provide the government with all available materials, and the government
is obliged to instruct the commander of its national contingent to cooperate and share any
documentation and information with the UN. Members of the national contingent must also
cooperate. Article 7(4) quater details further the steps to be taken by the UN, and cooperation
between the UN and the sending state, and the UN and the host state. The UN is to provide logistic
and administrative support for any national investigation officers whilst in the host state, and
financial support where their presence is required by the UN.671 National investigations officers are
to lead any investigation and again, the sharing of all materials and mutual assistance is
emphasised.672
In addition to the MoU provisions, under the GA Resolutions adopted in 2008, states are encouraged
to cooperate with each other and the UN in relation to information sharing and coordination of
investigations, as well as the prosecution of UN officials and experts on mission alleged to have
committed serious crimes.673
The coordination of investigations and cooperation between the UN and states is essential for
ensuring effective and thorough investigations into allegations of SEA (and any misconduct). The new
provisions of the Model MoU should go a long way to enabling coordinated and cooperative
investigations. This will in turn be strengthened by actions of the CDU in developing operation policy
and procedures on investigations of reports of misconduct involving military personnel, which have
been developed in consultation and coordination with states and investigative entities including the
670 Article 7(2) quater.
671 Article 7(4)(g) quater.
672 Article 7(4)(a)-(e) quater.
673 A/RES/62/63; A/RES/63/119, para. 4.
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OIOS.674 The CDU has developed mechanisms to ensure that all entities who were previously
responsible for or previously received allegations of misconduct forward all complaints to the CDU.675
This assures there is one central, independent body that monitors the progress of complaints, and
avoids the fragmented investigation system that previously existed. Streamlining and coordinating
investigation operations will result in more professional investigations, and also more efficient
investigations, which in turns creates more goodwill with victims and local communities. As the UN
has adopted policies and measures to guarantee cooperation and coordination, and improved
cooperation within its own relevant bodies, states need to adopt appropriate measures and
arrangements to make certain that there are procedures available under their domestic law to
facilitate the recognition and use of evidence obtained through UN administrative investigations.
States also need to address any mutual legal assistance issues that may arise in relation to other
states.
In addition to the MoU, as discussed above, coordination of investigations is an issue that could also
be addressed by the Draft Convention.676 This would be important as the MoU does only cover
investigations regarding military personnel, while the Draft Convention would cover investigations
into misconduct by officials and experts on mission, (or ideally all personnel) and so ensure no
category of personnel remains outside agreements between the UN and states as regards
investigation coordination. The following sub-section examines the relevant Draft Convention
provisions.
3.6.2. Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance under the Draft
Convention
3.6.2.1. Cooperation
Under Article 10 of the Draft Convention, state parties are obligated to “afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition
674 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 18.
675 Ibid., para. 20.
676 Supra Investigations and the taking into custody of an alleged offender.
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proceedings brought in respect of the crimes set out in article 3, including assistance in obtaining
evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings”,677 all actions related to which must be
carried out in conformity with any treaties or other arrangement on mutual legal assistance that may
exist between parties. “In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, States parties shall afford
one another assistance in accordance with their national law.”678
This article would benefit from more detail, in the character of other international instruments that
deal with mutual legal assistance. One example is found in Article 93 of the Rome Statute, which lists
particular necessary means of assistance between the ICC and state parties. Article 93 is not an
exhaustive list, but it requires minimum enactment of relevant provisions by state parties within
national legislation to ensure adequate mutual legal assistance is possible under state laws (as a
requirement under the Rome Statute). Article 93 lists certain assistance in relation to investigations
or prosecutions, including the identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items; the
taking of evidence; the questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted; the service of
documents; facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts; the execution
of searches and seizures; the provision of records and documents; and the identification, tracing, and
freezing or seizure or proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes. Such a list would
be useful under Article 10 of the Draft Convention to provide further direction for state parties when
enacting laws or agreements for mutual legal assistance during peacekeeping missions.
A similar list is to be found in the UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,679 and
in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.680 While the former is an
entire treaty on mutual assistance and thus would be difficult to transmit directly into the Draft
Convention, the latter has an excellent example of a detailed provision on mutual legal assistance.681
Aside from listing purposes of mutual legal assistance, Article 18 of the Convention against
677 Article 10(1) Cooperation.
678 Article 10(2).
679 GA RES 45/117, amended by GA RES 53/112, Article 1.
680 GA RES 55/25, 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003, Article 18.
681 The Group of Experts in fact mentions in a footnote that consideration may be required of Article 18 of the
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; fn 50 to Article 10.
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Transnational Organized Crime includes transfer of information; voluntary transfer of persons to
appear as witnesses or experts; the rule of speciality, which prohibits the prosecution of an
extradited person for any offence committed prior to their surrender other than the one for which
extradition is sought (which is notably absent from the Draft Convention);682 central authority and
contents of request; reasons for refusal of assistance; and costs. The Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
both also contain a provision providing for joint investigation teams. Such a provision would be
advantageous in the Draft Convention given that there are several bodies involved in investigation
any alleged crimes by peacekeeping personnel- potentially any combination of the UN
(administrative investigation), military police, civilian police, sending state authorities, and host state
authorities.
Alternatively, the UN could separately adopt a model mutual legal assistance agreement applicable
for peacekeeping operations, detailing the means of assistance necessary for adequate cooperation
between sending states, the host state and the UN for criminal proceedings. The Draft Convention
could have a provision requiring state parties to sign such an agreement and be bound by it when
they participate in a PSO. Such an agreement could be in the vein of the EAW, which has been very
successful in reducing the time taken for mutual legal assistance matters within the EU.683 The EU has
found that updating operational methods to affect flexibility in assistance is a necessity for improving
mutual legal assistance, and that this can be done by creating an agreement such as the EAW and
issuing guidelines to facilitate the application of the agreement in states.684 There is much diversity in
procedures in states’ legal systems, and the EAW has sought to expedite the mutual legal assistant
682 See e.g. K.E. Levitt, 'International Extradition, the Principle of Speciality, and Effective Treaty Enforcement '
(1992) 76 (4) Minnesota Law Review 1017-1040; Muther, supra note 606, p. 227. See also EAW, Article 27; UN
Model Treaty on Extradition, Article 14. N.B. Article 101 of the Rome Statute contains the rule of speciality, but
states that State Parties should endeavour to waive such rule.
683 Final Report on mutual legal assistance, supra note 612.
684 Ibid.
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process by eliminating states’ unnecessary bureaucratic and hierarchical procedures.685 By applying
the same principle to mutual legal assistance between states involved in PSOs, the process could be
greatly sped up and simplified.
The aim would not be to make all national domestic legal systems identical, but to harmonise
national domestic legal provisions. In this sense, the goal would be harmonisation meaning
approximation or “co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major
differences and creating minimum requirements and standards”.686
3.6.2.2. Transfer of criminal proceedings and of prisoners
Article 11 is derived from the United Nations Convention against Corruption,687 and requires state
parties to consider the possibility of transferring proceedings for prosecution to another state party,
“where such a transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice”.688
This article will enable states to take over prosecution proceedings where the host state is unable or
unwilling to conduct such proceedings. It will also allow for troop-contributing countries to consider
transferring proceedings to the jurisdiction of the host state, which may result in a more expeditious
trial due to proximity of evidence and witnesses.
Article 12 allows state parties to consider entering into agreements or arrangements for the transfer
of persons sentenced to their territory, in order to serve out their sentences there.689 This is an
advantageous provision for state parties, as it allows the investigation and prosecution of a crime by
a peacekeeper to take place in the host state (or elsewhere), but for the perpetrator to serve their
sentence in their country of nationality.
685 Ibid. Although, as mentioned above, this is possible due to the integration within the EU, a unique
circumstance that would be nigh impossible to replicate on a global scale; Craig and de Burca, supra note 610.
686 This approximation will also be assisted by the relaxing of the dual criminality requirement. Ibid.
687 Article 11, fn. 51. United Nations Convention against Corruption, GA RES. 58/4, 31 October 2003, entered
into force 14 December 2005.
688 Article 11 Transfer of criminal proceedings.
689 Article 12 Transfer of prisoners.
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3.6.2.3. Evidence obtained in the host State
Article 16 of the Draft Convention is an extremely useful provision.690 It is unique in that it applies
specifically to the circumstances of a peacekeeping mission, where there are several parties involved-
namely, the host state, the sending states, and the United Nations organisation. Under Article 16, a
state party is obligated to “ensure that there are procedures available under its national law which
provide for the use of evidence obtained by the [UN] in host States in proceedings in that State party
for the prosecution of crimes set out in article 3”. This is essentially a more detailed provision
concerning mutual legal assistance, as it ensures that state parties will be able to conduct criminal
proceedings against a peacekeeper who is a national of that state, even if the evidence has been
obtained by the UN in an administrative investigation.
In order to assist with this cooperation, Article 16(2) suggests that the UN may request a state party
to “provide relevant advice on the applicable procedures, conditions and requirements under its
national law on the admissibility or use of evidence obtained in the host State in proceedings in that
State party” for crimes covered by the Draft Convention, committed by peacekeeping personnel. If so
requested, the state party in question is required to “provide such advice in a timely manner and
shall endeavour to provide other forms of assistance as appropriate”, in order for the UN
investigators to ensure they comply with any procedures, conditions and requirements as closely as
possible. Following this provision will greatly help to reduce the chances of the failure of criminal
proceedings against peacekeeping personnel due to technical reasons such as problems with the
chain of evidence. This provision could be subsumed under a more detailed article covering general
mutual legal assistance, including joint investigation teams, as discussed supra.
3.6.2.4. Notification of outcome of proceedings
Under Article 17, state parties are required to communicate the final outcome of any proceedings
against a peacekeeper to the Secretary-General, who in turn must pass on the information to other
690 Article 16 Evidence obtained in the host State.
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state parties and to the host state.691 This will assist the UN with accurate data collection in ensuring
that misconduct by peacekeeping personnel does not go unpunished. It may also serve as a means
for the UN to choose which personnel will serve on peacekeeping missions. If a state party either
does not conform to its obligations under this provision, or it does not undertake proceedings against
alleged perpetrators, the UN could use this as a reason to prefer the inclusion of nationals of other
state parties in PSOs. In reality, however, this is unlikely, given the difficulty the UN has in recruiting
personnel for PSOs.
Article 17 is a follow-up to Article 4, and ensures that the UN another other states are aware of
compliance- or lack of- by all state parties with the convention. This would essentially be an
enforcement measure of the convention, by keeping pressure on states. While reporting may be
seen as a weak enforcement measure compared to court adjudication, this does not mean that it will
be ineffective in ensuring compliance.692 This will render assessment of performance to be a
collective action, and increase transparency in the implementation process- in contrast to the current
situation in which states are lax in their response to UN follow-ups of investigations.693 Compliance
will thus be based on a ‘reputation’ basis, in which state parties are encouraged to comply rather
than be ‘shamed’ by non-compliance. The transparency can also assist with knowledge sharing,
dissemination of information to other state parties on methods of implementation of more intricate
requirements under the convention. Overall, this may actually “promote better compliance and a
more effective agreement”.694
This section has discussed the changes the UN has been making to its investigations structure in
order to ensure more effective cooperation and mutual legal assistance between the UN and
member states. However it has also demonstrated that remains a lack of transparency from the UN,
as well as inadequate investigation reporting from states (which may indicate insubstantial
691 Article 17 Notification of outcome of proceedings.
692 Raustiala, supra note 585, p. 607.
693 See supra Recording and reporting of misconduct cases and data.
694 Ibid.
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investigations). The adoption of the Draft Convention would take steps towards solving these
problems through the creation of a binding legal instrument.
3.7. Conclusion
The actions of the UN clearly show the support from and indeed prominence placed by the UN on
the prohibition of SEA, and also for criminal accountability for peacekeeping personnel who commit
such offences. The UN has made a lot of progress in the areas in which it was deficient, as listed in
the introduction and detailed throughout this chapter. The establishment of the Conduct and
Discipline Unit has been a major factor in progress in all areas, enabling a single body to concentrate
on conduct and discipline issues, thus assuring comprehensive reforms are made in all relevant
areas. Advancement has been made from the prevention of SEA to the support and assistance of
victims, with positive results being particularly noticeable in the area of investigations. This
advancement is not yet complete, as the CDU continues to work on policies, guidelines and other
necessary actions for the UN to take. It remains to be seen whether these actions will result in a
reduction in the number of allegations of SEA, an outcome which will be able to be monitored
through the Secretary-General’s reports on sexual exploitation and abuse.695 Figures of allegations
comparing 2006 and 2007 numbers reveal that, while not yet eliminating SEA, these actions may
already be having positive effects: while there were 357 allegations of SEA in 2006, there were 127 in
2007 and 83 in 2008.696
UN actions also reveal recognition by the UN that, although it is committed to ensuring regulations
within the UN prohibiting SEA by peacekeeping personnel, criminal accountability can only come
from a body capable of exercising criminal jurisdiction over the personnel. Unfortunately, SEA and
use of prostitutes by peacekeeping personnel continue.697
695 See the Reports of the Secretary-General, supra note 504.
696 Figures referring to allegations against DPKO personnel only. Ibid. Comprehensive report of conduct and
discipline, supra note 451, Annex I Number of allegations reported to Conduct and Discipline Unit at
Headquarters in 2006/7, for peacekeeping personnel, by number of offence.
697 See the Reports of the Secretary-General, supra note 504. See also e.g., BBC Newsnight special report, ‘UN
troops in abuse row’, 30 November 2006. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/6196710.stm;
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Reports have highlighted the preference for host state jurisdiction, but have recognised difficulties
that may arise as regards the execution of this jurisdiction, and thus also stress the need for sending
states to have adequate criminal jurisdiction over their own nationals. The reports, Draft Convention
and revised draft MoU aim to ensure host states and contributing states have the jurisdiction to
ensure criminal accountability for peacekeeping personnel, and that such jurisdiction is exercised.
The UN simply does not have the jurisdiction to prosecute peacekeeping personnel. Disciplinary
action the UN can take against mission staff includes dismissal, and for MilObs, military personnel,
CivPol and members of formed police units, extends to repatriation.698 The UN however, is seeking to
obligate states to undertake the role it cannot, the prosecution of criminal misconduct. What is clear
is that responsibility for exercising criminal jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel, for ensuring
criminal accountability, lies with states. The Draft Convention has been given particular attention in
this chapter. It seeks to fill jurisdictional gaps that have long existed over mission personnel. The
Draft Convention aims to bind states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all peacekeeping personnel
(in the case of the host state) or at least over their own national peacekeeping personnel who are
officials or experts on mission.
The Draft Convention is indeed just that- a draft. It will go through many changes and negotiations
over provisions before it has a chance of being adopted as an international convention by member
states of the UN. The most important changes need to be made to the scope of application- both
ratione personae and ratione materiae. A final convention must apply to all peacekeeping personnel,
regardless of status. While the mandate of the Group of Legal Experts was to assess the criminal
accountability of only officials and experts on mission, it is illogical to create an international
instrument that only applies to a certain group of peacekeeping personnel and not all of them. This is
particularly important given the fact that the majority of allegations of SEA committed by
Jane Holl-Lute, ‘Press Conference by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on Allegations
of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeeping personnel’, UN DPI, News and Media Division, New York,
5 January 2007; Statistics on the CDU website http://cdu.unlb.org/.
698 Comprehensive report of conduct and discipline, supra note 451, para. 14.
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peacekeeping personnel are committed by military personnel,699 who are subject to absolute
immunity from host state jurisdiction which cannot be waived by the UN as they are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state.700 Therefore, it should be a priority that they are not
excluded from the scope of application of any international convention aiming to secure criminal
accountability for peacekeeping personnel. The fact that exclusive jurisdiction is and always has been
granted to the sending state over military personnel through the SOFA has obviously not led to
comprehensive disciplinary and criminal actions, nor effective prevention of SEA by military
personnel. An international convention would be binding and enforceable against the state for
violations of the convention, and require the sending state to take complete actions against any
misconduct that amounts to criminal conduct.
The Ad Hoc Committee on criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission has also
observed that a specific lacuna in the Draft Convention is the fact that the Draft Convention does not
address practical problems arising from competing jurisdictions and how competing requests might
be dealt with. The Report states that these “matters would be addressed in the same manner as in
other conventions which also provided for the establishment of jurisdiction by more than one
State”.701
The Draft Convention is also lacking in certain elements dealing with criminal law concepts, such as
clarity of grounds of criminal responsibility, grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility
(defences), and such principles as non-retroactivity. This Draft Convention deals with criminal
accountability, and takes tentative steps towards being a guide to criminalisation and ensuring
699 Over 70% of allegations involve military personnel. From 2003-2008, 537 out of 767 allegations concerned
military personnel. See statistics from Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,
Secretary-General’s Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data: A/59/782, Annex 1 Nature of
allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1 January- 31 December 2004; A/60/861, Annex
I Nature of allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1 January- 31 December 2005;
A/61/957 Annex VI Nature of allegations, by personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1
January-31 December 2006; A/62/890, Annex VI Nature of allegations in completed investigations, by category
of personnel of the DPKO/DFS, 1 January- 31 December 2007; A/63/720, Annex V Nature of allegations, by
category of personnel of the DPKO/DFS, for completed investigations, 1 January- 31 December 2008.
700 See discussion supra Immunity; see also Working paper, supra note 623, para. 35.
701 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on
mission, First session (9-13 April 2007), A/62/54, Annex, para. 6 (hereinafter ‘First session report of the Ad Hoc
Committee’).
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criminal accountability, but does not make sufficient cogent progression. More detailed and precise
provisions will enable state parties to have a clearer position as to how they can comply with their
obligations under the convention. The convention could include model provisions as a guide for
states to enact into national law. Certain aspects of the Rome Statute would be a good guide to
follow in this regard, such as Part 3, which deals with general principles of criminal law such as
grounds of criminal responsibility. While the Draft Convention is not establishing a court, it needs to
obligate state parties to criminalise harmful conduct by peacekeeping personnel in a comprehensive
manner, rather than only in a partial manner. Following concepts, definitions, phrasings and
principles from the Rome Statute would be useful because the Rome Statute is the first wholly
international instrument that deals with criminal law; the first instrument with terms agreed upon by
the international community through extensive negotiations.702 The Rome Statute represents an
agreement of the most internationally recognised principles, concepts, and definitions of criminal
law.
The other dilemma of the Draft Convention is that it does not adequately obligate states to
criminalise and prosecute crimes.703 It requires states to establish certain types of jurisdiction but
provides too many loopholes through which state parties can avoid enforcing this jurisdiction,
including those mentioned in the discussion of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 7. That being said, it would be
questionable whether states would agree to ratify a convention containing all the requirements as
suggested in this paper for these provisions. This is one drawback of a convention- it is a strong
agreement that signals a state is serious about commitment, but because it requires a high level of
compliance from states (both domestically and internationally), states are more likely to negotiate
weaker provisions.704 While the aim of the convention would be to ensure criminalisation and
prosecution, and the suggested changes in this paper to strengthen provisions would be ideal in
702 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR may be international tribunals, but the process
of formulating the statutes of these tribunals was nowhere as complex or as lengthy as the negotiation process for
the establishment of the Rome Statute, and nor were as many countries involved in the process.
703 O’Brien, supra note 561, pp. 73-75.
704 Raustiala, supra note 585, pp. 598, 601-2.
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attaining this goal, more flexible, general provisions would encourage more states to ratify the
convention as they would be easier to comply with.
It is true that there are disadvantages to an international convention, the foremost of which is the
principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.705 However, the continuing occurrences of SEA
committed by peacekeeping personnel demonstrate that organisational administrative regulations
are insufficient deterrents. While criminalisation is not the only answer to solving many problems
that arise in post-conflict societies,706 in terms of behaviour such as SEA, criminalisation and, most
importantly, prosecution of offenders, is the strongest deterrent to such behaviour. States involved
in PSOs may have obligations under newly negotiated MoUs to ensure they have jurisdiction over
their personnel, but a convention would be a much stronger instrument with more enforceability, as
seen in the discussion of Articles 4 and 17. There are certainly complexities in the adoption of a
convention which seeks to regulate state parties’ domestic criminal law, particularly given the
“disparity in the criminal laws and procedures of different States”.707 However, a pragmatic approach
to the drafting of the convention will enable the identification of specific crimes to be targeted,708
and ensure effective mutual legal assistance. It will also achieve the overall goals of deterring
peacekeeping personnel from committing SEA, and the repudiation of impunity for any peacekeeper
who commits such an offence.
The following chapter will look to how sending states can enact accountability after immunities,
jurisdiction and cooperation have been dealt with. Deficiencies in national law that may be solved
through the adoption of the Draft Convention will be highlighted.
705 Article 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UNTS, vol. 1155, p. 331, entered into force on
27 January 1980.
706 See e.g. D. Otto, 'Making sense of zero tolerance policies in peacekeeping sexual economies', in Munro and
Stychin (eds.), Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, (Glasshouse Press, London 2007), 259-282.
707 First session report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 701, para. 6.
708 Ibid., para. 24.
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4. National Criminal Jurisdiction
4.1. Introduction
It was demonstrated in the preceding chapters that gender-based violence against women by
peacekeepers amounts to conduct that should be criminalised. Such violence is a violation of rights.
It has been recognised by the UN that this conduct is criminal and must be investigated and
prosecuted. However, the UN has also acknowledged that, while it has the power to undertake
administrative organisational investigations, the organisation does not have the legal capacity to
undertake criminal investigations and prosecutions. Only national and international courts and
tribunals have this power. Chapter 3 demonstrated an emphasis on the role of states to prosecute
their own nationals for crimes committed, encouraged by the UN through the Secretariat and the
General Assembly, and affirmed in the Draft Convention on Criminal Accountability. Therefore it is
necessary to assess how states can execute criminal investigations and prosecutions of these gender-
based crimes committed by their nationals when engaged in a peace support operation.
This chapter will examine the jurisdictions of Australia and the United States, in order to assay the
role of national criminal jurisdictions in prosecuting peacekeepers. The assessment of the two
jurisdictions will demonstrate that national jurisdiction is the most effective method of prosecuting
misconduct by peacekeepers. Yet the examination will also show where national systems fail in their
ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers that have committed gender-based crimes.
Different national systems have different lacunae, but one common gap found is that of the absence
of the offence of sexual exploitation. The Draft Convention offers great potential to assist states with
ensuring such omissions no longer exist. The case studies will examine both substantive legislation
and jurisdictional legislation and case law.709
709 Jurisdiction is referred to as procedural law in some countries, and as substantive in others. E.g. the United
States views jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce as part of criminal procedure; whereas Canada
views all issues of jurisdiction as part of substantive law. See E. Silverman, 'Prosecution of International Crimes
in the United States of America', in Eser, et al. (eds.), National Prosecution of International Crimes [Nationale
Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen], (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2005), p. 445; and T. Gut and M.
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The laws of Australia and the US will be examined as both are troop contributing states to peace
support operations (PSOs). Australians have been involved in missions in countries such as East Timor
and Somalia, and Americans in such places as Haiti and Kosovo.710 The US is the top financial
contributor to peace missions.711 Both states have had allegations of misconduct by peacekeeping
personnel, including a successful prosecution in the US of a military staff sergeant for sodomy and
murder of a young girl in Kosovo.712 Both states are English-speaking, common law countries with an
Anglo military and legal heritage, and it is interesting to see the different developments that have
taken place in each country.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, military personnel make up the majority offenders in
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.713 The main focus of this thesis is on military personnel,
and so this chapter will examine the law applicable to military personnel (and civilian personnel
deployed by the military) of each state.
4.2. Jurisdiction
The concept of jurisdiction has been discussed in Chapter 3. Jurisdiction of a state is the power of
that state to govern persons and property; prescriptive jurisdiction is the right to prescribe laws, and
Wolpert, 'Prosecution of International Crimes in Canada', in Eser, et al. (eds.), National Prosecution of
International Crimes [Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen], (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
2005), pp. 40-41. In this thesis, only crimes of individual responsibility will be dealt with.
710 See Monthly Summary of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. See also M.J. Kelly, et al., 'Legal aspects of Australia's
involvement in the International Force for East Timor' (2001) (841) International Review of the Red Cross 101-
139.
711 See generally, Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/financing.html.
712 United States v Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635, (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2003); United States v Ronghi,
No. 03-0520, 60 MJ 83, decided 30 June 2004.
713 Over 70% of allegations involve military personnel. From 2003-2008, 537 out of 767 allegations concerned
military personnel. See statistics from Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,
Secretary-General’s Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data: A/59/782, Annex 1 Nature of
allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1 January- 31 December 2004; A/60/861, Annex
I Nature of allegations, by United Nations entity and category of personnel, 1 January- 31 December 2005;
A/61/957 Annex VI Nature of allegations, by personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1
January-31 December 2006; A/62/890, Annex VI Nature of allegations in completed investigations, by category
of personnel of the DPKO/DFS, 1 January- 31 December 2007; A/63/720, Annex V Nature of allegations, by
category of personnel of the DPKO/DFS, for completed investigations, 1 January- 31 December 2008. See also
Statistics on CDU website http://cdu.unlb.org/.
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enforcement jurisdiction is the power to enforce such laws.714 It was shown in Chapter 3 that
jurisdiction has traditionally been viewed as linked to state sovereignty, and is territorial,715 but that,
provided there is no specific rule to the contrary, jurisdiction may be enacted extra-territorially, at
the discretion of states.716 If a state engages its personnel in a PSO, those personnel are subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state.717 Personnel are located outside the territory of their
sending state; thus, in order for a sending state to ensure it has the ability to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over its personnel and nationals, it is necessary for a sending state to expressly enact law
granting extra-territorial jurisdiction. This is generally common for military personnel, but can be
significantly more complex when concerning non-military personnel. Both Australia and the United
States have laws expressly granting extra-territorial jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel,
although it was clearly an arduous and long journey for the US to enact extra-territorial jurisdiction
over non-military personnel.
4.2.1. Applicable Law to Australian Defence Force Personnel
Discipline and criminal accountability of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel are governed by
the Defence Force Discipline Act (DFDA).718 ADF personnel can be prosecuted for the commission of
offences under Part III of the DFDA, such as offences relating to operations against the enemy and
offences relating to ships, vehicles, aircraft and weapons. Such offences are referred to as service
offences,719 and criminal liability for such offences is determined by Chapter 2 of the federal Criminal
714 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 299;
M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, Cases And Materials On International Law, 4th ed., (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2003), p. 268; D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, London
2004), p. 265.
715 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, France v Turkey, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (Lotus Case), pp. 18, 20; Dixon
and McCorquodale, ibid., p. 268.
716 Lotus Case, pp. 19, 20.
717 See supra Chapter 3.3 Jurisdiction.
718 Defence Force Discipline Act (Cth) 1982.
719 The DFDA interpretation states “service offence means:
(a) an offence against this Act or the regulations;
(b) an offence that:
(i) is an ancillary offence in relation to an offence against this Act or the regulations; and
(ii) was committed by a person at a time when the person was a defence member or a defence civilian;
or
(c) an old system offence.”
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Code Act (Cth) which determines the general principles of criminal responsibility.720 Chapter 2 of the
Criminal Code Act covers elements of offences, defences, extensions of criminal responsibility and
geographical jurisdiction.721
Under s. 61 of the DFDA, a defence member or a defence civilian722 is guilty of an offence if the
person engages in conduct in or outside the Jervis Bay Territory, whether or not in a public place, and
engaging in that conduct would be a Territory offence, if it took place in the Jervis Bay Territory.
Maximum punishment for such offences is the fixed punishment set for the relevant Territory
offence, or otherwise a punishment that is not more severe than the maximum punishment for the
relevant Territory offence. The DFDA defines a Territory offence as:
“(a) an offence against a law of the Commonwealth in force in the Jervis Bay Territory other
than this Act or the regulations; or
“(b) an offence punishable under any other law in force in the Jervis Bay Territory (including
any unwritten law) creating offences or imposing criminal liability for offences.”
723
720 Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995.
721 See next sub-section for explanation of geographical jurisdiction.
722 Defence member is defined as
“(a) a member of the Permanent Navy, the Regular Army or the Permanent Air Force; or
(b) a member of the Reserves who:
(i) is rendering continuous full time service; or
(ii) is on duty or in uniform.”
Defence civilian is defined as:
“a person (other than a defence member) who:
(a) with the authority of an authorized officer, accompanies a part of the Defence Force that is:
(i) outside Australia; or
(ii) on operations against the enemy;
and has consented, in writing, to subject himself or herself to Defence Force discipline while so accompanying
that part of the Defence Force.”
DFDA, s. 3 Interpretation.
723 Notes to the definition:
Note 1: Paragraph (a) of this definition includes an offence (an ancillary Territory offence) against section 11.1
(attempt), section 11.4 (incitement) or section 11.5 (conspiracy) of the Criminal Code or section 6 (accessory
after the fact) of the Crimes Act 1914 in relation to another Territory offence within the meaning of that
paragraph.
Note 2: Paragraph (b) of this definition includes an offence (an ancillary Territory offence) against section 44
(attempt), section 47 (incitement) or section 48 (conspiracy) of the Criminal Code 2002 of the Australian Capital
Territory or section 181 (accessory after the fact) of the Crimes Act 1900 of the Australian Capital Territory in
relation to another Territory offence within the meaning of that paragraph.
Note 3: The laws of the Australian Capital Territory in force in the Jervis Bay Territory apply, and Chapter 2 of
the Criminal Code does not apply, for the purpose of determining criminal liability for offences referred to in
paragraph (b) of this definition.
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The Jervis Bay Territory is located within the state of New South Wales, but was acquired by the
federal Commonwealth government in order to ensure the federal government access to the sea,
through the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act (the Acceptance Act).724
Aside from service offences under the DFDA, ADF personnel can be prosecuted for the commission of
offences that would be Jervis Bay Territory offences. Although the Jervis Bay Territory is not part of
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), s. 4A of the Acceptance Act states that:
“Subject to this Act, the laws (including the principles and rules of common law and equity) in
force from time to time in the Australian Capital Territory are, so far as they are applicable to the
[Jervis Bay] Territory and are not inconsistent with an Ordinance, in force in the Territory as if the
Territory formed part of the Australian Capital Territory.”
725
It is also explicitly stated that, unlike in the case of service offences under the DFDA, “Chapter 2 of
the Criminal Code [Act] does not apply in relation to, or in relation to matters arising under, a law in
force in the Territory because of section 4A.”726 Thus criminal responsibility is determined by the
relevant act under which offences are deemed to have been committed. The principle piece of
legislation under which Territory offences are prosecuted is the Crimes Act (ACT).727
The system governing the applicable law is clearly quite complex. It also raises the question of
whether it is appropriate to use the laws of one territory (or state) as the applicable law over ADF
personnel when serving abroad. Australia is a federation of states and territories, and criminal law
falls under the ambit of both federal and state/territory law. Federal law applies throughout the
country, but each state or territory law only applies within the boundaries of that state or territory.
Criminal laws and their application may differ between the states and territories, as will be seen infra
in the discussion on HIV/AIDS-related crimes. Thus, the criminal law of the ACT is not necessarily
representative of the laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as a whole, and therefore it may not be
724 Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act (Cth) 1915.
725 Section 4A(1) of the Acceptance Act. See also Official government website of the Jervis Bay Territory, as
administered by the Commonwealth Minister for Regional Services Territories and Local Government; at
http://www.dotars.gov.au/territories/jervis_bay/governance.aspx.
726 S. 4AA of the Acceptance Act.
727 Crimes Act (ACT) 1900.
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appropriate to apply these territorial laws to ADF personnel when serving abroad, or stationed
elsewhere within Australia. The most prominent example of this is seen in the fact that prostitution is
not criminalised in the ACT, which creates problems with regards to the prosecution of peacekeepers
for, e.g. patronising a prostitute.728
It would be easier to have a more limited scope of laws under which ADF personnel fall. ADF
personnel do also fall under the jurisdiction of the federal Criminal Code Act, however this is only
when such relevant offences are deemed to have extraterritorial jurisdiction (see below). Specific
offences and their jurisdiction are discussed below.
4.2.2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Australian Defence Force
Military and Civilian Personnel
Section 9 of the DFDA expressly grants extraterritorial operation of all provisions of the DFDA.
“9 Extra territorial operation of Act
The provisions of this Act apply, according to their tenor, both in and outside Australia but do not
apply in relation to any person outside Australia unless that person is a defence member or a
defence civilian.”
Hence, all offences committed by ADF personnel, whether they be service offences under the DFDA
or civil criminal offences under ACT law, are applicable extraterritorially.
With regards to the Criminal Code Act, all applicable offences are designated as having
extraterritorial application through Part 2.7 of the Criminal Code Act,729 which means the Criminal
Code Act has extraterritorial jurisdiction over defence military and civilian personnel. Part 2.7
delineates both standard730 and extended geographical jurisdiction.731 Standard jurisdiction covers
offences in which conduct constituting an offence or a result of the conduct occurs wholly or partly
within Australia. Extended geographical jurisdiction grants different categories of extended
jurisdiction over conduct committed outside Australia, including conduct committed wholly outside
728 This is discussed infra in Prostitution-related Conduct.
729 Criminal Code Act, Chapter 2, Part 2.7 Geographical jurisdiction.
730 Part 2.7, Division 14.
731 Part 2.7, Division 15.
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Australia by an Australian citizen or by a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the
Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.
Extended geographical jurisdiction is categorised from Category A to D.732 Category D is the most
extensive, granting jurisdiction over conduct “(a) whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged
offence occurs in Australia; and (b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting the alleged
offence occurs in Australia”, and is not restricted to Australian citizens or nationals.733 Which
jurisdictional category a particular offence falls under is provided in the section that applies to the
offence. For example, Category D applies to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity,
rendering all ADF personnel subject to being prosecuted for such offences.734
The Constitutional validity of the exercise of extraterritorial application of civilian criminal law over
military personnel was considered in the 2004 case Re Colonel Aird.735 The case raises issues
particularly relevant to the consideration of criminal jurisdiction over Australian peacekeepers for
gender-based crimes committed while involved in a PSO. Private Alpert was a defence member
serving in Malaysia. It was alleged that, while on leave in Thailand, he raped an English woman.
Alpert was charged under the ACT Crimes Act, under the authority granted by the DFDA, and was to
be prosecuted by a general court martial in Australia.
The issue in question in the case was whether the Constitutional defence power736 granted the
Commonwealth the power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over defence personnel in respect
of the alleged offence. The issue was based on the ‘service connection’ versus ‘service status’ test,
concepts that determine whether or not the military has jurisdiction over a person. The ‘service
connection’ argument requires the crime itself to have a connection with the military. The ‘service
732 See Appendix 3 for full text of Part 2.7, Division 15 Extended Geographical Jurisdiction.
733 Part 2.7, Division 15, s. 15.4.
734 Chapter 8 Offences against humanity and related offences, Division 268 Genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and crimes against the administration of the justice of the International Criminal Court, Subdivision
K- Miscellaneous, s. 268.117 Geographical jurisdiction.
735 Supra note 67.
736 Supra note 66.
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status’ argument maintains the valid exercise of criminal jurisdiction over defence personnel based
solely on their status as a defence member.737
The question in Re Colonel Aird was: given that Alpert was on leave, in civilian clothing, on a holiday
paid for by his money, was it a valid exercise of the defence power to charge him with rape under the
DFDA authority? The 4-3 decision confirmed that the ‘service connection’ test is the applicable test in
Australian law. However, the method of application of that test was not entirely agreed upon by the
judges. Justice McHugh felt that “the prohibition against rape goes to the heart of maintaining
discipline and morale in the Defence Force. Rape and other kinds of sexual assault are acts of
violence. It is central to a disciplined defence force that its members are not persons who engage in
uncontrolled violence.”738
It was held to be irrelevant that the alleged rape was committed while Alpert was on leave. “A soldier
who rapes another person undermines the discipline and morale of his army. He does so whether he
is on active service or recreation leave.”739
Further reasons behind the majority judgment emphasise the existence of the military as a ‘special
community’, the importance of concepts such as discipline and morale to the military community,
and how the commission of serious crimes can impact on this.
“[I]t need hardly be said that other members of the Defence Force will be reluctant to serve with
personnel who are guilty of conduct that in the Australian Capital Territory amounts to rape or
sexual assault. This may be out of fear for personal safety or rejection of such conduct or both.
Such reluctance can only have a detrimental effect on the discipline and morale of the armed
services.”
740
The majority view also based the decision on the special position of the military in the global
community, which has particular resonance in the context of PSOs. The potential impact of such
serious criminal behaviour by members of the ADF was held to be an important reason for the
737 This is the view now followed in the US. See discussion infra; Solorio v United States 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
738 At 322.
739 Per Justice McHugh at 323.
740 Justice McHugh at 322.
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service connection. Justice McHugh rightly pointed out that, whether on leave or not, defence
personnel are perceived by foreign governments and local people as representatives of the
Australian government, and that it is irrelevant if defence personnel are in civilian dress or not.741 The
judge recognised that the commission of undesirable conduct by ADF personnel may result in
criticism and even hostility by the local community towards the ADF and its members.742 The
behaviour may even result in opposition from the government to the presence of ADF personnel in
the country. Such reactions would not only have a negative impact on the discipline and morale of
defence personnel, but may seriously damage inter-state relations and result in the ADF being
ejected from or refused entry into a state for purposes such as training or peacekeeping.743
It was also held that the application of one set of standards to ADF personnel serving overseas,
regardless of local laws, was necessary. Applying standard regulations and laws results in avoidance
of complications as to which laws are applicable, as well as ensuring appropriate behaviour of ADF
personnel at all times.
“[W]hile defence members serving overseas must obey local laws, the imposition of minimum
standards of behaviour by reference to Australian law is a legitimate means of preserving
discipline, bearing in mind that Australian forces might be located in places where there is no
government, or where there is a hostile government, or where peacekeeping is necessary… If it is
accepted to be a proper concern of Parliament to require defence members, when serving
overseas, to behave according to standards of conduct prescribed by Australian law, then there is
power to impose such a requirement generally; it does not vary according to local circumstances
and conditions in different places.”
744
In contrast, the dissent of Justices Callinan and Heydon argued that there was an insufficient ‘service
connection’ for the charge to be a valid exercise of power. Their Honours felt that applying the
‘service connection’ test to any conduct that constitutes “an undisciplined application of force” or
“would be regarded as abhorrent by other soldiers” would be over inclusive.745
741 Ibid.
742 Ibid.
743 Ibid.
744 Per Chief Justice Gleeson at 314.
745 At 351.
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Justice Kirby’s dissent also declined to overextend the reach of the defence extraterritorial
jurisdiction, but was the only judgment to consider the validity of the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. After reference to passive and active nationality jurisdiction, he concluded that the
exercise of such extraterritorial jurisdiction was entirely legitimate under international law.746
It was an accepted fact in the case that Thailand also held jurisdiction over Alpert, but that the ADF
had assumed jurisdiction because the complainant had made the complaint to the ADF and not the
Thai authorities; and that Thailand had not made any application for surrender of Alpert.747
Re Colonel Aird plainly demonstrates that Australian law supports the prosecution of ADF personnel
for crimes committed when posted overseas in any capacity, even when committed on leave. The
‘service connection’ test may be more restrictive than the ‘service status’ test, but it is nonetheless
broadly interpreted, and liberally applied. The majority decisions clearly apply this interpretation
based on comprehension of the military as a ‘special community’ which abides by different principles
from the ordinary civilian community. It is appropriate that the potential negative repercussions of
such conduct to Australia’s international position and the ability of the ADF to be involved in
international deployments are also recognised.
4.2.3. Applicable Law and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over the
United States Armed Forces
The United States has express extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of its
Armed Forces (USAF). Members of the Armed Forces are subject to the US Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ),748 which specifically declares that it “applies in all places”.749 This jurisdiction applies
at all times. Thus, there is absolutely no issue as to the question of UCMJ extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the Armed Forces.750
746 At 339-344.
747 It was also noted that England also held legitimate jurisdiction, as the complainant was an English national.
Per Gummow J.
748 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
749 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 805. Art. 5.
750 Persons subject to the UCMJ include “members of a regular component of the armed forces”, “in time of
declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying the armed force in the field”,
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It was discussed supra that in the Australian military, jurisdiction is granted through the liberal
application of the ‘service connection’ test. There was previously a service connection requirement
for court-martial jurisdiction in the US;751 however there was an exception to this requirement for
military personnel assigned overseas.
“The exception to the overseas rule rested in the possibility that extraterritorial application of the
federal penal code might exist. Thus, if the overseas offense could have been prosecuted in a
United States federal court, and the accused would be entitled to the right to indictment and jury
trial, the military prosecutor was required to establish service connection over the offense.”
752
Now there is no longer a service connection requirement at all; as a result this does not create any
issues for jurisdiction over any UCMJ crimes. This requirement was deemed no longer necessary by
the Supreme Court in Solorio v United States,753 which involved sex offences against young children.
The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction is based on the status of the accused as a member of the
armed forces, and not a connection of the offence to service.
Alongside the UCMJ, provisions of the US Code may apply to the USAF, such as Title 18, the War
Crimes Act. This will be dependent on the extraterritorial application of the provision. Such
extraterritorial application of relevant provisions will be addressed infra. However, while it is civilian
criminal law which is the main applicable law for ADF personnel, the UCMJ is the principal piece of
legislation which governs conduct of the US military, and it is preferred that USAF personnel are
charged under the UCMJ.754
and “subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of
international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United
States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands”; 10 U.S.C. § 802. Art. 2
(a); as amended by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083 (2007).
751 Jurisdiction was limited to offences that were ‘service-connected’. See O’Callaghan v Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969) and Relford v Commandant, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
752 D.A. Schlueter, Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure, 6th ed., (LexisNexis, 2004), p. 231.
753 Solorio v United States 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
754 See e.g. infra War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.
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4.2.4. Applicable Law and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over US
Civilians Accompanying or Employed by the Armed Forces
In contrast to the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction over ADF civilians, extraterritorial
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying or employed by the United States Armed Forces has had an
unfortunate history, and, throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, simply did not exist.755 It was
a significant gap in jurisdiction that did not go unnoticed. Between 1957 and 2000, more than 30 bills
were introduced into Congress in an attempt to solve this jurisdictional problem, but none were
passed.756
The UCMJ declares that certain persons are subject to the Code; including those who are not part of
the regular armed forces.
(10) In time of war, or contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any
accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands.
757
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that the exercise of jurisdiction of a military
court-martial over a civilian under these sections during peacetime is unconstitutional.758 Peacetime
was defined as any situation where the United States has not declared war. 759 A US declaration of
755 Prior to this, extraterritorial jurisdiction over civilians was covered by the Articles of War. See J.R. Perlak,
'The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Implications for Contractor Personnel' (2001) 169
Military Law Review 92-140, p. 96.
756 United States v Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2000) at 222; F.A. Stein, 'Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look
at the Current Loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act' (2005) 27 Houston Journal of
International Law 579-607, p. 591.
757 10 U.S.C. § 802. Art. 2(a)(10) and (11).
758 Reid v Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v Krueger 351 U.S. 470 (1956). See also now Manual for Courts-
Martial United States (2008 Edition), Part II Rules for Courts-Martial, Chapter II Jurisdiction, R.C.M. 202(a)(4).
759 Only federal Congress has the power to declare war: National Sav. & Trust Co. v. Brownell, 222 F.2d 395
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), judgment aff'd, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S. Ct. 1545,
36 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1973); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972), judgment aff'd, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.
Ct. 1545, 36 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), order rev'd on other
grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Even v. Clifford, 287 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1968). Participation in a
war can be authorized by a “constitutional equivalent” for a congressional declaration of war or by a specific
ratification of executive actions: DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Com. of Mass. v. Laird, 451
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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war has not occurred since World War II.760 Reid v Covert was the first case to remove this
extraterritorial jurisdiction, in relation to civilian dependants of military personnel.761
Several more prominent cases reached the Supreme Court before the end of the 1900s, upholding
the gap in jurisdiction of the UCMJ.762 In 1960, the Supreme Court declared the gap in jurisdiction to
extend also to non-capital offences in Kinsella v Singleton.763 In the same year, the Supreme Court
dealt with two cases concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction over civilian employees, one a capital
offence and one a non-capital offence.764 In both cases, the Court held that the jurisdiction of a
court-martial over civilian employees in peacetime was likewise unconstitutional and thus invalid.
In 1969, the Court of Appeals stated that even if it was willing to assert that the Vietnam War was an
officially declared war, it declined to allow court-martial jurisdiction over a merchant seaman for
murder whilst on a port-call in Da Nang because the circumstances were too remote to permit
jurisdiction.765 A 1970 case, United States v Avarette, dealt with a civilian employee, who had been
employed as an Army contractor in Vietnam.766 Avarette was convicted by a court martial of
conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny. The Court of Military Appeals (CMA) refused to
uphold the conviction, on the grounds that the relevant article of the UCMJ only allowed jurisdiction
in time of war. The CMA determined that the Vietnam War was not a congressionally declared
war,767 and thus there was no jurisdiction under the UCMJ to try Avarette before a court-martial.
760 Even the Vietnam War was never a declared war by Congress.
761 The cases of Reid v Covert and Kinsella v Krueger each involved a military spouse charged with a capital
crime (murder) committed in the territory of a foreign U.S. base during peacetime; supra note 758.
762 For more detailed description of the case history of extraterritorial jurisdiction over civilians since the UCMJ
became law, see Perlak, supra note 755, pp. 96-98; Stein, supra note 756, pp. 582-593; M.S.S. Gibson, 'Lack of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem' (1995) 148 Military Law Review
114-185, pp. 126-136; R.O. Everett, 'Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians' (1960) 1960 Duke Law Journal 366-
415.
763 Kinsella v Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
764 Capital offence of premeditated murder committed in France: Grisham v Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960). Non-
capital offences: McElroy v Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
765 Latney v Ignatious, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
766 United States v Avarette, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970); 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
767 Ibid
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Finally, in 2000, the Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) delivered its judgment in United States v
Gatlin.768 This case dealt with a military spouse who had been convicted in a civilian District Court for
sexual abuse of a minor that had been committed on property leased by the US Military in Germany.
The case was heard in the District Court because the crime was not discovered until the defendant
(and victim) was back in the US. The District Court determined that it had jurisdiction because the US
military base in Germany was within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States”. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, and held that this jurisdiction referred to in Title
18 of the US Code does not apply extraterritorially.769
The Court of Appeals felt that this was such an unfortunate situation (particularly considering the fact
that Gatlin had pled guilty to the offence which was undeniable given the young girl gave birth to his
child as proven by DNA testing) that it detailed the history of the jurisdictional gap in terms of the
opportunities that the Legislative branch had had to fill the gap, finally taking the step to encourage
Congress to fix the problem.770
Thus, the Supreme Court and other courts ensured there was a lacuna in the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States over its own nationals if they were civilians. Unless the civilians were
accompanying the Armed Forces in wartime, they could not be tried for a crime under the UCMJ. Nor
could they be tried for a crime under the US Code, because there was simply no general provision in
US law for extraterritorial jurisdiction.
It was not until 2000 that a bill finally passed through Congress and sought to remedy the situation.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA)771 specifically addresses the issue of
768 United States v Gatlin, supra note 756.
769 “In short, the legislative history of § 7(3) and its precursors demonstrates unequivocally that Congress, in
fact, intended the statute to apply exclusively to the territorial United States. Accordingly, we conclude that
Lincoln Village--where Gatlin's acts occurred--is not within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States”; that 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) does not apply to Gatlin's acts; and that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to try him.” Ibid., at 220.
770 “Finally, it clearly is within Congress's power to change the effect of this ruling by passing legislation to close
the jurisdictional gap. It is for this reason that we have taken the unusual step of directing the Clerk of the Court
to forward a copy of this opinion to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services and Judiciary
Committees.” Ibid., at 223.
771 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying or employed by the armed forces outside the
territory of the United States. It provides for US jurisdiction over “criminal offenses committed by
certain members of the Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States”.772 These are criminal offences under the US Code, “punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States; or (2) while a member of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of
title 10”.773
The MEJA does not, however, strictly impose US jurisdiction in these circumstances. The Act
specifically allows for jurisdiction to be exercised by a host country. Section 3263 states:
(a) Any person designated and authorized under section 3262(a) may deliver a person described
in section 3261(a) to the appropriate authorities of a foreign country in which such person is
alleged to have violated section 3261(a) if--
(1) appropriate authorities of that country request the delivery of the person to such country
for trial for such conduct as an offense under the laws of that country; and
(2) the delivery of such person to that country is authorized by a treaty or other international
agreement to which the United States is a party.
(b) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall determine which
officials of a foreign country constitute appropriate authorities for purposes of this section.
It is notable that the allowance for foreign jurisdiction is not without conditions, and in fact relies
upon the authorities of the host country taking the initiative and making a request for the delivery of
the person. Even then the delivery is not guaranteed, as the delivery must be allowed under any
treaty or agreement, which means that the terms of a SOFA become particularly relevant. Even if
delivery to foreign authorities were to be permissible under an agreement, the language states that a
personmay be delivered to foreign authorities. There is thus no obligation upon the US authorities to
deliver a suspect to foreign authorities.
772 § 3261.
773 Ibid. Subsection (a)(2) allows for prosecution of such categories of people as former members of the armed
forces for crimes committed during service, as this was also formerly a gap in jurisdiction.
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Despite being decades in the making, the MEJA nonetheless suffered from considerable deficiencies
in the granting of jurisdiction.774 Several are discussed by Stein,775 but the most significant and the
most relevant to jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel is that jurisdiction in relation to civilian
employees was only granted over those civilians who were employed by the Department of Defense
(DoD), either directly or by a contractor with the DoD. The shortcomings of this section were
discovered after the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were revealed. Civilian employees were
working in Iraq through contracting firms that did not have contracts with the DoD, but with the
Interior Department or the CIA.776 Thus, neither United States courts-martial nor federal civilian
courts had the jurisdiction to prosecute these particular civilian offenders for their role in the Abu
Ghraib abuses.
As a consequence, in late 2004, the MEJA was amended.777 The definition of a civilian employee now
includes civilian employees, contractors or employees of contractors (or subcontractors) of “any
other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to
supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas”.778
Another amendment that has been made recently is the addition of ‘contingency operation’ to
Article 2(a)(10).779 The term contingency operation is any military operation which the Secretary of
Defense deems so, “in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing
military force”.780 It can be reasonably surmised that this provision would apply to a PSO, during
774 M.G.R. Schmitt, 'Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an
Unforeseen Loophole' (2005) The Army Lawyer 41-47; Stein, supra note 756, pp. 599-606.
775 Ibid.
776 Jennifer K. Elsea, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq: Selected Legal Issues,
(Congressional Research Service/The Library of Congress, 19 May 2005),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44013.pdf, at CRS-17- CRS-18.
777 See 108th Congressional Public Laws Documents and Records, Pub. L. 108-376, Title X, Sec. 1088 at
www.govrecords.org/publ-108-376-to-protect-the-voting-rights-of-members-of-54.html.
778 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A).
779 Pub. L. 109–364 (2006) H.R.5122 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
SEC. 552. Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of Military Justice During a Time of War substituted
“declared war or a contingency operation” in place of “war”.
780 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(A). It also a military operation which “results in the call or order to, or retention on,
active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406
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which members of the armed forces do or may become involved in military actions, operations or
hostilities against an opposing military force.
Apart from this criminal jurisdiction, there is also jurisdiction over DoD civilians for war crimes. Title
18 of the US Code specifically states that a war crime can only be committed by (or against) a
member of the Armed Forces or a national of the United States. As this title has express
extraterritorial jurisdiction, covering the commission of a war crime “whether inside or outside the
United States”, civilian peacekeeping personnel would be subject to United States jurisdiction for
crimes committed under Title 18, section 2441.
Civilians are likewise subject to any provision of the US Code that has extraterritorial application. Any
relevant provisions and their jurisdiction are detailed below.
4.3. Substantive Law Provisions
Once the first hurdle of establishing extra-territorial jurisdiction itself is overcome, the next one must
be approached. A state must also have applicable substantive law provisions that are applicable
extra-territorially. Without adequate substantive law provisions, a state will not be able to prosecute
for specific crimes committed by its personnel. Many crimes have been presented through the
conduct addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, namely sexual exploitation, rape, trafficking, sexual slavery,
and prostitution-related activities, and every state needs to have the specific provisions outlawing
such conduct in order to prosecute. However, the mere existence of a provision will not always
guarantee a successful prosecution. Success is dependent on whether the provision is
comprehensive. An inadequate definition may result in conduct falling outside the ambit of the law,
and consequently an inability to prosecute. The presence and comprehensiveness of substantive law
provisions in Australian and US law will be examined in this section.
of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency
declared by the President or Congress”; 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B).
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4.3.1. Articles 133 and 134 of the US Uniform Code of Military
Justice
Before the respective provisions of Australian and US substantive criminal law are compared and
analysed, it is necessary to undertake an introduction to two unique articles found in the US UCMJ,
Articles 133 and 134. The reason for this is that these two provisions are distinctly general, and can
be used to prosecute crimes where no other provision provides for the proscription of certain
conduct. The application of these articles to specific crimes will be addressed under the relevant
crime sub-headings below.
4.3.1.1. Article 133 Conduct Unbecoming
Under Article 133 of the UCMJ, there is the ‘catch-all crime’781 of “conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman”.782 Certainly any of the gender-based crimes would fall within this broad category
of crime; however it belittles the seriousness of these crimes to simply refer to them as “conduct
unbecoming”. The vague, social characteristic of the description of this crime does not even give the
impression that this kind of conduct may even be a crime at all, let alone a serious one.783
Yet the Supreme Court has firmly declared that Article 133 is not constitutionally void for
vagueness,784 and thus remains a valid provision of the UCMJ. The text of the article is: “Any
commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” Indeed, the language of the article is
anachronistic, drawing from the time in which the provision was first constructed several hundred
years ago.785
781 The Court of Appeals termed art. 133 and art. 134 “an unwritten criminal code, a catchall receptacle… these
articles also have the very real capacity for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”. Levy v Parker, 478 F.2d
772, at 790-92. This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court, see infra note 784.
782 10 U.S.C. § 933. Art. 133.
783 It has been criticised for its vagueness in this respect, especially for the fact that it could lead to arbitrary
application. See J.M. Kamman, 'Parker v Levy- Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman' (1974-1975)
2 Pepperdine Law Review 435-444, pp.444; 435, fn. 5.
784 Parker v Levy 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
785 The history of the provision goes as far back as the Article of War of James II in 1688. See Kamman, supra
note 783, pp. 435-6. Nelson traces it back further to the Code of Chivalry in the time of William the Conquerer.
See K.E. Nelson, 'Conduct Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman: Ambiguity' (1970) 12 (2) U.S. A.F. JAG
Law Review 124-141, pp.126-130.
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The Manual for Courts-Martial offers the following definition of the offence:
b. Elements.
(1) That the accused did or omitted to do certain acts; and
(2) That, under the circumstances, these acts or omissions constituted conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman.
c. Explanation.
(1) Gentleman. As used in this article, “gentleman” includes both male and female commissioned
officers, cadets, and midshipmen.
(2) Nature of offense. Conduct violative of this article is action or behavior in an official capacity
which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as an officer, seriously compromises the officer’s
character as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an unofficial or private capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the person’s standing as
an officer. There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and the perfect
gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency,
indecorum, lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not everyone is or can be expected to meet
unrealistically high moral standards, but there is a limit of tolerance based on customs of the
service and military necessity below which the personal standards of an officer, cadet, or
midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising the person’s standing as an officer,
cadet, or midshipman or the person’s character as a gentleman. This article prohibits conduct by
a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman which, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, is thus compromising. This article includes acts made punishable by any other
article, provided these acts amount to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman…
(3) Examples of offenses. Instances of violation of this article include… public association with
known prostitutes; committing or attempting to commit a crime involving moral turpitude…
786
Not only is the language obsolete, but it is highly gendered,787 by the use of the word ‘gentleman’.
The military has attempted to ‘de-gender’ the word by offering the explanation that “[a]s used in this
article, “gentleman” includes both male and female commissioned officers, cadets, and
786 R.C.M. 59.b.-c. Other examples provided are: knowingly making a false official statement; dishonorable
failure to pay a debt; cheating on an exam; opening and reading a letter of another without authority; using
insulting or defamatory language to another officer in that officer’s presence or about that officer to other
military persons; being drunk and disorderly in a public place;… and failing without good cause to support the
officer’s family.
787 K. de Jong, 'On Equality and Language' (1985) 1 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 119-133; L.M.
Finley, 'Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning' (1989) 64
Notre Dame Law Review 886-910.
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midshipmen”.788 Yet if both male and female commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen are
subject to this provision, a re-wording of the provision would be pertinent.
Feminist activists in the United States have been among the most prominent, if not the most
prominent, in campaigning for non-gendered law.789 It is testimony to the dominance of men within
the military790 that a law so gendered in its wording has not been changed to gender-neutral
terminology. Indeed, the concept of a society that is structured so that men are ‘gentlemen’ and
women are subservient is the very antithesis of the feminist movement at all levels. What is sought is
a society where respect and fair treatment is conferred regardless of gender.
Taking into account the gendered perspective, ‘gentleman’ is a term that no longer has relevance in
today’s society, particularly in a legislative provision. The Oxford Dictionary791 has several definitions
of ‘gentleman’, including “[a] man of gentle birth, or having the same heraldic status as those of
gentle birth; properly, one who is entitled to bear arms, though not ranking among the nobility, but
also applied to a person of distinction without precise definition of rank”. This definition is
specifically referred to as “[n]ow chiefly Hist[orical]”. Likewise, “[u]sed (with more or less of its literal
meaning) as a complimentary designation of a member of certain societies or professions” is termed
“obs[olete] in ordinary use”. Conceivably, the meaning most relevant to Article 133 would be “a man
in whom gentle birth is accompanied by appropriate qualities and behaviour; hence, in general, a
man of chivalrous instincts and fine feelings”.
The military seeks such an article in the UCMJ for the purposes of upholding the discipline and image
of the military, as well as ensuring that only a certain standard of person is suitable for the armed
forces. This is not an unreasonable expectation. The offence could be reworded to reflect this
without using the word ‘gentleman’. Instead, the provision could simply make reference to ‘conduct
788 Manual for Courts Martial, supra note 52, at IV-94 R.C.M. 59.c.(1).
789 See e.g. C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., London
1987); M. Minow, 'Justice Engendered' (1987) 101 Harvard Law Review 10-95.
790 For discussions on this, see e.g. C. Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives,
First ed., (South End Press, London 1983).
791 See Oxford English Dictionary online, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), at http://dictionary.oed.com/.
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unbecoming an officer’, and remove all references to the word ‘gentleman’ in the definitions. This
wording would still capture the intention of the provision- that is, to instil the requirement of a
certain standard of behaviour by commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen. The type of
appropriate conduct is well expressed in a 1964 decision of the Court of Military Appeals: “the
necessary attributes of character, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing [are] to be expected of an
officer”.792
Article 133 is a very particular example of military-specific crimes that restrict behaviour in public and
private life. This restriction of an officer’s private life has been endorsed by military courts. The Court
of Military Appeals has held that “an officer on active duty is not a civilian and his off-duty activities
do not fall outside the orbit of Article 133”.793
4.3.1.2. Article 134 the General Article
Another possible provision that could be applied to unlisted crimes is the General Article, Article 134,
which proscribes
“…all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty...”
794
As with Article 133, the General Article has also been unsuccessfully challenged for vagueness.795 The
offence is explained in the Manual for Courts-Martial, and in some ways is similar to Article 133:
“b. Elements. The proof required for conviction of an offense under Article 134 depends upon the
nature of the misconduct charged. If the conduct is punished as a crime or offense not capital,
the proof must establish every element of the crime or offense as required by the applicable law.
If the conduct is punished as a disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces, or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, then the following
proof is required:
(1) That the accused did or failed to do certain acts; and
792 United States v Giordano, 15 U.S.C.MA 163, 35 CMR 135 (1964) at 141.
793 United States v Howe, 37 CMR 429 (1967) at 442.
794 10 U.S.C. § 934. Art. 134.
795 Parker v Levy, supra note 784.
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(2) That, under the circumstances, the accused’s conduct was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”
796
The Manual goes on to list specific crimes that can be charged under Article 134. This list is not
exhaustive, and other crimes may fall within the ambit of the General Article. Some of the relevant
crimes listed include adultery, wrongful cohabitation, kidnapping, and pandering and prostitution. As
with Article 133, there are crimes listed here that impose quite a restriction on the private life of
military personnel, and would certainly not be found in civil criminal law. Again, this demonstrates
the special nature of military discipline and the military community as a whole.797 “In military life
there is a higher code termed honor, which holds its society to stricter accountability; and it is not
desirable that the standard of the Army shall come down to the requirements of a [civilian] criminal
code.”798
796 R.C.M. 60.c.(1)-(3).
“c. Explanation.
(1) In general. Article 134 makes punishable acts in three categories of offenses not specifically covered
in any other article of the code. These are referred to as “clauses 1, 2, and 3” of Article 134. Clause 1
offenses involve disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
Clause 2 offenses involve conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. Clause 3 offenses
involve noncapital crimes or offenses which violate Federal law... If any conduct of this nature is
specifically made punishable by another article of the code, it must be charged as a violation of that
article…
(2) Disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces (clause 1).
(a) To the prejudice of good order and discipline. “To the prejudice of good order and discipline” refers
only to acts directly prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only in a
remote or indirect sense. Almost any irregular or improper act on the part of a member of the military
service could be regarded as prejudicial in some indirect or remote sense; however, this article does not
include these distant effects. It is confined to cases in which the prejudice is reasonably direct and
palpable. An act in violation of a local civil law or of a foreign law may be punished if it constitutes a
disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces…
(b) Breach of custom of the service. A breach of a custom of the service may result in a violation of clause
1 of Article 134. In its legal sense, “custom” means more than a method of procedure or a mode of
conduct or behavior which is merely of frequent or usual occurrence. Custom arises out of long
established practices which by common usage have attained the force of law in the military or other
community affected by them. No custom may be contrary to existing law or regulation. A custom which
has not been adopted by existing statute or regulation ceases to exist when its observance has been
generally abandoned. Many customs of the service are now set forth in regulations of the various armed
forces. Violations of these customs should be charged under Article 92 as violations of the regulations in
which they appear if the regulation is punitive…
(3) Conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces (clause 2). “Discredit” means to injure
the reputation of. This clause of Article 134 makes punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring the
service into disrepute or which tends to lower it in public esteem. Acts in violation of a local civil law or a
foreign law may be punished if they are of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces…”
797 See supra Military is a ‘special community’.
798 Parker v Levy, supra note 784, at 765.
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In general, conduct engaged in, such as sexual exploitation, trafficking and sexual slavery could all be
prosecuted under the General Article, as it is all conduct bringing discredit upon the armed forces
and prejudice good order and discipline. Prior cases in these categories have included convictions for
sexual intercourse in the presence of another and a man dressing in women’s clothing.799
4.3.2. Prostitution-related Conduct
In Australian law, there are no offences under the DFDA or the federal Criminal Code Act covering
prostitution-related conduct. In the ACT, prostitution is legalised. Consequently, under ACT law there
are specific offences under the Prostitution Act, but the acts of pandering, procurement and
prostitution are not criminal offences.800 Under the Prostitution Act, prostitution is defined as “the
provision of commercial sexual services”, which in turn are defined as “sexual services provided for
monetary consideration or any other form of consideration or material reward (regardless of
whether the consideration or reward is, or is to be, paid or given to the prostitute or another
person)”.801 Potentially relevant offences under the Prostitution Act are duress, soliciting, causing a
child to provide commercial sexual services, and proceeds of child prostitution.
The crime of duress is that of forced prostitution. The provision prohibits a person from inducing a
person to provide or to continue to provide commercial sexual services through intimidation, assault,
or the threat of assault of any person; or the supply or offer to supply a drug of dependence to any
person; or by making a false representation or otherwise act fraudulently.802 The offence also
proscribes the intimidation, assault or threat of assault of a person; or the supply or offer to supply a
drug of dependence to a person, “for the purpose of inducing any person to provide or continue to
provide him or her with payment derived, directly or indirectly, from the provision of commercial
sexual services”.803 The US UCMJ also contains the crime of forced prostitution through recent
amendments. The provision is termed forcible pandering, and proscribes compelling another person
799 United States v Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80 (2000); and United States v Guerrero, 31 M.J. 692 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990).
800 Prostitution Act (ACT) 1992.
801 Prostitution Act, Notes- Dictionary.
802 Part 3- Offences, s. 17(1).
803 Part 3- Offences, s. 17(2).
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to engage in an act of prostitution with another person to be directed to said person.804 This is a
much shorter provision than that found in the ACT Prostitution Act, which, as discussed above,
expressly lists the circumstances under which forced prostitution is committed, including
intimidation, assault and fraud. The UCMJ provision simply states ‘compels’, however this does not
necessarily mean that it is a more restrictive definition. It would enable both the prosecutor and the
court to adopt a broader interpretation and include methods such as fraud within the definition of
‘compels’.
There are more offences under the ACT Prostitution Act. It is prohibited to accost any person, or
solicit or loiter, for the purpose of offering or procuring commercial sexual services, in a public
place.805 This provision is in keeping with the legalised nature of prostitution under the ACT law,
which permits prostitution only in brothels located in prescribed locations, but not street
prostitution. The offence of soliciting also outlaws accosting a child in a public place for the purpose
of offering or procuring commercial sex services, with a maximum penalty of 3 years
imprisonment.806
Offences related to child prostitution proscribe the causing, permitting, offering or procurement of a
child to provide commercial sexual services.807 Maximum penalties vary according to the age of the
child, with 15 years imprisonment for a child under 12 years, and 10 years imprisonment for a child
over the age of 12. It is also prohibited for a person to receive payment the person “knows, or could
reasonably be expected to have known, is derived, directly or indirectly, from commercial sexual
services provided by a child”.808
Thus, while the provision and the procurement of commercial sex services are legal activities, it is not
legal to force someone through duress to engage in such conduct. This covers involvement in forced
prostitution but leaves a lacuna in the ability to hold Australian personnel criminally responsible for
804 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(l).
805 Prostitution Act (ACT), Part 3- Offences, s. 19(1).
806 Part 3- Offences, s. 19(2).
807 Part 3- Offences, s. 20.
808 Part 3- Offences, s. 21.
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patronising a prostitute while deployed on a mission. Military personnel could be charged under the
DFDA with the offence of ‘prejudicial conduct’, which states that a “defence member is guilty of an
offence if the member engages in conduct that is likely to prejudice the discipline of, or bring
discredit on, the Defence Force”.809 This is a broad provision similar to the General Article of the US
UCMJ. It could easily be argued that patronising prostitutes may prejudice the discipline of the ADF,
and certainly that the behaviour brings discredit on the ADF. Another possible offence is disobeying a
lawful command. If the ADF issues a command to all deployed personnel that they are not to
patronise prostitutes or visit brothels, and an off-limits list as part of that command directive; or
alternatively issues a command that PSO-wide off-limits lists must be adhered to, violation of such
order would be an offence under s. 27A of the DFDA.
It would be useful for the Australian legislature to look to the US UCMJ for guidance with regards the
outlawing of prostitution-related conduct. It is only recently that the UCMJ Article 134 has been
amended to criminalise patronising a prostitute. However, military courts have nonetheless
previously assessed the issue under both Article 133 and Article 134.
4.3.2.1. Article 133
The ‘conduct unbecoming’ provision could be an effective provision to use as a deterrent for officers
engaging in such behaviour as visiting strip clubs and brothels. It seems that this kind of behaviour is
indeed what the provision was intended for- given that example offences include “public association
with known prostitutes; [and] committing or attempting to commit a crime involving moral
turpitude”.
The offence of ‘public association with known prostitutes’ is somewhat outdated. The original text
was ‘public association with notorious prostitutes’, and ‘notoriety’ was an essential element of the
offence.810 In a 1954 case, the military Board of Review upheld this offence, stating that:
809 DFDA, s. 60.
810 Nelson, supra note 785, pp. 124 and 136, citing the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial.
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“It is our opinion that the word ‘notorious’ alleges an essential element of the offense. Paragraph
212, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, in listing public association with a notorious prostitute as
an instance of conduct unbecoming to an officer, restates a time honoured proposition of
military law that an allegation of notoriety is vital to set forth the offense of public association
with a prostitute… The discredit to the military service resulting from such conduct arises from
the unfavorable reaction upon those observers of the association who are aware of the unsavory
character and reputation of the accused’s companion. In the instant case the court having
excepted the word ‘notorious’ from the specification of which they found the accused guilty and
having failed to substitute an allegation from which the notoriety of the prostitute may be
inferred… an offense cognizable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice has not been made
out.”
811
The prostitute in question no longer has to be ‘notorious’, only ‘known’. Thus the standard to be
proven is even lower. That is, while ‘notorious’ may simply mean “well or widely known”, it is more
regularly given an extremely negative connotation: “Well known on account of something which is
not generally approved of or admired; unfavourably known; noted for some bad practice, quality,
etc”.812 It is a positive development that the word ‘notorious’ has been removed. However the
current wording of the offence implies that simply to be a prostitute constitutes an element of the
offence- unless of course, this fact is kept secret.
What precisely is meant by ‘association’ is questionable. While it should be an offence for military
personnel to engage the services of a prostitute, or to use sex services in general, the wording of this
offence sustains the negative image of prostitutes that has endured through the years.813 Prostitutes
have been regularly stigmatised, and this offence under Article 133 insinuates that mere association
with a (‘known’) prostitute is an act of ‘indecency’ or ‘indecorum’. It thus prohibits an officer even
being friends with someone who is a prostitute- unless no one is aware that the person is a
prostitute. What the offence should address is the act of engaging the services of a prostitute in any
811 United States v Mallory, CM 374664, 17 CMR 409 (1954) at 410.
812 Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2006, www.oed.com.
813 B. Cooper, 'Prostitution: A Feminist Analysis' (1989) 11 Women's Rights Law Reporter 99-119, p. 102. The
image of woman is often perpetuated as either ‘Madonna or Whore’. This is referred to in many different terms,
but refers to the ‘good girl/bad girl’ dichotomy- that a woman is either the ‘good girl’ i.e. marriageable, pure, etc;
or a ‘bad girl’ i.e. sexualised and dirty. Overall provides the example ‘comparison’ of feminists and prostitutes
presented as a representation of this image; C. Overall, 'What's Wrong With Prostitution? Evaluating Sex Work'
(1992) 17 (4) Signs 705-724, p. 705.
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manner, or patronising brothels, not associating with a prostitute.814 This would result in a reduction
in demand for prostitution.
There have been few cases dealing with this crime under Article 133, however one from 1954 is
directly relevant, and an encouraging precedent.815 The accused Rice was convicted of, among other
offences, violating a lawful general order by being in a house of prostitution, and of wrongfully
entering an ‘off-limits’ area, under Articles 92,816 133 and 134 of the UCMJ. At the time of the
offence, Rice was a member of the United Nations mission in Korea. The area in question was
“located in a general area where prostitutes are known to reside… As a consequence, an “Off Limits”
sign had been posted in the vicinity of this building…”817 In fact, it was specifically forbidden for UN
personnel to enter a brothel:
The following types of establishments, buildings, and areas are ‘Off Limits’ to all United Nations
personnel of this command (except ROKA):
1. Houses of prostitution;
2. Indigenous eating and drinking establishments;
4. Korean private homes.
The establishments, buildings, and areas enumerated above, will be treated as ‘Off Limits’
whether or not posted as such.
818
Expressly rendering houses of prostitution off limits is evidence that, even in 1954, use of the
services of prostitutes by UN personnel was unacceptable. This seems to have been taken seriously,
as “the house was located in an area notorious for the activities of prostitutes and duly designated as
an “off-limits” are, both by numerous signs posted throughout the village and by a circular
814 However, see infra for discussion of developments.
815 United States v Rice, 14 CMR 316 (1954).
816 10 U.S.C. § 892. Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation
Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to
obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
817 Rice, at 319.
818 Ibid., citing Circular 36 promulgated by Headquarters 7th Infantry Division on 21 July 1953.
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conspicuously posted at the central source of information for the accused's unit”.819 Thus, not only
were personnel informed of buildings and areas that were off limits, but these areas were specifically
signposted in order to ensure knowledge of the off limits status of these areas.
Further, the designation of places such as “Indigenous eating and drinking establishments” and
“Korean private homes” as off limits is in keeping with and assists to uphold the UN Code of Conduct,
which forbids exploitation of the local population.820 This avoids situations of unequal relationships of
any kind, but particularly ones involving receipt of sexual favours in return for such items as food or
money.
The court found that Rice had gone to the house in question with the specific intent of engaging in
sexual intercourse, and thus was guilty of violating Articles 133 and 134.821 This was despite the fact
that the accused did not actually end up engaging in sexual intercourse with the woman.822 Nor was
notoriety at issue in the case. In fact, the case distinctively centred on the behaviour of the accused
and the inappropriateness of that behaviour, rather than any ‘notoriety’ of the prostitute. Thus,
there is a clear precedent for using Articles 133 and 134 to prosecute personnel for going to a house
of prostitution, whether they engage in the services offered or not.
A more recent case, United States v Guaglione, distinguished itself from Rice, and held that the
appellant’s visit to a house of prostitution was not conduct unbecoming an officer.823 The Court of
Military Appeals made the differentiation based on the fact that Guaglione had not intended to
engage in sexual intercourse, and that the area was not designated as off limits.824 In fact, the case
reinforces the image of the military as a ‘boys’ club’, where this behaviour is acceptable:
“Appellant’s battery and battalion commanders testified that his conduct in visiting the houses of
prostitution had displayed “poor judgment” but had not demeaned him as an officer. The
819 Rice, at 319.
820 However, it is not clear in the sources available whether preventing exploitation was the basis of the
regulations that designated these areas as off-limits.
821 Rice, at 319.
822 The Military Police arrived before this could take place. Rice’s jeep driver who had accompanied him had
already engaged in intercourse with another woman.
823 United States v Guaglione, 27 M.J. 268 (1988). No reference is made in the judgment to ‘gentleman’.
824 Ibid., at 270.
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battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Leverett, an officer of some 23 years’ military service,
refused to describe appellant’s conduct as “unbecoming” despite trial counsel’s repeated
attempts to so characterize it during cross-examination. Also, the former first sergeant of the
battery to which Guaglione was assigned testified that, on the basis of his own experience and
knowledge of the customs and standards of the Army, appellant’s act was only “[p]oor
judgment.” This witness had served in the Army for 27 years at the time of trial.
“The Government’s only rebuttal witness was the brigade commander, Colonel A. W. Schulz.
Testifying in response to a hypothetical question based on the facts of this case, he stated on
direct examination, “I do not believe the conduct is acceptable.” When asked whether the visit to
the house of prostitution “rises to the level . . . that would disgrace him as an officer,” he
responded, “I think it comes very close. It might be very, very poor judgment and it is [sic]
certainly borderlines on conduct unbecoming.””
825
The Court did not simply dismiss the charges, and did state that: “In determining whether
Guaglione's visit to the house of prostitution constituted such conduct, we accept the premise that a
commissioned officer may be held to a higher standard of accountability for his conduct than an
enlisted member or a civilian.”826 However, the Court then went on to emphasise that “not every
delict or misstep warrants punishment under Article 133. In general, it must be so disgraceful as to
render an officer unfit for service”.827 This is extremely dubious reasoning, as since the 1960s, it is no
longer the case that a conviction for conduct unbecoming must result in dismissal from service. This
raises the standard of behaviour that constitutes conduct unbecoming too high. It echoes the
reasoning of why the mandatory punishment of dismissal was removed in the first place- that is, “the
existence of the mandatory penalty sometimes encouraged court members to vote for an acquittal
rather than a conviction”.828
The Court concluded that the conviction for conduct unbecoming could not stand because Guaglione
did not participate in any sexual activity or encourage any of the enlisted members to do so. This was
combined with the fact that “no American commander had attempted to prohibit American
servicemembers from entering these brothels by declaring them off-limits; and they were lawful
825 Ibid., at 270-271.
826 Ibid., at 271.
827 Ibid.
828 Nelson, supra note 785, p. 130, citing the Report to Honorable Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, by
the Committee on the UCMJ, Good Order and Discipline in the Army, 18 January 1960, at 14.
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under German law”.829 In fact, this case offers a completely contrary view towards prostitution to the
encouraging one delivered by the Court in Rice.
“We do not conclude, however, that “public association” within the contemplation of the Manual
occurs when a young officer not in uniform merely walks through a German “red-light district” or
even enters a house of prostitution. For one thing, “public” denotes something that is open or
generally known… and Guaglione's activity in Frankfurt on September 6 was not either generally
known at the outset or intended to be generally known. More importantly, we do not believe
that ogling the wares in a brothel constitutes “association”; instead, the contact must be physical
or, if not physical, must be continued over a substantial period of time.
“We recognize that an officer's conduct may be “unbecoming” for purposes of Article 133 even
though it is private and even though it may not violate some other punitive article. United States
v. Norvell, 26 MJ 477 (CMA 1988). However, the disgraceful aspect of the “association with
known prostitutes” is apparently that it is “public” and so represents an open flouting of
community morals. Here, Guaglione's conduct was quite lawful insofar as the local community
was concerned.”
830
Again, the standards set in this case are too high. The requirement that behaviour, to qualify as
‘association’, must be physical contact, or continued contact over a period of time (i.e. regular
patronage), precludes the possibility of prosecuting personnel who visit a brothel without engaging
in sexual activities. This indicates that it is only an offence when committed over a long period of
time, or if sexual activity is engaged in, and ignores the fact that one visit is just as unacceptable as
several, even if sexual activity is not engaged in. Any and all visits by PSO personnel to brothels or
strip clubs are unacceptable. Such visits can (and have) encourage(d) the proliferation of these clubs,
which can (and has) in turn result(ed) in a significant increase in the trafficking of women and girls.831
The Court’s reasoning in relation to private/public behaviour is likewise dubious. Whether
prostitution is legal in the territory in question should be irrelevant. If PSO personnel are under the
jurisdiction of the sending state, it should be the behaviour of the military personnel that is
prohibited through the laws of the sending state. This decision flagrantly ignores the reasoning in
829 Guaglione, at 271.
830 Guaglione, at 272.
831 See discussion supra Chapter 2.
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Howe that “an officer on active duty is not a civilian and his off-duty activities do not fall outside the
orbit of Article 133”.832 As can be seen in the above citation, the Court even mentions that private
behaviour may be restricted, but dismisses this without adequate discussion.833 The interpretation is
further complicated by the idea that there must be physical contact- in this case, sexual activity- and
it must be in public. Sexual activity engaged in inside a brothel itself is not public, but the entering of
the brothel is.
The Court’s use of local community morals as the standard is also inappropriate. Applying this
standard by which to judge whether behaviour is acceptable or not would result in confusion as to
what is conduct unbecoming and what is not. PSOs take place in many different locations around the
world, and local ‘community morals’ will differ from place to place. One standard should be set, quite
simply that visiting houses of prostitution is unacceptable and falls directly within the ambit of
Articles 133 and 134.
All in all, Guaglione is a disappointing case with flawed reasoning that ignores precedential case law.
It delivers the impression that visiting houses of prostitution is acceptable.
However, a case from 1999 demonstrates progression from the Guaglione decision. In United States
v Major Johnnie Hargrove, Jr., Hargrove was convicted under Article 133 for charging “$6,000.00 to
his government credit card for ‘adult entertainment services’ including live sex shows, pornographic
movies, striptease shows, and prostitutes at an adult club in the red light district of Rotterdam”.834 It
is unclear from the decision whether the conviction was based solely on the fact that he misused
government funds for these purposes, or a combination of the misappropriation and the fact of
visiting these services. The misuse of funds is a crime, but neither should it be appropriate for
personnel to frequent sex shows (etc.), even if these services are provided legally in the relevant
territory, as they are in the Netherlands.
832 Howe, supra note 793.
833 Supra note 830.
834 United States v Major Johnnie Hargrove, Jr., ARMY 9701151, US Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 19
April 1999, at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/ACCA.
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While restricting the movement and behaviour of military personnel may seem to violate the
freedom of personnel, particularly when off-duty and also in a situation where such services are
legally provided,835 the outlawing of this behaviour will uphold both the image of integrity that the
military evidently endeavours to convey, and the actual personal integrity of its personnel. This
integrity would thus include a general respect towards women in that payment for sexual services of
any kind is unacceptable.
4.3.2.2. Article 134
Article 134 encompasses the crimes of pandering and prostitution. The text of the elements of the
crime of pandering and prostitution demonstrate that these crimes do not target the buyer of sexual
services. Pandering is ‘pimping’, and prostitution is defined as having sexual intercourse with another
person not the accused’s spouse “for the purpose of receiving money or other compensation”.836
Pandering attracts a maximum punishment of confinement for five years, and prostitution for one
year. Despite the specific wording of the crime of prostitution limiting the application to those
involved in the transaction who receive the money or other compensation, the interpretation of
prostitution in case law seems to indicate that the buyer can also be prosecuted. In the case of
Miller, the accused was charged with pandering, for offering women money or cigarettes if they
would have sexual intercourse with him.837 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the
act of pandering must involve a third party and that with only two parties, the act amounts to
solicitation of another to commit prostitution. Hence the accused was found guilty of solicitation to
commit prostitution, or “wrongfully enticing a female to engage in a sexual act for hire and reward”.
This seems to indicate that although the text of Article 134 outlining the elements of prostitution
implicates only the prostitute can commit the crime, the courts are willing to use the General Article
to convict the buyer of sexual services. In fact, in Miller, there is no indication that an exchange of
835 See discussion supra Military is a ‘special community’.
836 R.C.M. 97.b.(b). Emphasis added.
837 United States v Miller, 47 M.J. 352 (1997).
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sexual services was engaged in, only solicitation to commit prostitution, and this was enough for a
conviction.
Pandering could certainly be used to prosecute PSO personnel who compel, induce, entice or procure
an act of prostitution or who arrange or receive consideration for arranging sexual intercourse or
sodomy for another person.838 This is also directly linked to trafficking and sexual slavery, as many of
the women involved in this kind of transaction in post-conflict societies are trafficked.839
In late 2005, the Manual for Courts-Martial was amended to include the crime of patronising a
prostitute.840 The new crime falls under Article 134:
‘‘(b)(2) Patronizing a prostitute.
(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with another person not the accused’s spouse;
(b) That the accused compelled, induced, enticed, or procured such person to engage in an act of
sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other compensation; and
(c) That this act was wrongful; and
(d) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.’’
The only shortcoming of the provision is that it only refers to ‘sexual intercourse’, rather than sexual
activity in general. This is essentially a loophole, enabling an accused to proffer the argument that
they engaged only in oral sex, and not intercourse, and thus their behaviour does not fall under the
definition of patronising a prostitute. There is also the possibility of the accused arguing that they did
not compel, induce, entice, or procure the other person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse in
exchange for money or other compensation- rather, they offered the money or other compensation
(such as food) after the act of intercourse. A simpler definition would have removed all these
elements and simply prohibited the exchange of sexual services for money or other compensation.
838 R.C.M. 97.b.(2)-(3).
839 See supra Chapter 2.
840 Amendment to Sec. 3 Part IV, ¶ 97, Article 134- (Pandering and prostitution). Amended by Executive Order
13387-2005, Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, October 18, 2005, 70 Fed. Reg. 60701. Manual for
Courts-Martial (2008 Edition), ¶97(b)(2).
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This amendment is an extremely positive step forward. It offers recognition that criminalisation of
military personnel patronising a prostitute is an appropriate response towards solving the problem.
The existence of such a provision sets an excellent example for other states such as Australia to
follow in amending their own national legislation. The lack of provisions outlawing prostitution-
related activities in the Australian legislation is a significant void. The legalisation of prostitution in
the Australian Capital Territory should not be a reason for the acceptance of prostitution-related
activities by Australian Defence Force military and civilian personnel when engaged in a peace
operation outside of Australia. It would be appropriate for the DFDA to be amended to include the
crimes of pandering and patronising a prostitute. The latter could be a straight-forward provision
outlawing ‘the exchange of sexual activities or services for monetary or other compensation’. This
broadly encompasses any form of sexual activity without limiting it to sexual intercourse, and also
ensures there is no need to prove anything beyond the fact of the exchange such as whether the
exchange was compelled, induced, enticed or procured. Likewise, while the new UCMJ provision is
very favourable, an amendment to ensure the definition is not as limited would be pragmatic and
beneficial.
4.3.3. Sexual exploitation
There is a clear lack of provisions proscribing sexual exploitation in both Australian and US law.
Turning to existing Australian provisions, there are some crimes under both federal and ACT law that
could possibly be used to prosecute sexual exploitation.
One set of crimes that could be used are those covering sexual offences against children overseas.
These provisions were enacted to deal with the problem of sex tourism, in which people travel
overseas to engage in sexual activities with children- conduct which is sexual exploitation. Australian
law comprehensively has a whole part of the Crimes Act (Cth) 1914 dedicated to sexual offences
against children overseas. Part IIIA of the Crimes Act deals with crimes of child sex committed by
Australian citizens, residents and body corporates committed outside the territory of Australia. It
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criminalises sexual offences against children overseas,841 and covers sexual intercourse with a child
under 16, inducing a child under 16 to engage in sexual intercourse, sexual conduct involving a child
under 16, and inducing a child under 16 to be involved in sexual conduct.842 All offences are absolute
liability offences, although this is contradicted by the available defence of mistaken belief about the
age of the child.843 There is no requirement to prove special intent that the accused travelled
overseas for the purposes of engaging in child sex, only that it took place. These provisions could be
very effective in prosecuting peacekeeping personnel who engage in this behaviour. The legislative
provisions are broad, covering not only sexual intercourse, but all sexual conduct with a child under
16. It is often the case that peacekeepers engaging in sexual exploitation or abuse do so with a
child.844
Child sexual offences are also found in the ACT Crimes Act. It is an offence under the ACT Crimes Act
to engage in sexual intercourse with a person who is under the age of 16 years.845 Further, it is
proscribed for an adult to maintain a sexual relationship with a young person (under the age of 16
years), which involves engaging in a sexual act with the young person on three or more occasions.846
Offences of acts of indecency are also prohibited by the ACT Crimes Act.847 There is no definition
provided for the term ‘act of indecency’, which leaves it open to broad interpretation, and one which
could certainly include sexual exploitation. The individual commission or commission in company of
another of an act of indecency on, or in the presence of, another person without the consent of that
person and with the knowledge the other person does not consent is a punishable offence.848 There
are a further three levels of acts of indecency- the infliction of grievous bodily harm, the infliction of
841 Part IIIA, Division 2- Sexual offences against children overseas.
842 Part IIIA, Division 2, ss. 50BA- 50BD respectively.
843 Division 3- Defences, s. 50CA, defence based on belief about age.
844 P. Higate, 'Peacekeepers and Gender: DRC and Sierra Leone', Pambazuka News, (8 July 2004),
http://www.pambazuka.org/#2, p. 3; 'From Camp to Community: Liberia study on exploitation of children' (Save
the Children UK, Monrovia, 8 May 2006) ; E. Schade, 'Experiences with regard to The United Nations Peace-
Keeping Forces in Mozambique' (International Save the Children Alliance, Barrio, 20 November 1995) ; 'Note
for Implementing and Operation Partners on Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee
Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone' (UNHCR and Save the Children UK, February 2002)
845 S. 55.
846 S. 56.
847 Ss. 57-61.
848 S. 60.
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actual bodily harm, and the unlawful assault or threat of grievous or actual bodily harm, on another
person with intent to commit an act of indecency. The commission of an act of indecency on, or in
the presence of, a person under the age of 16 years, is a separate offence attracting a higher
maximum imprisonment.849
Like Australia, the United States does not have any law covering sexual exploitation. The military law
provision in Article 134 criminalising patronising a prostitute could effectively be used to prosecute
personnel for sexual exploitation. While the crime is titled patronising a prostitute, the definition of
patronising is broad enough to cover sexual exploitation, particularly given that it involves sexual
intercourse with a person, and “the accused compel[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or procure[ing] such
person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other compensation”. The
definition does not actually require the other person to be classified by definition as a commercial
sex worker, thus enabling any situation involving the compulsion, inducement, enticement or
procurement of someone to engage in sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other
compensation to be covered by this provision.
This does not discount the need for a separate provision prohibiting sexual exploitation. The
shortcomings of the provision could be adequately covered by a separate provision dealing with
sexual exploitation. Aspects of the two crimes differ, and especially important is the emphasis on
abuse of power involved in sexual exploitation.
Other misconduct listed under the General Article could potentially be used to prosecute sexual
exploitation. While it is an outdated provision, adultery could be used, if the accused engaged in
sexual intercourse while they or the other person were married to someone else.850 Adultery is in
fact an oft-prosecuted provision of the UCMJ.851
849 All Crimes Act (ACT) sexual offences relating to young persons have a higher maximum punishment for
commission on or with a young person below the age of 10 years.
850 MCM 2008, ¶62.
851 “Despite its controversial nature… between 1992 and 1996 over 858 servicemembers were charged with
having committed adultery.” M.J. Davidson, A Guide to Military Criminal Law, (Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland 1999), p. 87.
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If the situation is one where the accused is living with a local woman, who in fact consents to the
relationship, the accused could possibly be charged with wrongful cohabitation.852 However this
crime requires that the accused and the other person “openly and publicly live together as husband
and wife, holding themselves out as such”, although they are in fact not married. Thus, if the accused
and the other person do not hold themselves to be husband and wife, the elements of wrongful
cohabitation would not be satisfied.
Another potential crime is that of ‘indecent act’, which proscribes engaging in indecent conduct.853
Indecent conduct in this context is defined as “that form of immorality relating to sexual impurity
which is not only grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, but tends to excite
lust and deprave the morals with respect to sexual relations.”854 While the definition provides that
indecent conduct includes observing, videoing or photographing another person without their
consent whilst engaged in a sexual act, this does not preclude a decision that any gender-based
crime could fall within the general definition, including the propositioning for an exchange of sex for
money, food or other compensation.
At the least, in keeping with codes of conduct, orders should be issued which prohibit PSO personnel
from adopting relationships of cohabitation with members of the local community, and any violation
of the order could then be prosecuted under Article 92. It may be argued that this would prevent
genuine relationships from developing.855 However, it would simply be unrealistic to apply a system
in which relationships were to be analysed on a case-by-case basis to determine their authentic as
opposed to exploitative status. This would involve unrealistic use of resources. It would also be
difficult to determine- what would be the criteria set in order to determine if a relationship was
indeed genuine for both parties? It would not be realistic, for example, to expect a peacekeeper in
852 MCM 2008, ¶69.
853 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(k).
854 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(12). The use of the terms ‘immorality’ and ‘morals’ is not appropriate for a legal
provision, as they are not legal terms, rather they are value terms that cannot be definitively defined in a legal
sense.
855 Or indeed, that some relationships of cohabitation may not be related to romantic/sexual attachments and may
only be a case of house sharing. Yet it is not to say that house sharing would also not involve exploitation of
locals, or at the very least unequal relationships.
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the early stages of a relationship to declare commitment to move to the host country to live with
their partner, or to bring the partner with them back to their home country. Thus, applying this
prohibition of relationships of cohabitation as a blanket rule would be the only realistic solution.
Should the sexual exploitation be engaged in under circumstances of force or violence, provisions
such as aggravated sexual assault,856 aggravated sexual contact,857 abusive sexual contact,858 or
wrongful sexual contact could be used for prosecution. Sexual contact is defined as
“the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of another person, or intentionally causing another person to
touch, either directly or through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person or to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person.”
859
Of these four provisions, only wrongful sexual contact contains lack of consent as an element.860
Wrongful sexual contact is sexual contact without the other person’s permission. The other
provisions require the elements of force, grievous bodily harm, or threats.
As regards children specifically, there are several express provisions: rape of a child (a sexual act with
a child under 12; or a sexual act committed using force, grievous bodily harm or threats against a
child who has attained the age of 12 but not 16; or a sexual act committed on an intoxicated or
unconscious child who has attained the age of 12 but not 16);861 aggravated sexual assault of a child
(a sexual act with a child who has attained the age of 12 but not 16);862 aggravated sexual abuse of a
child (a lewd act with a child);863 aggravated sexual contact with a child (sexual contact with a
856 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(c).
857 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(e).
858 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(h).
859 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(2).
860 See discussion infra on consent in Consent.
861 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(b).
862 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(d).
863 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(f). A lewd act is: “(A) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the
genitalia of another person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person; or (B) intentionally causing another person to touch, not through the clothing, the
genitalia of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person.” 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(10).
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child);864 abusive sexual contact with a child (sexual contact with a child who has attained the age of
12 but not 16);865 indecent liberty with a child (engaging in indecent liberty in the physical presence
of a child).866 Indecent liberty means indecent conduct, but physical contact is not required.867
Depending on the level of sexual activity engaged in, one of these provisions could be used for
prosecuting US personnel for sexual exploitation of a child. Aside from the UCMJ, the US Code
contains the specific crime of sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, which is a crime over
which the US has extraterritorial jurisdiction.868
The issuance of an order proscribing sexual exploitation, including a clear definition, would be one
method of both states solving the current lack of express provisions covering sexual exploitation.
Violation of the order could be prosecuted under s. 27A of the DFDA (for Australians) or Article 92
(for US personnel). Both states could also prosecute for ‘prejudicial conduct’ (DFDA s. 60) or for
‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline’ (the General Article of the UCMJ).
While several potentially applicable offences in both jurisdictions have been discussed, an express
provision criminalising sexual exploitation would enable prosecution for such an offence. It is clear
that there are provisions in both states proscribing child sex offences, but nothing that could really
be used effectively to prosecute for sexual exploitation of an adult. While act of indecency/indecent
acts may be used to prosecute a peacekeeper, such a crime does not really cover the serious nature
of sexual exploitation, and certainly does not emphasise the elements such as the abuse of the
power differential involved in sexual exploitation.
4.3.4. Rape
Under Australian law, the ACT Crimes Act prohibits sexual intercourse without consent of the other
person and with recklessness to the consent of the other person, committed either as an individual
864 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(g).
865 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(i).
866 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(j).
867 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(11).
868 Chapter 110 of Title 18, §§ 2251-2260.
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or acting in company with any other person.869 The element of recklessness is proven by knowledge
of lack of consent or by recklessness as to lack of consent.870
The rape provision of the US UCMJ has recently been amended.871 The provision now outlaws
additional offences other than rape, such as sexual assault and other sexual misconduct (which are
addressed elsewhere in this chapter where relevant). The amended provision now proscribes rape
as:
“Any person subject to this chapter who causes another person of any age to engage in a sexual
act by-
(1) using force against that other person;
(2) causing grievous bodily harm to any person;
(3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death,
grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping;
(4) rendering another person unconscious; or
(5) administering to another person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or
permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially
impairs the ability of that other person to appraise or control conduct.”
872
The difference between the two provisions is substantial in several different elements- the conduct
required to fulfil the definition, consent, and the conduct covered with regards to force and threats.
4.3.4.1. Conduct Covered
The ACT Crimes Act defines sexual intercourse as:
“(a) the penetration, to any extent, of the vagina or anus of a person by any part of the body of
another person, except if that penetration is carried out for a proper medical purpose or is
otherwise authorised by law; or
(b) the penetration, to any extent, of the vagina or anus of a person by an object, being
penetration carried out by another person, except if that penetration is carried out for a proper
medical purpose or is otherwise authorised by law; or
869 S. 54.
870 S. 54(3).
871 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006).
The amended provision came into effect on 1 October 2007.
872 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(a).
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(c) the introduction of any part of the penis of a person into the mouth of another person;
or
(d) cunnilingus; or
(e) the continuation of sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d).”
873
This definition is broad. It does not narrow rape to the penetration of the vagina by a penis, rather
criminalising both female and male rape, when conducted by any body part or object. It also moves
away from using the term rape, instead using the phrasing ‘sexual intercourse without consent’
which enables a conviction to be included under this category for engaging in non-consensual oral
sex, which would otherwise be prosecuted as sexual assault. Sub-section (e) covers the situation
where a person has initially consented to sexual intercourse, but then changes their mind during the
intercourse and wants to stop, but the other person continues engaging in the intercourse, no longer
with the consent of the first person.
In stark contrast, the definition of ‘sexual act’ under the UCMJ is extremely limited:
“The term ‘sexual act’ means--
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact
involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; or
(B) the penetration, however slight, of the genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by
any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person.”
874
The first constraint is that the definition covers only female vaginal rape- or more specifically, vulva
rape. Sub-article (A) clearly states that only penetration of the vulva by a penis is rape. The use of the
term ‘vulva’ in itself is unusual, given that the vulva refers only to the external female genitalia, most
of which cannot actually be penetrated. However, as ‘vulva’ includes the vaginal vestibule, or the
opening of the vagina, this does still cover vaginal penetration. In phrasing this sub-article, it would
have been better to refer expressly to vaginal penetration, and also not to define ‘contact’ as
873 S. 50.
874 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(1).
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‘penetration’, as contact between the penis and the vulva would not necessarily be actual
penetration (and would thus fall under the definition of ‘sexual contact’).
In a further exclusion of male rape in the provision, sub-paragraph (B) refers only to the genitalia.
Beyond the basic medical definition that genitalia are the reproductive sex organs only, it can be
assumed that the reference to “the genital opening” in (B) does not include the anus, as elsewhere in
the definitions under Article 120, genitalia and the anus are listed separately.875
The provision excludes oral sex and male rape from the definition of rape, probably due to the fact
that both oral sex and anal sex fall under the definition of the UCMJ crime of sodomy.876 However,
the crimes under sodomy do not cover non-consensual oral sex or anal sex, but any instance of such
behaviour, even if engaged in consensually. Thus, prosecuting anal rape or forced oral sex would only
be done under the crime of sodomy, which would not emphasise the fact that it was non-consensual.
Non-consensual oral sex could also be prosecuted under aggravated sexual contact or abusive sexual
contact.877
Sub-article (B) contains further limitations. The penetration of the genital opening by a hand or finger
is prohibited, but a much more effective wording would have been to prohibit the penetration by any
part of the body, which would have avoided any loopholes that may be argued when other body
parts are used to penetrate. It is excellent that the sub-article includes penetration with any object as
rape. However, this sub-article includes a significant circumscription in the fact that it has an element
of special intent: the penetration must be committed with the “intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or
degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”. This is a very unusual
element of the crime of rape, and may well result in difficulty in successful prosecutions under this
sub-paragraph, given the fact that the prosecution will have to prove such intent. Intent is not always
openly expressed, and while it may be inferred from the circumstances, it may still be formidable to
prove.
875 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(11) and (12).
876 10 U.S.C. § 925. Art. 125.
877 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(e) and (h).
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4.3.4.2. Consent
The Australian law bases the crime of rape on lack of consent; whereas consent is not a factor in the
UCMJ provision. This is contrary to developments in international criminal law, where emphasis has
been on lack of consent (or coercion) as the primary element of rape. The wording of the UCMJ
provision prior to amendment was the commission of “an act of sexual intercourse by force and
without consent”.878 Thus the interpretation of rape, although maintaining force as a necessary
element of rape, has required lack of consent as an element. This has been the case even after the
enactment of the new amendment, with regard to a case on appeal regarding events that took place
prior to the amendment. A 2008 judgment held the essential elements of rape to be that the accused
committed an act of sexual intercourse, and that the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and
without consent.879 The US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces referred to many other cases,
affirming the need for force and lack of consent. However the case law was pointing towards a
definition that preferred lack of consent as the main element of rape. A 2005 case recognised that
“the essence of” rape “remains the same- sexual intercourse against the will of the victim”.880 One
court in fact recommended amending the statute to base the crime of rape solely on consent,
indicating that rape is a violation of sexual autonomy.881
This recommendation was unfortunately not taken up, and consent is, instead, now an affirmative
defence882 to the crimes of rape, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual contacts and abusive
sexual contact.883 Consent is defined as
“words or overt acts indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a
competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no
consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from the accused's use of
878 Manual for Courts-Martial (2005 Edition), ¶45(a)(a).
879 United States v Bright 66 MJ 359 (2008).
880 United States v Leak, 61 MJ 234 (2005) at 239 and 246.
881 United States v Webster, 37 MJ 670 at 675.
882 “The term ‘affirmative defense’ means any special defense which, although not denying that the accused
committed the objective acts constituting the offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility
for those acts. The accused has the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence.
After the defense meets this burden, the prosecution shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the affirmative defense did not exist.” 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(16).
883 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(r).
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force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or
previous dating relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person involved with the
accused in the sexual conduct at issue shall not constitute consent.”
884
Further, consent cannot be given by a person under the age of 16, or by someone who is
substantially incapable of appraising the nature of the sexual conduct at issue due to mental
impairment or unconsciousness resulting from consumption of alcohol or drugs, or due to mental
disease or defect; or who is substantially incapable of physically declining participation in the sexual
conduct or physically communicating their unwillingness to participate.885
In a similar manner, the ACT Crimes Act contains an extensive list of situations where consent is
expressly considered to be negated, some of which cover the same situations as the UCMJ
provisions, but many are different. Consent is negated when the consent is caused:
“(a) by the infliction of violence or force on the person, or on a third person who is present or
nearby; or
(b) by a threat to inflict violence or force on the person, or on a third person who is present or
nearby; or
(c) by a threat to inflict violence or force on, or to use extortion against, the person or another
person; or
(d) by a threat to publicly humiliate or disgrace, or to physically or mentally harass, the person
or another person; or
(e) by the effect of intoxicating liquor, a drug or an anaesthetic; or
(f) by a mistaken belief as to the identity of that other person; or
(g) by a fraudulent misrepresentation of any fact made by the other person, or by a third
person to the knowledge of the other person; or
(h) by the abuse by the other person of his or her position of authority over, or professional or
other trust in relation to, the person; or
(i) by the person's physical helplessness or mental incapacity to understand the nature of the
act in relation to which the consent is given; or
884 10 U.S.C. § 920. Art. 120(t)(14).
885 Ibid.
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(j) by the unlawful detention of the person.”
886
As with the UCMJ, it is also stated that lack of physical resistance shall not be regarded as consenting
to the sexual intercourse. Sub-sections (c), (d), (f), (g), (h) and (j) are all situations or include elements
not provided for by the UCMJ. Of particular interest and relevance to rape committed by a
peacekeeper is sub-section (h), which negates consent through abuse of authority over, or
professional or other trust in relation to the other person. In the wording of this, direct echoes of the
UN definition of sexual exploitation can be recognised. This would in fact enable any peacekeeper
who engages in sexual intercourse as defined under the ACT Crimes Act, with a local woman or girl,
to be prosecuted for rape, as it can be shown to be an abuse of his position of authority or trust in
relation to that woman or girl.
4.3.4.3. Force and Threats
Prior to the adoption of the new UCMJ provision, force in US military rape law had been categorised
in case law as actual force or constructive force.887 Actual force is physical force used to overcome a
victim’s lack of consent, and requires more than incidental force involved in penetration.888
Constructive force does not require physical force; it may consist of expressed or implied threats of
bodily harm, and may be demonstrated by proof of a coercive atmosphere that includes threats to
injure others or statements that resistance would be futile.889
There is a new definition of force in the statute:
“The term ‘force’ means action to compel submission of another or to overcome or prevent
another's resistance by--
(A) the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object;
(B) the suggestion of possession of a dangerous weapon or object that is used in a manner
to cause another to believe it is a dangerous weapon or object; or
886 S. 67.
887 United States v Terry, 64 MJ 295 (2006); United States v Leak, 61 MJ 234 (2005); United States v Simpson,
58 MJ 368 (2003).
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
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(C) physical violence, strength, power, or restraint applied to another person, sufficient
that the other person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct.”
While this definition does not include the concept of constructive force, such a concept is covered by
the rape provision itself, under Article 120(a)(3) and (5), stating that a sexual act engaged in by
placing the other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm or
kidnapping, or by threat of force to administer a drug or intoxicant, constitutes rape. However, this is
still more limited than the open-ended definition of constructive force adopted by the courts. The
statute definition, for example, requires threats of grievous bodily harm, whereas the courts defined
constructive force as including threats of bodily harm of any kind.
As seen above under the discussion of consent, the ACT Crimes Act has a different emphasis on force
and threats, given that they are not an element of the crime of rape itself, but rather a definitive
method of negating consent, the lack of which is a principal element of sexual intercourse without
consent. Consent is negated by the infliction of, or the threat of infliction of, violence or force on the
person or on a third person. Violence and force are not defined, and it is likely the court would take a
broad view of what behaviour would constitute such terms. For example, while there is no mention
of ‘the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object’ as found in the UCMJ definition of force, it
would be presumable for the court to deem this situation as violence or force. The ACT Crimes Act
goes further, and also includes the use of extortion as a means of negating consent, as well as the
threat to publicly humiliate or disgrace, or to physically or mentally harass, the person or another
person.
Overall, there is little in common between the Australian and the US provisions on rape. Only force
and vaginal penetration remain a common element, and even these are not dealt with in the same
manner. The Australian law is much more in line with the direction of international legal definitions
of rape, with a broad definition that emphasises lack of consent as the principal element. Progressive
movement away from the element of force and towards the element of coercion or lack of consent
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has been visible in national890 and international jurisdictions891 for some time now, and it is surprising
that the US did not follow this, particularly when its own military courts were advocating the change
to the element of lack of consent.892 The new US UCMJ provision also encompasses many
circumscriptions such as seen in the discussion of conduct covered under the definition of rape. This
reveals that not all states have appropriate or adequate legislative provisions dealing with the most
basic sexual offence of rape, and some guidance is needed in order to ensure legislative provisions
are all-inclusive.
4.3.5. HIV/AIDS-related offences
In national law, one area that may prove to be useful to prosecute peacekeepers for sexual offences
is that of HIV/AIDS-related offences. It has been shown in Chapter 2 that victims of rape, sexual
slavery, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and trafficking are at high risk of contracting HIV (a violation
of their right to health and even right to life). Both Australia and the US have military policies aiming
to prevent HIV transmission, as well as criminal provisions providing for prosecution of various forms
of conduct leading to the transmission of HIV, although each state approaches these provisions from
a different perspective. Australian law focuses on endangerment to life, assault and possibly
manslaughter, and has prostitution-related provisions. US law fixates on strictly military crimes of
violation of an order or the General Article. Neither state has an offence expressly outlawing the
transmission of HIV (or any other infectious disease) under circumstances of intent or negligence.
4.3.5.1. Australia
Upon application to the ADF, all new recruits are required to undertake vigorous health tests. If a
recruit is found to be HIV positive, they are not to be enlisted or appointed to the ADF.893 This policy
has been challenged in the High Court of Australia (HCA) as discriminatory, but the HCA determined
890 See discussion in K. Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation, (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1996),
Chapter 6 Consent, Force, and Coercion, pp. 91-106.
891 See e.g. Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 688.
892 Supra notes 173, 174 and 175.
893 ADF Head Defence Health Services, Health Directive No 210, Amendment No 3, Policy on the Prevention,
Detection and Management of Blood Borne Virus Infection, 13 June 2007, para. 45. The viruses covered by this
policy are HIV, and Hepatitis B and C.
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that it was within the power of the Commonwealth to discriminate against a person with HIV based
on the need to ensure a safe working environment for all ADF personnel.894 That is, “the inherent
requirements of the employment of a soldier go beyond the physical capacity to perform the tasks or
skills of a soldier”, and that the health and safety risk to other soldiers or employees was a legitimate
reason for the rejection of HIV positive persons from ADF employment.895 However, the policy of
immediate dismissal does not apply to members already serving who are subsequently diagnosed
with HIV, although these members are considered non-deployable.896 The ADF has an extensive
policy relating to ‘the Prevention, Detection and Management of Blood Borne Virus Infection’, one of
the aims of which is “the prevention of infection with blood borne viruses”.897 The policy includes
provisions for pre- and post-deployment testing. Such a policy indicates that the ADF recognises the
importance of avoiding the possible spread of HIV/AIDS, and the role of the ADF in such avoidance,
particularly in consideration of the higher risk of transmission when serving in particular overseas
deployments.898 This indicates an attitude that would encompass willingness to prosecute personnel
for HIV/AIDS-related crimes committed whilst on deployment to a PSO, where the legislative means
exists.
Aside from ADF policies, there are also relevant legislative provisions that deal with aspects of
HIV/AIDS transmission. The ACT Prostitution Act outlaws the provision or receipt of commercial
sexual services at a brothel or elsewhere, “if the person knows, or could reasonably be expected to
know, that he or she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease”.899 This crime only attracts a
maximum penalty of 6 months, which is a relatively low punishment for an offence which may
ultimately result in the death of the victim.
894 X v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 63; 200 CLR 177; 167 ALR 529; 74 ALJR 176 (2 December 1999).
895 Per McHugh J at para. 30.
896 Health Directive No 210, supra note 893, paras. 40-44.
897 Ibid., para. 4(b).
898 Ibid., para. 3: “ADF personnel deploy to areas where the community prevalence of infection with these
viruses is often higher than in Australia.”
899 Prostitution Act, Part 3- Offences, s. 25.
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It is also an offence under the Prostitution Act for a person, at a brothel or elsewhere, to “provide or
receive commercial sexual services that involve vaginal, oral or anal penetration by any means unless
a prophylactic is used”.900 It is further prohibited to misuse, damage or interfere with the efficacy of
any prophylactic used, or to continue to use a prophylactic with the knowledge, or reasonable
expectation of knowledge, that it is damaged.901
Apart from these crimes, there are no express transmission offences found in ACT or federal law.
Hence, the potential applicability of other crimes to the transmission of HIV/AIDS through sexual
activity must be examined. Potentially applicable crimes to consider are murder, manslaughter,
assault, and conduct endangering life or health, under the ACT Crimes Act.
Could a peacekeeper be charged with murder for infecting a local woman with HIV who subsequently
died? It is ultimately, highly unlikely. The principal obstacle is that the crime of murder requires
intent to cause the death of the victim.902 Hence, intent must be proven, and it is most improbable
that a member of a peace support operation would intend to kill someone by engaging in sexual
activity in order to infect the other person with HIV. The crime of reckless murder is a more plausible
option, as the offence is committed with reckless indifference to the probability of causing the death
of the person.903 However, again, there are significant barriers to proving this crime. Proof of actual
foresight that death will be caused is required, and knowledge that it is merely possible that death
will occur is insufficient.904 Of course, the main element of the crime of murder is the death of the
victim, and in the case of HIV/AIDS, this will usually take years to occur. It would also be very difficult
to prove that it was in fact the accused peacekeeper that was the source of the infection in the
victim- a fact that could only be verified if the victim had been tested before the sexual contact and
with the exploration of other potential sources of infection.
900 Part 3- Offences, s.27(3).
901 Part 3- Offences, s.27(4).
902 Crimes Act (ACT), s. 12(1)(a).
903 S. 12(1)(b).
904 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378.
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The latter two problems also arise in proving manslaughter; however upon death other aspects of
manslaughter would be far easier to apply. It may be arguable that the infection of another person
with HIV through sexual activity (particularly when the conduct in question is a crime itself, such as
rape or sexual exploitation), may be regarded as manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act;
manslaughter by a negligent act; or manslaughter by omission.905 The latter category could apply to a
peacekeeper for failing to take necessary precautions to prevent transmission during sexual activity.
Manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act must be proved by showing the degree of danger is an
objectively appreciable risk of serious injury.906 For negligent manslaughter, proof of a very high
degree of negligence must be produced; that is, ‘gross’, ‘wicked’ or ‘culpable’ negligence, a gross
departure from the appropriate standard of care.907
It is clear that charging a peacekeeper with murder or even manslaughter for the death of a local
woman from AIDS contracted from the peacekeeper through sexual contact would be highly
problematic to prove, particularly as the behaviour does not really fall within the definition of those
crimes. However, in a Canadian case currently before the courts, the defendant is charged with two
counts of first degree murder and 13 counts of aggravated sexual assault for engaging in unprotected
sex when aware of his HIV status.908 The charges of murder relate to two women who died as a result
of AIDS after contracting HIV from the defendant.
Assault would also be a difficult crime to apply to the transmission of HIV through sexual activity.
Assault must result in harm to the victim, and the victim cannot consent to the assault. Common
assault requires proof of intent to assault, or at a minimum recklessness as to the risk of harm or
interference with the victim.909 Assault occasioning actual bodily harm requires an actual application
905 J. Godwin, et al., Australian HIV/AIDS Legal Guide, 2nd ed., (The Federation Press, Leichhardt 1993), p. 50.
906 Wilson v R (1992) 174 CLR 313.
907 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; 41 A Crim R 349; Nydam v R [1990] VR 430 at 445.
908 R v Aziga [2006] OJ No 4545 (QL); R v Aziga [2006] OJ No 5232 (QL). Further procedural judgements: R. v.
Aziga, 2007 CanLII 249 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2007 CanLII 56095 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 29780
(ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 39222 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 39612 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga,
2008 CanLII 53841 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 60336 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 66631 (ON
S.C.).
909 S. 26. Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56.
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of force. Consensual sexual intercourse itself is not intrinsically harmful. Due to the element of
intent, it would be difficult to prove the contraction of HIV by a person through consensual sexual
activity as assault;910 however it would not be impossible.
The most likely crimes that could be applied to this situation under the ACT Crimes Act are the
offences of conduct endangering life, and conduct endangering health.911 Yet what amounts to
conduct endangering life or health must be examined. The ACT legislation is significantly more
restrictive than other Australian state legislation prohibiting endangerment of life.912 Only the
conduct specifically detailed in the ACT provision is considered to be conduct endangering life. The
only category that HIV transmission through sexual activity may fall into would be under s. 27(3)(b):
“intentionally and unlawfully… administers to, or causes to be taken by, another person any
stupefying or overpowering drug or poison or any other injurious substance likely to endanger
human life or cause a person grievous bodily harm”. From this, it would have to be argued that the
HIV-positive body fluids exchanged in the sexual encounter amount to “any other injurious
substance”. No definition is provided in the legislation, which would certainly leave the matter open
to interpretation that the fluids do amount to an injurious substance.
Acts endangering health likewise include the intentional and unlawful administration to or causing to
be taken by, another person an injurious substance. However, the act must be done “with intent to
injure or cause pain or discomfort to” the victim. Such intent would be difficult to prove in the
situation of a peacekeeper engaging in sexual activity in relation to HIV transmission, even if the
sexual activity was not consensual.
There have been successful prosecutions for HIV transmission through unprotected sex under
charges such as aggravated assault and endangering life, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions.
910 Godwin, supra note 905, pp. 51-53.
911 Crimes Act (ACT), ss. 27 and 28.
912 E.g Crimes Act (Vic) 1958 has the broad offence of “recklessly engage[ing] in conduct that places or may
place another person in danger of death”. Two prostitutes were charged with this offence in 1991, for engaging
in prostitution while infected with HIV. The charges were only dropped when evidence of absence of safe sex
methods was lacking. Godwin, supra note 905, p. 55.
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While such cases are not required to be applied in a prosecution under the ACT law, they could be
referred to for precedential value in support of using such offences to prosecute HIV transmission via
unprotected sex, which could be used to prosecute ADF personnel for such conduct.
In the South Australian case of R v Parenzee,913 the defendant was convicted of three counts of
endangering life after engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with three women when he knew
was infected with HIV, knowing that the act or acts of unprotected sexual intercourse were likely to
endanger the life of the woman, either intending to endanger her life or being recklessly indifferent
to whether he life was endangered. However, the provision under which Parenzee was convicted is
far broader than that in the ACT Crimes Act. Parenzee was convicted under s. 29(1) of the Criminal
Law Consolidation Act (SA);914 the offence of endangering life or creating risk of serious harm is
fulfilled “Where a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or makes an omission (a) knowing that
the act or omission is likely to endanger the life of another; and (b) intending to endanger the life of
another or being recklessly indifferent as to whether the life of another is endangered”. It is evident
that this is a provision which leaves open the interpretation of what act or omission may be
committed to be considered an endangerment to life, unlike the restrictive listing in the ACT Crimes
Act. Other cases of HIV transmission through unprotected sex have been successfully prosecuted in
Victoria under conduct endangering serious injury, which again is a broadly worded provision.915
A Canadian case which could be referred to is that of R v Ssenyonga,916 in which the accused was
charged with “a number of criminal offences, including aggravated sexual assault, criminal
negligence, administering noxious bodily fluids, and nuisance endangering the life of another, for
allegedly having had unprotected sexual intercourse with a number of women while knowing that he
913 R v Parenzee [2006] SASC 127 (2 May 2006); R v Parenzee (2007) 248 LSJS 99; R v Parenzee [2007] SASC
143 (27 April 2007); R v Parenzee [2007] SASC 316 (24 August 2007).
914 Criminal Law Consolidation Act (SA) 1935.
915 Crimes Act (Vic) 1958, s. 23 Conduct endangering persons “A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly
engages in conduct that places or may place another person in danger of serious injury is guilty of an indictable
offence.”
916 R v Ssenyonga (1992) 73 CCC (3-d) 216 (Ont Ct, Prov Div). See also Ontario (Chief Medical Officer of
Health) v. Ssenyonga, [1991] O.J. No. 554 (Gen. Div.), in which an application by the Ontario Chief Medical
Officer for an order restraining Ssenyonga from engaging in certain sexual acts due to his suffering from AIDS,
pursuant to section 101 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act, 1983 of Ontario was granted.
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was infected with HIV, which resulted in transmission of HIV to three women”.917 Despite
acknowledgement that the HIV-infected semen was a ‘noxious thing’, the charge of administering
noxious bodily fluids was dropped because the intention of endangering life or causing bodily harm
was not present.918 Other charges were also dropped for various reasons, and the remaining charges
were not brought to trial before the death of the accused. Other cases, however, have already been
successful in the prosecution of aggravated sexual assault due to transmission through unprotected
sex.919
In another Canadian case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and public nuisance for
the transmission of HIV through unprotected sex to the complainant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal
changed the aggravated assault conviction to one of attempted aggravated assault, and affirmed the
conviction for public nuisance.920 In Appeal Justice Welsh’s opinion, the fact that the complainant
may have contracted HIV during the intercourse engaged in with the defendant prior to the
defendant finding out his serostatus was the reason for dismissing the charge of aggravated assault
and substituting it with attempted aggravated assault.921 The Court held that the assault had to be
applied without the consent of the complainant, and determined that the complainant’s consent to
the sexual intercourse was vitiated by the defendant’s fraud, as “consent obtained by fraud is not
valid consent”.922 It was found that the complainant would not have consented to unprotected
intercourse had she been aware that the defendant was HIV-positive.923 The charge of public
nuisance was upheld because the defendant’s actions had put at risk not only other partners with
whom the victim had gone on to engage in sexual intercourse with, but also a wider group of people
917 Canadian HIV/AIDS Policy and Law Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1996, p. 26.
918 Ibid., p. 27.
919 R v Walkem, [2007] OJ No 186 (Westlaw); R v D(N), [2006] JE 2006-273; [2006] CarswellQue 19.
920 Williams v R, 2001 NFCA 52; (2001), 158 CCC (3d) 523. See also R v Cuerrir, [1998] 2 SCR 371.
921 Williams, Paras 59-61; 72; 75; 78.
922 Paras 16-40.
923 Para. 39.
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such as potential recipients in the case of the victim donating blood, as well as health-care workers
handling the blood.924
4.3.5.2. United States
As with the ADF, the US military is an extremely HIV/AIDS aware institution. Since 1987, it has been
policy that applicants for the US military are screened before entering the service, and follow-up
testing is conducted on a regular basis.925 Education about transmission of the virus as well as
prevention is undertaken. It is now required that HIV positive military personnel are required to sign
‘safe sex’ orders. These orders require these personnel to inform sexual partners of their HIV status;
to use protective measures during sexual relations; to inform medical (emergency or other)
personnel of their HIV status in the event of medical care (emergency or other); and not to donate
blood, sperm, tissues or other organs.926 As these orders are issued, under the authority of Article 90
of the UCMJ,927 violating these orders subjects the HIV positive member to the military criminal
justice system.
It would be assertive and advantageous, and in accordance with the military’s ‘public duty’ and
‘military objective’ to take this policy further, and to enact a provision specifically prohibiting sexual
relations with the local population during a PSO, in particular prostitutes,928 for the reasons of
preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS. This would be in keeping with the military’s objective of
924 Paras 88-98.
925 Department of Defense Directive Number 6485.1, 19 March 1991 (incorporating Change 1, 10 August 1992),
subject: Human Immunodeficiency Virus-1 (HIV-1).
926 Regulation of sexual conduct of HIV infected military personnel has been deemed constitutional as the
military has a compelling justification of preventing the spread of the virus; United States v Dumford, 30 M.J.
137 (CMA 1990); United States v Negron, 28 M.J. 775 (ACMR), aff’d, 29 M.J. 324 (CMA 1989); United States
v Sargeant, 29 M.J. 812 (ACMR 1989).
927 10 U.S.C. § 890. Art. 90. Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer
Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him
while he is in the execution of his office; or
(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer;
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a
court-martial may direct.
928 In developing countries, women and girls often engage in unprotected sexual intercourse due to lack of access
to condoms or a desire to earn more money from clients willing to pay more for sex without a condom; see supra
discussion in Chapter 1.
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preventing its members from spreading the HIV antibody. In fact, the military sees it as a positive
duty to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, which stems from a history of prevention of STIs in
general.929 This is part of a broader protection of public health in both the military and the non-
military community. It is seen as a legitimate power of the criminal law (as represented by bodies
such as the police) to take action in the prevention of the spread of communicable disease.930
In the case of United States v Dumford, which dealt with a service member who had engaged in
unprotected sexual intercourse with a civilian, the Court of Military Appeals held:
“Appellant’s argument that the order lacks any valid military purpose is without merit. In United
States v Stewart, 29 M.J. 92 (CMA 1989), we took note of the dangers of unprotected sexual
intercourse by those infected with HIV. Consequently, we are certain that, when a
servicemember is capable of exposing another person to an infectious disease, the military has a
legitimate interest in limiting his contact with others, including civilians, and other preventing the
spread of that condition. See United States v Johnson, 30 M.J. 53 (CMA 1990). Fn 2: We have
absolutely no doubt that preventing a servicemember who has HIV from spreading it to the
civilian population is a public duty of the highest order and, thus, is a valid military objective.”
931
The appellant had been charged with “willfully disobeying the command of a commissioned officer
not to engage in sexual activity without informing his partner that he was infected with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and taking precautions against spreading the virus; and assault with a
means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, in violation of Articles 90 and 128, Uniform
Code of Military Justice”.932 Crimes such as attempted murder, attempted manslaughter, and
aggravated assault are all possible charges for a service member who is HIV positive and who
engages in unprotected sexual relations.933
929 STIs, or as they used to be referred to, venereal diseases, have always been a major concern for the military,
especially in armed conflict situations, when personnel frequent prostitutes. S. Sun, 'Where the Girls Are: The
Management of Venereal Disease by United States Military Forces in Vietnam' (2004) 23 (1) Literature and
Medicine 66-87; L.C.T.B. Turner, 'The Suppression of Prostitution in Relation to Venereal Disease Control in
the Army' (1943) 7 Federal Probation 8-11.
930 Love v Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1990), at 662.
931 United States v Dumford, 30 M.J. 137 (CMA 1990), at 138, incl. fn. 2.
932 Ibid., at 137.
933 See United States v Schofield, 40 M.J. 132 (CMA 1994); United States v Johnson, 30 M.J. 53 (CMA 1990);
United States v Stewart, 29 M.J. 92 (CMA 1989); United States v Reister, 40 M.J. 666 (NMCMR 1994); United
States v Joseph, 37 M.J. 392 (CMA 1993) (interestingly, in this case Joseph was found guilty of aggravated
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Evidently, these are crimes that can only be applied to personnel who are already infected with HIV.
However, if direct, written orders requiring a signature are issued to personnel to not engage in
sexual relations with any members of the local population during a PSO, as well as a specific order
disallowing engaging the services of a prostitute, violation of such an order could be prosecuted
under Article 90.934
The General Article can also be used to prosecute these acts of sexual relations, as confirmed in
Dumford: “It is clear to us that such conduct [a servicemember exposing another person to an
infectious disease] could be found to be service-discrediting [under] Art. 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice…”935
While both Australian and US offences discussed in this section do not strike at the heart of the issue
of prostitution and trafficking, some are important step towards reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS,
and may assist in adding another deterrent to engaging in inappropriate sexual relations whilst
involved in a PSO. It is clear that the military in both states takes the issue of stopping the spread of
HIV/AIDS very seriously, from the policies enacted and the adoption of the frame of reference that
avoiding the spread of the virus is a military objective. However, due to neither country having broad
express provisions criminalising the transmission of HIV/AIDS, there is a reliance on crimes such as
violation of orders or assault. Where there are express transmission-related offences they are
restricted to situations involving prostitution only, through the ACT Prostitution Act, which
circumscribes the scope of application of the crime.
Both states should enact a specific provision that deals directly with HIV/AIDS-related offences. The
offence could be ‘exposing another person to an infectious disease’. The definition could include not
only engaging in unsafe intercourse when already infected, but also engaging in indiscriminate
assault even though he had used a condom in the sexual relations, because he had not informed the woman of his
HIV status); and United States v Bygrave, 40 M.J. 839 (NMCMR 1994).
934 Supra note 927.
935 Dumford, supra note 931, at 138, fn. 2; the court also referenced United States v Woods, 28 M.J. 318-19
(CMA 1989).
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unsafe sexual activities, an action which highly increases the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission.936 Unsafe
sexual activities would include sexual activities with a prostitute and sexual intercourse without the
use of prophylaxis under certain circumstances. The latter element would have to contain limitations,
as it would be unreasonable to demand all personnel use prophylaxis in all sexual situations, such as
between married couples. For example, engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute without use of
prophylaxis could be an aggravating factor in the crime, resulting in a higher penalty. Each situation
could be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether or not the use of
prophylaxis should have been warranted.
Enacting such a provision would draw attention to the seriousness of the issue, bringing more
awareness to the fact that these are criminal offences. An express provision in the DFDA and the
UCMJ would ensure that there is no possibility of challenging a charge on the basis of vagueness or
lack of knowledge of the type of behaviour that is prohibited. This would ideally be accompanied by
increased interaction with organisations or agencies such as UNAIDS or AIDS awareness NGOs, and
special training for PSO personnel on HIV/AIDS in addition to the regular training provided.
4.3.6. Trafficking and Sexual Slavery
Both Australian and US law suffer from significant flaws in legislative provisions dealing with
trafficking and sexual slavery. These shortcomings stem from problems with extraterritorial
jurisdiction and from offence definitions, which will result in an inability to prosecute Australian
personnel for trafficking and US personnel for sexual slavery.
The Commonwealth Criminal Code Act contains two divisions of provisions prohibiting slavery, sexual
servitude and deceptive recruiting,937 and trafficking in persons and debt bondage.938 There is no
issue with extraterritorial jurisdiction, as extended geographical jurisdiction category B applies to
936 The offence could also include activities related to sharing needles.
937 Criminal Code Act, Division 270.
938 Criminal Code Act, Division 271.
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both sections, which means that the offences apply to conduct engaged in partly or wholly outside
Australia by an Australian citizen or resident.939
However, trafficking offences under the Criminal Code Act are limited in application, in that the
offence must involve entry or proposed entry into, or exit or proposed exit from Australia.940 This
leaves a lacuna in the legislation, meaning that, even though the extraterritorial jurisdiction exists,
Australian peacekeeping personnel cannot be prosecuted for trafficking committed without entry or
proposed entry into, or exit or proposed exit from Australia, due to the limited structure of the
substantive criminal law for this offence.
Such a definitional problem is not found for the crime of sexual servitude, which is a comprehensive
provision. Sexual servitude is defined as “the condition of a person who provides sexual services and
who, because of the use of force or threats: (a) is not free to cease providing sexual services; or (b) is
not free to leave the place or area where the person provides sexual services.”941 A person is guilty of
an offence when engaging in conduct that “causes another person to enter into or remain in sexual
servitude” and “who intends to cause, or is reckless as to causing, that sexual servitude”.942
The ACT Crimes Act includes the crime of forcible confinement, prohibiting the unlawful confinement
or imprisonment of another person.943 The Crimes Act also contains provisions expressly outlawing
sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting for sexual services. The definition and the offence of sexual
servitude are the same as the Criminal Code Act definition and offence provided above.944 However,
the Crimes Act goes one step further and determines it to be an offence to conduct a business that
involves the sexual servitude of others, with the knowledge that or recklessness about whether the
business involves the sexual servitude of others.945 Conducting a business is taken to include, but not
939 See Appendix 3 for full text of category B jurisdiction. Except the crimes of domestic trafficking, which are
not relevant to the context of this thesis. Category B jurisdiction applies to ss. 270.6, 270.7, 2701.2, 271.3, 271.4,
271.8, and 271.9.
940 Ss. 271.2, 271.3, and 271.4.
941 S. 270.4.
942 S. 270.6.
943 Crimes Act (ACT), s. 34.
944 Supra text at notes 941 and 942. Crimes Act (ACT), s. 79(1).
945 Crimes Act, s. 79(2).
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be restricted to, taking part in the management of the business; or exercising control or direction
over the business; or providing finance for the business.946 This provision could be used to prosecute
clients of such a business, as such a business only exists due to the demand from clientele. It is the
money from the clientele that enables the business to subsist.947 Personnel who engage in behaviour
that assists the business or facilitates its continued existence could also be prosecuted. Such
behaviour may include warning brothel owners of impending raids or providing transport of
trafficked women in exchange for free sexual services.948
It is also an offence to, with the intention of inducing someone else to enter into an engagement to
provide sexual services, deceive the other person about the fact that the engagement will involve the
provision of sexual services.949 This would be a very useful provision for the prosecution of behaviour
relating to trafficking, as many women are trafficked after being promised lawful jobs in other, more
prosperous, countries.950
In contrast, US military law is significantly lacking in any provisions proscribing trafficking and sexual
slavery. The only provision that could be applied to situations of trafficking and sexual slavery is
Article 134 of the UCMJ, which covers the crime of kidnapping. Under the definition, there is no
requirement for any kind of request for ransom or other such ‘bargaining’.951 The elements are
simply that:
(1) That the accused seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, or carried away a certain person;
(2) That the accused then held such person against that person’s will;
(3) That the accused did so willfully and wrongfully; and
946 S. 79(3).
947 For example, it was estimated in 2002 that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30% of brothel clientele were PSO
personnel, but that such personnel were the source of 70% of the money earned by the brothels in a year.
'Trafficking, Slavery and Peacekeeping: The Need for a Comprehensive Training Program. A Conference
Report.' (Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre & UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute,
Turin, 9-10 May 2002) , p. 14.
948 Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations,
Second Session, 'The U.N. and the Sex Slave Trade in Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger Problem in the U.N.
System?' (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 24 April 2002) Document No. 107-85, p. 53.
949 S. 80,
950 See discussion supra Chapter 2.
951 This is in contrast to the crime of kidnapping under the US Code, which requires that the person be held for
ransom or reward or otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
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(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
952
Any involvement in trafficking or sexual slavery would fall into this definition, as it includes “lur[ing],
lead[ing] astray, or entic[ing] by false representations or other deceitful means”.953 However, this
does not recognise the fact that the abduction took place for the purposes of forcing the person into
sexual slavery. It may be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing, but it would be more
appropriate to have an express provision dealing with the crimes of sexual slavery and trafficking.
Some crimes relating to trafficking and slavery not found in the UCMJ are to be found in the civilian
criminal code. These are peonage, forced labour, slavery and trafficking in persons (including
children);954 sexual exploitation and other abuse of children;955 and transportation for illegal sexual
activity and related crimes.956 However, extraterritorial jurisdiction does not apply to all these crimes.
The US has extraterritorial jurisdiction over sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, sex
trafficking of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes, as both
include jurisdiction involving foreign commerce.957
In relation to trafficking, forced labour, peonage and slavery, no reference is made to jurisdiction in
the respective provisions of the Code.958 Hence it is necessary to consult jurisprudence on
jurisdiction. In the case of United States v Corey,959 the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
upheld the principle that:
“Congress may enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.
(“Generally there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of United States penal
952 R.C.M. 92.b. Elements.
953 R.C.M. 92.c.(1).
954 Chapter 77 of Title 18, §§ 1581-1595.
955 Chapter 110 of Title 18, §§ 2251-2260.
956 Chapter 117 of Title 18, §§ 2421-2427.
957 See Chapter 1 of Title 18, § 10. “The term “foreign commerce”, as used in this title, includes commerce with
a foreign country.”
958 There are crimes within these sections dealing with slave vessels, and some of these imply jurisdiction over
the vessel at any place. § 1585 outlaws the seizure, detention, transportation or sale of slaves, and states:
“Whoever, being a citizen or resident of the United States… on any foreign shore seizes any person with intent
to make that person a slave… shall be fined… or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.” The only
condition is that the citizen or resident must be a member of a crew or ship’s company (either US or foreign).
Thus the provision is not universally applicable.
959 United States v Corey, 232 F.3d 1166.
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laws.”). Whether Congress has in fact exercised such power is a question of statutory
construction, normally subject to the rule “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”… The
territorial presumption is thus based on the common-sense inference that, where Congress does
not indicate otherwise, legislation dealing with domestic matters is not meant to extend beyond
the nation's borders.”
960
However, the Court also held that
“the presumption does not apply where the legislation implicates concerns that are not
inherently domestic. For instance, in United States v. Bowman,961 the Supreme Court held that
the territorial presumption does not govern the interpretation of criminal statutes that, by their
nature, implicate the legitimate interests of the United States abroad… Although the statute
there did not contain an extraterritoriality provision, the Court concluded that it covered the
conduct in question… Thus, courts do not apply the territorial presumption where it is not a
reliable guide to congressional intent.”
Corey in fact concerned crimes of aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse committed by a U.S.
citizen working as a civilian employee at the U.S. Air Force Base at Yokota, Japan. The Court of
Appeals determined that with the other nation’s consent, legislative jurisdiction over the territory of
a foreign state could be acquired. It found that the legislative provision in question could apply
“where the foreign sovereign does not or cannot object to the exercise of such jurisdiction”.962
The Court actually rejected Gatlin,963 and examined the relevant statute as a whole, including an
assessment of the history of the statute. Based on this broad outlook, the Court found:
“Taken as a whole, 18 U.S.C. § 7 extends the jurisdiction of the federal criminal laws to areas
where American citizens and property need protection, yet no other government effectively
safeguards those interests. Congress unmistakably had foreign locales in mind when it set about
defining that jurisdiction.”
964
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals is inherently logical, and would be well applied to the crimes of
trafficking, forced labour, peonage and slavery, where jurisdiction is not mentioned. This is
particularly the case given that during PSOs, the host state generally has a fractured or non-existent
960 Ibid., at 1170, citations omitted.
961 260 U.S. 94, 98, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922).
962 Corey, at 1171.
963 See supra, note 756.
964 Corey, at 1172.
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legal infrastructure, and the US will have agreements with the host state for the US to have primary
jurisdiction, as well as the fact that these are generally crimes that can involve a transnational
element. Even if extraterritorial jurisdiction were found not to apply to the crime of trafficking, the
crime of transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes would still be available to be
used.
Unlike the Australian legislation, there is no provision outlawing sexual slavery under US law. The
crime of sale into involuntary servitude is the closest offence, which forbids knowingly and willfully
holding or selling another person to involuntary servitude.965 However, as with the offence of
kidnapping, this clearly avoids the essential element of sexual slavery being for the specific purposes
of providing sexual services.
There are clearly problems with regards to provisions dealing with trafficking and sexual slavery in
both states, which need to be solved through amendments and enactment of new provisions. While
Australia has an effective and applicable provision on sexual slavery, the provision on trafficking is
limited by its definition and would not apply to trafficking engaged in wholly outside the territory of
Australia. It thus requires amendment to remove the limitation that the crime must involve entry or
proposed entry into, or exit or proposed exit from Australia. The US has no provision enjoining sexual
slavery, and while it does have a provision prohibiting trafficking, the extraterritorial application of
the provision is not straight-forward and would have to be decided by a federal court.
4.3.7. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
There is a stark contrast between the laws in Australia and the United States that proscribe war
crimes and crimes against humanity. An examination of each provides an example of how these
crimes can be dealt with comprehensively by some states, and quite poorly by other states.
965 Chapter 77 of Title 18, § 1584.
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The Australian federal Criminal Code Act was amended by the International Criminal Court
(Consequential Amendments) Act in 2002.966 This resulted in comprehensive provisions covering war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.967 All three categories of offences are an all-inclusive
implementation of the crimes as set out under the Rome Statute.968 War crimes provisions in fact
cover more offences than found in the Rome Statute, with an additional subdivision encompassing
‘War crimes that are grave breaches of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions’.969 Extended
geographical jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide falls under Category
D jurisdiction. Hence, extraterritorial jurisdiction exists and is not restricted to only Australian citizens
or residents.970 As the potentially applicable crimes are identical to those found in the Rome Statute,
the analysis of the prospective applicability of these offences will be undertaken in Chapter 5, which
considers the potential jurisdiction of the ICC. These crimes are inhumane treatment,971 wilfully
causing great suffering,972 cruel treatment,973 outrages upon personal dignity,974 rape,975 sexual
slavery,976 enforced prostitution,977 and sexual violence.978
It is clear that there is again no provision expressly outlawing sexual exploitation. However, this could
be prosecuted under outrages upon personal dignity (in which the perpetrator “humiliates, degrades
or otherwise violates the dignity” of the victim)979, and/or sexual violence. The latter would
emphasise the sexual element of the crime. The crime of sexual violence is an act of a sexual nature
that occurs without consent, and a person is deemed not to have consented in a situation of abuse of
966 Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995; International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act (Cth) 2002,
Schedule 1—Amendment of the Criminal Code Act 1995. In addition to these amendments, the War Crimes Act
(Cth) 1945 covers war crimes committed by Australian citizens or residents during World War II.
967 Criminal Code Act (Cth), Chapter 8 Offences against humanity and related offences. The chapter also
includes crimes against the administration of the justice of the International Criminal Court.
968 Any wording changes are very slight.
969 Subdivision H, ss. 268.95- 268.101.
970 Supra note 734.
971 S. 268.26.
972 S. 268.28.
973 S. 268.72.
974 Ss. 268.58; 268.74.
975 Ss. 268.59; 268.82.
976 Ss. 268.60; 268.83.
977 Ss. 268.61; 268.84.
978 Ss. 268.64; 268.87.
979 Ss. 268.58(1)(a); 268.74(1)(a).
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power or “because of the perpetrator taking advantage of a coercive environment”,980 which would
adequately encompass the abuse of power aspect of sexual exploitation.
One principal difference that is found in the Australian war crimes legislation is the mental element
of recklessness. The Rome Statute does not contain recklessness as a mode of criminal mens rea, but
it is commonly used in Australian law,981 including war crimes. For example, rape and enforced
prostitution can be committed with recklessness as to whether there was a lack of consent; and
sexual slavery can be committed with recklessness as to causing the sexual slavery.982 Within the
chapeau elements, a perpetrator may also be reckless as to the status of a person as a protected
person or as a civilian not taking part in hostilities.983 Thus there is a slightly broader aspect to the
mens rea required to commit these crimes under Australian law than is found in the Rome Statute.
It is, however, unlikely that an Australian peacekeeper would be charged with a war crime or a crime
against humanity for the crimes relevant to this thesis. This is not based on the fact that the
Australian authorities would be unwilling to prosecute their own nationals for war crimes or crimes
against humanity. The reasoning for this will also be discussed in Chapter 5, but may be briefly
mentioned here as the difficulty of applying the chapeau elements of the crimes. That is, there is a
required nexus to armed conflict for war crimes, and for crimes against humanity, the crime must be
committed as part of a large scale or systematic attack on the civilian population.984
980 Ss. 268.64(3); 268.87(3).
981 See e.g. Vallance v. The Queen [1961] HCA 42; (1961) 108 CLR 56; R v Crabbe [1985] HCA 22; (1985) 156
CLR 464. Recklessness is categorised as a fault element of the crimes within s. 5.4 of the Criminal Code Act
(Cth):
(1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if:
(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
(2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if:
(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
(3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.
(4) If recklessness is a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or
recklessness will satisfy that fault element.
982 Ss. 268.59(b); 268.82(b); 268.60(b); 268.83(b); 268.61(a); 268.84(a); 268.64(a)(ii); 268.87(a)(ii).
983 Ss. 268.26(c); 268.28(c); 268.72(c); 268.74(c).
984 See discussion infra Chapter 5; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 7 and 8.
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The United States law relating to war crimes is far from comprehensive. Title 18 of the United States
Code, the War Crimes Act of 1996, defines war crimes under United States jurisdiction. The relevant
section states that:
“(c) Definition.— As used in this section the term “war crime” means any conduct—
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August
1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when
committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international
character…”
985
Both Additional Protocols specifically prohibit “rape, forced prostitution and other indecent assault”
of women and children.986 However, as the United States is not a party to either of the Additional
Protocols, only the relevant provisions in the four Geneva Conventions are applicable as war crimes
under United States jurisdiction.987 The only pertinent crimes under the grave breaches are inhuman
treatment, and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.988
Crimes such as rape, sexual exploitation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, or any other form of
sexual violence could be categorised under any of the grave breaches listed above. These gender-
based crimes are inhuman treatment, and cause great suffering and serious injury to body or
health.989 However it would be far more all-encompassing, and thus avoid any issues over definition,
to expand the legislation to expressly proscribe these crimes.990 Including these crimes would also be
a clear recognition by the United States government of these crimes and demonstrate that the
government advocates the prevention of impunity for perpetrators of gender-based crimes.
Given the fact that that the War Crimes Act was only enacted in 1996 and has been amended since,
the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR were already in existence as references for a somewhat more
985 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c). Omitted subsections (2) and (4) in the definition have no relevance to this paper.
986 API Art. 76; APII Art. 4(2)(e).
987 ICRC IHL database of the States party to the main treaties, as of 4 February 2010, at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf.
988 GCI art. 50; GCII art. 51; GCIII art. 130; GCIV art. 147.
989 See supra Chapter 2.
990 There are many other crimes that should be added to make the legislation comprehensive, but that is outside
the scope of this thesis.
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comprehensive coverage of war crimes. Since then the ICC Rome Statute has developed what is the
most wide-ranging codification of war crimes to date. Given the US’ distinct lack of willingness to
become a party to the Rome Statute, it could at the very least prove its lack of need for the ICC by
demonstrating that its own law is all-inclusive, using the Rome Statute as a guideline for
amendments to the War Crimes Act of 1996. As noted above, the War Crimes Act also includes
crimes committed during non-international armed conflict, as grave breaches of Common Article 3.
This section of the War Crimes Act was amended in 2006 to expand the definition of what constitutes
Common Article 3 violations. Such violations now include cruel or inhuman treatment, rape, and
sexual assault or abuse.991 Such provisions would not apply to war crimes committed by a US
peacekeeper, serving in an international context. However the fact that the amendments were made
is interesting as it is surprising the amendments were not more comprehensive. It would have been
beneficial for the US, already spending resources and time on expanding the range of war crimes
covered in non-international armed conflict, to also consider the need for more comprehensive
provisions dealing with war crimes committed during international armed conflict, and include
amendments to the definition of such war crimes.
As with Australian law, the applicability of the war crimes provisions to American personnel is highly
improbable. However, rather than being due to definitional concerns, this is based on US policy that
is found in the Rules for Courts-Martial in the Manual for Courts-Martial, and the Department of the
Army Field Manual on the Land of Law Warfare.992 The MCM expressly states that “ordinarily persons
subject to the code [of military justice] should be charged with a specific violation of the code rather
than a violation of the law of war”.993 The Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare asserts:
991 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d).
992 This policy is also supported by military lawyers, see e.g. M.M.N. White, 'Charging War Crimes: A Primer
for the Practitioner' (2006) The Army Lawyer 1-11, where the author, a US Army Judge Advocate, concludes
“The decision to charge a servicemember with violations of the law of war… is rife with political
repercussions… the enumerated offenses under the UCMJ should be the primary tool for prosecuting
servicemembers suspected of violating the laws of war.” Ibid., at pp. 10-11.
993 R.C.M. 307(c)(2)(D).
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“The United States normally punishes war crimes as such only if they are committed by enemy
nationals or by persons serving the interests of the enemy State. Violations of the law of war
committed by persons subject to the military law of the United States will usually constitute
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under that
Code.”
994
This policy is confirmed by US practice. After the massacre of several hundred unarmed civilians at
My Lai in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Lieutenant William Calley was charged with multiple
specifications of premeditated murder under Article 118 of the UCMJ, but not with any war
crimes.995 In 2003, US Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi pled guilty to and was found guilty of
premeditated murder, indecent acts with a child under 16 years of age, and forcible sodomy of a
child less than 16 years of age, in violation of Articles 118, 134, and 125 of the UCMJ.996 These acts
were committed when he was engaged as part of the American peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo
in 2000.997 Cases against US military personnel involving crimes committed in Iraq have also been
brought under the UCMJ. This includes the trials against two marines for indiscriminate killings in
Fallujah charged with murder and dereliction of duty;998 and cases against personnel involved in
torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, who were charged with maltreatment of detainees.999 In
contrast, the US has charged non-nationals with war crimes, such as the case of Ex parte Quirin.1000
The US Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction existed over German nationals charged with
violations of the law of war.1001
994 The Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (July 1956), para. 507(b).
995 Charges available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/MYL_ctchar.htm. United States
v Calley, 46 CMR 1131 (1971); aff’d, 22 U.S.C.MA 534, 48 CMR 19 (1973).
996 United States v Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635, (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2003).
United States v Ronghi, 60 M.J. 83, 86 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
997 As part of the NATO Kosovo Force, KFOR.
998 J. Shaulis, 'US civilian jury acquits ex-Marine of Fallujah killings ', Jurist, (29 August 2008),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/08/us-civilian-jury-acquits-ex-marine-of.php; J. Belczyk, 'Military jury
acquits Marine of all charges in Fallujah detainee killing ', Jurist, (9 April 2009),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/military-jury-acquits-marine-of-all.php.
999 List of cases http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/abu-ghurayb-chronology.htm.
1000 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
1001 The petitioners were arguing against the jurisdiction of military commissions appointed by the President. The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 actually grants jurisdiction over more war crimes than are listed in the War
Crimes Act; see 10 U.S.C. § 950v, Crimes triable by military commissions. Persons triable by military
commissions under the Military Commissions Act are alien unlawful enemy combatants, so only non-US
nationals can be tried in the commissions; 10 U.S.C. § 948c.
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This policy and practice is contradictory to the jurisdiction of the War Crimes Act, which applies only
when the “person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States”.1002 Despite the fact that there
is specific jurisdiction granted for war crimes when committed by a member of the USAF or a US
national, the US policy is not to charge military personnel or nationals with war crimes. Legislation
and policy should be in sync to ensure an effective legal system.
In addition to the limited range of war crimes, the US currently lacks any legislation covering crimes
against humanity, in its criminal legislation, either military or civil.1003 There has recently been a bill
proposed for the Crimes Against Humanity Act 2009.1004 The legislation would make it a crime under
federal law to commit a number of crimes as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population. The listed crimes are murder, peonage, kidnapping, slavery, sale into involuntary
servitude, forced labour, trafficking, and hostage taking, if committed within the United States.
Crimes included when committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States also cover sex trafficking of children, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse and
kidnapping. Finally, several crimes are included under the provision without territorial limitation,
namely torture; extermination; national, ethnic, racial, or religious cleansing; arbitrary detention; and
imposed measures intended to prevent births. This is an intriguing blend of conduct covered by the
1002 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b).
1003 The US does have provisions covering genocide, which were enacted in 1988, and are quite similar to the
definitions found in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC statutes; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093. The legislation has also been
heavily criticised. See L.J. Le Blanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention, (Duke University Press,
Durham 1991); J.J. Paust, 'Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going To Get Away With It' (1989) 11
Michigan Journal of International Law 90-104; J.D. Van der Vyer, 'Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide' (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 286-356; L.A. Steven, 'Note: Genocide and the Duty
to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of its International Obligations' (1999) 39 Virginia
Journal of International Law 425-466; S. Power, 'The United States and Genocide Law: A History of
Ambivalence', in Sewell and Kaysen (eds.), The United States and the International Criminal Court, (Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, New York 2000), p. 165.
The legislation was amended in 2007 by the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, which allows for prosecution
if the offender is a US national or the offence was committed in whole or in part in the US, or if an offender is
brought into or found in the US regardless of where the offence was committed; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091(d).
1004 Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 (Introduced in Senate, 111th Congress) S. 1346 IS, 24 June 2009. To
be inserted as Chapter 25A of Part 1 of Title 18 of the US Code. See also ‘Durbin, Leahy and Feingold Introduce
Legislation Making Crimes Against Humanity a Violation of US Law’, Press Release Senator Dick Durbin, 24
June 2009 http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseId=315009; Human Rights Watch, ‘US: Support
Law on Crimes Against Humanity’, New York, 24 June 2009 http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/24/us-
support-law-crimes-against-humanity. The Bill has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
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bill, as it does not necessarily include all categories of crimes against humanity to be found in the
Rome Statute, such as deportation or forcible transfer of population.1005 However, included are
categories of crimes that fall under genocide under the Rome Statute (and indeed, in Australian
legislation), such as measures intended to prevent births.1006 In fact, the concept of ‘national, ethnic,
racial or religious cleansing’ is a term that tends to be used to refer to genocide itself, the goal of
which is to destroy in whole or in part a particular group.1007 This is perhaps following the ideology of
some American scholars and experts, who are avoiding separate terminology for international crimes
and referring to them under the umbrella of ‘genocide’1008 or ‘atrocity crimes’.1009 The inclusion of
such a crime may be a positive step, as it will broaden the potential of the US to prosecute for crimes
that have targeted a group but fall short of the evidentiary requirements of genocide of the dolus
specialis of the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part.1010 However, ‘national, ethnic, racial
or religious cleansing’ is not defined in the Crimes Against Humanity Act. This would leave the term
open to much debate in judicial forums as to a legal definition to enable accurate application.
Unfortunately the bill defines crimes against humanity as crimes committed as part of a widespread
and systematic attack against a civilian population rather than the disjunctive widespread or
systematic. This conjunctive requirement deviates from the international definition of crimes against
humanity, which presents widespread and systematic as disjunctive.1011 Requiring the attack to be
1005 Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.
1006 Article 6(d) Rome Statute.
1007 ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is not a legal term, and such behaviour is referred to as genocide in case law of the ICTR
and ICTY; see e.g. Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzidana, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-95-1-T (21 May
1999) paras. 98-99; Prosecutor v Jelisic, Trial Judgement, IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) paras. 67-72.
1008 M.K. Albright and W.S. Cohen, 'Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers' (United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the Endowment of the United States
Institute of Peace Washington, DC, 2008) , p. xxii.
1009 D. Scheffer, 'Genocide and Atrocity Crimes' (2006) 1 (3) Genocide Studies and Prevention 229-250, pp.
229-250.
1010 U.S.C. 18 § 1091(a). See also Article 6 of the Rome Statute.
1011 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 99; R. Dixon
and C.K. Hall, 'Crimes against humanity- chapeau', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), , pp.
176-178; H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, 'Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court', in Lee (ed.), The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999),
79-126, pp. 94-95; D. Robinson, 'The Context of Crimes Against Humanity', in Lee (ed.), The International
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (Transnational Publishers, Inc.,
Ardsley, NY 2001), 61-79, p. 63; T. Meron, 'Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court',
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both widespread and systematic renders the provision far more limited in application, necessitating
proof of both a large number of victims and the organised nature of the attack.1012
The bill as currently drafted applies to such crimes committed anywhere in the world by a US citizen
or any person present in the United States regardless of nationality, or if the crime has been
committed in whole or in part within the United States.
The US is clearly aware of the gaps in its legislation. This is evidenced by such statements as quoted
below, the 2006 amendments to the Common Article 3 definition in the War Crimes Act and the
proposal for the Crimes Against Humanity Act. It is also demonstrated, rather surreptitiously, through
the rejection of the jurisdictional reach of the ICC. In initial negotiations over the Rome Statute, the
US wanted the Security Council (and thus the US) to have the power to veto ICC jurisdiction.1013
However, this was only in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity- not genocide. It is not
a far reach to realise that, while the US has legislation covering genocide,1014 its legislation covering
war crimes and crimes against humanity is poor to non-existent- thus leaving a US national
potentially open to ICC jurisdiction through the “unable to prosecute” category.
Enhancing current legislation on war crimes and enacting new legislation dealing with crimes against
humanity1015 would be in line with the US belief that
in Von Hebel, et al. (eds.), Reflections on the International Criminal Court, (TMC Asser Press, The Hague
1999), 47-55, p. 50; A. Cassese, 'Crimes against Humanity', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 353-378, p. 366; Prosecutor v
Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case), Trial Judgement, SCSL-04-15-T (2 March 2009) para. 78.
1012 Prosecutor v Kordic, Appeal Judgement, IT-95/14/2-A (17 December 2004), para. 94. See also Prosecutor v
Blaskic, Appeal Judgement, IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004), para. 101; Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Foca), Appeals
Chamber Judgement, IT-96-23-A (12 June 2002), para. 94. The ICTR has used almost identical language: “the
scale of the attacks and the multiplicity of the victims”; Prosecutor v Muyunyi, Trial Judgement, ICTR-00-55A-
T (12 September 2006), para. 512; Prosecutor v Muhimana, Trial Judgement, ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005),
para. 527; Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Judgement, ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003), para. 329; Prosecutor v
Musema, ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 2000), paras. 203-4; RUF Case, paras. 78-79. See also Prosecutor v
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008)
paras. 394, 397.
1013 J.D. van der Vyer, 'American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National
Self-Righteousness' (2001) 50 Emory Law Journal 775-832, pp.797-8.
1014 See supra note 1003.
1015 See W.J. Aceves and P.L. Hoffman, 'Pursuing Crimes Against Humanity in the United States: The Need for a
Comprehensive Liability Regime', in Lattimer and Sands (eds.), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity, (Hart
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2003), 239-269.
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“states, not international institutions are primarily responsible for ensuring justice in the
international system.
1016
We believe the best way to combat these serious offenses is to build
domestic judicial systems, strengthen political will and promote human freedom… The existence
of credible domestic systems is vital to ensuring conditions do not deteriorate to the point that
the international community is required to intercede… The United States will… continue our
longstanding role as an advocate for the principle that there must be accountability for war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law… We will take steps to
ensure that gaps in United States’ law do not allow persons wanted or indicted for genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity to seek safe haven on our soil in hopes of evading justice.”
1017
It is indeed true that “[t]he existence of credible domestic systems is vital to ensuring conditions do
not deteriorate to the point that the international community is required to intercede”.1018 While
‘deteriorated’ may be too strong a word, it is evident that the US war crimes legislation does need
action from the international community. Despite its obligations under the Geneva Conventions, the
US took 41 years to enact war crimes legislation, and when it did, it was far from adequate. Even
consequent actions taken to amend the legislation have been insufficient to render the War Crimes
Act a comprehensive piece of law. Yet, despite this general need for new law, in the specific case of
US personnel and citizens, it may ultimately be irrelevant to have an all-encompassing War Crimes
Act, as it has been shown that in praxis they are not likely to be charged with war crimes, but rather
under the UCMJ.
The legislation discussed in this section from Australia and the US demonstrates where there are
gaps in national legislation in relation to gender-based crimes that amount to war crimes. While the
Australian legislation is expansive, and the US act is not, as with other laws of both states the crime
of sexual exploitation is not expressly addressed by either country. Australian law covers enforced
prostitution but not prostitution-related activities in general. The US simply does not have any
express provisions outlawing gender-based crimes in armed conflict. Thus it is necessary for both
states to enact further provisions, or amend current legislation, in order to assure that national
1016 Ironically, despite the US fears, this is also what the ICC promotes.
1017 M. Grossman, 'American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court ' (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 May 2002) .
1018 Ibid.
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authorities have the available jurisdiction to prosecute peacekeeping personnel. While not
specifically referring to crimes committed during armed conflict, the Draft Convention does not
preclude application during armed conflict. Henceforth, should states ratify and enact in domestic
law the Draft Convention should it be adopted, peacekeeping personnel could still be prosecuted for
those crimes whether committed during armed conflict or not.
4.4. Conclusion
In order to determine which of national or international criminal jurisdiction is or should be more
effective in preventing and prosecuting gender-based crimes, it has been necessary to examine
examples of national jurisdictions. In using the two jurisdictions of Australia and the United States,
countries that both have personnel involved in peace support operations, it has been possible to see
how national jurisdiction can be very effective, but also where problems may lie. These two states
both have legal systems born from the Anglo legal system, but they have adapted very differently.
There are clearly two separate areas where it is necessary for states to have comprehensive laws-
extraterritorial jurisdiction over all types of personnel, and substantive legislative provisions covering
the relevant crimes.
While the applicable legislation to Australian military and defence civilian personnel is somewhat
complicated, it nonetheless results in relatively comprehensive substantive provisions covering a
wide variety of crimes, all of which are expressly applicable extraterritorially. The discussion in this
chapter has shown that the following acts are criminal offences for peacekeeping personnel:
soliciting, duress in the context of prostitution, rape, child sexual services, sexual offences against
children overseas, sexual assault, sexual intercourse with a minor, indecency, provision or receipt of
commercial sex when infected with an STI, commercial sex without a condom, slavery, sexual
servitude, trafficking, debt bondage, forcible confinement, conducting business that involves sexual
servitude of others (including providing finance), war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
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However, as has been demonstrated, this does not mean that there are no gaps in the Australian
law. Problems lie in the area of HIV/AIDS transmission offences- there are no express transmission
offences. While a peacekeeper may be charged with other offences (manslaughter, assault,
endangering life, endangering health) it has been discussed that HIV/AIDS transmission would be
difficult to prove under the definitions of such offences. There is also a lacuna in trafficking
legislation, which must involve entry or proposed entry into Australia. Another gap exists in relation
to charging personnel with patronising a prostitute. Nor is there an express offence of sexual
exploitation.
With the example of the United States, it has been shown that without law that expressly allows for
extraterritorial jurisdiction, even with the existence of substantive crimes provisions, it is not possible
to prosecute a national for an offence committed extraterritorially.
With regards to substantive law, it is evident that United States has much to work with, and yet is
lacking many criminal offences in its legislation that applies to crimes committed by peacekeeping
personnel. The UCMJ and the US Code offer some provisions that could be extremely effective in the
prevention and punishment of some gender-based crimes, if applied. Military law has been boosted
recently by the addition of the crime of patronising a prostitute. Yet there are also many crimes
simply not covered under US law, such as sexual slavery and sexual exploitation.
The most obvious gap in both jurisdictions is a lack of provisions prohibiting sexual exploitation.
Sexual exploitation is the allegation most commonly brought against peacekeeping personnel, and
therefore it is vital that states who contribute personnel to missions have legislation to enable
prosecution of personnel who engage in sexual exploitation. While other gender-based crimes may
be adequately covered in legislative provisions, the prohibition of sexual exploitation in criminal
legislation is simply non-existent. This is despite the encouragement of the General Assembly and the
inclusion of the new sections within the MoU requiring sending states to take all steps to ensure the
state is able to prosecute personnel for sexual exploitation. The adoption of the Draft Convention will
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be one further step toward ensuring that states criminalise this behaviour, by requiring state parties
to criminalise sexual exploitation, as well as offering a definition that can be adopted by states into
their legislation to guarantee that legislative provisions are comprehensive.
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5. International Criminal Court Jurisdiction
5.1. Introduction
The preceding chapters in this thesis have looked at the problem of gender-based violence against
women by peacekeepers: why such violence is a violation of women’s rights and should be
criminalised; what actions the UN has been taking to prevent and punish this conduct; and how
national jurisdictions can prevent and punish these crimes. Given the international nature of peace
support operations, there is another jurisdictional option to examine for potential prosecutions of
personnel: international criminal jurisdiction. This chapter undertakes such an examination.
Although it is recognised that the international criminal system is broader than just the International
Criminal Court, only the ICC will be considered as a potential forum for bringing peacekeeping
personnel to justice. This is based on the fact that the ICC is a permanent court, while the ad hoc and
internationalised tribunals all have limited jurisdiction, ratione personae, ratione loci and ratione
temporis.1019 Where, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has the “power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”,1020 the ICC
maintains jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territory of any state party,1021 committed
after the entry into force of the Rome Statute (1 July 2002).1022 The ICC may also exercise jurisdiction
over crimes committed by a national of a state party, regardless of where the crime was
1019 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S/25704 at
36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by S/RES/827 (1993), Article 1; Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S/RES/ 955 (1994), Article 1; Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, Article 1(1); Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 1;
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S/RES/1757 (2007), Article 1.
1020 ICTY Statute, Article 1.
1021 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002, Article
12(2)(a).
1022 Rome Statute, Article 11(1). Article 11(2) qualifies this: if a state becomes a party to the Rome Statute after
its entry into force, the Court will only have jurisdiction over crime committed after the entry into force of the
Statute for that state.
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committed.1023 Even more broadly, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction if the Security Council has
referred a situation to the Prosecutor, regardless of where the crimes took place or the nationality of
the perpetrator(s).1024 Thus it is evident that, while the Rome Statute ensures certain restrictions
upon the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, the ICC has relatively broad jurisdiction. These
restrictions, however, will be of importance when the ICC’s jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel
is considered. Unless the situation is referred by the Security Council, the crime must either have
been committed by a national of a state party or within the territory of a state party.1025 Analysis in
this chapter is based on the assumption that preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC
under Article 12 of the Rome Statute are met.1026
There are many different challenges that may arise with regards to prosecution of perpetrators of
international crimes before the International Criminal Court (ICC). This chapter will not address every
possible issue, but rather will analyse a small number of challenges that present themselves in
relation to the specific perpetrators (peacekeeping personnel) and crimes (rape, sexual slavery,
trafficking-related offences, prostitution-related offences, and sexual exploitation) dealt with in this
thesis. These will be the considerations that would ultimately grant the ICC jurisdiction over a
peacekeeper- or demonstrate that the ICC is an unlikely or even impossible forum before which to
prosecute such perpetrators for such crimes. The areas that will be considered are: substantive law
issues concerning the definition of crimes; individual criminal responsibility and superior/command
responsibility; immunities; and the jurisdictional aspects of prosecutorial discretion with particular
regard to gravity.
1023 Rome Statute, Article 12(2)(b). See S.A. Williams and W.A. Schabas, 'Article 12 Precondition to the
exercise of jurisdiction', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 2nd ed., (C.H.Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), 547-561.
1024 Rome Statute, Article 13(b). This includes crimes committed in the territory of a non-state party; see
Security Council Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, on Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,
referring the situation of Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC; S/RES/1593 (2005); Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
(4 March 2009), para. 40, in which the Pre-Trial Chamber held the case to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Court due to the Security Council referral.
1025 Article 12 of the Rome Statute.
1026 See H.-P. Kaul, 'Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 583-618.
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It may first be asked whether bringing peacekeeping personnel to justice is part of the aim and role
of the ICC. The ICC was established with the purposes of bringing an end to impunity for perpetrators
of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and preventing said crimes.1027 It was
envisaged as a ‘court of last resort’; that is, a court to step in and prosecute perpetrators when
national jurisdictions are genuinely unable or unwilling to do so.1028 Complementarity remains a
crucial aspect of the Court.1029 In fact, as the Court has progressed in its first years of existence, there
has been a development towards emphasising the ICC not just as a court, but as a system of
international criminal justice, of which states are an integral element.1030 That system aims to
promote national courts as the primary jurisdiction for prosecution of perpetrators,1031 and at the
same time recognises that when the ICC exercises its jurisdiction, it cannot do so without the
cooperation of states. The role of national jurisdictions in prosecuting peacekeeping personnel for
gender-based crimes has been examined in Chapter 4, and now it remains to be examined what role
the ICC may have.
1027 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 5. The crime of aggression will also be under the jurisdiction of the Court,
should a definition be formulated; article 5(2) Rome Statute.
1028 Rome Statute, Article 17. L.N. Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of
International Law, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New York 2002), pp. 123-4.
1029 Complementarity is the idea that the ICC will complement national courts. Primacy is given to national
courts as the forum in which to prosecute perpetrators of heinous crimes. The Preamble of the Rome Statute
states that the Court “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction”; see also Articles 1 and 17. See
e.g. M.A. Newton, 'Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court' (2001)Military Law Review 20-73; Sadat, ibid., p. 119; J.T. Holmes,
'Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 667-686; T.N. Slade and R.S.
Clark, 'Preamble and Final Clauses', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome
Statute, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002), 421-450, p. 428; M.C. Bassiouni, Introduction to
International Criminal Law, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, New York 2003), pp. 500-1.
1030 Fatou Bensouda, ‘Concluding Remarks’, Fighting Impunity in a Fragmented World- New Challenges for the
International Criminal Court, European University Institute, 24 May 2008, Florence, Italy. Some authors have
suggested an even greater role for states, with the ICC acting in a role of assistant to domestic prosecution: M.S.
Ellis, 'The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building'
(2002) 15 (2) Florida Journal of International Law 215-242; W.W. Burke-White, 'Proactive Complementarity:
The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice' (2008) 49 (1)
Harvard International Law Journal 53-108; M.S. Ellis, 'International Justice and the Rule of Law: Strengthening
the ICC through Domestic Prosecutions' (2009) 1 (1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 79-86.
1031 The Preamble of the Rome Statute states that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes” (para. 6). Cryer questions the status of this duty, however, as it
has “no basis in the operative part of the treaty”; R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the
International Criminal Law Regime, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), pp. 171-2; J.K. Kleffner,
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, (Oxford University Press, Oxford
2008), pp. 100-101.
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Chapter 4 demonstrated that gaps in national jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel exist. If the
ICC was established to fill these gaps, when states are unable (or unwilling) to undertake prosecution
of peacekeeping personnel who commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the ICC should be
willing to step in and exercise its jurisdiction. The ICC aims to eliminate impunity for international
crimes, and there should be no exception for peacekeeping personnel who commit crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. The discussion in this chapter of prosecutorial discretion and the application
of the gravity threshold will consider the question of whether peacekeeping personnel and the
crimes they commit should be considered by the Office of the Prosecutor as the type of perpetrator
and crime(s) for the ICC to expend resources on. It is the argument of this chapter that crimes
committed by peacekeeping personnel should be seen to satisfy the gravity threshold of the Rome
Statute.
This thesis examines individual criminal responsibility of the peacekeeper, and not the civil
responsibility of any other entity such as the perpetrator’s sending state, or the UN itself (as
represented by the PSO).1032 It is now universally recognised that individual criminal responsibility for
violations of international law such as international humanitarian law and human rights norms is
valid and necessary.1033 The responsibility for the crime is individual, as the harm is caused by a
natural person.1034 The reasoning behind enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for
harm1035 is multiple-fold. Retribution and deterrence are the two main reasons; alongside
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and reconciliation. Retribution may be in the vein of restorative justice,
1032 For commentary on state and organisational responsibility in PSOs, see M. Zwanenburg, Accountability of
Peace Support Operations, Vol. 9, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005), pp. 51-129.
1033 K. Ambos, 'Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Jurisprudential Analysis-
From Nuremberg to the Hague', in Kirk McDonald and Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural
Aspects of International Crimianl Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague 2000), p. 6.
1034 A. Eser, 'Individual Criminal Responsibility', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 767-822, p. 770; O. Triffterer, 'Preliminary
Remarks: The Permanent International Criminal Court- Ideal and Reality', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford,
Baden-Baden 2008), p. 25.
1035 Triffterer, ‘Preliminary Remarks’, ibid., p. 25.
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to rectify the moral balance because punishment is deserved,1036 and not just the enactment of
punishment as vengeance. “From a deterrence perspective, punishment is inflicted not because the
offender deserves it, but because punishment has a consequential or utilitarian value, in this case the
value of minimizing recidivism.”1037 In the case of peacekeeper perpetrators, accountability would
primarily exist as a method of deterrence- criminalising sexual exploitation, ensuring accountability,
in order to deter future personnel from committing such offences. This forms part of the overall aim
of prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse that the UN is seeking.1038 Retribution would also be a
reason; punishment is deserved for the violations of rights committed through sexual exploitation
and abuse.1039 In the same regard, punishment would hopefully be a method of rehabilitation;
through accountability, the perpetrator can acknowledge the harm caused by their actions.1040
The analysis of substantive law jurisdiction in this chapter will examine war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Genocide will not be addressed, as it is considered highly unlikely that a peacekeeper will
engage in genocide. This is based on two premises, the first being that peacekeeping personnel
seldom find themselves located in the region of a genocide (although this may occur, such as
UNAMIR1041 in Rwanda and UNAMID1042 in Sudan).1043 The second and principal reason is that
genocide requires a mental element of specific intent1044 to destroy a group in whole or in part, the
dolus specialis.1045 It is unlikely that a peacekeeper would have this intent; given the lack of
1036 M.A. Drumbl, 'A Hard Look at the Soft Theory of International Criminal Law', in Sadat and Scharf (eds.),
The Theory and Practice of International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2008), 1-18, p. 11.
1037 Ibid., p. 14.
1038 See supra Chapter 3.
1039 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2009), supra
note 597, pp. 34-36; Prosecutor v Kupreãkiü, Trial Judgement, IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), paras. 848-849.
1040 Ibid.
1041 United Nations Mission in Rwanda.
1042 African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.
1043 Out of 63 missions past and present, only a handful have taken place in the context of what has been termed
(sometimes controversially) genocide, such as Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan. The ICTY and ICTR
have convictions for genocide; e.g. Prosecutor v Krstiü, Trial Judgement, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001;
Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998.
1044 W.A. Schabas, 'The Jelisic Case and the Mens Rea of the Crime of Genocide' (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of
International Law 125-139, pp. 128-129.
1045 Article 6 Rome Statute; Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998), para.
498; A. Cassese, 'Genocide', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 335-352; Werle, supra note 1039, pp. 274-281; W.A. Schabas, 'Article
6 Genocide', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed.,
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connection a peacekeeper would have with the group in question- there is no history for a
peacekeeper to have developed a discriminatory hatred of a group to the extent of forming intent to
destroy that group in whole or in part. Genocidal situations exist in circumstances of years of inter-
group animosity, discrimination and hatred.1046 In contrast, crimes such as sexual exploitation are
committed for reasons of power and sexual satisfaction.1047
It is very difficult to prove the specific intent to destroy required for the commission of genocide, and
the ad hoc tribunals have determined the specific intent from such evidence as the accused’s
statements and deeds, the existence of a plan, a large number of victims, the behaviour of the
perpetrator when committing the crime, the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of
killing, and the fact that victims were selected due to their membership of a particular group.1048 All
of this must be committed in a broader “context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction”, such context including
“the initial acts in an emerging pattern”.1049
Henceforth, this chapter will look at war crimes and crimes against humanity as potential categories
of international crimes under which to prosecute peacekeeping personnel.1050 Both will be examined
in order to provide options for prosecution for crimes committed under different circumstances: a
PSO may be located in a territory in the midst of armed conflict, but may also be situated in post-
conflict territory. Therefore, the application of the jurisdiction of war crimes may not be so apparent.
(C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), ; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law,
2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 137.
1046 E.g. O. Triffterer, 'Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such' (2001)
14 Leiden Journal of International Law 399-408, pp. 400-401 with reference to the years of ‘Aryan race’
domination intention of Hitler before and during World War II.
1047 Supra Chapter 2; see also C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., London 1987), Chapter 7 Sex and Violence: A Perspective, pp. 85-92; Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and
Gbao (RUF Case), SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgement (2 March 2009), para. 1348.
1048 See e.g. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, para. 523; Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgement,
ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para. 93; Prosecutor v Jelisic, Trial Judgement, IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999)
para. 73.
1049 Elements of Crimes, Article 6 Genocide, Introduction. The word ‘plan’ was rejected by drafters, in line with
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, which does not require a plan or policy, although it has been recognised
that “it is not easy to carry out genocide without such a plan, or organisation”; Kayishema and Ruzidana, Trial
Judgement, para. 94; Schabas, ‘The Jelisic Case’, supra note 1044, p. 134.
1050 Articles 7 and 8 Rome Statute.
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An examination of the chapeau elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity will
demonstrate where the difficulties may lie in this respect.
In addition to the chapeau elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the individual
elements of crimes will be examined.1051 This will demonstrate whether the ICC has substantive law
jurisdiction over rape, trafficking, sexual slavery, sexual exploitation and prostitution-related
offences. Analysis will be made as to whether this jurisdiction is sufficient or whether there are any
lacunae. Within the assessment of individual elements of crimes, different categories of potential
individual criminal responsibility will be presented.1052 Following this, the responsibility of
commanders and superiors will be considered as a prospective category of responsibility with which
to prosecute peacekeeping personnel.1053
However, should the substantive law and categories of responsibility be appropriate and adequate
with which to prosecute peacekeeping personnel, there are other potential roadblocks on the path
to the Trial Chamber. These include immunities of peacekeeping personnel. Such immunities have
been discussed in Chapter 3, including the fact that military personnel have absolute immunity.1054
Immunity has a specific relevance with regards to the Rome Statute, which has express provisions
dealing with immunities. Assuming that the hurdle of immunities is cleared, there still remains the
fact that the Prosecutor of the ICC has discretion over which cases he brings before the Court, and
aspects of this discretion may prove particularly problematic when considering peacekeeping
personnel as potential ICC defendants.
All of these potential issues will be analysed, with the aim of bringing about a general conclusion as
to the likelihood of prosecution of peacekeeping personnel in the ICC.
1051 Ibid.
1052 Article 25 Rome Statute.
1053 Article 28 Rome Statute.
1054 See also Appendix 2.
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5.2. International Crimes
International crimes have been viewed by some as any crime included in a treaty which includes a
duty or right to extradite.1055 However, this thesis takes a more restrictive definitional approach to
international criminal law, as followed by Broomhall and Cryer: the “body of international law that
imposes criminal responsibility directly upon the individual, without the necessary interposition of
national legal systems”.1056 This is the system of international criminal responsibility established,
beginning with the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, through the ad hoc tribunals,
culminating in the ICC.1057 International crimes fall under four categories: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Such crimes are defined as international because they are
crimes that shock the conscious of humanity, and are committed against the world community as a
whole, constituting a threat to international peace and security.1058 They are also so defined because
they generally occur on a large scale, a fact that distinguishes them from ordinary domestic crimes.
This large scale is demonstrated by the examples of crimes committed during World War II, the
Balkan conflict, the Rwandan genocide, and the current situations before the ICC such as Sudan and
Uganda.1059
While the individual elements of crimes are important, so are the unique chapeau elements of crimes
under the Rome Statute. This section will examine the chapeau elements of war crimes and crimes
against humanity in the context of crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel, pointing out
problematic areas that may arise for their prosecution. These chapeau elements are what
demonstrate the difference of international crimes- namely, elements of crimes being committed on
1055 Bassiouni, supra note 1029, pp. 114-133.
1056 B. Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule
of Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003), pp. 9-10; Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes,
supra note 1031, pp. 9-10.
1057 For a summary of the development of international criminal law, see Cryer, ibid., pp. 9-72.
1058 Bassiouni, supra note 1029, pp. 119, 121.
1059 Werle, supra note 1039, pp. 31-2.
240
a large-scale, systematically, or part of a plan or policy. However, this is not necessarily the case with
war crimes, as a single occurrence of a war crime is still considered an international crime.1060
5.2.1. Crimes against Humanity
There are two chapeau elements of a crime against humanity, which must be proven in addition to
the individual elements of crimes as discussed infra. These chapeau elements are likely to be the
principal reason why it would be very difficult to charge a peacekeeper with crimes against humanity.
The chapeau elements concern the context of the crimes committed.
Unlike war crimes, what is not required is a nexus with armed conflict.1061 The removal of this nexus
is a departure from the definition of crimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Tribunal
Statute.1062 Such as nexus was not included in the definition of crimes against humanity of the ad hoc
tribunals.1063 The lack of a nexus to armed conflict has been considered by the ICTY as to be the
current formulation of customary international law,1064 and that is reflected in the Rome Statute.1065
Rather than associating them with armed conflict, crimes against humanity may be viewed as a
violation of human rights on a massive scale.1066
5.2.1.1. Widespread or Systematic Attack directed against Civilian
Population
The first chapeau element of crimes against humanity is that the crime is committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The words ‘widespread’ and
1060 Although the Rome Statute does grant jurisdiction over war crimes ‘in particular’ when committed as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes. See discussion infra.
1061 Meron, ‘Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, supra note 1011, p. 49; Cassese, ‘Crimes against
Humanity’, supra note 1011, p. 356.
1062 T.L.H. McCormack and S. Robertson, 'Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the New International
Criminal Court' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 635-666, pp. 652-3.
1063 Article 5 ICTY Statute, Article 3 ICTR Statute, Article 2 SCSL Statute, Article 5 Law on ECCC.
1064 Prosecutor v Tadic, Trial Judgement, IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997), para. 627.
1065 von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 1011, pp. 92-93; W. Rückert and G. Witschel, 'Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity in the Elements of Crimes', in Fischer, et al. (eds.), International and National Prosecution of
Crimes Under International Law, (Berlin Verlag, Berlin 2001), p. 71.
1066 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 1045, p. 99.
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‘systematic’ are disjunctive, meaning that the crime must be committed as part of either a
widespread attack or a systematic attack directed against a civilian population.1067
‘Widespread’ is not a reference to geographical location, but to the number of victims.1068 The ad hoc
tribunals have given the term an expansive definition covering “the large-scale nature of the attack
and the number of targeted persons.”1069 A systematic attack is one with “organised nature of the
acts of violence and… improbability of their random occurrence”,1070 showing “patterns of crimes, in
the sense of the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis”.1071 The
term “reflects the organised nature of the attack, excludes random violence, and does not require a
policy or plan”.1072
It is only the attack that must be widespread or systematic.1073 The criminal behaviour of the accused
may be a single act or limited number of acts occurring in the context of the attack against a civilian
population, and cannot be isolated or random.1074 The targeted civilian population must also be
specified. In the RUF Case, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) examined whether the killing of
peacekeeping personnel fell within the scope of crimes against humanity. Trial Chamber I held that
“the attacks against UNAMSIL1075 personnel were geographically and temporally removed from the
crimes against civilians” found proven under other charges in the case.1076 It was found that the
1067 Ibid; Meron, ‘Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, supra note 1011, p. 50; von Hebel and Robinson,
supra note 1011, pp. 94-95; Robinson, ‘The Context’, supra note 1011, p. 63; Cassese, ’Crimes against
Humanity’, supra note 1011, p. 366; Dixon and Hall, supra note 1011 , pp. 176-178. RUF Case, para. 78.
1068 Dixon and Hall, ibid., p. 178.
1069 Prosecutor v Kordic, Appeal Judgement, IT-95/14/2-A (17 December 2004), para. 94. See also Prosecutor v
Blaskic, Appeal Judgement, IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004), para. 101; Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Foca), Appeals
Chamber Judgement, IT-96-23-A (12 June 2002), para. 94. The ICTR has used almost identical language: “the
scale of the attacks and the multiplicity of the victims”; Prosecutor v Muyunyi, Trial Judgement, ICTR-00-55A-
T (12 September 2006), para. 512; Prosecutor v Muhimana, Trial Judgement, ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005),
para. 527; Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Judgement, ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003), para. 329; Prosecutor v
Musema, Trial Judgement, ICTR-96-13-A (27 January 2000), paras. 203-4. See also Prosecutor v Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008), para. 394.
1070 Kordic, Trial Judgement, para. 94; Blaskic, Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Foca, Appeal Judgement, para. 96;
RUF Case, para. 78. See also Katanga and Chui, confirmation of charges, paras. 394, 397.
1071 Ibid.
1072 Muyunyi, Trial Judgement, para. 512; RUF Case, para. 79; A. Marston Danner, 'Constructing a Hierarchy of
Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing' (2001) 87 (3) Virginia Law Review 415-501, p. 474.
1073 Kordic, Trial Judgement, para. 94; Blaskic, Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Foca, Appeal Judgement, para. 96.
1074 Ibid; Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 649.
1075 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.
1076 RUF Case, para. 1952.
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peacekeeping personnel were not killed in connection with these other crimes or further crimes
against civilians. The categorisation of the peacekeeping personnel was actually distinguished from
the civilians of Sierra Leone- they were civilian peacekeeping personnel, but not the civilian
population that was the target of the widespread or systematic attack.1077 Thus, despite the fact that
the peacekeeping personnel were held to be civilians, the Trial Chamber held that the attacks were
“distinct from and did not form part of the widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population
of Sierra Leone”.1078
Whether a crime committed by a peacekeeper was part of a widespread or systematic attack would
depend upon the circumstances in which the crime was committed.1079 If widespread or systematic
crimes are ongoing, then a crime committed by a peacekeeper could be seen to be part of that attack
on the civilian population. It is highly unlikely that a peacekeeper would intend their crime to be part
of the attack, but it would certainly be committed as part of the attack if that attack is extant. It is
also unlikely that a peacekeeper would commit a crime against humanity. This is due to the fact that
peacekeeping missions do not generally take place in the context of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population. This does not mean they cannot take place in such a context: Rwanda
(UNAMIR) and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID) are examples of missions that were or are located in
territories experiencing widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population. However the
greatest difficulty in determining whether a crime by a peacekeeper constitutes a crime against
humanity lies in the fact that crimes by peacekeeping personnel “tend to be isolated and sporadic
acts of military indiscipline or indifference”, rather than part of a widespread or systematic attack.1080
In the instance of a mission located in a post-conflict territory no longer experiencing a widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population, a crime committed by a peacekeeper could not be
considered a crime against humanity, because it would not fulfil the first chapeau element. Unlike
1077 Ibid., paras. 1953-4.
1078 Ibid., para. 1953.
1079 The attack does not have to be a military attack. Elements of Crimes Article 7 Introduction para. 3;
Robinson, ‘The Context’, supra note 1011, p. 74.
1080 J.N. Maogoto, 'Watching the Watchdogs: Holding the UN Accountable for Violations of International
Humanitarinan Law by the 'Blue Helmets'' (2000) 5 (1) Deakin Law Review 47-80, p. 74.
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the definition of war crimes, in which a war crime is committed in the context of and associated with
an armed conflict, a crime against humanity must be committed as part of the widespread or
systematic attack. This difference in wording demonstrates that the war crimes nexus with armed
conflict is broader than the crimes against humanity nexus with an attack. A crime committed by a
peacekeeper would have to be analysed in its context, and an isolated incident would not amount to
a crime against humanity.1081 A crime committed after the cessation of the widespread or systematic
attack does not constitute a crime against humanity,1082 because the emphasis of the crime would
then be on the victim as an individual, rather than the victim as part of a collective, which is the
essence of a crime against humanity.1083 The victim would not be chosen because of their
“membership of a targeted civilian population”, and therefore the crime committed would constitute
an isolated incident, but not a crime against humanity.1084
5.2.1.2. Knowledge of or Intention that Conduct was Part of
Widespread or Systematic Attack
The second chapeau element of crimes against humanity is that the perpetrator knew that the
conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population.1085 Knowledge of the attack does not require “proof that the perpetrator had
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State
or organisation.”1086 Indeed the majority of peacekeeping personnel would not be aware of the
details of a plan or policy of a widespread or systematic attack, as they would not be interacting
directly with those who were organising the plan or policy. However it is something that those in
superior positions within the mission may well be aware of, given their role in interacting directly
with any leaders or commanders of parties to the conflict or other relevant groups. This was the case
1081 Cassese, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 1011, p. 361.
1082 Depending on the circumstances, it may constitute a war crime.
1083 Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 644.
1084 Ibid.
1085 von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 1011, p. 98.
1086 Paragraph 2 of the Introduction to Article 7 of the Elements of Crimes; Katanga and Chui, confirmation of
charges, para. 401; Robinson, ‘The Context’, supra note 1011, p. 72; Cassese, International Criminal Law,
supra note 1045, p. 115.
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for General Dallaire in Rwanda prior to and following the commencement of the genocide.1087 Thus a
Head of Mission, Force Commander and immediate deputies would be aware of the existence of a
widespread or systematic attack including aspects of a plan or policy.
What the perpetrator must know are the factual circumstances- that there is an attack on a civilian
population, and that his/her acts formed part of that attack.1088 The perpetrator’s knowledge of the
attack and awareness that his/her conduct formed part of that attack can be determined from the
contextual circumstances, such as the accused’s position in the military hierarchy, his presence at the
scene of the crimes, and the general historical and political environment in which the acts
occurred.1089 The identification of such knowledge would be similar to the knowledge of armed
conflict, and would be ascertained from the context of the commission of the crimes as well as the
context of the PSO itself. The commission of crimes against humanity, an attack on a civilian
population, would be the reason behind the decision of the Security Council to establish a PSO, and
therefore the very reason personnel are present in that territory. Personnel would be made aware of
the situation on the ground, and the general historical and political environment, thus making it very
difficult to argue they had no knowledge of an attack on a civilian population and that their act was
part of that widespread or systematic attack.1090
The requirement of knowledge or intention is disjunctive, indicating that a perpetrator may commit a
crime without the intention that such conduct be part of the widespread or systematic attack.1091
However, should they have knowledge of the attack, even without that specific intent, the
perpetrator will still be found guilty of committing a crime against humanity if their crime is
committed in the context of the attack.
1087 In January 2004 Dallaire testified at the trial of Bagosora, the ‘mastermind’ of the genocide; Prosecutor v
Bagosora, Trial Judgement, ICTR-98-41-T (18 December 2008), para. 181 fn. 200.
1088 Katanga and Chui, confirmation of charges, para. 401; Prosecutor v Kordic, Appeal Judgement, IT-95/14/2-
A (17 December 2004), para. 99; Blaskic, Appeal Chamber Judgement, para. 124; Semanza, Trial Judgement,
para. 332; Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 657; Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeal Judgement, IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999)
para. 266. Cassese, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, supra note 1011, p. 365.
1089 Katanga and Chui, confirmation of charges, para. 402.
1090 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzidana, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999), paras. 133-
4.
1091 Of course they would still require the general intent to commit the crime; Article 30 Rome Statute.
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There are definitive challenges to prosecuting a peacekeeper for crimes against humanity in the ICC
due to the chapeau elements. A charge of crimes against humanity would be infinitely more difficult
than one under war crimes, due to the required elements of systematic or widespread attack. It
would be a rare instance where the Court would find a peacekeeper committing a crime that
constituted part of a systematic or widespread attack.
5.2.2. War Crimes
5.2.2.1. ‘Part of a Plan or Policy or Part of a Large-Scale
Commission of Such Crimes’
Under Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute there is no absolute requirement that a war crime be
committed on a large-scale. Article 8(1) states that the “Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes”.1092 The Prosecutor has accurately acknowledged that “[t]his threshold is not an
element of the crime, and the words “in particular” suggest that this is not a strict requirement”.1093
In its statutory interpretation of Article 17(1)(d) in the Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, the Appeals
Chamber confirmed this interpretation of the Rome Statute, declaring that “the requirement of
either large-scale commission or part of a policy is not absolute but qualified by the expression ‘in
particular’”.1094 It should be perceived as a guideline rather than a requirement.1095 Therefore a single
occurrence of a war crime is sufficient for the ICC to establish jurisdiction.1096 The expression ‘in
1092 Emphasis added.
1093 Prosecutor’s communication response to communications concerning the situation in Iraq (9 February 2006)
available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf>
(Iraq Communication). See also Meron, ‘Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the ICC’, supra note 1011, p. 52; P.
Rowe, 'War Crimes', in McGoldrick, et al. (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court, (Hart
Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon 2004), 203-230, pp. 205-6.
1094 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04 (13 July 2006)
(Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal), para. 70. It is clear that the intention of drafters was not to render ‘part of a
plan or policy or part of a large-scale commission’ as an absolute requirement as they specifically chose the
wording ‘in particular when committed…’ over ‘only when committed as part of…’ (emphasis added); von
Hebel and Robinson, supra note 1011, p. 108.
1095 Ibid., p. 124.
1096 See discussion infra on gravity. This does not, however, avoid some scholars arguing that the plan or policy
or large-scale commission should be an essential element of all international crimes, including war crimes: L.
May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), pp. 80-
95; K.J. Heller, 'Situational Gravity under the Rome Statute', in Stahn and von den Herik (eds.), Future
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particular’ indicates that the Court will have jurisdiction over all war crimes, but especially when
committed as part of a plan or policy or large-scale commission, as such large-scale or policy
commission is a significant factor in defining crimes as international, at which point they amount to a
threat to international peace and security. However, the fact that this is not a requirement will
enable the Court to prosecute single war crimes, or war crimes not committed as part of a plan or
policy or on a large-scale, and this will broaden the scope of potential crimes the Court can
prosecute. In terms of crimes committed by peacekeepers, it has been shown above the difficulty
that will arise in proving a peacekeeper’s crime to be a crime against humanity due to the necessity
for the crime to be part of a widespread or systematic attack. A war crime avoids any similar
requirement, and thus it will be far more likely that a crime by a peacekeeper is classified as a war
crime.
With regard to the number of victims (large-scale commission), the ICTR has distinguished the
number of victims as an element specific to crimes against humanity only. In Semanza,1097 the ICTR
held that the number of victims was an integral element of a crime against humanity, but not of
genocide. The Chamber held that genocide was a crime with “no numeric minimum of victims”, but
that the number of victims could be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing.1098 The same
principle should apply to war crimes, given that it is not a requirement under the Rome Statute that a
war crime be committed as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
It is unlikely that crimes such as sexual exploitation by peacekeeping personnel will be committed as
part of a plan or policy, although in some circumstances it could be argued that there is a plan to
commit these crimes. Such circumstances would include the involvement of multiple peacekeeping
personnel in the trafficking and sexual slavery of women, or of peacekeeping personnel who engage
in protection of brothel owners in order to be able to make use of the brothel’s services. While this
Perspectives in International Criminal Justice, (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2010), 227-253 pp. 230-233
(using the term ‘systemacity’).
1097 Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2005), para. 571.
1098 Ibid. Prosecutor v Krstic ICTY-98-33 (2 August 2001) also referred to the number of victims as a factor in
assessing the gravity of crimes committed, for sentencing; para. 702.
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would also be an issue with regards to the category of criminal responsibility (e.g. it may be viewed
as joint commission1099), the context of the commission of the crime(s) can also be used to argue the
existence of a plan to commit the crime(s).
While crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may be isolated incidents, they can be placed in
the broader context, and thus be committed as part of a large-scale commission of war crimes. Other
crimes committed within the relevant territory should be taken into account. The context of crimes
committed by peacekeeping personnel is the armed conflict in the territory within which the
peacekeeping personnel are situated. The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily mean the end
of the application of international humanitarian law, and thus does not mean the end of a situation
of armed conflict.1100 Crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel after the cessation of hostilities
can still be considered to be associated with the armed conflict, and therefore part of any large-scale
commission of crimes that may have occurred during such conflict.
5.2.2.2. Nexus with Armed Conflict
To qualify as a war crime, conduct must be associated with the armed conflict, and the perpetrator
needs to commit the crime in the context of an armed conflict and be aware of the existence of such
conflict.1101 Reference may be made to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Armed conflict was
defined by the ICTY in Tadic as existing
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in
the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of
1099 Article 25(3)(a) Rome Statute.
1100 See infra, text at n. 1102.
1101 Article 8 Rome Statute; Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3; M. Bothe, 'War Crimes', in Cassese, et al. (eds.),
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 379-426,
pp. 388-9.
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internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat
takes place there.”
1102
The Tribunal’s Appeals Chamber found it to be “sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely
related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the
conflict”.1103
The association with armed conflict requirement of war crimes was also broadly interpreted by the
ICTY in the Foca case:
“[T]he criterion of a nexus with the armed conflict under Article 3 of the Statute does not require
that the offences be directly committed whilst fighting is actually taking place, or at the scene of
combat. Humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole of the territory under the control of
one of the parties, whether or not actual combat continues at the place where the events in
question took place. It is therefore sufficient that the crimes were closely related to the hostilities
occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. The
requirement that the act be closely related to the armed conflict is satisfied if, as in the present
case, the crimes are committed in the aftermath of the fighting, and until the cessation of
combat activities in a certain region, and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of the
situation created by the fighting.”
1104
The phrase ‘in the context of’ is to be interpreted in “very general geographical and temporal terms”,
following the direction of the ICTY, and ‘associated with’ demonstrates the nexus with the armed
conflict.1105 The ICC has applied the broad interpretation, requiring that “the armed conflict must
play a substantial role in the perpetrator’s decision, in his or her ability to commit the crime or in the
1102 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction IT-94-1-AR72 (2
October 1995), para. 70.
1103 Ibid. Crimes can still be “committed in the context of an armed conflict, even if substantial clashes were not
occurring in the region at the time and place that the crimes were allegedly committed”; Celebici, Trial
Judgement, paras. 196-7.
1104 Kunarac et al. (Foca), Trial Judgement, (22 February 2001), IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, para. 568. “There
is no necessary correlation between the area where the actual fighting is taking place and the geographical reach
of the laws of war. The laws of war apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal
armed conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party to the conflict, whether or not actual combat
takes place there, and continue to apply until a general conclusion of peace or, in the case of internal armed
conflicts, until a peaceful settlement is achieved.” Foca, Appeals Chamber Judgement, IT-96-23-A (12 June
2002), para. 57. Rowe, ‘War Crimes’, supra note 1093, p. 208.
1105 K. Dörmann, et al., 'The Context of War Crimes', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements
of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, NY 2001), 112-123,
pp. 12-1.
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manner in which the conduct was ultimately committed”.1106 However, the “armed conflict need not
be considered the ultimate reason for the conduct and the conduct need not have taken place in the
midst of battle”.1107
Crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may fall within this expansive interpretation. Peace
support operations are always located in places experiencing on-going conflict, or in a post-conflict
situation. Their very presence is related to the armed conflict; that is precisely the reason the mission
is in that territory. The commission of crimes such as sexual exploitation takes advantage of the
situation created by the fighting, as the conflict has created a society in which women are left with
no choice but to sell their bodies in order to survive.1108 Thus, it can be argued that these crimes are
committed in the context of an armed conflict, and are associated with an armed conflict, even if
hostilities have ceased.1109
Unfortunately, such an application to UN missions is not so simple, and it may be the case that the
Court finds that the crime(s) in question do not have a nexus to armed conflict because it was
committed after the cessation of hostilities- or even later in time, after the conclusion of peace, and
thus concludes there is no jurisdiction under Article 8. There is much debate on the issue of
peacekeeping personnel involvement in armed conflict, and whether and when they are considered
to be combatants engaging in armed conflict or civilians.1110 There is no clear legal stance as to the
application of IHL1111- that is, the exact circumstances when peacekeeping personnel are considered
1106 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007), para.
287; Katanga and Chui, Confirmation of Charges, paras. 380-382.
1107 Ibid.
1108 See supra Chapter 2.
1109 It is not “necessary that the crime alleged takes place during combat, that it be part of a policy or of a
practice officially endorsed or tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual
furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the conflict”;
Prosecutor v Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 573.
1110 States may be unwilling to concede that their personnel have engaged in armed conflict, as upon engagement
in armed conflict, peacekeepers lose their special protection as civilians and become combatants; see Article
8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) Rome Statute.
1111 See U. Palwankar, 'Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-keeping forces'
(1993) (294) International Review of the Red Cross 227-240; C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law
and United Nations Military Operations' (1998) 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3-34; M.J.P.
Bialke, 'United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict'
(2001) 50 A.F.L. Rev. 1-63; R. Murphy, 'United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian
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to be engaging in armed conflict.1112 The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United
Nations forces of international humanitarian law states:
“The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present
bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are
actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.
They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the
use of force is permitted in self-defence.”
1113
From this, it can be deduced that whether IHL is applicable will depend on the individual mandate of
the operation,1114 and this may assist in interpreting whether the circumstances in which the crime is
committed amounts to armed conflict. In addition to the mandate, the SCSL has suggested other
elements that may assist in defining the situation:
“the specific operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping
mission during the particular conflict, their rules of engagement and operational orders, the
nature of the arms and equipment used by the peacekeeping force, the interaction between the
peacekeeping force and the parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the
peacekeeping force and the parties in the conflict, the nature and frequency of such force and
the conduct of the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel.”
1115
Law' (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 153-194; A. Faite and J.L. Grenier (eds.), Expert Meeting on Multinational
Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN
Mandated Forces, (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2004).
1112 'Application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to UN-mandated forces:
Report on the Expert meeting on multinational peace operations' (2004) 86 (853) International Review of the Red
Cross 207-212, pp. 208-9.
1113 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law,
ST/SGB/1999/13, sub-section 1.1. It must be recalled that the Bulletin is an internal UN document, which
amounts to policy, but there is disagreement as to whether it amounts to law. The Bulletin is binding on
members of UN forces, but the source of the legal obligation stems from IHL rules that individual states are
bound by. The Bulletin mostly applies customary rules of IHL, although some rules imposed by the Bulletin are
not customary. Customary rules of IHL will of course apply, but beyond customary law, force personnel will still
be bound by the law of their sending state, and states do not all apply the same rules of IHL, as not all states are
members of all IHL treaties. H. McCoubrey and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United
Nations Military Operations, (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot 1996), pp. 161-2; D. Shraga,
'UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for
Operations-Related Damage' (2000) 94 (2) American Journal of International Law 406-412, p. 408-9; B.D.
Tittemore, 'Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace
Operations' (1997) 33 Stanford Journal of International Law 61-117, p. 93; P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in
United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents' (2000) 5 (1) Journal of
Conflict and Security Law 45-62, p. 53; Faite and Grenier, supra note 1111, pp. 10-11.
1114 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2nd ed., (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2010), pp. 29-30.
1115 RUF Case, para. 234.
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The RUF Case Trial Chamber held that “peacekeeping personnel are considered to be civilians only
insofar as… they do not take direct part in the hostilities”.1116 It also held that
“their protection would not cease if the personnel use armed force only in exercising their right
to individual self-defence [and that] the use of force by peacekeeping personnel in self-defence
in the discharge of their mandate, provided that it is limited to such use, would not alter or
diminish the protection afforded to peacekeeping personnel”.
1117
However, ultimately, whether or not IHL is applicable to peacekeeping personnel may not be
relevant if it is the peacekeeper committing a war crime, as a war crime may be committed by a
combatant or a civilian.1118 A war crime must be committed in the context of and be associated with
an armed conflict, but the perpetrator does not have to be engaged as a combatant in the armed
conflict.1119
A problem that would arise is whether to charge a peacekeeper with a war crime committed in
international or non-international armed conflict, and again there is no clear rule on this.1120 Clearly if
the mission is mandated to exist because of an armed conflict between two states, then the armed
conflict is international.1121 However, most missions are located in one state, due to internal armed
conflict, usually between government and rebel forces. One argument is that such a conflict
automatically becomes international with the involvement of a multi-national peacekeeping
1116 RUF Case, para. 233.
1117 Ibid.
1118 Dinstein, supra note 1114, pp. 263-4, 266; Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 1045, pp. 82-3;
Dörmann et al., supra note 1105, p. 119.
1119 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Appeal Judgement, ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001), paras. 443-5; K. Dörmann,
Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002), pp. 34-35; 391-393; A. Zimmerman, 'Preliminary Remarks on
para. 2 (c)-(f) and para. 3: War crimes committed in an armed conflict not of an international character', in
Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart,
Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), 475-504, p. 488.
1120 Greenwood, supra note 1111, pp. 8-9; Faite and Grenier, supra note 1111, p. 11. Article 8(2)(a) and (b) grant
jurisdiction over crimes committed in international armed conflict; Article 8(2)(c) and (e) grant jurisdiction over
crimes committed in armed conflict not of an international character.
1121 Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, para. 209.
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force.1122 The opposite claim is that an armed conflict is only international if it involves hostilities
between two states1123- and a UN force is not a state.1124
This issue was broached in the RUF Case. The Trial Chamber found the conflict in Sierra Leone to be
non-international in nature, and examined whether the involvement of the ECOMOG1125 force
automatically rendered the armed conflict international. Unfortunately the Trial Chamber did not
discuss this in depth, but held that the armed conflict remained non-international, because
“ECOMOG fought against the AFRC/RUF at the behest of the internationally recognised Kabbah
Government”.1126 Henceforth the “intervention cannot be classed as recourse to armed force
between two States”.1127 The Trial Chamber reached this conclusion by applying the definition of
international armed conflict found in common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, that
international armed conflict exists whenever there is declared war or any other armed conflict
between two or more High Contracting Parties, which in the case of the Geneva Conventions, limits
international armed conflict to armed conflict between states.1128 However, Additional Protocol I
recognises that Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions also includes “armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination”.1129
On strict application of the Geneva Conventions, the SCSL was correct in determining that the Sierra
Leone conflict did not transform into an international one. However, there are two issues. Firstly, the
1122 Faite and Grenier, supra note 1111, p. 11; P. Kirsch, 'The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel' (1995) International Peacekeeping 102-106, p. 105.
1123 Dinstein, supra note 1114, pp. 26-27. McCoubrey and White state that “there is no reason to think that the
involvement of a UN force in a situation of armed conflict will of itself render the conflict ‘international’ for the
purposes of the application of the jus in bello”; McCoubrey and White, supra note 1113, p. 172.
1124 Greenwood, supra note 1111, p. 15. Greenwood argues that because of its status as a subject of international
law, the UN is subject to IHL “insofar as it engages in activities of the kind regulated by IHL”; ibid., p. 16.
1125 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.
1126 RUF Case, para. 973.
1127 Ibid.
1128 RUF Case, para. 971; M. Sassoli and A.A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and
Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, (International Committee of
the Red Cross, Geneva 1999), p. 89. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held it to be “indisputable that an armed
conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States”; Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeal Judgement, IT-
94-1-A (15 July 1999), para. 84.
1129 Article 1(4), Additional Protocol I.
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ECOMOG force was not a UN force, but a force from West African States fighting under a mandate
from ECOWAS.1130 While it may have been a multi-national force, it was ultimately a regional multi-
national force, not a UN-mandated force. Hence there must be differentiation between the
situations of the organisations involved and the mandates of the forces.1131 This would include the
application of IHL to the mission forces and the extent of such application by the forces.1132
Secondly, it is determined that IHL applies to UN forces when they are engaged in hostilities. While it
is true that IHL has been determined to apply in both international and non-international armed
conflicts, and there is support for the elimination of a distinction between the two,1133 a distinction
does still exist between international and non-international armed conflict, particularly with regard
to IHL. The application of IHL to UN forces demonstrates that there is consideration of the UN forces
as engaging in international armed conflict.1134 Even if the UN forces are fighting at the request of a
government, it cannot be said that they are engaging in non-international armed conflict because
they do not form part of the government (or other) forces. UN forces are independent of all parties
to any armed conflict; impartiality is one of the basic principles of peacekeeping.1135 Therefore, a UN
force is an international force which may become party to the conflict upon engagement in
hostilities- and therefore the armed conflict becomes international.
1130 Economic Community of West African States; RUF Case, para. 973.
1131 The Statute of the SCSL expressly excludes peacekeeping personnel from the SCSL jurisdiction under
Article 1(2) of its statute: “Any transgressions by peacekeepers and related personnel present in Sierra Leone
pursuant to the Status of Mission Agreement in force between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone or agreements between Sierra Leone and other Governments or regional organizations, or, in the absence
of such agreement, provided that the peacekeeping operations were undertaken with the consent of the
Government of Sierra Leone, shall be within the primary jurisdiction of the sending State.”
1132 Zwanenburg points out “the discrepancy between the attention for respect for international humanitarian law
by operations under United Nations command, and ‘subcontracted’ operations like ECOMOG”, with the UN
applying minimum standards whereas ECOMOG did not; M. Zwanenburg, 'Double Standards in Peacekeeping?
Subcontracting Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International
Law 753-757, p. 756.
1133 Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 97-98; E. Crawford, 'Unequal before the Law: The Case for the
Elimination of the Disctinction between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts' (2007) 20 Leiden
Journal of International Law 441-465; Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 1045, p. 96.
1134 Greenwood, supra note 1111, p. 25.
1135 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (New York: Peacekeeping Best
Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United
Nations, January 2008), pp. 66-69, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
(hereinafter ‘DPKO Principles and Guidelines’), pp. 33-34.
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The ICTY has held that an internal armed conflict “may become international (or, depending upon the
circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State
intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the
internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.”1136 It may be argued that a state has
intervened in the conflict through its troops, despite the fact that those troops are part of the UN-
mandated mission. The ICTY determined that a test of control must be applied to determine whether
individuals are acting on behalf of a state, and thus whether that renders the conflict international.
Reference was made to the Nicaragua test, which requires that the “State had effective control of
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed”.1137 The ICTY determined that the
“control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of
an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group.”
1138
While both courts apply the concept of control, it seems that the ICTY has a lower threshold in
determining this control, as the ICJ held that the US participation in financing, organising, training,
supplying and equipping the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the
planning of the whole operation was insufficient to attribute the acts of the contras to the US- that is,
such participation did not amount to control.1139 In contrast, such US participation would fall within
the ICTY test for control. The ICJ has since differentiated the determination of state control by the
1136 Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 84; see also Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, para. 209.
1137 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 115; Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 100.
Additional Protocol II also refers to “responsible command” of armed forces or other organised armed groups;
Article 1(1).
1138 This test is used when a state does not intervene directly; Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 137; Lubanga
Confirmation of Charges, para. 210. Agency has also been discussed in Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoliü, Decision
on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, IT-94-2-PT (9 October 2002), with
regard to whether SFOR is an agent of the ICTY. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that SFOR merely fulfilled
its obligations to arrest and transfer, but could not determine whether or not a relationship of agency between the
ICTY Office of the Prosecutor and SFOR existed; paras. 67-69. See also T. Henquet, 'Accountability for Arrests:
The Relationship between the ICTY and NATO's NAC and SFOR', in Boas and Schabas (eds.), International
Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY, (Brill, Leiden 2003), 113-155; J. Sloan, 'Prosecutor v
Dragan Nikolic: Decision on Defence Motion on Illegal Capture' (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law
541-552.
1139 Nicaragua, paras. 115-6.
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ICTY from that of its own reasoning in Nicaragua.1140 The Court held that the ICTY reasoning was
appropriate for ascertaining state control in the context of seeking to define an armed conflict as
international or non-international in international criminal law, but not for state responsibility in
public international law, and chose to follow the Nicaragua test.1141
In a peace operation, such control is shared between the sending state and the UN.1142 Effective
control is exercised over military personnel by the sending state and by the UN. For example, the
sending state controls any disciplinary matters, but the UN is ultimately in charge of the military
actions of personnel on a mission.1143 Personnel have been financed, trained and equipped by their
sending states, but are also financed, trained and equipped by the UN whilst on a mission.1144
National case law has also held that member states of the UN still retain their sovereignty when
carrying out UN tasks and national personnel are still ultimately agents of the state, because the
“individual component forces [of a mission] have their own national duty and discipline and remain
in their national service”.1145 Therefore, given the fact that each sending state contributes
significantly to “organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group”,1146 it
could be argued that the armed conflict is international due to the involvement of each sending state
through its troops, who remain agents of their sending state.
1140 Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Gen. List No. 91, 26 February 2007, paras
402-405.
1141 Ibid. See also C.F. Amerasinghe, 'The Bosnia Genocide Case' (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law
411-428, pp. 426-428.
1142 See further discussion on control of PSOs infra, at Command and Superior Responsibility.
1143 Although this UN control may not be absolute in praxis, which may in turn support the argument that the
state is in control of its personnel; see discussion infra at Command and Superior Responsibility. States will still
apply their own Rules of Engagement (ROE) to their national personnel, and also apply a distinct interpretation
of the mission ROE; McCoubrey and White, supra note 1113, p. 146; P. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights
Law on Armed Forces, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006), pp. 227-8; B.F. Klappe, 'International
Peace Operations', in Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2008), 635-673, pp. 642-3; 655-662.
1144 The UN also accepts responsibility for injuries or damage caused by mission personnel unjustifiably to
innocent parties, with the exclusion of damage to persons or property resulting solely from military operations or
military necessity; Zwanenberg, Accountability, supra note 1032, pp. 88-89; R. Murphy, 'An Assessment of UN
Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel' (2006) 13 (4) International Peacekeeping
531-546, p. 539.
1145 House of Lords decision in Attorney-General v Nissan [1969] All ER 629, at 647.
1146 See further discussion on control of PSOs infra, at Command and Superior Responsibility.
256
The Preparatory Commission of the Rome Statute specifically decided not to define ‘international
armed conflict’,1147 and thus it is open to interpretation by the Court. However, one inclusion has
been added to the Elements of Crimes, in a footnote to Article 8(2)(a)(i), which states that
‘international armed conflict’ as it applies to all crimes under Article 8(2)(a) includes military
occupation.1148 This may help to clarify which provisions to charge under in some circumstances, as
some peacekeeping missions involve the UN acting as an occupying power.1149 In such a situation,
under the Rome Statute armed conflict would automatically be classified as international.
These arguments demonstrate that the situation is far from clear. The Prosecutor would not
necessarily have to make a distinction with charges, as he already avoided doing in the Lubanga case.
It is for the Court to determine this on the facts at the pre-trial stage.1150 The charges confirmed
against Lubanga are those of enlisting and conscripting children under both Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi)
(international armed conflict) and Article 8(2)(e)(vii) (non-international armed conflict).1151 Charging
crimes under both international and non-international was based on the fact that the Trial Chamber
found there to be both types of armed conflict in existence at different periods of time.1152
1147 Dörmann et al., supra note 1105, p. 115.
1148 The law of occupation has been applied by states in some missions, and such application has support. See
e.g. M.J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal
Framework (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1999); M.J. Kelly, et al., 'Legal aspects of Australia's
involvement in the International Force for East Timor' (2001) (841) International Review of the Red Cross 101-
139; S. Vité, 'L'applicabilité du droit international de l'occupation militaire aux activités des organisations
internationales' (2004) 86 (853) International Review of the Red Cross 9-34. There are, however, others that do
not subscribe to the concept of occupation with regards to multi-national operations; see Zwanenberg,
Accountability, supra note 1032, pp. 198-9; B. Oswald, 'The Law on Military Occupation: Answering the
Challenges of Detention During Contemporary Peace Operations?' (2007) 8 (2) Melbourne Journal of
International Law 311-326.
1149 For example, UNMIK, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, both a civil and military presence
in Kosovo; S/RES/1244 (1999). Rowe, however, asserts that it is “unrealistic… to argue that the armed forces
comprising the multinational force are in ‘occupation’ of the territory on which they are based”; Rowe, The
Impact of Human Rights Law, supra note 1143, p. 230. Yet during occupation, “territory must be placed under
the actual authority of the… army” and “the authority of the legitimate authority [must have] passed into the
hands of the occupant”, and this is in fact what has occurred in PSOs such as UNMIK; Regulations concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague Convention IV 1907, Articles 42 and 43. See also
Rowe’s discussion in Rowe, ‘Maintaining Discipline’, supra note 1113, pp. 54-56.
1150 Rowe, ‘War Crimes’, supra note 1093, fn. 102, pp. 220-1.
1151 Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, para. 410.
1152 Ibid., paras. 205- 237.
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5.2.2.3. Knowledge of Existence of Armed Conflict and Status of
Victim
Finally, under Article 8, a perpetrator of a war crime must be aware of the existence of an armed
conflict. The knowledge required is simply that of the existence of an armed conflict, and the
perpetrator is not required to have any knowledge of the category of armed conflict (international or
non-international) or the circumstances establishing the category of armed conflict.1153 It would be
extraordinarily difficult for a peacekeeper to claim they were not aware of the existence of an armed
conflict within the territory in which they are stationed. As stated above, the ultimate reason for the
presence of a PSO within any territory is a situation of armed conflict or post-conflict. Even if granted
a mandate,1154 rules of engagement and weaponry consistent only with the ability to engage in
hostilities in self-defence, this does not result in a lack of awareness of circumstances amounting to
armed conflict in the territory in which the mission is carrying out the mandate.
For some war crimes,1155 the perpetrator must also be aware of the factual circumstances
establishing the status (protected or civilian/non-combatant) of the victim.1156 The status of the
victim is to be either protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article
8(2)(a)) or is either hors de combat or a civilian, medical personnel or religious personnel taking no
active part in the hostilities (Article 8(2)(c)). Protected persons are “those who, at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the Conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.1157 The elements of
nationality and ‘in the hands of’ have been loosely applied by the ICTY, in order to avoid a too
restrictive interpretation of the definition, particularly with regard to the number of non-
international armed conflicts between parties of the same nationality. Thus a person may be granted
1153 Dörmann et al., supra note 1105, p. 122; Bothe, supra note 1101, p. 389.
1154 Klappe, supra note 1143, pp. 648-655.
1155 Those under Articles 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c).
1156 The perpetrator does not have to be aware “of the protected status under the Geneva Conventions per se,
which would be a question of law”- the emphasis is on the factual circumstances; Dörmann et al., supra note
1105, pp. 118-119; Bothe, supra note 1101, p. 390.
1157 Article 4, Geneva Convention IV.
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protected status even if s/he is the same nationality as the perpetrator.1158 The Appeals Chamber
decided that “Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations, not their legal characterisation
as such”.1159 With respect to ‘in the hands of’, the ICTY has referred to the ICRC’s Commentary on the
Geneva Convention IV which expressly states that “It is not merely a question of being in enemy
hands directly, as a prisoner is... In other words, the expression ‘in the hands of’ need not necessarily
be understood in the physical sense; it simply means that the person is in territory under the control
of the Power in question”.1160 Thus it is clear that the definition of a protected person is a broad one,
and will cover a prisoner of war, but also any person located in the territory in which armed conflict
is taking place and in general which is under the control of a party to the conflict.
Again, the situation in which the mission is conducted will provide clear evidence of a person’s non-
combatant status. The relevant facts of each victim should be examined to ascertain whether, “in
each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant
time”.1161 Encompassed within this definition would also be former members of an armed force who
have laid down their arms and are no longer taking part in hostilities.1162 A peacekeeper would have
trouble proving that they were not aware of the protected status of a young girl, or a woman
working in a brothel, located within the territory under control of one or more parties involved in the
armed conflict. The victims of sexual exploitation by peacekeeping personnel are not taking direct
part in hostilities and therefore are not combatants- they are part of the civilian population.1163
Overall, it can be seen that there are some challenges to the potential application of the chapeau
elements of war crimes to crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel. The determination of the
existence of an armed conflict and the status of such a conflict are the two biggest hurdles.
Ultimately, however, it would not be impossible to prosecute a peacekeeper under Article 8 of the
1158 Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 166.
1159 Ibid., para. 168.
1160 Prosecutor v Rajic, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
ICTY-95-12-R61 (13 September 1996), para. 36.
1161 Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 616.
1162 Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 616; Zimmerman, supra note 1119, p. 488.
1163 Tadic, Trial Judgement, para. 615; N. Melzer, Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in
hostilities under international humanitarian law, (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2009).
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Rome Statute. Once the existence of an armed conflict has been established, applying the broad
interpretation of association with armed conflict established by the ICTY in the Foca case1164 will
enable the Prosecutor to argue that crimes committed by a peacekeeper are committed in the
context of and are associated with an armed conflict, regardless of whether or not the peacekeeping
personnel were engaged as combatants in that armed conflict.
5.3. Gender-based Crimes
5.3.1. Development in International Criminal Law
The past two decades have seen a significant advancement in international criminal law of the
development of the law of crimes against women, particularly sexual offences. Crimes such as rape
and sexual slavery have become a common weapon of war.1165 After so many years of impunity for
perpetrators of these crimes, the late 20th Century brought about changes in the way the
international community views such crimes, and it has become customary law that rape and sexual
violence are prohibited in armed conflict.1166 Rape was prohibited for US armed forces under the
Lieber Code of 1863.1167 In international humanitarian law,1168 Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions proscribes outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states “Women shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any
form of indecent assault”.1169 The Additional Protocols specifically mention rape: “Women shall be
1164 See text accompanying note 1104.
1165 Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) on Women, Peace and Security, S/RES/1820 (2008), 19 June 2008;
Akayesu, Trial Judgement, paras. 416-460, 685-695.
1166 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), p. 323.
1167 Article 44, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis
Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, 1863, Washington 1898:
Government Printing Office.
1168 See T. Meron, 'Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law' (1993) 87 (3) American Journal of
International Law 424-428.
1169 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287, entered into
force 21 October 1950.
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the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and
any other form of indecent assault.”1170
Neither of the International Military Tribunals (IMT) established after World War II included rape as
an express crime in their Charters. However, a US military tribunal and the IMT of the Far East (Tokyo
Tribunal) convicted Generals Toyoda1171 and Matsui1172 of command responsibility for violations of
the laws or customs of war committed by their soldiers in Nanking. These violations included
widespread rapes and sexual assaults. In Yamashita, the former general1173 was convicted of war
crimes committed by troops under his command, which included rape.1174
Since the establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals, the prohibition of gender-based crimes against
women, and jurisprudence on the crimes, particularly sexual violence, has developed exponentially.
The crimes of sexual violence against women were of such a massive scale in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia that they could not be ignored.1175 A number of cases in the ad hoc tribunals have
become extremely prominent in discussion about sexual violence in international criminal law:1176
1170 API, Article 76(1) Protection of Women. APII, Article 4(2)(c) Fundamental guarantees prohibits “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form or indecent assault”.
1171 Soemu Toyoda, United States, US Military Tribunal sitting in Tokyo, 6 September 1949, Official Transcript
of Record of Trial, at 4998-5007.
1172 Iwane Matsui, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1948, pp. 453-4.
1173 Yamashita was formerly Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese
Army in the Philippine Islands.
1174 In re Yamashita (1945) 327 US 1.
1175 See A. Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (University of
Nebraska Press, LIncoln and London 1994); K.D. Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in
International War Crimes Tribunals, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1997). See also Letter dated 24
May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, A/1994/674 (1993), at 2, annex
Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); see
particularly Rape and Sexual Assault: A Legal Study, S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I), Annex II.
1176 See e.g., Askin, ibid.; K.D. Askin, 'The International War Crimes Trial of Anto Furundzija: Major Progress
Toward Ending the Cycle of Impunity for Rape Crimes' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 935-955;
R. Dixon, 'Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here?' (2002) 13 (3) European
Journal of International Law 697-719; D. Buss, 'Prosecuting Mass Rape: Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac,
Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic' (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 91-99; P. Viseur Sellers, 'Sexual Violence
and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of Rape' (2002) 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law 287-303; K.D. Askin, 'Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles' (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288-316;
A. Obote-Odora, 'Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution' (2005) 12 New England
Journal of International and Comparative Law 135-159; W. Schomburg and I. Peterson, 'Genuine Consent to
Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law' (2007) 101 (1) American Journal of International Law 121-
140.
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Akayesu, Celebici, Furundzija, Foca, Semanza, Gacumbitsi, AFRC Case and RUF Case.1177 Akayesu was
the first case in any of the ad hoc tribunals to address rape.1178 The ICTR Trial Chamber sought to
create a definition of rape and sexual violence in international criminal law, which was previously
non-existent:
“The Tribunal notes that while rape has been historically defined in national jurisdictions as non-
consensual sexual intercourse, variations on the form of rape may include acts which involve the
insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual. …
The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the
crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts… Like
torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination,
punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity…
“The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include
acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact… The Tribunal notes in this
context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats,
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may
constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed
conflict or… military presence… among refugee… women…”
1179
Both Celebici and Furundzija upheld the definition of rape as found in Akayesu. The Celebici Trial
Chamber agreed that rape constitutes “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person
under circumstances that are coercive”,1180 and declared that “[t]here can be no doubt that rape and
1177 Akayesu, Trial Judgement; Prosecutor v Delalic et al. (Celebici), Trial Judgement (16 November 1998), IT-
96-21-T; Prosecutor v Furundzija, Trial Judgement, (10 December 1998), IT-95-17/1-T; Prosecutor v Kunarac
et al. (Foca), Trial Chamber Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001); Prosecutor v Semanza,
Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-97-20-T; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, ICTR-2001-64-T, Trial Judgement (17 June
2004); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), SCSL-2004-16-PT, Trial Judgement (20 June
2007); RUF Case.
1178 See e.g. C.A. MacKinnon, 'Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu' (2006) 44 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 940-958; the same essay is also found in C.A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human?
And Other International Dialogues, (Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., London 2006), pp. 237-246.
1179 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, paras. 686-688 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber found that forcing a young
girl to do gymnastics naked in front of a crowd constitutes sexual violence; para. 688.
1180 Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 479.
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other forms of sexual assault are expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law”.1181
However, the Trial Chamber in Furundzija engaged in a more in-depth discussion of the definition of
rape, acknowledging the Akayesu judgement,1182 but also considering domestic laws of States.1183
From this consideration, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that “most legal systems in the common
and civil law worlds consider rape to be the forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the
penis or the forcible insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the anus”.1184 However,
the Trial Chamber found there to be a distinction in domestic law with regards to whether forced oral
penetration was categorised as rape or as sexual assault. The Trial Chamber held “that the forced
penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humiliating and degrading
attack upon human dignity”, and thus “such an extremely serious sexual outrage as forced oral
penetration should be classified as rape”.1185 The Trial Chamber went on to define rape as:
“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by
the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”
1186
This definition is more refined, more definitive than that created by the Akayesu Trial Chamber. It is
also more restrictive, a factor which was recognised by the Trial Chamber in Foca,1187 which did
substantially apply the definition, but ensured a broad interpretation of “coercion or force or threat
of force against the victim or a third person”. The Trial Chamber stated that “coercion in particular
would encompass most conduct which negates consent”.1188 A definition of the actus reus of rape
was developed from the Furundzija one:
1181 Ibid., para. 476.
1182 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 176.
1183 Ibid., paras. 178-182. See also Foca, Trial Judgement, paras. 439-456.
1184 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 181.
1185 Ibid., para. 183.
1186 Ibid., para. 185.
1187 Foca, Trial Judgement, para. 438.
1188 Ibid., para. 459.
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“the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the
penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the
victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free
will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”
1189
The mens rea of the crime was held to be “the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim”.1190 The notable difference between the
Furundzija and Foca definitions is that any reference to force or threat of force, as found in
Furundzija, has been removed in Foca, and the emphasis is on lack of consent of the victim. The Foca
Trial Chamber held that there are factors other than force or threat of force “which would render an
act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim”,1191 such as
general circumstances that would “have the effect that the victim’s will was overcome or that her
ability freely to refuse the sexual acts was temporarily or more permanently negated”.1192 In the facts
of the case, lack of consent of victims was proven by factors such as their captivity (enslavement) and
threats of violence and death.1193 However, it is notable that in these cases, there was a move away
from the use of non-consent as a factor in rape, and a preference for coercion as a defining element.
In using coercion, lack of consent is almost irrelevant, as non-consent is to be assumed by the
coercive circumstances:1194 “circumstances prevailing in most cases charged under international
criminal law, as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, will be almost universally
coercive, thus vitiating true consent”.1195
Other than rape, Foca also involved accusations of forced naked dancing, which were charged as
outrages upon personal dignity.1196 Victims were forced to strip and to dance naked in front of the
defendant Kovac and other men. The Trial Chamber held this to be a “painful and humiliating
1189 Ibid., para. 460.
1190 Ibid.
1191 Ibid., paras. 438, 459.
1192 Ibid., para. 452.
1193 Ibid., e.g., paras. 646-647; 739-741.
1194 E.g. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, paras. 686-688; MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape’, supra note 1178, p. 951.
1195 Prosecutor v Muhimana, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005), para. 546.
1196 Foca, Trial Judgement, paras. 766-774; 782.
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experience for the three women involved, even more so because of their young age”.1197 The
defendants were also found guilty of enslavement, as many of the victims were enslaved in
apartments by the defendants, in order to do household duties, but principally to provide sexual
services for the defendants and other men.1198
In Furundzija, the Trial Chamber referred to sexual violence other than rape:
“international criminal rules punish not only rape but also any serious sexual assault falling short
of actual penetration. It would seem that the prohibition embraces all serious abuses of a sexual
nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of
force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”
1199
The Akayesu Trial Chamber held that forcing a young woman to undress and do gymnastics naked in
a public courtyard constituted sexual violence, which fell within the scope of other inhumane acts,
outrages upon personal dignity, and serious bodily or mental harm as set forth in the ICTR Statute.
The Tribunal defined sexual violence as “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person
under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the
human body and may include acts which do involve penetration or even physical contact.”1200
The SCSL has also addressed certain gender-based crimes- rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage.
The SCSL’s development of the crime of forced marriage has been quite prominent. In the AFRC Case,
the trial judgement held that forced marriage was not a separate crime against humanity, and that
the elements constituted sexual slavery.1201 This decision was appealed by the Prosecutor and
reversed by the Appeals Chamber, which established forced marriage as a separate crime against
humanity, falling under the category of ‘other inhumane acts’- rather than ‘sexual violence’.1202 The
reason for this categorisation was the finding that the crime is not necessarily sexual in nature, and
1197 Ibid., para. 773.
1198 Ibid., e.g. para. 782.
1199 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 186.
1200 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, para. 688.
1201 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), SCSL-2004-16-PT, Trial Judgement (20 June 2007),
paras. 703-714.
1202 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal Judgement (22 Feb 2008),
paras. 183-203. This has been upheld in RUF Case, Trial Judgement, paras. 164-166.
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while non-consensual sex is usually an element of the crime it does not have to be. Forced marriage
was found to consist of elements such as non-consensual sex, and deprivation of liberty. However,
the Appeals Chamber established that the two distinct aspects of forced marriage are the compulsion
of a person by force or threat of force into a forced conjugal association, and the subsequent
relationship of exclusivity which includes disciplinary consequences for breaches of that exclusivity.
Thus, forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime, but nonetheless remains a gender-based
crime, as it is women who are abducted (under violent circumstances) to be wives for men. Forced
marriage results in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim.1203
Thus what has emerged from the ad hoc jurisprudence is a very broad definition of sexual violence.
As with rape, coercion is a material element, but what constitutes the sexual violence itself is not
subject to a limited definition, and will depend on the particular circumstances of a case. It includes
forced nudity and forced naked activity (such as dancing or gymnastics), and other cases have also
determined sexual mutilation, forced marriage, forced abortion, sexual molestation,1204 and biting
and kicking of the genital area, to constitute sexual violence.1205 It has also been developed that
gender-based crimes do not necessarily involve a sexual element, as with forced marriage, although
sexual conduct is habitual.
5.3.2. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute was drafted in the 1990s, at a time following the start of the development of the
ad hoc tribunal jurisprudence on gender-based crimes. Thus, the crimes included in the Rome Statute
are influenced by some of this jurisprudence. However, the Elements of Crimes were not adopted
until 2002,1206 and therefore were able to draw on more significant jurisprudence, such as the
Furundzija and Foca rulings. For example, the emphasis on lack of consent and coercive
1203 AFRC Case, Appeal Judgement, para. 196.
1204 Prosecutor v Kvocka et al., Trial Judgement, IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001), para. 180 (fn. 343).
1205 Prosecutor v Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001), paras. 38 and 66.
1206 The Elements of Crimes were adopted under Article 9 of the Rome Statute, which provides for Elements of
Crimes to assist the Court in interpretation and application of Articles 6, 7 and 8. Elements of Crimes, ICC-
ASP/1/3 (part II-B), September 2002.
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circumstances, rather than force, as developed in Furundzija and Foca, is echoed in the Elements of
Crimes.1207
Under Article 7(g) of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity include “rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity”.1208 The definitions of these crimes found in Article 7(g) apply to the same
crimes found under Article 8, as war crimes. Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) includes almost identical crimes as
war crimes in international armed conflict: “Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”. The text of Article
8(2)(e)(vi) (non-international armed conflict) is the same except the last phrase is “any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions”. Thus, there are six main categories of sexual offences1209 under the Rome Statute:
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and sexual
violence.
To determine whether any of these could be applicable to the sexual exploitation and abuse
misconduct committed by peacekeeping personnel as addressed in this thesis, the individual
definitions of the four relevant crimes (rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and sexual
violence) must be examined. The definitions of the crimes are found in the Elements of Crimes.
5.3.2.1. Rape
The elements of rape under the Rome Statute are as follows:
1207 See discussion below on elements of crimes for rape, enforced prostitution and sexual violence.
1208 A definition is provided for forced pregnancy in Article 7(2)(f): “"Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful
confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”
1209 The sexual offences were included in the Rome Statute after the intensive lobbying of the Women’s Caucus
for Gender Justice in the ICC, a coordinated group of NGOs. They are sometimes referred to as the ‘gender
crimes’, although, with the exception of forced pregnancy, the application of the sexual offences is gender-
neutral. See M. Cottier, 'Article 8 War crimes para. 2(b)(xxii)', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-
Baden 2008), , pp. 435-6. A footnote to the elements of rape notes that “[t]he concept of “invasion” is intended
to be broad enough to be gender-neutral”.
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“1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however
slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.”
It is apparent that this definition was designed to be broad, and to capture the essence of rape as a
violation of sexual autonomy of the victim.1210 Avoidance of the word ‘penetrated’, instead preferring
the term ‘invaded’, voices the experience of the victim, who feels invaded by the act of rape,1211 and
ensures the provision is gender-neutral.1212 Reference to ‘any part of the body of the victim or of the
perpetrator’ means that non-consensual oral sex or sexual intercourse qualifies as rape.1213 In
addition, rape can be committed ‘with any object or any other part of the body’, and is not restricted
to penetration by the penis. Application to peacekeeper conduct can be demonstrated using the
example of allegations against Italian peacekeeping personnel, supported by photographic evidence,
of the rape of a Somalian woman with a flare gun.1214 This would clearly fall within the elements of
rape, as her genital opening was physically invaded by an object. Likewise, the circumstances of the
case of Ronghi, examined in Chapter 4, would also constitute rape, as he invaded the anal opening of
his young victim with his sexual organ.1215
The second element of the crime of rape is quite detailed. While the direction taken by the ICTY in
Furundzija and Foca has been followed to a certain extent, there is a distinct lack of express
1210 M. Boot and C.K. Hall, 'Article 7 Crimes against humanity para. 1 (g)', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford,
Baden-Baden 2008), 206-216, p. 210. The Foca Trial Chamber judgement recognised rape as a violation of
sexual autonomy; Foca, Trial Judgement, para. 457.
1211 Rape has typically been defined in domestic law around penetration; “defined according to what men think
violates women”. However, “what women experience as degrading and defiling when we are raped includes as
much that is distinctive to us as is our experience of sex”. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 1047,
p. 87.
1212 E. La Haye, 'Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)', in Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley, NY 2001), 187-198, p. 188.
1213 The terminology retains a gender-neutral phrasing, enabling male rape to be prosecuted under this provision.
1214 Lea Thompson, ‘Disturbing the Peace’, Dateline NBC, MSNBC (22 January 1999).
1215 United States v Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635, (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2003); United States v Ronghi,
60 M.J. 83, 86 (C.A.A.F. 2004). See supra, Chapter 4.
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reference to ‘lack of consent’. The requirement of lack of consent may possibly be implied from the
wording of the second element, as the Preparatory Commission did recognise that consent was an
inherent element of the crime of rape.1216 However, the ultimate decision was not to phrase the
second element in terms of consent,1217 and thus this leads to uncertainty as to whether the ICC can
or should consider lack of consent as such as an element of the crime. Despite this, it must be
remembered that the Elements of Crimes are not binding, but form guidance, and the Court is not
precluded from taking a more expansive interpretation of what constitutes the crimes under the
Rome Statute in its judgements.1218 From this perspective, it is open to the Court to regard ‘lack of
consent’ as an element of rape. Cassese has interpreted ‘coercion, or force, or threat of force’ “in
essence [to] imply or mean” ‘lack of consent’, and thus views the two definitions as “in substance
equivalent”.1219 It is true that, as has been shown in Chapter 4 and above, some case law has used
the terms ‘lack of consent’ and ‘coercion’ in a manner which could be seen as interchangeable.1220
However, to grant the same meaning to non-consent and coercion is inaccurate. In Muhimana, the
ICTR clearly separated consent and coercion, viewing coercion as “an element that may obviate the
relevance of consent as an evidentiary factor in the crime of rape”.1221
As MacKinnon points out, there is a distinction between consent and coercion: “emphasis on
nonconsent as definitive of rape views the crime fundamentally as a deprivation of sexual freedom, a
denial of individual self-acting. Emphasis on coercion as definitive… sees rape fundamentally as a
crime of inequality, whether of physical or other force, status or relation.”1222 This differentiation also
exists in the application in a court:
“Consent definitions accordingly have proof of rape turn on victim and perpetrator mental state:
who wanted what, who knew what when… Coercion definitions by distinction turn on proof of
1216 Cottier, supra note 1209, p. 440.
1217 La Haye, supra note 1212, p. 189.
1218 Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute: “Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and
application of articles 6, 7 and 8”. Elements of Crimes General Introduction “1. Pursuant to article 9, the
following Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8…”
1219 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 1045, p. 112, fn. 33.
1220 See Chapter 3 Consent; supra text accompanying fn. 1180 and 1189.
1221 Muhimana, Judgement and Sentence, para. 546.
1222 McKinnon, ‘Defining Rape’, supra note 1178, p. 941.
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physical acts, surrounding context, or exploitation of relative position: who did what to whom
and sometimes why…Accordingly, while consent definitions tend to frame the same events as
individuals engaged in atomistic one-at-a-time interactions, coercion definitions are the more
expressly social, contextual, and collective in the sense of being group-based.”
1223
As the second element stands, the sexual invasion must be committed by force, threat of force,
coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment. This is clearly taken from the case law of
the ad hoc tribunals, which, as discussed above, moved in the direction of coercion rather than non-
consent, and the idea that non-consent is essentially irrelevant in such coercive circumstances.1224
The ICC is likely to follow the direction of the ad hoc tribunals, in which the Chambers are “free to
infer non-consent from the background circumstances”.1225 However the ad hoc tribunals recognised
that “inquiring into individual consent to sex for acts that took place in a clear context of mass sexual
coercion” makes no sense.1226 They also deemed certain circumstances to be inherently coercive-
such as enslavement, armed conflict or a military presence.1227 “The term ‘coercive environment’ can
be understood as referring to, inter alia, vertical power relations between troops conquering a village
and the inhabitants of that village or between a detained person and his or her guards.”1228 This can
specifically be applied to rape when committed by peacekeeping personnel. As previously discussed,
PSOs take place either in the context of armed conflict, or in a post-conflict society. In addition to
those circumstances, the power differential between peacekeeping personnel and the local
community can create a situation of coercion, where a woman may feel intimidated and powerless
to refuse the sexual advances of a peacekeeper. This may be defined as coercion, or as taking
advantage of a coercive environment. The coercive environment would be constituted from the
existence of armed conflict,1229 or of the instability and insecurity of a post-conflict society including
1223 Ibid.
1224 Supra note 1194 and accompanying text.
1225 Gacumbitsi, Trial Judgement, para. 155.
1226 MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape’, supra note 1178, p. 950.
1227 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, para. 688; Foca, e.g., paras. 452; 646-647; 739-741.
1228 Cottier, supra note 1209, pp. 440-1.
1229 The Special Rapporteur for Slavery has determined that “the manifestly coercive circumstances that exist in
all armed conflict situations establish a presumption of non-consent and negates the need for the prosecution to
establish a lack of consent as an element of the crime”; Final Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Working
Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during
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the lack of access to adequate financial and living resources, as well as lack of structured and
effective rule of law. Such circumstances result in trauma, poverty and displacement of the local
population- in turn creating a situation of desperation.1230 This does not generate circumstances
under which a woman has the true freedom of consent. The presumption of coercion also exists with
regard to crimes against humanity. The ICTY has held that “circumstances… charged as… crimes
against humanity will be almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent will not be
possible.”1231
If we take the example of the case of Ronghi,1232 involving a rape which was committed in post-
conflict Kosovo, the elements of force (the violence used in subduing his victim) and taking
advantage of a coercive environment (exploiting the trust his victim had in him by luring her to an
empty basement) exist. It may be noted that there is no specific differentiation within the Rome
Statute crimes with regards to the age of the victim. However, this is a factor likely to be considered
as aggravating in sentencing decisions by the Court. It is also likely to be considered in relation to
consent, as the Elements note that “[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving
genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity”.1233 It may be inferred from
this that lack of consent will be presumed in the case of rape of a child. Thus in Ronghi’s case there
would be a presumption of lack of consent due to the young age of his victim (10 years old).
5.3.2.2. Sexual Slavery
Under the Rome Statute, the elements of sexual slavery are:
“1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over
one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
armed conflict E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, (hereinafter ‘Special Rapporteur for Slavery Report 1998’),
para. 25.
1230 P. Higate and M. Henry, 'Engendering (In)security in Peace Support Operations' (2004) 35 (4) Security
Dialogue 481-498, p. 488.
1231 Foca, Appeal Judgement, para. 130.
1232 United States v Ronghi, supra note 1215.
1233 Footnote 16 to Elements of Article 7(1)(g)-1.
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2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual
nature.”
A footnote to element 1 notes that the deprivation of liberty may “include exacting forced labour or
otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956.1234 It is
also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children.”1235
The elements of sexual slavery differ from rape in that they do not require force, threat of force, or
coercive circumstances. The elements are different as the concept of slavery itself is the basis for the
crime, with the additional element being the involvement of sexual acts. The emphasis is on the
concepts of ownership or deprivation of liberty. It includes “situations where women and girls are
forced into ‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves forced
sexual activity, including rape by their captors”.1236 It is clear that the activities of some peacekeeping
personnel would amount to sexual slavery; such as the purchase of a Moldovan woman by an
American in Bosnia, who kept the woman in a house with her passport confiscated and forced her to
1234 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, 226 UNTS 3, entered into force 30 April 1957. Article 7(b) states that “"A person of servile
status" means a person in the condition or status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in
article I of this Convention”, which in turn covers “(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for
a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or
the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to
live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person,
whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in
money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value
received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by
either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view
to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.”
1235 Footnotes 53 and 65, Elements of Crimes.
1236 Boot and Hall, supra note 1210, p. 211; Special Rapporteur for Slavery Report 1998, supra note 1229, para.
8.
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engage in sexual acts.1237 Trafficking in women would also fall within the ambit of sexual slavery, as
provided in the elements of crimes footnote, covering conduct such as transportation of women or
facilitating the trafficking through procurement of false documents. Such conduct amounts to
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person, as well as a deprivation of liberty.
Peacekeeping personnel who engage in sexual relations with women being kept in sexual servitude
could be charged with aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting sexual slavery. While they may not be
the persons directly responsible for the victims’ servitude, by their engagement with the victims are
contributing to the ongoing servitude of such women. An aider and abettor does not have to be part
of a plan or agreement,1238 or be aware of the precise crime that was intended,1239 but is criminally
responsible if he “carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to
the perpetration of a certain specific crime… and this support has a substantial effect upon the
perpetration of the crime”.1240 The engagement in sexual relations with women kept in sexual slavery
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime by enabling it to be carried out and to
continue.
However, they could also be charged as principal perpetrators, as they are purchasing the women.
The purchase may only be for a limited time, but for that period of time, they are exercising the
powers of ownership by controlling that person’s liberty (including sexual liberty) for the duration of
the engagement.
5.3.2.3. Enforced Prostitution
The Elements of Crimes define enforced prostitution:
“1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature
by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
1237 M. Vandenberg, 'Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina
for Forced Prostitution' (Human Rights Watch, New York, November 2002) Vol. 14, No. 9 (D) pp. 17; 62-67.
1238 Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
1239 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 246.
1240 Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 229. See R. Cryer, 'General Principles of Liability in International Criminal
Law', in McGoldrick, et al. (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and
Portland Oregon 2004), 233-262, p. 248.
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detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’
incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other
advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature.”
This offence could be used to prosecute peacekeeping personnel who engage in agreements with
owners of brothels containing forced prostitutes, to provide protection against potential raids by the
mission, or who have any kind of involvement with those engaged directly in forced prostitution.1241
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, many women working in ‘night clubs’ or brothels are trafficked
or forced to work there as prostitutes. It has also been mentioned that, even in situations where
women are working by choice, it is not a true ‘choice’, but rather one emanating from desperate
circumstances1242- which amounts to the night club or brothel owners taking advantage of a coercive
environment.
Should a peacekeeper engage in pandering, they could be charged under this provision. This may be
a charged in conjunction with sexual slavery. For example, the peacekeeping personnel in the Former
Yugoslavia who bought women and kept them for their own sexual services would be charged with
sexual slavery, but if they also offered the services of the woman or women to others, this could also
amount to forced prostitution.1243 Any forced prostitution taking place under the conditions of
purchasing, selling, lending, bartering or deprivation of liberty would also amount to sexual slavery.
As with sexual slavery, it is possible that a peacekeeper who engages in patronising a forced
prostitute could be charged with aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of forced
prostitution, or as the main perpetrators. Without clientele to purchase the service of the forced
prostitutes, those who engage in forced prostitution would have no temptation or indeed means to
1241 See e.g. 'Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) "So does it mean that we have the rights?" Protecting the human
rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo' (Amnesty International, 6 May 2004)
EUR 70/010/2004, p. 42. UNMIK Police were alleged to have assisted a brothel owner in trafficking women and
to alert the brothel owner about a raid.
1242 See discussion in Chapter 2.
1243 Amnesty International discovered allegations of Russian troops in Kosovo bringing trafficked women for sex
work onto the KFOR base; ‘So does it mean we have the rights?’, supra note 1241, pp. 44-45.
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commit the crime, as it is the demand that makes the crime possible.1244 Thus any client is having a
substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime, and is aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in
the commission of the crime.1245 However, it would be more significant to charge a peacekeeper as a
main perpetrator. Under the provision, a peacekeeper engaging in acts of a sexual nature with a
prostitute is taking advantage of a coercive environment, and another person obtains or expects to
obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with these acts. That other
person in receipt of pecuniary or other advantage (e.g. food) may be the victim herself, or may also
be a brothel owner or panderer.1246
5.3.2.4. Sexual Violence
Sexual violence consists of the following elements under the Rome Statute:
“1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a
coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 7, paragraph 1 (g), of
the Statute/ The conduct was of a gravity comparable to that of a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions/ The conduct was of a gravity comparable to that of a serious violation of article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions.”
With the crime of sexual violence, once again there is the element of taking advantage of a coercive
environment. Of all the provisions of the Rome Statute, sexual violence is the offence under which a
charge for sexual exploitation would most likely succeed. It is clear that rape, sexual slavery and
enforced prostitution are all crimes with very specific elements. However, the crime of sexual
violence is a broadly defined one, in order to encompass a wide range of crimes.1247 It has been
discussed above how a coercive environment is created and can be presumed within an armed
1244 “International presence generates sex trade” in ‘So does it mean we have the rights?’, supra note 1241, pp.
6-7; Murphy, ‘An Assessment of UN Efforts’, supra note 1144, p. 541.
1245 Tadic, Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
1246 La Haye, supra note 1212, p. 193.
1247 Ibid., p. 198.
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conflict or in post-conflict society. Such an environment would then be the basis for determining that
sexual exploitation falls within the ambit of ‘sexual violence’ under the Rome Statute, as the act of a
sexual nature may not have been committed with force, but was certainly committed by taking
advantage of a coercive environment.
Depending upon which provision the offence is being charged under, it must also, however, be
determined whether the conduct was of gravity comparable to other crimes against humanity, to a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, or to that of a serious violation of Common Article 3. Thus
is must be proven that sexual exploitation is of gravity comparable to one of these definitions. This
could be argued using the analysis as detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The gravity of sexual
exploitation is found in the fact that it is violates many human rights of the women involved,1248 as
well as abusing a relationship that has a significant power differential. The crux of sexual exploitation
is the abuse of “a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes”,1249 and
this makes it a grave crime. An additional factor of the gravity of the crime would be the age of the
victim. Many cases involve girls,1250 and the youth of a victim has been found by the ad hoc tribunals
to be a factor that increases the pain and humiliation of sexual violence.1251
5.3.2.5. A New Provision?
While it may be argued that sexual exploitation would fall under the ambit of ‘sexual violence’, it may
also be argued that the Rome Statute is lacking in an express provision which would enable
peacekeeping personnel to be prosecuted for sexual exploitation, including patronising prostitutes.
In the context of armed conflict, sexual exploitation should be acknowledged as a crime as grave as
the other listed sexual offences. While the drafters of the sexual offences provision aimed to avoid
1248 War crimes are also violations of human rights; Rowe, ‘War Crimes’, supra note 1093, pp. 212-213.
1249 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003) (Secretary-General’s SEA Bulletin, 2003).
1250 Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005), A/59/661.
1251 Foca, Trial Judgement, para. 773. In addition, the vulnerability and defenceless of the female victims was
considered an aggravating factor in sentencing; para. 874.
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less grave crimes such as sexual harassment,1252 sexual exploitation is a grave crime within itself, as
demonstrated by the impact it has on victims by violating their rights and abusing their trust. It can
also become something which is endemic;1253 and can be linked to trafficking and forced prostitution.
Sexual exploitation should be recognised as a crime in its own right, as it is a serious abuse of a sexual
nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person1254 by taking advantage of a
coercive environment. The elements of the crime of sexual exploitation could be taken from the UN
definition: “[T]he term ‘sexual exploitation’ means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to, profiting
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”1255 The element of force,
threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the person’s incapacity to
give genuine consent, could be included; although this should not be necessary given the crucial
aspect of sexual exploitation being the abuse of position, rather than an emphasis on force or lack of
consent per se. Thus, the elements of the crime of sexual exploitation could be defined as follows:
1. Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, or taking
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine
consent, for sexual purposes.
2. Such conduct was engaged in for the purpose of, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially
or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.
Element two aims not to restrict the definition of sexual exploitation only to profiting monetarily,
socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another, but rather to include those
circumstances as possible situations of sexual exploitation in addition to the basic element of the
crime, as defined in the first element.
1252 Cottier, supra note 1209, p. 454.
1253 Which is evidenced by the ongoing and widespread problem of use of prostitutes and sexual exploitation by
peacekeepers in mission territories in worldwide locations; supra Chapters 2 and 3.
1254 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 186.
1255 Secretary-General’s SEA Bulletin 2003.
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Thus, it can be seen that the Rome Statute covers some of the relevant crimes, particularly rape,
trafficking-related offences, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution, but does not necessarily
contain express provisions to prosecute peacekeeping personnel for sexual exploitation. The crime of
‘sexual violence’ may be seen as adequate and applicable, but sexual exploitation is a crime of
sufficient gravity to be introduced as a stand-alone, express sexual offence.
5.4. Command and Superior Responsibility
Under the Rome Statute, there are various categories of individual criminal responsibility through
which the ICC could enact jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel. The main categories, such as
individual commission, joint commission, ordering and aiding, are found in Article 25.1256 These
categories have been referred to supra in the discussion on individual elements of crimes. However,
another category of criminal responsibility which could have broad application to any of the crimes is
that of responsibility of commanders and other superiors, found in Article 28.1257 Indicting under
1256 Note that ordering is technically a method of command or superior responsibility, as an order is given by a
commander or superior. However, the criminal responsibility of ordering a crime falls under Article 25 not
Article 28. The requirements for ordering a crime are quite distinct from those under command/superior
responsibility, and will not be discussed in this thesis, as it is deemed unlikely that a commander or superior in a
PSO would actually order a subordinate to commit rape or sexual exploitation. See e.g. C. Garraway, 'Superior
orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice delivered or justice denied' (1999) 836 International Review
of the Red Cross 785-794; P. Gaeta, 'The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal
Court versus Customary International Law' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 172-191; L.C.
Green, 'Superior Orders and Command Responsibility' (2003) 175 Military Law Review 309-384.
1257 Article 28: “In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his
or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and
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Article 28 responsibility would expand the jurisdiction of the ICC over a greater number of personnel.
This is particularly relevant with regard to PSOs, and even more so the military community. The
Introduction to this thesis presented the military as a special community, part of which is the high
level of discipline enforced, by a unique system of discipline and a hierarchical structure. Chapter 4
showed the specific types of crimes found only within the military, the so-called service-related
offences, centred on such conduct as following orders. These crimes emphasise the important role of
the hierarchy in the military; more specifically the role of commanders and superiors. A PSO is
likewise hierarchical, with both military commanders and civilian superiors. The importance placed
on superior responsibility by the UN has been discussed in Chapter 3, and the adoption of rules and
regulations relating to the role of superiors has repercussions for liability, as will be demonstrated in
this section.
In this section, ‘command responsibility’ will be used to refer to responsibility of military
commanders, and ‘superior responsibility’ will refer to responsibility of civilian superiors. This section
will briefly outline the development of command/superior responsibility in international criminal law,
before summarising the elements of command and superior responsibility under the Rome Statute.
The application of Article 28 to PSOs will then be discussed.
5.4.1. Development of Command/Superior Responsibility in
International Criminal Law
“The criminal responsibility of commanders for war crimes committed by their subordinates, based
on the commanders’ failure to take measures to prevent or punish the commission of such crimes is
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.”
Command “is the authority lawfully exercised by a commander over his or her subordinates by virtue of the rank
or appointment held. Command provides the authority and responsibility for effectively planning and executing
the employment of assigned resources to accomplish the mission.” Control “is the process through which the
commander, assisted by staff, organises, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the assigned forces.” R.
Murphy, 'Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian and Irish Forces'
(1999) 4 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 41-73, p. 48.
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a long-standing rule of customary international law.”1258 Since World War II there has been case law
in international criminal law dealing with command/superior responsibility, which has developed
several elements of the doctrine.
Command/superior responsibility requires that there is a superior-subordinate relationship. This
relationship can be in a military hierarchy or the superior can be a civilian. The status of the
relationship is determined by whether the commander/superior had effective control over the
subordinate: “actual possession, or non-possession, of powers of control over the actions of
subordinates”.1259 In Blaskic, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that “where a person has the material
ability to prevent or punish crimes committed by others, that person must be considered a
superior”.1260 The commander/subordinate relationship does not have to be de jure authority, but
can be de facto, which is “sufficient to occasion liability of the commander” (or superior).1261 What it
is important is the “actual possession of control over the actions of subordinates, in the sense of
material ability to prevent and punish the commission of crimes, as the crucial criterion”.1262 Thus “it
is a commander’s degree of effective control, his material ability, which will guide the [Court] in
determining whether he reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to
punish the perpetrator”.1263 The ICC has noted that other factors may be taken into account,
including official position; the power to issue or give orders; the capacity to ensure compliance with
the orders; the commander’s military position and associated tasks; the capacity to order forces or
units to participate in hostilities; the capacity to change command structure; the power to promote,
1258 Henckaerts and Doswald-BeckJ.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), supra note 1166, p. 559.
1259 Prosecutor v Delalic et al. (Celebici), Appeal Chamber Judgement, IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001), para.
198; Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Trial Chamber Judgement, IT-94-14/1-T (25 June 1999), para. 76; Blaskic, Trial
Judgement, paras. 301-335; Prosecutor v Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgement, IT-98-33 (2 August 2001), para.
648.
1260 Blaskic, para. 335; Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute
on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Bemba Confirmation of Charges) ICC-
01/05-01/08-424 (15 June 2009), para. 415-416.
1261 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 1166 p. 561. Prosecutor v Delalic et al, (Celebici), Appeal
Chamber Judgement, IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001), para. 251; Blaskic, Trial Judgement, para. 300.
1262 Celebici, Appeal Judgement, para. 256. See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 1166, p. 561.
1263 Blaskic, Trial Judgement, para. 335. See also Aleksovski, Trial Judgement, paras. 73-78.
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replace, remove or discipline any force members; and the authority to allocate and withdraw
forces.1264
With regard to civilian superiors, this has been defined by the ICTY in Celebici as having “the
possession of effective control over subordinates, which requires the possession of material abilities
to prevent subordinate offences or to punish subordinate offenders”.1265 In the ICTR case ofMusema,
the Trial Chamber established that Musema exercised de jure authority over employees of the Tea
Factory at which he was a superior.1266 This authority was exercised while they were on the premises
of the Tea Factory and while engaged in their professional duties as employees, “even if those duties
were performed outside factory premises”.1267 Musema was found to have legal and financial control
over employees, as he had the power to appoint and remove employees. In particular, the Chamber
noted
“that Musema was in a position, by virtue of these powers, to take reasonable measures, such as
removing, or threatening to remove, an individual from his or her position at the Tea Factory if he
or she was identified as a perpetrator of crimes punishable under the Statute. The Chamber also
finds that, by virtue of these powers, Musema was in a position to take reasonable measures to
attempt to prevent or to punish the use of Tea Factory vehicles, uniforms or other Tea Factory
property in the commission of such crimes. The Chamber finds that Musema exercised de jure
power and de facto control over Tea Factory employees and the resources of the Tea
Factory.”
1268
The case of Yamashita has been widely criticised for its imposition of a very high threshold of
command responsibility.1269 Yamashita was convicted of command responsibility despite being
located nowhere near the troops and without attribution of knowledge of the crimes being
1264 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 417.
1265 Celebici, Appeal Judgement, para. 266.
1266 Musema, Trial Judgement, para. 880.
1267 Ibid.
1268 Ibid.
1269 See e.g. Justice Murphy’s dissent; In re Yamashita (1945) 327 US 1. See also G.R. Vetter, 'Command
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court' (2000) 25 Yale Journal of
International Law 89-143, pp. 106-108; K. Ambos, 'Superior Responsibility', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 823-872, pp. 825-
828.
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committed.1270 However, the doctrine developed somewhat in subsequent cases. A significant
distinction of command/superior responsibility from other forms of criminal responsibility is that it is
responsibility by omission. The commander or superior is held liable for a failure to discharge their
duty or obligation (to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates), rather than an act they have carried
out.1271 This is opposed to responsibility being accorded directly for the actions of subordinates
through strict liability. Strict liability removes the element of mens rea, which would result in a
commander/superior being held liable for an offence committed by a subordinate even thought the
commander/superior did not have the requisite mens rea to commit the offence (e.g. intent,
knowledge, etc).1272 In the High Command Case, the concept of strict liability was rejected.1273 It has
also been rejected in cases before the ad hoc tribunals.1274 A commander is not held responsible by
mere fact of position alone; rather, there must be some kind of intent involved, and if not malicious
intent, at least negligence.1275
Case law has set the standard for knowledge required by a commander/superior. A
commander/superior is held responsible if they knew or had reason to know that crimes were going
to be, were being committed, or had been committed by their subordinate. The ICTY held that the
knowledge could be actual knowledge, demonstrated by direct or circumstantial evidence, or
constructive knowledge, which puts the commander/superior on notice that further investigation is
necessary.1276 Cases have held that it is the duty of a commander to know about activities occurring
within the scope of his/her power, although it has been recognised that a supreme commander could
1270 Ibid.
1271 Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 1045, p. 242.
1272 Vetter, supra note 1269, p. 106.
1273 US v Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (High Command Case), UN War Crimes Commission, 12 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 23 (1948).
1274 Akayesu, Trial Judgement, paras. 488-9.
1275 High Command case ; Akayesu, Trial Judgement, para. 489.
1276 Celebici, Trial Judgement, paras. 141-146; 383; 393.
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not possibly aware of every detail of a military operation.1277 The ICTY has clarified that a commander
is liable if:
“(1) he had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes… or (2) where he had in his possession
information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences
by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were
committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates.”
1278
The Trial Chamber went on to state that “in the absence of direct evidence of the superior’s
knowledge of the offences committed by his subordinates, such knowledge cannot be presumed, but
must be established by way of circumstantial evidence”.1279 In order to determine such knowledge,
the ICTY suggested the following factors to take into consideration:
“(a) The number of illegal acts;
(b) The type of illegal acts;
(c) The scope of illegal acts;
(d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred;
(e) The number and type of troops involved;
(f) The logistics involved, if any;
(g) The geographical location of the acts;
(h) The widespread occurrence of the acts;
(i) The tactical tempo of operations;
(j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
(k) The officers and staff involved;
(l) The location of the commander at the time.”
1280
In addition to knowledge, the commander/superior must have taken necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent a crime or to punish the perpetrator of the crime. These measures must be
1277 O. Triffterer and R. Arnold, 'Article 28 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors', in Triffterer (ed.),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos,
Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), p. 828.
1278 Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 383.
1279 Ibid., para. 386.
1280 Ibid. See also G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009),
pp. 214-5.
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within the competence of the commander/superior.1281 The commander/superior will not be held
responsible if they did not have “the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of the
offences”.1282 It is the failure to carry out these necessary and reasonable measures “within his
material possibility”1283 that render the commander/superior criminally responsible- it is, essentially,
a dereliction of duty to not prevent or punish the crime.1284 However, the ICTY has recognised the
difficulty in imposing a standard on what is necessary and reasonable: “any evaluation of the action
taken by a superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the facts
of each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstracto would not
be meaningful”.1285 Hence, what measures are necessary and reasonable is to be determined based
on the individual circumstances of the case. The ICTY has held that the commander does not
necessarily have to personally mete out the punishment; that “under some circumstances, a
commander may discharge his obligation to prevent or punish an offence by reporting the matter to
the competent authorities”.1286
It is in the context of these elements of the doctrine of command/superior responsibility that Article
28 of the Rome Statute was formulated and it will be interpreted.
5.4.2. Application of Article 28 of the Rome Statue to Peace Support
Operations
5.4.2.1. Authority, Command and Control Structure of a Peace
Support Operation
Command and superior responsibility is of particular importance in relation to offences committed
by peacekeeping personnel. In Chapter 3 the importance of managerial (superior) and commander
1281 US v von List et al. (Hostage case), 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 34 (1949); 11 Trials of War
Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council No. 10 (1950); Celebici, Trial
Judgement, para. 707.
1282 Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 378; Aleksovski, Trial Judgement, paras. 81; Blaskic, Trial Judgement,
paras. 302, 335; Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 415. A superior cannot be expected “to perform the
impossible”; Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 395.
1283 Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 395.
1284 Hostage case, 71.
1285 Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 394.
1286 Kvocka et al., Trial Judgement, para. 316; Blaskic, Trial Judgement, para. 335; Prosecutor v Strugar, Trial
Judgement, IT-01-42-T (31 January 2005), para. 376.
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responsibility was discussed. This importance has been recognised, with the UN taking a compliance-
based approach and a risk assessment approach to managerial compliance. We have seen that the
Model MoU now contains specific provisions obligating sending states to take action when a
commander fails “to cooperate with a UN investigation, fail[s] to exercise effective command and
control, or neglect[s] to immediately report to appropriate authorities or take action in respect of
allegations of misconduct reported to the commander”.1287 It is the commander’s “obligation to
maintain the discipline and good order of the contingent”.1288 Fulfilment of these obligations forms
part of a commander’s performance appraisal.
These obligations offer an effective starting point from which to examine the criminal responsibility
of a PSO superior or commander for gender-based crimes committed by subordinate personnel.
However, firstly it is necessary to give an outline of the command structure with a PSO. A PSO is
multi-dimensional in its authority, command and control distribution.1289 There are three dimensions:
strategic, operational and tactical.1290 The strategic aspect of an operation consists of defining
objectives and overall planning of general operations.1291 Operational and tactical command deals
with the attainment of these objectives in the field.1292
The ultimate authority of a PSO is the Security Council, which issues the mandate of the mission, and
any subsequent alterations to this mandate. The mandate ultimately controls the direction of the
mission operations.1293 The Security Council is essentially the head of the strategic dimension of an
1287 Model MoU, A/61/19 (Part III), Annex, 12 June 2007, Article 7(2) sexiens.
1288 Model MoU, Article 7(4) sexiens.
1289 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (New York: Peacekeeping Best
Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United
Nations, January 2008), pp. 66-69, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
(hereinafter ‘DPKO Principles and Guidelines’).
1290 Of course, it must be remembered that “the detailed structure of command in a UN force inevitably differs
somewhat from situation to situation”; McCoubrey and White, supra note 1113, p. 142.
1291 Ibid., p. 138.
1292 Ibid.
1293 Ibid., p. 139. However it is the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that ultimately govern any use of force; ibid., p.
146. The Force Commander ultimately defines a mission’s ROE, although national contingents will usually also
implement their own; Rowe, ‘Maintaining Discipline’, supra note 1113, pp. 59-62.
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operation.1294 Under the Security Council within the strategic dimension is the Secretary-General, the
UN Secretariat (as represented by the DPKO and the DFS1295), and the Head of Mission.
The next dimension to a PSO is operational. In the field, it is the Head of Mission (or Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, SRSG) who “exercises operational authority over the United
Nations peacekeeping operation’s activities, including military, police and civilian resources”.1296 The
Head of Mission is a civilian, who is under the authority of the Secretary-General (through the Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations). The Head of Mission is given “significant delegated
authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the political process on
the ground”.1297 The SRSG “is responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire [UN] system in
the field”.1298 The SRSG and deputies form part of a Mission Leadership Team (MLT), which is
comprised of the heads of the major functional components of the mission, and is responsible for
“overseeing the implementation of the mission’s activities”.1299
Military personnel are “under the operational control of the United Nations Force Commander or
head of military component, but not under United Nations command”.1300 However, contingent
commanders and their personnel are to report to the Force Commander, and to act according to the
Force Commander’s orders and directions, and not on national direction;1301 although, as previously
discussed, national contingent commanders are responsible for discipline and good order of their
contingent members.1302 Thus, after the Head of Mission and the MLT, the component heads
1294 J.W. Houck, 'The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in the Era of "Peace Enforcement"'
(1993-1994) 4 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 1-69, p. 23.
1295 The DPKO provides policy guidance and strategic direction; the DFS provides logistical and administrative
support. DPKO Principles and Guidelines, p. 66.
1296 Ibid., p. 68.
1297 Ibid.
1298 Ibid.
1299 Ibid.
1300 Ibid.
1301 Consultation with national commanders on operational issues has been deemed ‘indispensable’, provided
such consultations do “not lead to delays in the execution of tasks or prevent the Mission from retaining the
necessary operational flexibility”; Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/832 (24 August 2000), para. 47.
1302 Model MoU, Article 7 ter Discipline; Article 7 quinquiens Exercise of jurisdiction by the Government.
Houck, supra note 1294, p. 26.
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(commanders or civilian superiors) constitute the final element of the operational dimension. The
military component heads are appointed by the Force Commander.
The component heads form the highest level in the final dimension of a mission- tactical. Underneath
the component heads, there are military units, civilian units, and police units. Civilian regional offices
also fall within the tactical sphere, although these are not directly connected to the component
heads.
Thus, the authority, command and control structure is constructed as following:
Figure 1 Authority, Command and Control in Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations
1303
The command and control structure thus seems fairly structured and straight-forward. Ultimate
individual responsibility lies with the Head of Mission; ultimate military responsibility with the Force
1303 Figure from DPKO Principles and Guidelines, p. 66.
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Commander. Under both, there are deputy civilian superiors and military commanders. However,
while the structure may seem straight-forward, in praxis applying the criteria of Article 28 may be
problematic, particularly with regard to military command.
5.4.2.2. Command Responsibility
The first requirement of Article 28(a) is that there exists a superior-subordinate relationship. The
most important aspect of this relationship is not the rank of the superior, but the fact that the
commander had command or authority over the subordinate.1304 Command results in responsibility
for those subordinates underneath a commander. The existence of this relationship is inextricably
linked to the concepts of command, authority and control, as it is these aspects that demonstrate the
existence of the relationship.1305 If the person responsible is ‘effectively acting as a military
commander’, this will be demonstrated by their effective command or authority and control, and this
expression indicates that de facto command or authority is sufficient under Article 28.1306 A military
commander is a person “formally or legally appointed to carry out a military commanding function
(i.e., de jure commanders)... irrespective of their rank or level”,1307 whereas those ‘effectively acting
as a military commander’ encompasses “superiors who have authority and control over regular
government forces such as armed police units or irregular forces (non-government forces) such as
rebel groups, paramilitary units including, inter alia, armed resistance movements and militias that
follow a structure of military hierarchy or a chain of command”.1308 The commander must exercise
effective command or authority “at least when the crimes were about to be committed”, and at the
time of the commission of the crime.1309
A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander will be held criminally
responsible for crimes committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
1304 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 856.
1305 Ibid., p. 857.
1306 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 409.
1307 Ibid., para. 408.
1308 Ibid., para. 410.
1309 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 419.
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forces.1310 Thus, in the case where a subordinate peacekeeper commits a crime, in order to establish
command responsibility, the person or persons who exercise effective command and control, or
effective authority and control, over that subordinate, need(s) to be determined.1311
The use of both ‘command’ and ‘authority’ provides for different superior-subordinate relationships.
Command is the power to issue orders.1312 A superior may have authority but not command, but
remains responsible for crimes by subordinates. The command or authority and control must be
effective. This phrasing allows for both de jure and de facto command or authority. A de jure
commander is not per se adequate. A commander who does not exercise effective command or
authority and control may not be held responsible for crimes committed by superiors because the
crimes were outside of their ability to prevent or report.1313 In contrast, a person with no official rank
may exercise de facto command or authority and control over others, resulting in a superior-
subordinate relationship. Hence, the particular circumstances of command or authority and control
of each case must be examined to determine whether a commander held a position in which they
exercised effective command or authority and control that would attract responsibility.1314 This
would include considering the extent of the command or authority and control- what behaviour was
encompassed within the parameters of the command or authority and control? It may be questioned
whether the command or authority and control cover only work-related behaviour or if it also
includes other activities. In a military setting, as has been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, acts
committed in a soldier’s free time are usually still considered within the parameters of military
discipline, as military personnel are always representing the military, particularly so when serving
overseas.1315
1310 Article 28(a) Rome Statute (emphasis added).
1311 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 414.
1312 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsiblity’, supra note 1269, p. 857.
1313 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, pp. 825-6; 828.
1314 Ibid., p. 826.
1315 See e.g. Re Colonel Aird; Ex-parte Alpert [2004] HCA 44; 220 CLR 308; 209 ALR 311, discussed supra
Chapter 4.
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Command responsibility is a crime by omission- failure to act- rather than a crime committed by
positive actions.1316 To fulfil duties that demonstrate control is properly exercised, a commander
must
“ensure his forces are adequately trained in IHL; ensure that due regard is paid to IHL in
operational decision making; ensure that an effective reporting system is established so that he
or she is informed of incidents when violations of IHL might have occurred; monitor the reporting
system to ensure it is effective; and take corrective action when he or she becomes aware that
violations are about to occur or have occurred”.
1317
Requiring a commander to fulfil certain duties indicates that responsibility is attributed when the
crime would not have been committed but for the failure of the commander.1318 The crime would not
have occurred had the commander fulfilled his duties; as such actions would have prevented the
crime from occurring.1319 However, responsibility is also attributed when “the superior’s failure of
supervision [merely] increases the risk that the subordinates commit certain crimes”.1320 It must also
be noted that the crime must have been committed; a commander cannot be held responsible under
the Rome Statute for a mere failure to exercise control if no crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court were actually committed.1321
Failure to exercise such control by a commander may be proven with regard to the duties of
commanders that are imposed by the UN, including under the MoU, which specifically obligates the
sending state to take action if a commander fails to exercise effective command and control.1322
Given that commanders are tasked with the implementation of programmes and policies of the UN
for the prevention of SEA; and they are being assessed on how they perform these duties, it is clear
what method and means of control and authority commanders have and are expected to carry out in
1316Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, p. 823; Mettraux, supra note 1280, pp. 37-53, 269.
1317 Ibid., p. 822, citing Fenrick in the 1st edition of the same book.
1318 This is an element of causation; ibid. Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, pp. 835-6; Mettraux, supra note
1280, pp. 87-89.
1319 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 860. This is distinct from the commander’s or
superior’s action causing the crime; B. Swart, 'Modes of International Criminal Liability', in Cassese (ed.), The
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009), 82-93, p. 88.
1320 Ibid., p. 860; Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 425.
1321 Thus a commander cannot be held responsible for an attempted crime that was not carried out due to the
interception of the commander; Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, pp. 827-8.
1322 Model MoU, Article 7(2) sexiens; the language used echoes that of Article 28 Rome Statute.
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order to prevent and ensure accountability for SEA.1323 Thus, they have the material ability and
power to prevent and punish SEA.1324 The Prosecutor would be able to use this as evidence
(particularly the UN assessments of performance) to determine whether a commander had failed to
exercise control over the forces.
Failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures is the second element of omission triggering
responsibility, and is the crux of command/superior responsibility.1325 A commander who fails to
exercise effective control but does take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress
the crimes or to submit the matter to the competent authorities will not be held responsible when
subordinates have committed crimes. The failure to take necessary and reasonable measures can be
committed intentionally or with negligence. The necessary and reasonable measures must be within
the legal competence and the material possibility of the commander.1326 Such measures may include
the duties mentioned above of ensuring training in and application of IHL, establishment of an
effective reporting system, monitoring the system, and taking action for violations.1327
The failure to prevent or repress or submit to the competent authorities follows the principle
detailed above that command responsibility is based on a failure to act rather than imputed liability
for the subordinate’s actions.1328 Thus the mens rea required is one of negligence rather than intent,
differentiating Article 28 responsibility from Article 25 criminal responsibility.1329
Prevention of a crime takes priority over actions to punish an act. “Obviously, where the accused
knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit crimes and failed to prevent
them, he cannot make up for the failure to act by punishing the subordinates afterwards.”1330
Prevention of a crime stops the crime when it has not yet been committed. Repression of a crime
1323 See supra Chapter 3.
1324 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, paras. 415-416.
1325 Cryer, ‘General Principles’, supra note 1240, p. 261.
1326 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 861.
1327 See text accompanying note 1317; Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 438.
1328 M. Lippman, 'Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility' (2001) 9 Tulsa
Journal of Comparative & International Law 1-93, p. 86.
1329 Criminal responsibility under Article 25 requires intent and knowledge; Article 30 Mental element.
1330 Blaskic, Trial Judgement, para. 336. See also Additional Protocol I, Articles 86 & 87.
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takes place by a commander when a crime is already in the process of being committed. Reporting of
the crime to the competent authorities takes place after the fact, with the aim of reporting intended
to ultimately result in punishment of the offender through triggering of investigation.1331
It is notable that Article 28 only requires a commander to prevent or repress the commission of
crimes, or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. This
is in contrast to the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, which expressly include command responsibility
for failure to punish.1332 It is also distinct from customary law, which has developed the requirement
to punish perpetrators of international crimes.1333 However, the ICC has elected to interpret ‘repress’
as encompassing two separate duties at two different stages of the commission of the crimes- a duty
to stop ongoing crimes, and to punish forces after the commission of crimes.1334 The duty to punish
may involve the commander taking necessary measures or by referring the matter to the competent
authorities, and which duty is applicable will depend upon the circumstances of the case.1335
Command responsibility may ultimately be attributed to the Force Commander, as it is the Force
Commander who issues all of the orders for a mission. All military personnel are under the
operational control of the Force Commander, who is therefore responsible for directing the
behaviour of all mission military personnel. In this regard, the Force Commander must take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the
commission,1336 by issuing orders or directives to mission personnel detailing prohibited behaviour,
off-limits locations, and consequences for any violations of these orders.
In addition, if the Force Commander knew, or should have known1337 that military personnel were
committing or about to commit such crimes, s/he would be under an obligation to take action to
prevent such crimes through his/her position as Force Commander. The knowledge requirement of
1331 Mettraux, supra note 1280, pp. 67, 250-2.
1332 ICTY (Article 7(3)), ICTR (Article 6(3)) and SCSL (Article 6(3)), and the Law on the ECCC (Article 29).
1333 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 1166, p. 558-563; Additional Protocol I, Article 87(1).
1334 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 439-440.
1335 Ibid., paras. 440-1.
1336 Article 28(a)(ii) Rome Statute.
1337 Article 28(a)(i) Rome Statute.
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Article 28 is likely to follow that of the ad hoc tribunal case law: actual knowledge, demonstrated by
direct or circumstantial evidence. The determination of knowledge could be ascertained through,
inter alia, the elements listed by the ICTY in Celebici.1338 Where a commander should have known is
likely the equivalent of the constructive knowledge element developed by the ICTY.1339 A commander
is not required to actively search for information but must acknowledge any information already
available to him, and failure to take notice of such information will incur liability.1340 What the
commander knew or should have known will depend on the individual circumstances of the case.1341
One notable aspect of this provision is that it applies to situations where forces were committing or
about to commit crimes, but not where a commander knew or should have known that crimes had
been committed. This phrasing leaves a gap in the reach of the Court, as on strict application of
Article 28, it cannot hold a commander responsible for failure to report a crime he becomes aware of
only after it has been committed.1342
The fact that the Force Commander ultimately has no disciplinary authority over national contingent
members would not bar prosecution, as the Rome Statute does not require a commander to punish
the perpetrator, but only to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution. Thus, the Force Commander would be under an obligation to refer any allegations to
both the UN, for administrative disciplinary action, and to the alleged perpetrator’s national
contingent commander for investigation and prosecution by the sending state authorities. Under the
wording of Article 28, this is where the responsibility of the Force Commander would end, as there is
no requirement to ensure that investigation or prosecution does actually take place, and no express
requirement to punish. Provided the Force Commander has taken all necessary and reasonable
1338 See supra, text accompanying note 1280.
1339 Lippman, supra note 1328, pp. 86-87; Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 864.
1340 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, pp. 829-30.
1341 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 867.
1342 This also brings into question the ability to prosecute a commander who assumes command after the
commission of the crimes and does not take action to report the matter, as he could not have been aware of the
crimes until after their commission; Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, pp. 836-7.
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measures within his or her power to refer the matter to the competent authorities, s/he has fulfilled
obligations under Article 28.1343
This logic would also apply to commanders ranked under the Force Commander, depending upon
their area of command, authority and control. Contingent commanders would likely only be held
responsible for the actions of members of their own contingent, as they do not exercise any
authority, control or command over members of other national contingent. Responsibility of any
commander would have to be assessed by analysing over which subordinates a particular
commander held authority, command and control, either de facto or de jure.1344
However, there may be problems with the determination of authority. Despite the projected
command/authority hierarchy in a mission, the reality is unfortunately that national contingent
members sometimes refuse to acknowledge the de jure authority and command (as appointed by
the Force Commander) of a commander originating from a different sending state.1345 This is a
problem that has been recognised by the UN. For example, national contingents in UNOSOM1346
were not following mission orders, but instead were following orders from their sending state
command, who were also applying mission orders at their own discretion.1347
It is possible that the Court could find that, in this situation, two commanders in fact had authority
and command: the UN-appointed commander and the national contingent commander. The
categorisation of the authority as de jure or de facto would depend on the interpretation of the
circumstances. The UN-appointed commander would hold de jure authority by means of his/her
appointment by the Force Commander, and would be held responsible based on this authority.
1343 Ibid., p. 839.
1344 RUF Case, para. 366; Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 443.
1345 There may be an “override” of force commanders orders by national contingent commanders, resulting in
‘parallel command’; Murphy, ‘Legal Framework’, supra note 1256, p. 55; J.V. Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st
Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier?, (Routledge, Oxon 2006), p. 121.
1346 United Nations Operation in Somalia.
1347 The UN found “this made them unreliable in the mission area and reduced the mission's effectiveness”; The
Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) April 1992 -
March 1995, paras. 44-46, available at
<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/UNOSOM.pdf>. See also C. Gray,
'Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN?' (2001) 6 Journal of Conflict
and Security Law 267-288, p. 281; Zwanenberg, Accountability, supra note 1032, pp. 40-41.
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Should that commander carry out their control effectively, they would be criminally responsible
based on their obligation to prevent or report crimes. However, in praxis the UN-appointed
commander may hold no effective authority and control, and thus may not be held responsible for
the actions of subordinates.1348 This may be evidenced by the fact that subordinates were not
following the commander’s orders. As held in Celebici, a commander must have actual control of the
subordinate.1349 Thus the national contingent commander, whose orders the subordinate was
actually following, and therefore had actual or effective control of the subordinate, could be deemed
to have de facto authority.1350 At the same time, given the fact that a national contingent leader is
responsible for the discipline and good order of national contingent members, and thus has the
effective control and material ability to prevent and punish, the national contingent member could
also be found to hold de jure authority in this regard. Given the fact that a contingent member is
receiving orders from two sources, the national commander and the UN commander,1351 the result is
that there are two different commanders who may be held responsible for the actions of the
subordinate.
Yet responsibility only attaches if the commander knew (actual knowledge)1352 or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known (negligence in failing to acquire knowledge)1353 about
the commission of the crime(s).1354 There are multiple factors that the ICC is likely to take into
account when considering the actual knowledge of a commander. Aspects such as logistics,
geographical location, widespread occurrence of the acts, and the location of the commander at the
time1355 will be particularly relevant in relation to a PSO, but may greatly differ between missions,
owing to the circumstances at the time. For example, some missions are located in geographically
1348 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, p. 826; Mettraux, supra note 1280, pp. 122-3.
1349 Celebici, Appeal Judgement, para. 255. This control may be direct or indirect; ibid., para. 252.
1350 One state example is that of Canada, which deems that national command is never withdrawn during any
international operation; Murphy, ‘Legal Framework’, supra note 1256, pp. 41-2.
1351 Tittemore, supra note 1113, p. 80.
1352 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 429.
1353 Ibid., para. 432.
1354 Article 28(a)(i) Rome Statute.
1355 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, para. 431.
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small areas, and do not have a large number of personnel involved. In such a situation, a higher level
of knowledge of the Force Commander and other commanders would be expected. For a mission
located in an expansive territory (such as the DRC), where units are spread far and wide, it may be
less practical for a Force Commander to have knowledge of details of all unit operations. In this latter
case, it would be more likely to be unit commanders who would bear responsibility for crimes
committed by subordinates. However, in general, the military, and a PSO, are organised structures
with established reporting and monitoring systems, rendering it simple to prove actual
knowledge.1356
However, even in the latter case, this would not necessarily absolve the Force Commander of
responsibility. It is the responsibility of commanders, including the Force Commander, to be aware of
locations designated as off-limits (especially considering that these are also off-limits to
commanders), and to maintain awareness that such off-limits orders are being adhered to. It is the
responsibility of national commanders to ensure conduct and discipline, and therefore to maintain
knowledge that orders and directive relating to conduct and discipline are being implemented and
followed by their subordinates. Therefore, if officers are frequenting a ‘night club’ or bar where it is
known that trafficked women are forced to work as prostitutes, or where prostitution in general
takes place, commanders should be aware of this activity and take steps to stop it. For example, in
the case of Russian soldiers bringing trafficked women onto their KFOR base, “allegedly disguised in
Russian army uniforms”, for sex work, this activity would be within the knowledge of commanders,
as it was taking place on the KFOR base itself.1357
5.4.2.3. Superior Responsibility
Superior responsibility is the responsibility of non-military, or civilian, leaders for crimes committed
by subordinates. The existence of this relationship is also determined in the same manner as a
commander-subordinate relationship, by examining effective authority and control.
1356 Ibid.
1357 ‘So does it mean we have the rights?’, supra note 1241, pp. 44-45.
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Within the UN, this will include all levels of superiors up to the SRSG, and possibly even the
Secretary-General. As with commanders, a superior must also have effective authority and control
over the subordinates in question.1358 This provision is similar to the one under Article 28(a), with the
notable difference that there is no requirement of effective command and control. The difference is
due to the fact that superior-subordinate relationships differ from commander-subordinate
relationships. Command is a military concept without application in a non-military context. Another
distinction is that there are likely to be more limitations on the scope of authority and control of a
superior.1359 It may be determined that a subordinate’s behaviour in the workplace is the only
conduct under the effective authority and control of a superior, while actions committed outside this
time and location do not fall within the authority and control of the superior.1360
There is an additional requirement of superior responsibility, namely that the crimes were within the
effective responsibility and control of the superior. This requirement is linked to the concept of
effective authority and control. This additional element is again due to the fact that superior-
subordinate relationships are very different to military relationships, in which commanders generally
exercise authority and control over all areas of a soldier’s conduct.1361 With regard to civilian
superiors, if the crimes were not within the competence of the superior to control, they cannot be
held responsible.1362 A failure to exercise control properly will be determined in the same manner as
those under command responsibility, although duties of a civilian superior may be determined to be
different to those of a military commander.1363 Again, this will depend on the particular role and
status of the superior.
1358 Article 28(b).
1359 Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 858.
1360 Ibid., p. 858 ; see also Museuma, Trial Judgement, para. 880, as discussed supra.
1361 Vetter, however, believes this renders Article 28(b)(ii) superfluous, because other aspects of the provision
differentiate the military and civilian relationships; Vetter, supra note 1269, p. 120.
1362 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, p. 841.
1363 Mettraux, supra note 1280, p. 108.
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Mission superiors are in a position to take reasonable measures to attempt to prevent or report
crimes by their subordinates due to their authority.1364 Within a PSO, a civilian superior will have
authority and control over mission civilian personnel, which includes the power to appoint and
remove (dismiss and repatriate) UN employees. Which subordinates fall within their authority and
control will depend on the exact role of the superior. Superiors have the authority and control to
prevent or punish the use of mission property in the commission of crimes (e.g. the use of UN
vehicles to transport trafficked women or to visit brothels). Superiors can thus exercise both de jure
and de facto authority and control over their subordinates. At the highest level, the SRSG has
authority and control over the entire mission, over all military and civilian personnel, and thus could
be held responsible for crimes committed by either military or civilian personnel.1365
As discussed with regard to commanders, superiors within the UN are also specifically tasked with
the implementation of programmes and policies of the UN for the prevention of SEA, and are
assessed on their performance in this implementation.1366 This clearly demonstrates that superiors
are expressly given the material abilities (and duty) to prevent such crimes, thus rendering SEA
prevention within the effective responsibility and control of UN managers.1367 It also demonstrates
that a superior is required to maintain awareness (have knowledge) of SEA misconduct, and once
that knowledge is acquired, to act upon such information by referral to the relevant disciplinary
channels (e.g. the Conduct and Discipline Unit, the Office of Internal Oversight). These requirements
and assessments would also be clear evidence for the Prosecutor as to whether or not the superior
failed to exercise control properly by taking all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her
power to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes, or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.1368 Fulfilment by a superior of his/her duties with
1364 Musema, Trial Judgement, para. 880.
1365 The SRSG does not have command over the military personnel, but only authority and control is required
under Article 28(b).
1366 See supra Chapter 3.
1367 Article 28(b)(ii).
1368 Article 28(b)(iii).
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regard to SEA misconduct would avoid criminal responsibility for not acting on knowledge obtained,
but also for consciously disregarding information clearly indicating the commission of crimes.1369
It is clear that ‘consciously disregarded information’ is a different threshold from that required by
command responsibility, as a superior is not held responsible for what they should have known, but
rather, if they consciously disregarded information. This means that a superior will be held
responsible if they were put on notice of crimes being committed (or about to be) but did not take
action on this information. The standard is generally viewed as being lower than that required by a
military commander, due to the fact that a military commander “would have far more possibilities to
receive information on the conduct of their subordinates”.1370 This ability is connected with the realm
of authority and control exercised by commanders and superiors, which is greater for military
commanders than civilian superiors.
Superiors are held responsible if information clearly indicating a significant risk that subordinates
were committing or were about to commit crimes existed and was available to the superior; that the
superior “declined to refer to the category of information”.1371 This is a criterion similar to the ‘wilful
blindness’ concept, which does not presume knowledge, but results in responsibility for ignoring
available information.1372
The obligation to not consciously disregard information clearly indicating subordinates were
committing or about to commit crimes differs from the obligations of military commanders, and is
seen as a lower threshold than ‘should have known’.1373 The reasoning behind the lower threshold is
that civilian superior-subordinate relationships are not of the same mould as military commander-
subordinate relationships. The military is built on a system of discipline and good order, and a
1369 Article 28(b)(i).
1370 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, p. 841.
1371 Ibid., p. 841.
1372 Discussed in Celebici, Trial Judgement, para. 387. Vetter, supra note 1269, p. 124; Ambos, ‘Superior
Responsibility’, supra note 1269, p. 870.
1373 This has been criticised by some, see particularly Vetter, supra note 1269.
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definitive hierarchy based on authority, command and control.1374 This is not the case with regard to
superior-subordinate relationships, which are hierarchical, and involved authority, but do not have
such an emphasis on command and control- civilian superiors do not usually have disciplinary
powers.1375 However, this does not absolve civilian superiors of any responsibility, although clearly
responsibility will be determined based on the individual circumstances of any case. While superior
responsibility for crimes of a high-level politician (such as a head of state) is more obvious, such
responsibility of lower level superiors will be more challenging to ascertain. However, within the UN,
it is the responsibility of superiors to refer any allegations to the appropriate authorities, both within
the UN for administrative investigation and disciplinary action (potentially dismissal and
repatriation), and with regard to military personnel, to the national contingent commander.
5.4.3. Conclusion
It is clear that command and superior responsibility are particularly relevant forms of criminal
responsibility for crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel. Both military commanders and
civilian superiors have an express duty to ensure prevention and punishment of misconduct, in
particular sexual exploitation and abuse.1376 In addition, military commanders are tasked with the
discipline and good order of their forces.1377 This in fact places quite a high level of responsibility
upon mission commanders and superiors with respect to these particular crimes, and would in turn
assist with prosecution as the duties of superiors and commanders are expressly articulated in
regulations and agreements, and followed up by performance appraisals. Were the ICC to be seized
of jurisdiction over cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel, then it would
be vital to explore the responsibility of any superiors and commanders, to ensure accountability at all
1374 See discussion supra Chapters 3 & 4.
1375 Triffterer and Arnold, supra note 1277, p. 841.
1376 Supra Chapter 3; Model MoU.
1377 Model MoU.
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levels for such crimes and to seek to prevent further failures by commanders and superiors to
exercise control and authority over their subordinates.1378
Criminal responsibility before the ICC is thus possible for perpetrators and their superiors or
commanders. Yet, as Chapter 3 revealed, a variety of immunities will be applicable to all personnel,
and it must be examined how immunities can be dealt with in the ICC.
5.5. Immunities
Linked with the concept of both individual criminal responsibility and command/superior
responsibility of peacekeeping personnel is the issue of immunity. Immunity of mission personnel has
been addressed in Chapter 3; an immunity of some category is attached to all mission personnel.1379
The Rome Statute was drafted with the express intention of creating a court that could prosecute
anyone for the serious international crimes under its jurisdiction, regardless of their status. Under
the Rome Statute, any official position is no bar to prosecution by the ICC. Article 27 specifically
states that the Rome Statute applies “equally to all persons without distinction based on official
capacity”, and that immunities “shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over” any
person, which includes officials of international intergovernmental organisations.1380 Article 27 is
based on the idea that those “who abuse their official position and the powers flowing from it cannot
avail themselves of that position to obtain impunity from crimes committed”.1381 This principle is
particularly pertinent with regard to peacekeeping personnel and sexual exploitation, which has
been recognised as an abuse of position and power.1382 It also stems from the rejection of the
application of any type of immunity to international crimes, as “those responsible for such crimes
1378 Particularly given the fact that such responsibility is customary law; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra
note 1166, pp. 558-563.
1379 See Appendix 2.
1380 P. Gaeta, 'Official Capacity and Immunities', in Cassese, et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), 975-1002, p. 991. See also Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), judgement of 14 February 2002
(Arrest Warrant Case), para. 61; and Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, SCSL-2003-
01-I (31 May 2004), para. 52: “the principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not
prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or court”.
1381 Gaeta, ibid., p. 990.
1382 Supra Chapters 2 and 3.
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cannot invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such
crimes while acting in their official capacity”. 1383 This is in part because the crimes are viewed as acts
not committed as part of official capacity “because they are neither normal State functions nor
functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform”1384 and in part because such
crimes are so heinous that no immunity should bar prosecution.1385
Article 27 is linked to Article 98. While Article 27(2) states that immunities “shall not bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction over” a person with official capacity, Article 98(1) prohibits the Court
from proceeding with a request for surrender or assistance if such a request would result in the
requested state acting “inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the
State or diplomatic immunity of a person… unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
third State for the waiver of the immunity”.1386 Article 98(2) applies the prohibition with regards to
“international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court”, unless the Court obtains the consent of the sending State. It is
generally agreed that Article 98(2) is intended to apply to situations governed by SOFAs1387- under
which personnel of the sending state are granted immunity and are subject only to the jurisdiction of
their sending state with regard to crimes.1388 However, Fleck argues that in fact, SOFAs and Article
98(2) deal with different subject matter, and therefore there is no contradiction between Article
98(2) and SOFAs.1389 SOFAs deal with conditions under which jurisdiction may be exercised by the
1383 Prosecutor v Blaskic, Appeal Chamber Judgment on the Request of The Republic of Croatia for Review of
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (29 October 1997), para. 41.
1384 Arrest Warrant Case, joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para. 85.
1385 “Immunity should never apply to crimes under international law, neither before international courts nor
national courts.” Arrest Warrant Case, dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, para. 36; see also joint
separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para. 85. Werle, supra note 1039, p. 31; C.
Kress and K. Prost, 'Article 98 Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender', in
Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed., (C.H.Beck, Hart,
Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), p. 1609.
1386 Emphasis added.
1387 There was widespread reference to SOFAs in the negotiations of Article 98(2); See also Broomhall, supra
note 1056, p. 148 ; D. Akande, 'The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618-650, p. 644; Kress and
Prost, supra note 1385, p. 1615; Werle, supra note 1039, p. 240 fn. 561.
1388 Supra Chapter 3.
1389 J. Paust, 'The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals' (2000) 33 (1) Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 1-11, pp. 6-7; D. Fleck, 'Are Foreign Military Personnel Exempt from International Criminal
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sending state and host state over crimes committed by sending state military personnel in the
territory of the host state. In the case of UN PSOs, Chapter 3 has discussed the UN SOFA with host
states, which expressly grants exclusive criminal jurisdiction over a national to the sending state.1390
Article 98(2) refers to agreements under which the consent of a sending state is required to
surrender a person to the ICC. Fleck rightly points out that the latter situation is not mentioned at all
in SOFAs.1391 Using this logic, the surrender of military peacekeeping personnel by the host state
would require agreement of the sending state, and hence fall under Article 98(1) as a waiver of
immunity by a state. Given these two distinct views on Article 98 and SOFAs, it will remain to be seen
how the Court will interpret the relationship between SOFAs and Article 98. However the chance for
the Court to interpret the application of a SOFA under Article 98 would only arise in the specific
circumstances where the host state is seeking to surrender a national of a sending state to the ICC, as
only the host state is a party to the SOFA. Should a perpetrator be apprehended by a third state (i.e.
not the sending state or the host state), that third state is under no obligation from the UN SOFA as it
is not a party to the agreement.
With regards to peacekeeping personnel, it has been noted that personnel fall under different
jurisdictional and disciplinary authorities.1392 Military personnel are subject only to their sending
state jurisdiction, and thus it is up to the sending state to waive any immunity.1393 Whether military
personnel fall under the ambit of Article 98(1) or 98(2), either way problems may arise. Even though
a sending state may not be willing or able to undertake prosecution of a peacekeeper perpetrator,
they may not be willing to either surrender the perpetrator or to waive immunity to enable another
state (e.g. the host state) to surrender the perpetrator.1394 Potential unwillingness to do so has been
Jurisdiction under Status of Forces Agreements?' (2003) 1 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 651-670,
pp. 656, 669. This argument is also put forward by other scholars: Akande, supra note 1387, p. 644.
1390 See supra Chapter 3.3 Jurisdiction.
1391 Ibid.
1392 Appendix 2.
1393 Article 7 quinquiens Exercise of jurisdiction by the Government, Revised Model MoU, Report of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the 2007 resumed session, A/61/19 (Part III),
Annex, 12 June 2007.
1394 Fleck, ‘Foreign Military Personnel’, supra note 1389, pp. 60-61.
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clearly demonstrated by the so-called ‘Article 98 Agreements’ that the US engaged in following the
establishment of the ICC.1395 Such agreements were made with a number of state parties to the
Rome Statute, each of them agreeing not to surrender any US personnel to the ICC.1396 In addition,
the US also succeeded in the obtaining of Security Council resolutions deferring for a period of 12
months any ICC investigation of peacekeeping personnel from states not party to the Rome
Statute.1397 However, the US was only successful in doing so for two years, as an attempt to renew
the deferrals for a third year in 2004 lacked support within the Security Council. This lack of support
for exempting peacekeeping personnel from ICC jurisdiction is heartening, but at the same time it is
difficult to envisage that in praxis states would willingly surrender one of their own national
peacekeeping personnel.1398
Unfortunately, in addition, the Security Council referral of the situation in Sudan to the ICC exempts
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state outside Sudan which is
not a party to the ICC from ICC jurisdiction.1399 Such persons are declared “subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to
operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such
1395 S. Zappala, 'The Reaction of the US to the Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: Comments on UN SC
Resolution 1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements' (2003) 1 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 114-
134; D.J. Scheffer, 'Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent' (2005) 3 (2) Journal of
International Criminal Justice 333-353, pp. 341-2.
The US also passed national legislation, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002. The
ASPA prevents the ICC from giving aid to the ICC, and it also authorises the US to use “all means necessary and
appropriate” to free US government employees and other certain individuals from detention by the ICC (which
has resulted in the ASPA being nicknamed ‘The Hague Invasion Act’); 'American Servicemembers' Protection
Act' (2002) 96 (4) American Journal of International Law 975-977; L.J. Faulhaber, 'American Servicemembers'
Protection Act of 2002' (2003) 40 (2) Harvard Journal on Legislation 537-557; M.T. Johnson, 'The American
Servicemembers' Protection Act: Protecting Whom?' (2003) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 405-484;
M.E. Lantto, 'The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Permanent Divide?' (2008) 31 Suffolk
Transnational Law Review 649-646, pp. 630-635.
1396 These agreements are a violation of Article 86 of the Rome Statute, which obligates state parties to cooperate
with the Court; Fleck, ‘Foreign Military Personnel’, supra note 1389, p. 654; 'International Criminal Court: The
unlawful attempt by the Security Council to give US citizens permanent impunity from international justice'
(Amnesty International, London, May 2003) IOR 40/006/2003.
1397 S/RES/1422 (2002); S/RES/1487 (2003). See 'Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for U.S. Peacekeepers'
(2002) 96 (3) American Journal of International Law 725-729; Amnesty, ‘ICC: the unlawful attempt’, ibid.; S.
Zappala, 'Are Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) and the
ICC' (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 671-678; Kress and Prost, supra note 1385, p. 1605.
1398 Broomhall, supra note 1056, p. 149.
1399 S/RES/1593 (2005).
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exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State”.1400 While this is not a
blanket exemption of all UN missions’ personnel from ICC jurisdiction, it does set a potentially
damaging precedent for situations referred by the Security Council to the ICC to include an
exemption from ICC jurisdiction for mission personnel. Damaging, as it will deny the ICC the ability to
exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties involved in missions. The wording of the
resolution appears to cover all personnel, both civilian and military: “nationals, current or former
officials or personnel from a contributing state”. In reality, however, this is not clear; the language
used is not consistent with the language used in other mission documents such as the MoU, where
terms used include ‘sending state’ and ‘national contingent members’ (to expressly refer to military
personnel).1401 The phrase “from a contributing state” indicates military or police personnel only, but
the terms “nationals, current or former officials or personnel” seems to cover a broader range of
persons and may include all persons involved in a mission. Therefore the practical application of the
resolution may result in debate over who is actually covered by the exemption.
For UN officials and experts on mission, it is the Secretary-General (as representative of the UN) who
must waive any immunity.1402 There is no provision in the Rome Statute providing for the Court to
suspend a request for surrender or assistance if it would require the requested state to act
inconsistently with an obligation under international law with regards to a waiver of immunity that
would be granted by an international organisation.1403 Therefore, it can be argued that personnel
whose immunity must be waived by the Secretary-General do not fall within the ambit of Article 98,
resulting in no bar of the Court to proceed with a request for surrender or assistance relating to a UN
official or expert on mission. In addition, the UN has concluded a Relationship Agreement with the
1400 S/RES/1593, para. 6.
1401 See discussion in Chapter 3.
1402 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Article V Section 20 and Article VI
Section 23.
1403 Article 98(1) expressly deals with relations between two states; Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity’, supra note 1380,
p. 996.
305
ICC.1404 Through this agreement, the UN and the ICC agree to cooperate and consult with each other
on matters of mutual interest.1405 In particular, if the Court seeks to exercise jurisdiction over
someone who falls within the ambit of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations,1406 the UN “undertakes to cooperate fully with the Court and to take all necessary
measures to allow the Court to exercise its jurisdiction, in particular by waiving any such privileges
and immunities in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations and the relevant rules of international law”.1407 This indicates that the UN expressly intends
to waive any immunity of its personnel who commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Evidently, the application of this article of the Relationship Agreement remains to be tested, but to
date other provisions of the Relationship Agreement have been carried out.1408 This hopefully sets a
precedent for the UN to fulfil its obligations under Article 19 of the Agreement and thus to ensure
that immunity of any peacekeeping personnel sought by the ICC is not an impediment to
prosecution.
5.6. Prosecutorial Discretion: The Big Fish/Small Fish Debate
and the Gravity Threshold
Once the hurdle of immunity has been cleared, there remain other potential barriers to prosecution.
Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has been afforded considerable discretion, particularly with
regard to his ability to select situations and cases to investigate and prosecute.1409 There are two
1404 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, ICC-
ASP/3/Res.1, entered into force 4 October 2004.
1405 Relationship Agreement, Article 3 Obligation of cooperation and coordination.
1406 That is, for PSOs, UN Officials and Experts on Mission.
1407 Relationship Agreement, Article 19 Rules concerning United Nations privileges and immunities.
1408 Relationship Agreement, Article 18 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Prosecutor; see e.g. in
Lubanga, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e)
agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at
the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401 (13 June 2008); and Judgment on the appeal of
the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure
of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of
the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008", ICC-01/04-
01/06-1486 (21 October 2008).
1409 See e.g. A.P. Rubin, 'The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse' (2001) 64 (1)
Law and Contemporary Problems 153-165; G. Turone, 'Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor', in Cassese, et al.
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume II, (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2002), 1137-1180; A. Marston Danner, 'Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
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areas within this discretion that may significantly impact on the potential for peacekeeping personnel
to be prosecuted before the ICC. The first of these is the status of peacekeeping personnel as ‘big
fish’ or ‘small fish’. This section will introduce the big fish/small fish debate, and then examine
peacekeeping personnel as both big fish and small fish. The second area of prosecutorial discretion
concerns the application of the gravity threshold as found in Article 17(1)(d). Prosecutorial policy and
the case law of the ICC to date which deal with the gravity threshold will be discussed in the context
of peacekeeping personnel.
5.6.1. The Big Fish/Small Fish Debate
“[T]o every woman who is raped, the fish who did it is plenty big.”1410
There has been a trend in the ad hoc tribunals to prosecute only those people in senior positions,
whether military or civilian- the ‘big fish’.1411 The ICTY was criticised for its prosecution of lower-
ranking perpetrators- the ‘small fish’.1412 In the completion strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR, both
Tribunals have been urged to concentrate “on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for crimes”, and to transfer “cases involving intermediate- and
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court' (2003) 97 (3) American Journal of International
Law 510-552; M.R. Brubacher, 'Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court' (2004) 2
Journal of International Criminal Justice 71-95; H.B. Jallow, 'Prosecutorial Discretion and International
Criminal Justice' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 145-161; D.D.N. Nsereko, 'Prosecutorial
Discretion before National Courts and International Tribunals' (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 124-144; L. Côté, 'Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law'
(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 162-186; A.K.A. Greenawalt, 'Justice Without Politics?
Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court' (2007) 39 NYU Journal of International Law and
Politics 583-673; H. Takemura, 'Big Fish and Small Fish Debate- An Examination of the Prosecutorial
Discretion' (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 677-685; W.A. Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v.
Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court' (2008) 6 (4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 731.
1410 C.A. MacKinnon, 'The ICTR's Legacy on Sexual Violence' (2008) 14 New England Journal of International
and Comparative Law 101-110, p. 106.
1411 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals also focused on the prosecution of senior leaders; Schabas,
‘Prosecutorial Discretion’, supra note 1409, p. 9. For support for this policy, see A. Cassese, 'The ICTY: A
Living and Virtual Reality' (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 585-597, p. 595; P.M. Wald,
'ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within' (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 466-
473, pp. 468-9; S.E. Smith, 'Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC's Initial Lubanga Decision and its
Regressive Consequences' (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 331-352, pp. 338-340.
1412 Smith, ibid., p. 339.
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lower-rank accused to competent national jurisdictions”.1413 The situation with regards to the ICC is,
however, not so clear-cut, as prosecutorial policy and case law demonstrates.
In following with this trend, the ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper, released in 2003, states:
“The global character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical constraints support a
preliminary recommendation that, as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its
investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those
crimes.”
1414
The policy statement apparently takes its phrasing from the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, which exercises jurisdiction over “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law”.1415
However, the Rome Statute does not share this wording. Article 1 grants the ICC jurisdiction over
“persons for the most serious international crimes”, without reference to those bearing ‘the greatest
responsibility’.1416 This Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) Policy Paper does in fact follow the Rome
Statute fairly accurately, by referring to those in leadership positions as an example of the persons
who may bear the greatest responsibility for crimes committed. The Prosecutorial Policy does not
restrict the OTP to seeking prosecution only of high-ranking perpetrators, and expressly recognises
that “in some cases, the focus of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor may go wider than
1413 S/RES/1503 (2003). See also Security Council Resolution 1534, calling on the ICTR and ICTY “in
reviewing and confirming any new indictments, to ensure that any such indictments concentrate on the most
senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the relevant
Tribunal…” S/RES/1534 (2004). See Smith, ibid., pp. 339-340.
1414 Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (hereinafter OTP Policy Paper), p. 7.
1415 Article 1 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the
International Criminal Court, 3rd ed., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007), p. 34.
1416 In any case, the phrase ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ or alternate phrasings such as ‘those most
responsible’ is a general phrase and should not be equated with ‘senior leaders’. The Law On The Establishment
Of Extraordinary Chambers In The Courts Of Cambodia For The Prosecution Of Crimes Committed During The
Period Of Democratic Kampuchea (27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006) grants the ECCC competence over
“senior leaders… and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian
penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia,
that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”. Thus there is a distinct separation
of command/superior responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, and the competence of the ECCC is
not limited only to senior leaders.
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high-ranking officers”.1417 However, this investigation is to be undertaken “if investigation of certain
types of crimes or those officers lower down the chain of command is necessary for the whole
case”.1418 It is notable that there is no reference made to the prosecution of lower-ranking offenders
(that is, a case), only to investigation. It may be possible to infer that the OTP would prosecute if the
elements of crimes committed by a lower-ranking perpetrator were in existence. However this is not
a wise inference, as in the work of the ICC and the OTP in particular, there is a distinct separation
between investigation and prosecution.1419
Article 25 of the Rome Statute provides the Court with the power to hold persons who commit
crimes under its jurisdiction individually responsible- any persons, regardless of leadership or other
position with a group, entity or organisation. This jurisdiction includes cases where the person acts as
an individual, jointly with others, or orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime.1420
Superior responsibility and command responsibility, however, are separate categories of criminal
responsibility under the Rome Statute.1421 In addition, Article 33 proscribes the use of superior orders
as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility (except under certain circumstances).1422 A contextual
interpretation of these articles of the Rome Statute indicates that such explicit separation of
categories of individual criminal responsibility means that the ICC was intended to exercise
jurisdiction not only over those in command or control who ordered crimes (or failed to stop them),
but over perpetrators at all levels who committed crimes.1423
The ICC has addressed the issue of the Court prosecuting only the most senior leaders suspected of
being most responsible, in the context of gravity. Pre-Trial Chamber I held in the Lubanga/Ntaganda
Arrest Warrant ruling that the senior position of a perpetrator as a mandatory element of the gravity
1417 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1414, p. 7.
1418 Ibid.
1419 E.g. the distinction in Article 53 between investigation initiation and prosecution initiation. See Part 5.
Investigation and Prosecution in general.
1420 Article 25.Individual criminal responsibility.
1421 Article 28 Responsibility of commanders and other superiors. See discussion supra Command and Superior
Responsibility.
1422 Article 33 Superior orders and prescription of law.
1423 Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, para. 78.
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threshold.1424 This decision was criticised as both an inappropriate restriction on prosecutorial
discretion and an element of the gravity threshold set far too high.1425 On appeal, however, the
Appeals Chamber deemed it more logical “to assume that the deterrent effect of the Court is highest
if no category of perpetrators is per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court”.1426
In fact, the imposition of such a rigid test may result in a lack of accountability or deterrence, as only
those of the highest ranks would be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. As the Appeals Chamber held,
the “particular role of a person… may vary considerably depending on the circumstances of the case
and should not be exclusively assessed or predetermined on excessively formalistic grounds”.1427
Importantly, the Appeals Chamber recognised that subordinates, or lower-ranked personnel, “may
still carry considerable influence and commit, or generate the widespread commission of,1428 very
serious crimes… predetermination of inadmissibility on [the grounds of superior or subordinate
categorisation] could easily lead to the automatic exclusion of perpetrators of most serious crimes in
the future”.1429 Further, the Appeals Chamber considered the Rome Statute itself, and that the
prosecution of only senior leaders would conflict with a contextual interpretation of the Statute: the
inclusion of command/superior responsibility as a separate mode of responsibility; Article 27(1)
which provides that the Statute applies equally to all persons; and that the Preamble does not make
reference to those ‘most responsible’, only “those responsible”.1430
It should not be presumed that the only important cases will be those which focus on senior leaders.
While the ICTY, in its final years, seeks now to prosecute only senior leaders,1431 this has not always
been the case, and in fact, cases dealing with low-ranking perpetrators have been some of the most
1424 Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10
February 2006, No.: ICC-01/04-01/07 (Lubanga/Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Pre-Trial Decision), paras. 51 and 63.
1425 R. Murphy, 'Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court' (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 281-315, p.
293; M.M. El Zeidy, 'The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court' (2008) 19
Criminal Law Forum 35-57, p. 49; Smith, supra note 1411, p. 340.
1426 Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, para. 73.
1427 Ibid., para. 76.
1428 The Court here is mentioning widespread commission of crimes, but must recall its statement only
paragraphs before that this is not a requirement of war crimes.
1429 Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, para. 77.
1430 Ibid., paras. 78-79.
1431 The completion strategy for the ad hoc tribunals is set out in Security Council Resolution 1534.
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important in the ICTY’s jurisprudence and in international criminal law. One such case is the
Furundzija case, as mentioned above, the significance of which cannot be understated with regards
to crimes of sexual violence.1432 At the time of commission of the crimes, Furundzija was a local
commander of a special unit of military police, and in fact was of equal rank to ‘Accused B’, who was
the physical perpetrator of the rape.1433 Furundzija was found guilty of individual criminal
responsibility for the acts, and not for superior responsibility, which was not sought by the ICTY
OTP.1434
5.6.1.1. Peacekeeping Personnel as Small Fish
Flexibility in the interpretation of both Article 1 and the gravity threshold with respect to the
category of persons to be prosecuted would be essential in any attempt to bring a peacekeeper
before the ICC. Peacekeeping personnel consist of people of all levels in the hierarchy, from entry
level civilians and military personnel to the Force Commander and SRSG. While reports do not detail
the rank of peacekeeping personnel against whom allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are
made, it can be assumed that lower-ranking personnel are involved (without excluding the possibility
of such crimes being committed by senior leaders). If the basic separation of perpetrators into big
and small fish, based on hierarchical rank, is to be followed, then clearly lower-ranking personnel will
be categorised as small fish.
However, even if such low-ranking peacekeeping personnel are deemed small fish, this does not
mean that they should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. The reasoning of the Appeal
Chamber in the Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal demonstrates that it is vital not to preclude the
prosecution of lower-ranking persons as they may be perpetrators of most serious crimes under the
1432 Furundzija, Trial Judgement. Another important case is Tadic, the first case before the ICTY, in which the
Appeals Chamber took strides with “a broad and innovative reading of the two categories of war crimes in the
Statute of the Tribunal, affirming that international criminal responsibility included acts committed during
internal armed conflict”. Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October
1995), IT-94-1-AR72. Schabas, An Introduction to the ICC, supra note 1415, p. 115.
1433 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, para. 262. Accused B beat and raped Witness A while Furundzija questioned
her.
1434 Furundzija, Trial Judgement, paras. 187-189. See also Prosecutor v Furundzija, Amended Indictment, (2
June 1998), IT-95-17/1-PT.
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jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, in the case where a peacekeeper has committed a crime that
falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, such as sexual slavery or sexual violence, where
there is no national entity willing or able to prosecute, the ICC Prosecutor should step forward to
prosecute- regardless of the seniority of the peacekeeper.
5.6.1.2. Peacekeeping Personnel as Big Fish
Clearly, peacekeeping personnel of senior ranking will be classified as big fish- particularly the Force
Commander or the SRSG. However, it is the argument of this thesis that all peacekeeping personnel,
regardless of rank, should be considered ‘big fish’. It is the position of peacekeeping personnel as
protectors of civilians, as those who are tasked with advancing human rights and creating a secure
and stable environment,1435 that should render them ‘big fish’ regardless of their actual rank or
position. The special status of peacekeeping personnel is already enshrined in the Rome Statute.
Under the Rome Statute, it is a war crime to intentionally direct attacks against personnel involved in
a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN Charter.1436 The
Prosecutor has recently requested ICC judges to issue arrest warrants for Sudanese rebel leaders
believed to be responsible for an attack on peacekeeping personnel in September 2007, which
resulted in eight peacekeeping personnel injured and 12 killed.1437 Given the fact that the number of
killed and injured is very similar to the number in the Iraq communication, which was deemed to be
an insufficient number of deaths and injured victims to satisfy the gravity threshold,1438 there must
be an additional reason why this incident is considered grave enough.1439 It is suggested that this
reason is the status of peacekeeping personnel- in this case, as victims. It is especially abhorrent to
attack people who are charged with protecting the safety and security of civilians, and the
1435 DPKO Principles and Guidelines, pp. 14 and 23.
1436 Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii).
1437 Press Release, ‘“Attacks on peacekeepers will not be tolerated”,’ ICC Prosecutor presents evidence in third
case in Darfur’, The Hague, 20 November 2008, ICC-OTP-20081120-PR374_ENG, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/446.html.
1438 See discussion infra.
1439 The gravity threshold is found in Article 17(1)(d). See infra for further discussion of The Gravity Threshold.
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Prosecutor spoke of how the attack directly affected “aid and security for millions of people of Darfur
who are in need of protection”.1440
If peacekeeping personnel are afforded special status as victims, then a special status as perpetrators
should also be bestowed upon them.1441 There should be no double standard as to the status of
peacekeeping personnel. As the ICTR has stated, punishment for those who commit war crimes
should “be applicable to everyone without discrimination”, as “international humanitarian law would
be lessened and called into question if it were to be admitted that certain persons be exonerated
from individual criminal responsibility for a violation of [international humanitarian law] under the
pretext that they did not belong to a specific category”.1442 If it is especially heinous for peacekeeping
personnel to be victims of crimes under the Rome Statute, then it should be equally heinous if they
commit one of those crimes. Their commission of international crimes risks the success of a PSO
through the distrust created in the local population and the global community, resulting in
endangerment to both the local population and to international peace and security. Therefore, given
the important role of a peacekeeper and the integral link between this role and the success of the
mission, their ranking or position within the mission (or their own armed forces) should not be
relevant, and a peacekeeper should be automatically deemed a big enough fish for the ICC to catch.
5.6.2. The Gravity Threshold
The greatest challenge to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel may well be
the gravity threshold. The gravity threshold is found in Articles 17(1)(d), 53(1)(b) and 53(2)(b). Article
17(1)(d) requires a case to be of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court; and Article 53
obligates the Prosecutor to consider the gravity of a situation or case when deciding whether to
1440 Press Release, ‘“Attacks on peacekeepers will not be tolerated”’, supra note 1437.
1441 In this respect, the situation must be differentiated from children, who afford special status as victims but not
as perpetrators of crimes as child soldiers. The difference is that peacekeepers are adults charged with a specific
role of upholding rule of law and human rights, and are mentally capable of appreciating the consequences of
their actions. In contrast, child soldiers are recruited unwillingly, commit their crimes under duress, and are too
young to be considered capable of truly understanding the consequences of their actions (age-related incapacity
for the true elements of mens rea is a grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility); Article 26 excludes
jurisdiction of the ICC over persons aged under 18 at the time of the offence.
1442 Akayesu, Appeal Judgement, (1 June 2001), ICTR-96-4-A, para. 443.
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initiate an investigation or a prosecution. As gravity has not been defined in the Rome Statute, the
first determinations of the application of the gravity threshold in the ICC are to be found in
prosecutorial policy and assisted by the Court’s Decisions on the Prosecutor’s Application for
Warrants of Arrest for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Bosco Ntaganda.1443 This section will examine how
the direction being taken by the Prosecutor and by the Pre-Trial Chamber could impinge on the
possibility of a peacekeeper being prosecuted by the ICC.
5.6.2.1. Prosecutorial Application of the Gravity Threshold
The Prosecutor has made clear the direction that his office will take with regards to the application of
the gravity threshold.1444 The elements that will be considered by the OTP will include:
Leaders/those who bear most/the greatest responsibility for the crimes (such as the leaders of the
State or organisation);
The degree of participation in the commission of the crime;
The number of victims (killed and of other crimes against physical integrity);
The impact of the crimes;
The scale of the crimes;
The manner of commission of crimes; and
The nature of the crimes.1445
However, what appear to be the most important of those elements so far in prosecutorial decisions
relating to situations or cases are the position of a person as a leader, and the number of victims.
1443 Lubanga/Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Pre-Trial Decision); Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal.
1444 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1414; Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal meeting of Legal
Advisors of Ministries and Foreign Affairs, New York, 24 October 2005; Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
Fourth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 28 November 2005; The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on
the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003- June 2006), 12 September 2006; The Office of
the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006 (hereinafter Prosecutorial Strategy);
Background Situation in the Central African Republic, 22 May 2007, ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220-A_EN.
1445 Ibid.
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In February 2006, the Prosecutor released a letter detailing how the OTP had addressed
communications concerning alleged crimes committed in Iraq.1446 In this communication, the
Prosecutor addressed allegations concerning wilful killing or inhuman treatment of civilians. “[I]t was
concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court had been committed, namely wilful killing and inhuman treatment.”1447 Once this basis was
established, the Prosecutor then turned to assess whether the gravity threshold was satisfied, stating
that the “Office considers various factors in assessing gravity. A key consideration is the number of
victims of particularly serious crimes…”1448 The number of alleged victims of wilful killing and
inhuman treatment amounted to a total less than 20. The Prosecutor then made a direct comparison
with the number of victims in the other situations currently under investigation by the Court, which
number in the hundreds or thousands, and determined that “the situation did not appear to meet
the required [gravity] threshold of the Statute”.1449 No further assessment of any other gravity
factors were made, such as impact of the crimes, manner of commission of the crimes or nature of
the crimes. Thus, in his application of the facts of the relevant alleged crimes in Iraq, the Prosecutor
in fact applied only one element as the gravity threshold test- that of the number of victims.1450 In
contrast, the Prosecutor has announced a preliminary investigation into “serious allegations
surrounding the events of 28 September 2009” in Conakry in Guinea.1451 The events on this day
apparently included rape and killing of civilians by armed forces, but the number of victims of rape
1446 Iraq Communication, supra note 1093.
1447 Ibid.
1448 Ibid.
1449 Ibid.
1450 See discussion of the Iraq communication in Murphy, ‘Gravity Issues’, supra note 1425, pp. 309-311; M.
O'Brien, 'The Impact of the Iraq Communication of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on War
Crimes Admissibility and the Interests of Victims' (2007) Symposium Edition University College Dublin Law
Review 109-125; El Zeidy, supra note 1425, pp. 40-41; S.A. Williams and W.A. Schabas, 'Article 17 Issues of
Admissibility', in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed.,
(C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, Muenchen, Oxford, Baden-Baden 2008), 605-625, pp. 621-2; Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial
Discretion’, supra note 1409, pp. 5-6; Heller, supra note 1096, p. 234.
1451 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under examination’, 14 October
2009. “On Monday 28 September, police opened fire on tens of thousands of people gathered at the national
stadium in Conakry, in order to protest against the junta that seized power in a bloodless coup last December.
Despite the ban by the junta, which had been announcement on national radio and television networks on Sunday
evening, demonstrators took to the streets.” OCHA Guinea, Victims of security forces crackdown Situation,
Report No. 1, 2 October 2009. The situation itself raises other issues of whether the conduct amount to war
crimes or crimes against humanity, but that is out of the scope of this thesis.
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and killing is estimated at less than 200 in total.1452 A larger number are reported to have been
wounded.1453 Thus, it seems the Prosecutor is not applying consistent standards of gravity when
considering which situations to investigate. In addition, in may be questioned what the number of
victims is that would satisfy the gravity threshold.1454 However it must be noted that the Guinea
situation is only under preliminary investigation, as the Iraq situation had been, and it remains to be
seen whether the OTP will initiate a full investigation.1455
Should the requirement of a large number of victims be continued as prosecutorial policy in the
application of the gravity threshold, then it would be very challenging to successfully pass such a
threshold in relation to gender-based crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel. Such crimes are
not committed on a massive scale; they tend to be isolated incidents; or if they are on-going (such as
continued sexual exploitation), the total number of victims would not be sufficient to pass the
Prosecutor’s high threshold. While UN reports detail several hundred complaints in a yearly
period,1456 these are from different missions around the world, which indicates that these crimes are
not being committed on a large scale in one geographical location.1457
If a quantitative approach is to be applied, the crimes could be examined in the overall context in
which they occur. Peacekeeping missions are often located in areas in which armed conflict is
ongoing, which may involve the commission of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. For example, if a
peacekeeper with MONUC, UMAMID or UNMIS was to commit rape or sexual exploitation, this
conduct should be viewed within the broader context of the ongoing crimes being committed in the
DRC or Sudan.1458 Crimes under the Rome Statute are analysed in their context according to the
chapeau elements. The rape or sexual exploitation should not be considered as an incident isolated
1452 OCHA Guinea, Victims of security forces crackdown Situation, Report No. 1, 2 October 2009; Report No. 2,
8 October 2009; Report No. 3 18 October 2009; available at http://ochaonline.un.org/guinea.
1453 Ibid.
1454 This author has previously questioned what the ‘magic number’ is; see O’Brien, supra note 1450, p. 115.
1455 See Articles 15 and 53 Rome Statute.
1456 Secretary-General’s Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data, A/58/777 for 2003;
A/59/782 for 2004; A/60/861 for 2005; A/61/957 for 2006; A/62/890 for 2007; A/63/720 for 2008.
1457 See CDU website Statistics by mission.
1458 See supra for further discussion on this with regards to the chapeau elements of war crimes.
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from the other crimes being committed, as they are committed in that context. Therefore the total
number of victims of crimes will be far greater, thereby satisfying a qualitative approach to the
gravity threshold. The ICC Prosecutor has in fact already set a precedent for lower numbers of victims
by requesting arrest warrants for Sudanese rebel commanders for an attack on peacekeeping
personnel that resulted in the death of 12 peacekeeping personnel and injured another eight.1459
Such an attack could be placed in the broader context of the on-going armed conflict and alleged
commission of crimes such as genocide in Darfur, rendering this one attack part of a large-scale
commission of crimes. This reasoning could be followed in the case of a peacekeeper committing a
crime. It would not be relevant that a peacekeeper was not a member of a party involved in the
armed conflict (e.g. government forces or rebel forces), as the crime would still be part of the overall
large-scale commission of international crimes. It is clear, however, that the Prosecutor has instead
chosen to apply qualitative reasoning, and selected the incident due to such factors as the nature,
manner and impact of the crimes.1460 This is a promising application of non-quantitative factors in
gravity decisions.1461
Even without the context of mass crimes, a single war crime should be enough for a prosecution, and
in fact such a case may have an unforeseen impact on the formulation of international criminal law
precedent. The ICTY OTP came under fire, given the limited resources of the Tribunal, for the choice
to prosecute a case that centred on a low-ranking perpetrator for his role in the rape of a single
victim.1462 Yet that case became one of the most significant judgements in international criminal law.
In Furundzija, the Tribunal found the accused guilty of rape, as torture and as outrages upon personal
dignity.1463 It was a groundbreaking case, as it was “the first international war crimes trial in history
1459 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘“Attacks on peacekeepers will not be tolerated”. ICC Prosecutor presents evidence
in third case in Darfur’, Press Release ICC-OTP-20081120-PR374, 20 November 2008; ‘Pre-Trial Chamber I
requests additional information in relation to the application for a warrant of arrest for three rebel commanders in
Darfur’, Press Release ICC-CPI-20081210-PR381, 10 December 2008. The Prosecutor has been successful in
the arrest of one suspect; see The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09.
1460 Prosecutor v Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09 (8 February 2010),
para. 31.
1461 Heller, supra note 1096, p. 243 fn. 133.
1462 Askin, ‘Furundzija’, supra note 1176, p. 936.
1463 Furundzija, Trial Judgement. This case is discussed in more details supra.
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to focus almost exclusively on the actus reus of rape”,1464 and further developed the meaning of rape
in international law.1465 Prosecution of a peacekeeper for a single crime or a small number of crimes
would likely be of great significance in international criminal law- precisely for the fact that the
accused would be a peacekeeper, a representative of the UN and the international community. It
would demonstrate that a person responsible for a crime or crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction,
regardless of the number of victims, cannot avoid punishment.1466
It has been argued that one aspect of gravity that the Prosecutor should consider is the fact that the
crimes were committed by state actors, such as government officials or military personnel.1467 This is
an excellent criterion to apply to gravity, and the example of peacekeeping personnel is ideal to
demonstrate. Peacekeeping personnel represent both the UN and their states. In particular, military
personnel remain agents of their sending state.1468 It is unacceptable for perpetrators of international
crimes to avoid accountability simply because they are agents of the state (or the UN). Peacekeeping
personnel often work in failed states- states in which people can no longer rely on the state as a
protector of their rights.1469 Instead, peacekeeping personnel are the ones ensuring these rights. If it
is heinous for the state to violate these rights through international crimes, then it is equally so for
peacekeeping personnel to do the same.
The Prosecutor should examine a case using all the criteria listed in the OTP Policy Paper,
Prosecutorial Strategy, and other statements made relating to the elements of gravity. As mentioned
above, these would not be limited to a quantitative analysis of the number of victims, but also
include the degree of participation in the commission of the crime; the impact of the crimes; the
manner of commission of crimes; and the nature of the crimes.1470 As Schabas states, “gravity has a
1464 Askin, ‘Trial of Furundzija’, supra note 1462, p. 955.
1465 Furundzija, paras. 174-186.
1466 Applying the principle discussed supra in the Introduction and Immunities.
1467 Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion’, supra note 1409, p. 10; Heller, supra note 1096, p. 237.
1468 Supra, text accompany note 1145.
1469 Heller, supra note 1096, pp. 240-242.
1470 Supra note 1445.
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qualitative as well as quantitative dimension”.1471 With regard to these categories, the impact of the
crimes has been addressed in Chapter 2, resulting in the violation of a significant number of the
victims’ rights. The degree of participation would be relevant when examining a crime that involves
more than one perpetrator, such as trafficking or enforced prostitution. In the latter offence, for
example, the degree of participation may be differentiated by such roles as falsifying documents
compared to selling a victim to a brothel. The manner of commission of the crimes may be seen in a
similar comparative light- for example, is the crime particularly vicious and violent? For example,
participation as a rapist in a gang rape is far more severe than warning a brothel owner of an
impending raid. However, in contrast, the nature of the crime may result in differing conclusions as
to gravity- the nature of the crime of warning a brothel owner of an impending raid results in a
continuation of the crime of enforced prostitution and trafficking. Each crime has ongoing
ramifications, but they differ. A violent rape results in physical and mental trauma for the victim, but
allowing a brothel to continue to function, results in more women being treated as sexual slaves,
enforced into prostitution.
One additional factor that could be addressed as an element of gravity is an examination of the
victim or victims themselves. When the victims are particularly vulnerable, such as children, the
elderly, or pregnant women the crime is rendered grave. In the case of peacekeeping personnel
engaging in sexual relations with young girls, the gravity of this is evident in that the victims are
children incapable of making valid decisions about their sexual autonomy. With regard to adult
women, while their age does enable them legally capable of decision-making, the overall
circumstances of their situation need to be examined. These circumstances have been discussed in
Chapter 2: poverty, armed conflict and discrimination create a situation of desperation in which
women have no real choice or control over their bodies or livelihood, and therefore are vulnerable.
1471 Schabas, An Introduction to the ICC, supra note 1415, p. 191; see also Williams and Schabas, supra note
1450, p. 622.
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5.6.2.2. Pre-Trial Chamber Application of the Gravity Threshold
The day after the Iraq communication was released, the Pre-Trial Chamber I decision of 10 February
2006 in the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases considered the issue of “whether the cases against Mr
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Mr Bosco Ntaganda meet the gravity threshold provided for in Article
17(1)(d) of the Statute”.1472 The decision involved a detailed analysis of the requirements of gravity,
developing what it termed a three-pronged test, requiring that conduct must be either systematic or
large-scale and cause social alarm; and that only the most senior leaders be prosecuted by the Court.
This test was, however, subsequently overturned by the Appeals Chamber.1473
In overturning the Pre-Trial Chamber decision, the Appeals Chamber was able to determine what is
not required in the test for gravity, but unfortunately in that ruling did not submit any clarification as
to what does constitute the elements of gravity for the Court to consider. The Appeals Chamber first
held that, in relation to war crimes, there is no requirement that the conduct be systematic or large-
scale. It was pointed out that it is expressly stated in the Rome Statute that crimes against humanity
must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, but Article 8 grants jurisdiction in
respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crimes. ‘Systematic’ is not a requirement at all under Article 8, and large-
scale commission or part of a policy “is not absolute but qualified by the expression ‘in
particular’”.1474 The Appeals Chamber established that to impose such a requirement would be
inconsistent with Article 8.
As to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion that the crime(s) must cause ‘social alarm’ to the international
community, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Prosecutor’s argument that the criterion of ‘social
alarm’ is dependant “upon subjective and contingent reactions to crimes rather than upon their
objective gravity”.1475 The Appeals Chamber held that the “subjective criterion of social alarm
therefore is not a consideration that is necessarily appropriate for the determination of the
1472 Lubanga/Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Pre-Trial Decision, section II.2.2.
1473 Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, paras. 68-82.
1474 Ibid., para. 70.
1475 Ibid., para. 72.
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admissibility of a case pursuant to article 17(1)(d) of the Statute”.1476 The expression ‘social alarm’
has been held by El Zeidy to be a “weird novelty of the Chamber”,1477 but by Heller to be “a better
indicator of situation gravity than the number of victims”.1478 Heller’s reasoning is certainly valid,1479
however El Zeidy has reason to criticise the choice of phrasing in ‘social alarm’. In lieu of such a
phrase, the Court would be better to adopt the broader criterion listed by the Prosecutor of ‘impact
of the crimes’.1480 Reference to the impact of the crimes can encompass the impact of the crimes on
both victims and the international community. Heller’s reasoning for maintaining the criterion of
‘social alarm’ is that investigating crimes that have an impact on the international community
“regardless of their number of victims has far greater expressive value than investigating crimes that
involve numerous victims but are not particularly socially alarming”.1481 This is because “punishment
affirms the value of law, strengthens social solidarity, and incubates a moral consensus among the
public”.1482 The symbolism of international criminal justice is to ensure prosecutions are conducted
for crimes that do shock the conscience of the international community, and crimes with a lesser
number of victims can also have such an impact. Certainly crimes committed by peacekeeping
personnel have a negative impact on both their victims and the international community, and can
even have an impact on peace and security in the region in which the mission is located.1483 In this
respect such crimes can be considered particularly grave.
1476 Ibid. This phrasing (“admissibility of a case”) had led one commentator to point out that “nothing in the
Appeal’s Chamber judgment… prohibits the OTP from considering the social alarm caused by a particular kind
of crime when determining the gravity of a situation”; Heller, supra note 1096, p. 233; see also El Zeidy, supra
note 1425, pp. 47-48.
1477 However El Zeidy provides little analysis of the term, viewing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s language as
“confusing”; El Zeidy, supra note 1425, p. 45.
1478 Heller, supra note 1096, pp. 233, 236.
1479 Ibid., pp. 233-237.
1480 Supra note 1444.
1481 Heller, supra note 1096, p. 236.
1482 M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2007), p. 17.
1483 As discussed in Chapter 2, crimes by peacekeepers can jeopardise a mission by creating distrust amongst the
local population and the international community.
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The Pre-Trial Chamber’s second and third prongs of the test, requiring only the prosecution of senior
leaders as this would have the most deterrent effect, have been discussed above with regards to the
big fish/small fish debate.
The Pre-Trial Chamber decision made reference to decisions of the ICTR and ICTY which have
addressed the issue of gravity. The ad hoc tribunals have considered gravity when addressing the
referral of an indictment to another court. In such application, pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which permits referral of a case to a national jurisdiction, the
Tribunal must consider the gravity of the crimes charged.1484 In doing so, the ICTY held that the
gravity “depends on the circumstances and context in which the crimes were committed and must
also be viewed in the context of other cases tried by this Tribunal”.1485 The Tribunal seems to have
considered number of victims, time period of the crimes, and geographical scope as the three main
factors to determine gravity. The level of responsibility of the accused is addressed separately, and is
not an element of gravity in 11 bis decisions.1486 The ICTY has, for example, considered “a single
military incident which lasted a limited period of time and occurred within a relatively confined
geographical area” as “not so serious as to preclude the possibility of trial in Croatia”.1487 Yet it has
also considered enslavement of nine women and girls over a three month period, and rape of two of
the women;1488 persecution, murder and inhumane treatment of a large number of victims in two
camps over a three month period;1489 torture and rape of 16 victims over four months;1490 and
“persecution, torture and beating, wilful killing and murder, imprisonment, inhumane acts, cruel
1484 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev 39 (22 September 2006) Rule 11 bis (C).
1485 Prosecutor v Ademi and Norac IT-04-78-PT, Decision for referral to the authorities of the Republic of
Croatia pursuant to rule 11 bis (14 September 2005), para. 28.
1486 E.g. Ademi and Norac, paras. 28-29; Prosecutor v Mejakic et al., Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 Bis, IT-02-65-PT (20 July 2005), paras. 21, 26.
1487 Ademi and Norac, para. 28.
1488 Prosecutor v Stankovic, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11 Bis, IT-96-23/2-PT (17 May 2005),
para. 19.
1489 Mejakic et al., para. 21.
1490 Prosecutor v Jankovic, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11 Bis, IT-96-23/2-PT (22 July 2005), para.
19; upheld by the Appeals Chamber Decision on Rule 11 Bis Referral, IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, paras. 21-22.
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treatment, and enslavement of a large number of detainees over a significant length of time”1491 to
be not so grave to preclude transfer to national courts.
Despite the seemingly arbitrary nature of the decisions as to the number of victims required for
crimes to be determined sufficiently grave to be tried by the ICTY, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber used
these decisions as a referential authority for using number of victims (or as it put it, large-scale
commission) as an aspect of gravity. However, the ICTY is making such decisions of gravity from a
completely different position from the ICC, a fact which did not go unnoticed by the Appeals
Chamber. The Ntaganda Appeal wisely points out that the ICC is an ongoing institution without the
constraints of completion strategy that the ICTY is working under.1492 The ICTY is forced to make a
selection between cases due to lack of time (and resources) to prosecute all cases resulting from the
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The ICC has no constraints on the time for investigations or
prosecutions.1493 There are definitively other courts in which these cases are being prosecuted. This is
not the case with ICC situations, in which no national court systems are set up to undertake
prosecutions of perpetrators of international crimes.1494 Therefore the ICC is the only Court willing
and able to prosecute such perpetrators. While the ability and willingness of a state to investigate
and prosecute is a separate issue to gravity,1495 this may be a consideration for the ICC Prosecutor to
consider- what is the impact of these crimes and is such an impact exacerbated by lack of
accountability? These issues are clearly not an element of the ICTY’s 11bis decisions. Thus the
context of the ICTY gravity decisions, made for referral to national courts, is completely dissimilar
from the concept of gravity with regards to admissibility under Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.
Therefore the 11bis decisions may be considered but should not be followed by the ICC with regard
to Article 17(1)(d).
1491 Prosecutor v Rasevic and Todovic, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11 Bis, IT-97-25/A-PT (8 July
2005), para. 23.
1492 Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal, para. 80.
1493 Of course time for trials must be within reason to ensure fair trials. It is also true that the ICC does also not
exist with unlimited resources, and is to a certain extent constrained by limited resources.
1494 This does not mean to say that this cannot happen in the future.
1495 Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute.
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Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC has subsequently stated several factors that are required to satisfy the
Article 17 gravity threshold, in the Abu Garda Confirmation of Charges.1496 While the PTC declined to
confirm the charges against the accused due to evidentiary reasons, it was found that the case itself
was of sufficient gravity under Article 17.1497 The Court assessed the nature, manner and impact of
the attack on peacekeepers in question, and specifically noted that “the gravity of a given case
should not be assessed only from a quantitative perspective, i.e. by considering the number of
victims; rather, the qualitative dimension of the crime should also be taken into consideration”.1498
The Chamber also referred to factors relevant in sentencing which could be used as guidelines for the
evaluation of the gravity threshold under Article 17. Such factors are “the extent of damage caused,
in particular, the harm caused to victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour and
the means employed to execute the crime”.1499 The Chamber considered the disruption that the
attack caused to the PSO and the wider effect on civilians in Darfur. It was concluded that “the
consequences of the attack were grave for the direct victims of the attack, that is, the AMIS
personnel, and for their families”, and had “a grave impact on the local population”. This contextual
analysis of the gravity of the crime is well-placed as a precedent for prosecuting peacekeeping
personnel. In particular, the wider effect on civilians, and disruption to a PSO caused by criminal
conduct by peacekeepers (e.g. distrust) is a crucial element in the gravity assessment of crimes
committed by peacekeepers.1500
From the Appeals Chamber Ntaganda judgment, it can be established that requirements of an
assessment of gravity under Article 17(1)(d) do not include a systematic or large-scale commission
(with respect to war crimes); any ‘social alarm’ caused to the international community; or the
seniority of the perpetrator in question. This is in fact quite positive when considering the
prosecution of a peacekeeper, who may be low-ranking and may have committed a crime that was
1496 Abu Garda, Confirmation of Charges, paras. 31-33.
1497 Para. 34.
1498 Para. 31.
1499 Referring to rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, at para. 32.
1500 Supra Chapter 2.2.5 Effects on the Mission of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers.
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not part of a systematic or large-scale commission. As now held by Pre-Trial Chamber I, the factors
that should be applied as part of the gravity threshold in relation to these crimes are the impact of
the crimes on the victims, their families, and the international community; the nature of the crime;
the position of the perpetrator in that he is a peacekeeper; and the manner of commission of the
crime.
5.7. Conclusion
This chapter has examined several different areas that may be problematic when seeking the
prosecution of peacekeeping personnel before the ICC. Gender-based crimes committed by
peacekeeping personnel may not fall within the substantive jurisdiction of the Court. The chapeau
elements may create a significant stumbling block. Depending on the circumstances in which the
crime was committed, the Court may need to take a broad interpretation of some chapeau elements
such as the nexus to armed conflict in order to find that it has substantive jurisdiction for war crimes.
This would, however, be less difficult than situating a crime by a peacekeeper as part of a widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population. Individually, rape and sexual slavery are clear
provisions, and will also cover trafficking. Prostitution-related activities and sexual exploitation,
however, will be somewhat more difficult to charge under the Rome Statute, and would require
creativity by the Prosecutor and the Chambers in interpreting the existing provisions. These
difficulties, however, do not mean that substantive jurisdiction does not exist. It would simply
require expansive interpretation and application of the Rome Statute provisions and the Elements of
Crimes.
Beyond the substantive jurisdiction of the ICC, problematic areas have been demonstrated to exist
with respect to immunities and prosecutorial discretion. However, it has also been shown that such
problems can be overcome. Immunity should not amount to a problem, provided the UN upholds the
Relationship Agreement provision in which it has agreed to waive immunity. However, with regards
to national military personnel, it is up to the states to waive immunity, and they may not be willing to
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do so. It would be hoped that states who are not willing or able to prosecute their own personnel
would waive such immunity. However, this may result in implications for the UN for troop provision:
if a soldier is sent to the ICC, states may be unwilling to provide personnel for missions.1501 Such a
consideration will have to be taken into account, but if it is a state sending its own personnel, then
that state has chosen to do so and cannot hold the UN to blame over this action.
Should immunities be waived, there is next the matter of prosecutorial discretion. The Prosecutor
has been specific in his reasons for selecting cases, generally based on the number of victims as an
indicator of the gravity of the situation to investigate and cases to prosecute. This is undoubtedly the
biggest hurdle to be overcome on a peacekeeper’s road to the ICC. Only if the Prosecutor were to
take the view that a peacekeeper is a ‘big fish’ to be prosecuted, taking such action as a means of
ensuring the principles of individual criminal responsibility are applied in that no one person is
beyond accountability, would a peacekeeper end up before the ICC. It would be up to the Prosecutor
to recognise that, regardless of the number of victims, ensuring accountability for peacekeeping
personnel for crimes such as rape, sexual slavery and sexual exploitation is important as these crimes
are grave indeed. The application of gravity should be a malleable concept, applied both subjectively
and objectively so that it takes account of broader general issues but also the individual
circumstances of the particular situation or case.
One of the reasons behind the need for the Prosecutor to exercise discretion in choice of cases is that
the ICC does not work with unlimited resources, and this is a valid motivation. That being said, a case
involving crimes by peacekeeping personnel would be of a much smaller scale than the massive
situations currently before the court, and as a result would require far less resources and time to
investigate and prosecute. Therefore it would make sense for the Court to take on some smaller
scale cases in order to advance its own jurisprudence and to demonstrate the ability of the Court to
bring cases to completion, without having to rely only on cases that take years to investigate and
prosecute.
1501 Broomhall, supra note 1056, p. 149.
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Ultimately, the difficulty of bringing a peacekeeper to justice before the ICC demonstrates the
necessity for states to exercise their jurisdiction. States will also have more resources to prosecute
their own personnel of all ranks. As detailed in Chapter 4, states can adequately prosecute
peacekeeping personnel for crimes such as rape, sexual slavery and sexual exploitation by ensuring
they have comprehensive substantive provisions and that such provisions are applicable
extraterritorially. These provisions may provide for the individual elements of the crimes without
necessarily having additional elements such as those required under the Rome Statute for war crimes
and crimes against humanity, thus eliminating a significant challenge to ICC jurisdiction. Sending
states also automatically have the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over their own military
personnel, without concern of immunity issues. The ICC was designed to be a court of last resort,
functioning as part of a system of complementarity with states. The ICC should never be discounted
as a forum in which to prosecute peacekeepers, but the challenges reveal that it is unlikely that
peacekeepers will find themselves before the ICC.
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6. Conclusion
This thesis began by questioning whether and why gender-based violence against women by
peacekeepers should be criminalised. Criminalisation is sought for the purposes of prevention and
punishment of such conduct. Proscribing violence against women such as sexual exploitation and
prostitution-related activities by peacekeepers contributes to protecting the interests of the women,
the community, and society. It has been demonstrated that sexual exploitation and abuse amounts
to harm against the women involved through the violation of many rights, such as the right to health
and the right to life. It may even amount to harm to the peacekeepers if they contract an STI or HIV.
Thus, the harm caused justifies criminalisation.
However, criminalisation cannot be approached without first considering alternative forms of
regulation. Hence, this thesis has examined codes of conduct (both national and UN), as well as UN
regulations and resolutions. The involvement of the UN in prevention and punishment of misconduct
is fundamental, and thus UN-issued regulations and resolutions are crucial in the elimination of
misconduct by peacekeepers. UN-wide regulation of conduct, in conjunction with the newly
established system of monitoring and reporting, attention to welfare, and imposition of command
and superior responsibility, has been an essential factor in the reduction of the number of allegations
of misconduct in PSOs. The UN has established the Conduct and Discipline Unit, dedicated entirely to
working with those issues.
One of the most interesting developments to stem from the UN’s investigations into conduct,
discipline and accountability, is the drafting of a Draft Convention on Criminal Accountability of UN
Officials and Experts on Mission. This thesis has established that the Draft Convention could be of
significant assistance in the criminalisation of sexual misconduct by peacekeeping personnel. This is
particularly so given the examination of national jurisdictions undertaken in Chapter 4. It was
necessary to examine the role and ability of national jurisdictions in ensuring criminal accountability
for their own personnel, due to the inability of the UN to exercise criminal jurisdiction, and the fact
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that sending states retain jurisdiction over their national personnel. UN regulations may contribute
to the prevention of misconduct, but they do not have the full deterrent effect of criminal sanctions,
nor can they enact such sanctions. The analysis revealed that national jurisdictions are not
necessarily capable of prosecuting their own personnel for crimes committed during a PSO due to
lack of either substantive law or the fact that provisions are not applicable extraterritorially. Such
lacunae could be filled by a state becoming party to a convention on criminal accountability, and
executing obligations under the convention. A convention would be legally binding on all state
parties, and require them to implement the convention provisions accordingly. In addition, the
reporting requisite under the convention would assist enforcement of convention obligations.
Additionally, the Draft Convention deals with the problematic fields of immunity and jurisdiction
when seeking accountability. A peace operation is international, resulting in international immunities
and jurisdictional complications. Immunity and jurisdiction have been addressed throughout this
thesis, particularly in Chapters 3-5, which demonstrated that there are complicated hurdles to
overcome. It has been demonstrated that sending states retain jurisdiction over their own nationals
whilst engaged in peace operations, however Chapter 4 revealed that there can be no assumption
made as to the ability of states to exercise such jurisdiction and assure successful prosecutions for
gender-based crimes. Jurisdiction was also shown to be an issue with regards to the ICC, which may
have difficulty exercising jurisdiction due to the limiting preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
in the Rome Statute,1502 as well as issues of admissibility.1503 Immunity applies to peacekeeping
personnel (of all categories, as demonstrated in Appendix 2). While a sending state may exercise
criminal jurisdiction over its own nationals without regard to immunity, the position with the ICC has
been shown to be more complicated,1504 and it remains to be seen how the ICC will approach the
issue of immunity as constructed in SOFAs and MoUs. Whilst the Draft Convention requires a
significant amount of revision, provisions relating to immunity and jurisdiction have been shown to
1502 Article 12 Rome Statute.
1503 Article 17 Rome Statute.
1504 Articles 27 and 98 Rome Statute.
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have great potential to enable states to avoid traditional problems of immunity and exercise of
jurisdiction.
The main disadvantage, however, of a convention, is that there is no obligation to become a party to
a convention, and a convention is only binding on the parties to it. Thus it is crucial that the UN
continue to monitor misconduct, and that relevant provisions as discussed in this thesis are always
included in MoUs.
Despite the gaps in legislation at national level, national jurisdictions remain the jurisdictions with
the potential for the most effective prosecutions of peacekeeping personnel. This has been proven
by analysis of the potential of the exercise of jurisdiction at the international level, by examining the
capacity of the International Criminal Court as a forum for prosecution. Chapter 5 has proffered the
ICC as a valid forum in several ways. Firstly, the Court has relevant substantive law provisions.
Secondly, the use of the ICC to prosecute peacekeeping personnel would reveal the seriousness of
crimes committed by peacekeepers (in particular the gender-based crimes discussed in this thesis)
and act as a highly public deterrent to such behaviour. Lastly, the specific provisions for superior and
command responsibility provide an exceptionally valuable category of mode of liability with which to
prosecute personnel in a PSO. The importance of accountability of superiors and commanders was
demonstrated throughout the thesis through consideration of the unique military community and in
particular the structure of a PSO.
However, this analysis found several problematic areas which would create difficulties in the process
of prosecution. These include the substantive law- definitions of crimes, in particular the chapeau
elements, which require the crime to be part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population (crimes against humanity), or a nexus to armed conflict (war crimes). In addition,
immunities and prosecutorial discretion may prove a challenge. Immunity needs to be waived.
Subsequently, the Prosecutor should apply his discretion broadly, and not limit his application of the
concept of gravity to senior leaders or crimes with a large number of victims. Qualitative factors need
330
to be applied, such as: impact on victims, their families, and the international community; the nature
of the crime; the position of the perpetrator in that he is a peacekeeper; and the manner of
commission of the crime. Peacekeepers are big fish, and should be viewed as such by the ICC,
regardless of official rank.
Whilst the ICC should not be disregarded as a potential forum for prosecution of peacekeepers, the
hurdles that require jumping indicate that it will be extremely difficult, and therefore exceptionally
improbable that a peacekeeper will ever be prosecuted before the ICC. It is therefore vital to ensure
the Draft Convention becomes a full convention, and that states are encouraged to become parties
and implement the convention obligations. This will ensure states have adequate laws to prosecute
their own personnel involved in PSOs, and that investigations and disciplinary actions to ensure
accountability for peacekeepers are conducted with appropriate cooperation and mutual legal
assistance instrumental in successful punishment of misconduct. The Member States of the UN and
the Secretariat should make certain of continued work on the Draft Convention with the aim of
creating an effective international instrument.
This thesis has sought to offer unique commentary on a subject with little prior discussion. It has
assisted in filling lacunae of scholarship on accountability of peacekeepers for gender-based crimes
against women, in particular in its analysis of the Draft Convention, consideration of the ability of
states to prosecute, and the potential difficulties of prosecuting peacekeepers before the ICC. It is
hoped that academic debate of these areas will be stimulated, and more so that practical application
of suggestions will be carried out. That is, states should strive to proscribe conduct such as sexual
exploitation in a manner that guarantees their own peacekeeping personnel can and will be held
accountable. This should occur regardless of whether the Draft Convention is adopted or not. The UN
should continue, both at Secretariat and Member State (General Assembly and Security Council)
levels, to pursue action against personnel accused of criminal conduct. In addition, it will be vital for
the UN to cooperate with states and with the ICC in any potential legal proceedings. Again, such
cooperation will be assisted by a convention.
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The ICC needs to apply a broad definition of concepts such as gravity and war crimes, emphasising
the contextual element of crimes, in order not to limit the field of potential perpetrators the Court
can prosecute. Peacekeeping personnel should certainly not be automatically excluded from ICC
jurisdiction. This thesis has also suggested the addition of a new provision in the Rome Statute. Such
an amendment could be discussed at the Rome Statute Review Conference in May-June 2010.1505 In
addition, further discussion could be undertaken of the applicability of Article 98, as it remains
unclear whether immunities granted in SOFAs will fall within the scope of Article 98.
While the UN has already begun to take action, and some states appear to have extraterritorial
application of their laws, few states have reported having the specific substantive law to prosecute
crimes such as sexual exploitation.1506 Consequently, it is vital for the UN to remain seized of the
issue of criminal accountability and push states to enact such legislation and ensure extraterritorial
applicability. States should also seek to utilise the ICC as a potential forum for prosecution should
they be unable or unwilling to do so. Comprehensive criminal law at national and international levels
will affect accountability for peacekeepers for gender-based crimes against women. Punishment for
crimes committed will deter future commission of such crimes, resulting in the reduction of gender-
based crimes by peacekeepers. This will create healthy relationships between peacekeepers and the
local population, contribute to the success of missions, and crucially, reduce the number of women
forced to survive gender-based crimes.
1505 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ReviewConference/.
1506 Report of the Secretary-General, Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission,
A/64/183, 28 July 2009.
332
Appendices
Appendix 1
1.1. Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets
1. Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring,
considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality.
Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.
2. Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs and
practices.
3. Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are there
as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration. Neither solicit nor accept
any material reward, honor or gift.
4. Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the
local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.
5. Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. Do not act
in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, detainees or people in your
custody.
6. Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property
assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits.
7. Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission, including
other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.
8. Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the host country.
9. Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking of drugs.
10. Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official
business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.
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1.2. We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel
The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for peace.
In this context the United Nations Charter requires that all personnel must maintain the highest
standards of integrity and conduct.
We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.
We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help
it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result we must consciously be prepared to accept
special constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of
the United Nations Organization.
We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated
between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our
peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high and
our actions, behaviour and speech will be closely monitored.
We will always:
Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times;
Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations;
Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions;
Respect the environment of the host country;
Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion, traditions
and gender issues;
Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration;
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Act with impartiality, integrity and tact;
Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak;
Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command;
Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic or
national origin, race, gender, or creed;
Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeeping personnel;
Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse;
Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times;
Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission; and
Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.
We will never:
Bring discredit upon the United Nations, or our nations through improper personal conduct, failure
to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping personnel;
Take any action that might jeopardize the mission;
Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs;
Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including unauthorized press statements;
Improperly disclose or use information gained through our employment;
Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody;
Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members
of the local population, especially women and children;
Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children under 18, or
exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex;
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Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the well-being of others;
Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public;
Wilfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment;
Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization;
Collect unauthorized souvenirs;
Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices; or
Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept benefits to
which we are not entitled.
We realize that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may:
Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations;
Jeopardize the achievement of the mission;
Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel; and
Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.
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Appendix 2
Table 1 Categories, immunity and jurisdiction of UN peacekeeping personnel
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- Third
state
Military
liaison
officers
Experts
on
mission
- National
commander
- Force
Commander
Functional
immunity
- MoU
- SOFA
- Draft
Convention
- General
Convention
- Host
state
- Sending
state
- Third
state
CivPol Experts
on
mission
- National
commander
- Head of
UN CivPol
Functional
immunity
- SOFA
- Draft
Convention
- General
Convention
- Disciplinary
Directives
- Host
state
- Sending
state
- Third
state
Formed
police
units
Experts
on
mission
- National
commander
- Head of
UN CivPol
Functional
immunity
- Draft
Convention
- General
Convention
- Host
state
- Sending
state
- Third
state
1507 Where the mission authority is listed as the Force Commander, this also implies that the ultimate mission
authority is the head of mission. However, the purpose of the table is to differentiate who falls under the
authority of the Force Commander and who does not.
1508 Applicable instruments listed are: the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (General
Convention), the Draft Convention on the criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission (Draft
Convention), Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National Contingents (Military
Disciplinary Directives), and Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military
Observers (CivPol Disciplinary Directives).
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Civilian
personnel
Experts on
mission
- Head of
mission
Functional
immunity
- SOFA
- Draft
Convention
- Host
state
- Sending
state/
state of
nationality
- Third
state
Very senior UN
officials
Official - Head of
mission
Absolute
Immunity
- General
convention
- Draft
Convention
- Possibly
third
state
UN staff Officials - Head of
mission
Functional
immunity
- SOFA
- Draft
Convention
- General
Convention
- Host
state
- Third
state
UNVs Officials - Head of
mission
Functional
immunity
- Draft
Convention
- General
Convention
- Host
state
- State of
nationality
- Third
state
Consultants
and individual
contractors
Experts on
mission
ONLY if
required to
travel on
behalf of
UN
- Subject
to local
law
- Head of
mission?
Functional
immunity
- Contracts - Host
state
- State of
nationality
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Appendix 3
Criminal Code Act (Cth) 1995 (Australia)
Chapter 2 General principles of criminal responsibility
Part 2.7 Geographical jurisdiction
Division 15—Extended geographical jurisdiction
15.1 Extended geographical jurisdiction—category A
(1) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
does not commit the offence unless:
(a) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs:
(i) wholly or partly in Australia; or
(ii) wholly or partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; or
(b) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia and a result of the
conduct occurs:
(i) wholly or partly in Australia; or
(ii) wholly or partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; or
(c) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia and:
(i) at the time of the alleged offence, the person is an Australian citizen; or
(ii) at the time of the alleged offence, the person is a body corporate incorporated by or under a law
of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory; or
(d) all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the alleged offence is an ancillary offence;
(ii) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia;
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(iii) the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary offence relates, or a result of
that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur, wholly or partly in Australia or wholly or
partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship.
Note: The expression offence is given an extended meaning by subsection 11.2(1), section 11.3 and
subsection 11.6(1).
Defence—primary offence
(2) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(aa) the alleged offence is a primary offence; and
(a) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(b) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(c) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; or
(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; a law
of that foreign country, or a law of that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that
corresponds to the first-mentioned offence.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (2). See
subsection 13.3(3).
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(3) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (2) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
Defence—ancillary offence
(4) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(a) the alleged offence is an ancillary offence; and
(b) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(c) the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary offence relates, or a result of
that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur, wholly in a foreign country, but not on
board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(d) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(e) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary
offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; or
(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the
ancillary offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; a
law of that foreign country, or a law of that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that
corresponds to the primary offence.
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Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (4). See
subsection 13.3(3).
(5) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (4) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
15.2 Extended geographical jurisdiction—category B
(1) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
does not commit the offence unless:
(a) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs:
(i) wholly or partly in Australia; or
(ii) wholly or partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; or
(b) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia and a result of the
conduct occurs:
(i) wholly or partly in Australia; or
(ii) wholly or partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; or
(c) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia and:
(i) at the time of the alleged offence, the person is an Australian citizen; or
(ii) at the time of the alleged offence, the person is a resident of Australia; or
(iii) at the time of the alleged offence, the person is a body corporate incorporated by or under a law
of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory; or
(d) all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the alleged offence is an ancillary offence;
(ii) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia;
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(iii) the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary offence relates, or a result of
that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur, wholly or partly in Australia or wholly or
partly on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship.
Note: The expression offence is given an extended meaning by subsection
11.2(1), section 11.3 and subsection 11.6(1).
Defence—primary offence
(2) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(aa) the alleged offence is a primary offence; and
(a) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(b) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(c) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; or
(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; a law
of that foreign country, or a law of that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that
corresponds to the first-mentioned offence.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (2). See
subsection 13.3(3).
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(3) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (2) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
Defence—ancillary offence
(4) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(a) the alleged offence is an ancillary offence; and
(b) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and (c) the conduct constituting the primary offence to
which the ancillary offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to
occur, wholly in a foreign country, but not on board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(d) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(e) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary
offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; or
(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the
ancillary offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; a
law of that foreign country, or a law of that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that
corresponds to the primary offence.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (4). See
subsection 13.3(3).
344
(5) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (4) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
15.3 Extended geographical jurisdiction—category C
(1) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, the
offence applies:
(a) whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in Australia; and
(b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in Australia.
Note: The expression offence is given an extended meaning by subsection 11.2(1), section 11.3 and
subsection 11.6(1).
Defence—primary offence
(2) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(aa) the alleged offence is a primary offence; and
(a) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(b) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(c) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; or
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(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs; a law
of that foreign country, or that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that corresponds
to the first-mentioned offence.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (2). See
subsection 13.3(3).
(3) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (2) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
Defence—ancillary offence
(4) If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, a person
is not guilty of the offence if:
(a) the alleged offence is an ancillary offence; and
(b) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly in a foreign country, but not on board
an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(c) the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary offence relates, or a result of
that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur, wholly in a foreign country, but not on
board an Australian aircraft or an Australian ship; and
(d) the person is neither:
(i) an Australian citizen; nor
(ii) a body corporate incorporated by or under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;
and
(e) there is not in force in:
(i) the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the ancillary
offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; or
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(ii) the part of the foreign country where the conduct constituting the primary offence to which the
ancillary offence relates, or a result of that conduct, occurs, or is intended by the person to occur; a
law of that foreign country, or a law of that part of that foreign country, that creates an offence that
corresponds to the primary offence.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subsection (4). See
subsection 13.3(3).
(5) For the purposes of the application of subsection 13.3(3) to an offence, subsection (4) of this
section is taken to be an exception provided by the law creating the offence.
15.4 Extended geographical jurisdiction—category D
If a law of the Commonwealth provides that this section applies to a particular offence, the offence
applies:
(a) whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in Australia; and
(b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in Australia.
Note: The expression offence is given an extended meaning by subsection 11.2(1), section 11.3 and
subsection 11.6(1).
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